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ABSTRACT 
Free and fair elections constitute the basic 
foundation of a democracy. The Constitution of India ensures 
a free and fair election. For this purpose Part XV of the 
Constitution visualizes an Election Commission, adult 
suffrage, electoral rolls and provisions relating to the 
holding of elections. Parliament enacted the Representation 
of the People Act 1950 and the Representation of the People 
Act 1951 to regulate the electoral process. Though the 
Constitution restricts judicial interference in the election 
process beginning from the issue of election notification 
and ending with the declaration of results, the validity of 
an election can be called in question by filing an election 
petition in an appropriate court of law. Under the amended 
law, the appropriate court is the High Court of a state. An 
appeal from the decision of High Court in these petitions 
lies to the Supreme Court. 
In spite of there being a vast body of law to regulate 
the election process, in actual practice elections are 
/and 
neither free nor fair. They are vitiated by corrupt illegal 
practices. Section 123 of the Representation of the People 
Act 19 51 envisages that candidates do not secure tho 
valuable votes of the people by bribery, undue influence. 
sectarian campaigning, or, other corrupt practices as 
defined in the Act . A charge of corrupt practice against a 
t -
candidate, if established, entails serious penal 
consequences. It debars him from an election for a 
considerably long period. 
The present work is an attempt to find out whether 
courts have been successful in completely eradicating.y or, 
even in minimising the menace of corrupt practices from the 
electoral scene of the country. The study is mainly based 
on Supreme Court, High Court, and Election Tribunal cases. 
The first category of corrupt practice is bribery. 
Courts have opted for more positive evidence to prove 
bribery. They want motive ascertained which is often very 
difficult to prove. In any case courts have put a narrow 
construction on the statutory provision of Section 123(1). 
They have often been subjective in their conclusions and 
have even differed when facts were the same. Again, law 
wants the voter to vote without fear either of physical 
injury, social deprivation or divine displeasure. Of 
course abuse of influence is the law's target only. 
However, judicial interpretation has been restrictive and 
has called for evidence difficult to obtain. That was 
Section 123(2). Clauses(3)of Section 123 rules against 
divisive factors in electioneering and prohibits arousing 
sectarian or religiously centred irrational passions. The 
apex court laid down three principles in Kultar Singh to 
judge if Section 123(3) had been violated. However these 
directions have only been selectively implemented, keeping 
the doors of sectarian campaigning open. Clause (3A) was 
/creation 
added to prohibit/of animosities for political gain. But 
once again judicial interpretation was not found enthused 
enough by the spirit of the Constitution, Glorification of 
Sati as a corrupt practice was added in 198 8. No election 
has yet been impugned on this account. Law even took notice 
of the finer details of a political campaign because it was 
considered a part of the freedom of speech, though 
character assassination was hardly its object. Courts 
do recognise an individual to have a public character and 
private life, and piercing of the latter is looked upon 
with disfavour. Law also discourages use of vehicles to 
transfer voters to and from election booths, but what is to 
be done if the misuse is very rampant. Even election 
expenditure is required to be within limits, and yet money 
and muscle power rule the roost. Government employees are 
also prohibited from affecting a candidate's prospects, and 
booth capture is thought scandalous. 
The study has led to conclude that the courts have 
given a narrow construction to Section 123 of the Act. 
This may be because of the fact that courts have always 
opined that in our country election is a costly venture 
and hence an election result should not be treated lightly. 
Identifying a few practices as corrupt becomes a 
meaningless exercise, if circumvention and corruption 
infect the body-politic as a heinous disease. Law and 
courts are the greater sufferers because as institutions 
they are given short shrift. The Constitution of India has 
yet to become a way of life, its bulk and lip-service to it 
notwithstanding. What has eroded is a sense of values. 
Money and muscle power have no accountability. The Election 
Commission has very rightly observed, "Unless public 
conscience is stirred to its depth against these evil 
practices and the standard of public and electoral morality 
is • raised, no police arrangement and no legal provision 
however adequate can root out these practices from our 
elections ..." 
/IS 
Note: The case law considered upto early 19 94 
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CHAPTER-I 
INTRODUCTION 
An election is a long accepted process for choosing 
representatives to institutions to help make laws and take 
important decisions. To-day elections are invariably 
associated with the concept of a representative 
government. The Indian Constitution also visualises a 
democratic republic for the country and its salient 
provisions largely conformi with suitable modificationsf 
to constitutional practices of other democratic 
constitutions of the world. 
The sine qua non for a true democracy is the holding 
of free and fair elections to send peoples' representatives 
to legislative bodies. The framers of the Indian 
Constitution drew largely from the experience of other 
countries and tried to avoid abuses and pitfalls. 
Provision was accordingly made in the Constitution to 
ensure that at no time may/ the party in power be# in a 
position to influence the conduct of elections in a 
manner which may favour its own interests. Therefore, the 
preparation, direction and conduct of all elections to the 
offices of the President and the Vice-President have been 
vested in a permanent consitutional body called the 
Election Commission, It has been made independent of the 
government of the day. Earlier, it had also the power to 
appoint Election Tribunals to decide disputes arising out 
of elections, part XV of the Constitution specifically 
relates to elections. It defines the powers of the 
Election Commission and of the Parliament and State 
Legislatures to enact laws for elections. Article 325 in 
this part of the Constitution prohibitis exclusion from 
participation in the electoral process on grounds of 
religion, race, caste or sex. Article 326 establishes 
adult suffrage, and courts are barred from interfering in 
electoral matters under Article 329. However, these 
Constitutional provisions do not cover the details of an 
electoral process. These details were left to Parliament 
and State Legislatures. Parliament passed two major Acts 
for this purpose. The first of these was the Representation 
of the People Act 1950. It provided for the allocation of 
seats and the delimitation of constituencies, the 
qualifications of voters, and, "matters connected 
therewith". The next enactment was the Representation of 
the People Act 1951, the preamble to which announces that 
the Act was to provide law for the conduct of elections to 
the Parliament as well as to the Legislature of each 
State. It also sought to define various corrupt practices 
and prescribe law for settling electoral disputes. Under 
each of these two ActS/ statutory rules were also made by 
the Central Government. These were respectively called the 
Representation of the People (Preparation of Electoral 
Rolls) Rules 1950, and the Representation of the People 
(Conduct of Elections and Election Petitions) Rules 1951. 
It is within the framework of these laws and Rules that 
the first general election was held in the country. 
Subsequently/ the two Acts and the Rules were amended as 
and when necessary. Till date, nine general elections to 
the Lok Sabha have successfully been held, the last being 
in 1991. Subsequent to each election several petitions 
were filed, rightly or wrongly, to settle electioneering 
disputes. However, the general impression is that election 
petitions were more to harass the successful candidate 
than to expose unfairness and get redress. Of course, the 
election of a successful candidate is not to be lightly 
interf erred v/ith. However, one basic essential of the 
election law is to safeguard the sanctity of the process 
itself and to see to it that people do not get elected by 
flagrant disregard or breach of law, or through a corrupt 
practice. An election petition is never only a matter of a 
dispute between candidates who strove against each other 
at the hustings. There is substantial public interest also 
and this is not only of news value. The citizens at large 
have an interest in insisting that elections be free and 
fair and not be vitiated by any corrupt or illegal 
practice. And yet, it is unfortunate that electoral 
malpractices in our country abound. It is a contest 
carried on at the lowest common denominator of public 
morality by the candidates and their parties. Hence, there 
is a spate of election petitions after elections are over^^ 
But allegation of a corrupt practice is easy to make, 
though hard both to rebut, as well as to prove, 
particularly because courts want a proof that is beyond 
reasonable doubt. A charge of corrupt practice against a 
candidate, if established, entails serious penal 
consequences. It has the effect of debarring him from 
being a candidate at an election for a considerably long 
period. The courts have constantly held that in our country 
election is a costly venture. Therefore, an election 
result cannot be lightly brushed aside. In any case the 
Representation of the People Act 1951 has sufficient 
provisions to safeguard that an election be free and fair. 
At the same time, it is also necessary to ensure that 
candidates do not secure the valuable votes of the people 
by bribery, undue influence, communal propaganda, or, 
other corrupt practices as defined in the Act. 
It is in this background that the present work 
studies the various corrupt practices enumerated in 
Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act 1951. 
The object is to find out whether courts have been 
successful in completely eradicating, or, even in 
minimising the menace of a corrupt practice from the 
electoral scene of the country. The study also aims at 
evaluation of various judicial propositions, propounded to 
help arrive at an upholding, or, reversing the electoral 
verdict. The study is mainly based on Supreme Court, High 
Court, and Election Tribunal cases. 
The study is divided into eighteen chapters. 
Chapter I is introductory. Chapter II is the historical 
background of elections in India and the enactment of 
electoral laws, so that the Indian Councils Act 1909 and 
the Government of India Acts 1919 and 1935 receive some 
attention. Chapter III describes the fascinating electoral 
process, including preparation for an election, the 
selection of candidates by the political parties, 
nominating process, as also the campaign and actual 
voting. Chapter IV assesses the machinery the Constitution 
has devised for conducting free and fair elections and 
comments on its efficacy as an institution. Chapter V 
discusses the first category of corrupt practice, i.e., 
bribery. Chapter VI discusses the abuse of influence 
exercised on voters. Campaigning on the ground of 
religion, race, etc., has been prohibited as a corrupt 
practice in clauseO) of Section 123. The ambit of 
judicial check on such divisive campaigning has been 
covered in chapters VII and VIII under the titles 
Sectarian campaigning. These two chapters have been 
concluded together since both discuss the same statutory 
provision. Promotion of the feelings of enmity or hatred 
among different classes of Indian citizens is examined in 
Chapter IX. Chapter X looks at the glorification of Sati 
as a corrupt electoral practice. Chapter XI is an attempt 
to see how the courts have reacted to the publication of 
false statements made on the eve of an election to 
jeopardise the prospects of rivals. Hiring or procuring of 
vehicles for voters which also comes under the rubric of 
corrupt practices has been considered in Chapter XII. One 
election law is 
of the most controversial aspects of' election expenses. 
Chapter XIII reflects on how courts have reacted to this 
aspect of an election. The act of obtaining assistance 
from government servants was made a corrupt practice to 
ensure fairness. The rationale behind the provision is to 
keep government servants aloof from politics and to 
prevent the machinery of the government being used in 
furtherance of a candidate's return and also to protect 
government servants from being pressed upon by those with 
influence or in a position of authority. This is the 
subject of discussion in Chapter XIV. The most recent 
legislation is to control the rising menace of booth 
capture. It is discussed in Chapter XV. Chapter XVI covers 
the various facets of electoral adjudication. From time to 
time political parties and associations have come out with 
detailed proposals for electoal reforms. The Election 
Commission, too, has suggested many electoral changes on 
different occasions. Chapter XVII gives a list of those 
reforms some of which require immediate attention for a 
fresh look at the election law. Chapter XVIII incorporates 
the conclusions arrived at in the thesis about extant 
judicial behaviour in petitions grounded on Section 123 of 
the R.P. Act 1951. 
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CHAPTER - II 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
The Principle of representation, and in an indirect 
way of election, was first incorporated in the Indian 
Councils Act of 1892."'• 
The most striking feature of the Councils Act of 
1892 was that it cautiously introduced elective element in 
the Councils. Although the framers of the Act deliberately 
avoided the use of the word 'election' in the Act but the 
provisions of the Act contained a scheme which required 
that all the members of the Legislative Councils were not 
to be nominated by the Government. A certain number of 
them were to be non-official members nominated by the Head 
of the Government from amongstthe panel recommended by 
the local bodies, such as Municipal Committees, District 
Boards, Chambers of Commerece, Zamindars and University 
Senates. The Supreme Legislative Council was to accept the 
non-official members recommended by the Provincial Council 
of Madras, Bombay, Bengal and North-West Province and also 
one representative of the Chamber of Commerce at Caclutta. 
Thus the system of indirect election was introduced by the 
Act of 1892 for the inclusion of non-official members in 
the Legislative Councils of India. Considered frora this 
standpoint, the Act was a step forward as compared to 
the earlier Councils Act of 1861 which introduced the 
2 
system of nomination without any elective element in it. 
By conceding the principle of elections and by giving the 
Legislative Councils some control over the the Executive, 
the Indian Councils Act of 1892 paved the way for further 
3 
reforms in India. 
THE INDIAN COUNCILS ACT 1909 
The Indian Councils Act 1909 (known as 
Morley-Minto Reforms) constitutes a landmark in the 
constitutional history of India. The most important aspect 
of the Act was the increase of the representative element 
in the Legislative Councils and the extension of their 
pov/ers. An elective principle having been introduced under 
the Act of 1892, the Act of 1909 extended that principle 
4 
somewhat further. 
The Act greatly increased the strength of the 
Supreme Legislative Councils. The numberof "Additional 
Members "which was not more than sixteen under the Act of 
1892 was raised to sixty. The total strength of the 
Supreme Council was thus fixed at sixtynine including the 
Governor General, six ordinary members of his Council, the 
10 
Commander-in-Chief and the Governor of the Province where 
the meeting took place. Like the Supreme Legislative 
Council, the strength of the Provincial Legislatures 
was also increased. 
The Indian Councils Act 1909 introduced the 
principle of election in the Supreme and the Provincial 
Legislative Councils. Twentyseven out of sixtynine members 
of the Central Legislative Council were elected from 
different electorates. Similarly the Provincial Councils 
were also to have a fixed number of elected members as was 
det.ermined by the Regulations. Thus the elective principle 
which was hitherto cautiously and deliberately avoided was 
now conceded to Indians by the Act of 1909. The system of 
election was, however, indirect. The people elected the 
members for their local bodies like Municipalities, 
District Board, etc. These local bodies in turn elected 
the members for the Provincial Legislative Councils. The 
members so elected to the Provincial Councils, further 
chose the members for the Supreme Legsilative Councils. 
Thus the election to the Supreme Legislative Council was 
by a double indirect method and people had no direct 
contact with these members. 
Another important feature of the Indian Councils 
Act 1909 was the introduction of separate and special 
11 
electorates for providing representation to certain 
classes and communities with a view to safeguarding their 
interests. Thus, twentyseven elected members of the 
Supreme Legislative Councilconsisted of six members of 
special landlord constituencies, six of separate 
Mohammedan Constituencies, two of special electorates 
7 
and thirteen of general electorates. 
Under the provisions of the Act the Governor 
General was empowered to make regulations for the purpose 
of elections to the Councils. Accordingly the regulation 
g 
created three types of electorates, namely: 
(a) General Electorates: Consisting of non-official 
members eitherof Provincial Legislative Councils or of 
Municipal and District Boards. 
(b) Class Electorates: Consisting of landlord and 
Mohammedans. 
(c) Special Electorates: Consisting of Presidency 
Corporations, Universities, Chamber of Commerce and trade 
and business interests. 
The franchise was extremely narrow and limited. The 
number: of voters was small. In some cases the number of 
voters in a constituency did not exceed nine or ten. Women 
12 
v/ere completely barred from voting. The qualifications for 
the voters for Supreme Legislative Council were rigid. 
Only the landlord with specified income or minimum land 
revenue payment of Rs.10,000 or more, or those with high 
titles or honorary offices were conferred voting rights. 
The qualifications fixed for voting in case of Provincial 
9 
Councils were also rigid and comparatively restricted. 
Although the principle of election was introduced by the 
Act of 1909, the system of nomination was not altogether 
abandoned. No special qualifications were, however, laid 
for the nomination of non-official members. In case of 
nominated official members some were to be ex-officio 
members like the Head of the Government and Members of the 
Executive Council and some were to be nominated by the 
Head of the Government. The Act provided for the first 
time the appointment of Indians to the India-Council and 
the Governor-General's Executive Council. 
THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT 1919 
On the 20th August 1917, the British Government 
made a pronouncement that its policy vis-a-vis India was 
"that of increasing association of Indians in every branch 
of the administration, and the gradual development of 
self-governing institutions, with a view to the 
13 
progressive realization of responsible government in India 
as an integral part of the British Empire". Then 
followed an inquiry by the Secretary of State, Edwin S. 
Montagu and the Viceroy of India, Lord Chelmsford. The 
results of the inquiry were published in 1918 in their 
Report on Indian Constitutional Reform. The Act of 1919 
was enacted by the British Parliament as a step towards 
the fulfilment of the above objective which conceded a 
12 little more power to the Indian hands. The Act 
initiated a 'sort of responsible government' in the 
Provinces. The Act also introduced dyarchy in the 
Provinces. Matters of administration were first divided 
between the Centre and the Provinces and then the 
Provincial subjects were further bifurcated into the 
'transferred', and 'reserved' subjects. The 'transferred' 
subjects were to be administered by the Governor with the 
aid of the Ministers responsible to the Legislative 
Council composed mainly of elected members. Thus, 
responsible government was sought to be created in a 
Limited sphere. The 'reserved' subjects were to remain the 
responsibility of the Governor and his Executive Council, 
which was not responsible to the Legislature. The 
Governor could override both the Ministers and the 
13 Executive Council. But no element of responsible 
14 
government was introduced at the Centre. The governor 
General in Council continued to be responsible as before 
to the British Parliament through the Secretary of State 
for India. There was an intention however to make the 
14 Central Executive more responsible to the Legislature. 
The main effect of the Act of 1919 as regards the 
Legislative Councils was :- (a) to introduce the 
bi-cameral or two-chamber system in the Indian Legislative 
Council; (b) to increase the size of the Provincial 
Legislative Councils and in particular, the number of the 
elected members in each," (c) to substitute direct for 
indirect election,' and (d) to enlarge the electorate. 
The normal duration of the Legislative Council was 
three years. However the Governor could dissolve it at 
time, or extend its life for one year in special 
circumstances. 
The Provincial Councils set up under the Act of 
1919 consisted of members who were directly elected by the 
people. The scheme of franchise was based generally upon 
the principle of residence within the constituency and the 
possession of certain property qualifications as evidenced 
by the payment of land revenue, rent or local rates in 
15 
rural areas, municipal rates in urban areas, and 
income-tax. Thus, franchise was widened and extended to 
all tax payers. Women also got the right to vote for all 
Legislatures except the Council of States. 
In addition to the special qualifications for 
members and electors, there were also some general 
qualifications. A person was not eligible for election to 
a legislative body if he was not a British subject, or had 
been adjudged by a competent court to be of unsound mind, 
or was under twentyfive years of age, or had been guilty 
of certain crimes. A man could not be a member of more 
than one legislative body of the same time. The 
residential restriction was imposed in Bombay, the Punjab, 
17 
and Central Provinces, but not in the others. There 
were also general qualifications for electors. No person 
was entitled to be registered on the electoral roll if he 
was not a British subject, or was of unsound mind, or had 
been declared guilty of certain offences, or was under 
twentyone years of age„ Under certain conditions, subjects 
of Native States were not disqualified. No person was 
entitled to vote in more than one general constituency. 
Plural voting was thus only permitted in cases where a 
man voted in a general constituency and also in a special 
16 
constituency such as a Chambers of Commerce or a 
•4. 18 University. 
The principle of communal representation, which was 
accepted under the Morely-Minto scheme of reform, was not 
only retained, but even extended in its application. There 
were also a small number of seats for Europeans in all 
Councils except Punjab, Assam and Central Provinces. In 
the Punjab Council, there were some seats for the Sikh 
Community. In the Madras Council, a certain number of 
seats were reserved for non-Brahmans, Christians and 
Anglo-Indians, in the Bombay Council for the Mahratta 
19 Community, and m Bengal for the Anglo-Indians. 
Thus India came to have for the first time in her 
history an elected parliament with power to influence 
20 largely her administration. 
THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT, 1935 
The Government of India Act, 1935, for the first 
time introduced federation in India comprising the 
Provinces and the Indian States. While under all the 
previous Government of India Act, the Government of India 
was unitary, the Act of 1935 prescribed a federal 
structure for India, distributing legislative and other 
17 
21 powers between the Centre and the Provinces • The 
composition of the Legislatures also underwent a 
significant change and the pricniple of bicameralism was 
introduced at the Centre and some of the Provinces. The 
Central Legislature under the 1935 Act was bicameral 
consisting of the King represented by the Governor General 
and two House known as the Federal Assembly and the 
Council of State. The Council v^ as a Permanent body 
consisting of 260 members, l/3rd of its members retiring 
every three years. The Assembly had a maximum duration of 
five years. The Council had 156 members for the British 
India, and upto 104 members for the States. All members 
from the British India were to be directly elected, except 
for six members who were to be nominated by the Governor-
General so as to secure due representation for the 
scheduled classes, women and minority communities. The 
Federal Assembly was to have 250 representatives from the 
British India and not more than 125 members from the Indian 
States. The elective seats in the House were divided among 
General seats, Sikh seats and Muhammadan seats. Some seats 
were reserved for Scheduled castes and women. Some seats 
were reserved for Anglo-Indians, Europeans and Indian 
Christians. Again, some seats were reserved for commerce 
and industry, landholders and labour. The representative of 
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the British India v/ere not to be directly elected but 
were indirectly elected by Provincial Assemblies, the 
varioMS communities voting separately for their own 
representatives in accordance with the system of 
proportional representation with single transferable 
vote. 
The Central Legislature was never constituted under 
the provisions of the Government of India Act 1935. It 
continued to function under the provisions of the previous 
Act of 1919, because the Indian States showed reluctance 
to join the federation and then the Second World War 
intervened. The Provisional Legislatures were however 
constituted, and they did function for some time, under 
the Act of 1935, the first elections being held for then 
in 1937. But their functioning was interrupted by the 
resignation of the Congress Ministeries in 1939 in 
furtherance of the objective to gain independence for 
23 India. 
Thus, as far as election is concerned, the 
(Sovernment of India Act retained separate electorates for 
the minorities in the Provinces. Section 291 of the said 
Act further provided that in so far as proviso with 
respect to matters mentioned in the said Act had not been 
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made, the Sovereign namely, his Majesty in Council might, 
from time to time, make provision with respect to those 
matters or any of them dealing with that franchise in 
elections, namely, (a) de-limitation of territorial 
constituencies for the purpose of elections under the 
Act; (b) qualifications entitling persons to vote in 
territorial or other constituencies at such elections and 
preparation of electoral rolls; (c) qualifications for 
being elected at such elections as a member of a 
legislative body and (d) the filling of casual vacancies 
in any such body and other matters namely, conduct of 
election, expenses of candidates and corrupt practices 
and other offences connected with elections, dealing with 
the position of doubts and disputes arising out of or in 
connection with elections and other ancillary matters 
relating to the above. The right of adult franchise as a 
constitutional right was not recognised and the 
legislature was free to impose conditions for enlistment 
as a voter or to exercise his franchise. Under the Act, 
thereafter the right of franchise was conferred on the 
qualification of either of property, or of education or of 
tax. It is stated that electorate totalled about 30 
millions in 1937 under the Government of India Act, 
1935.^ '^  
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CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY AND ELECTIONS 
On December 9, 1946, the Constituent Assembly was 
set up to draft a constitution for Independent India. The 
members of the Constitutent Assembly were elected by the 
members of the Provincial Assemblies. The members of each 
provincial Assembly were to be divided into two groups, 
General and Muslim, except in Punjab where they were to 
be divided into three groups - General, Muslim and Sikh. 
Each group was to elect its own representatives to the 
Constituent Assembly by the method of proportional 
representation with single transferable vote. The number 
of representatives allotted to each Province and community 
was to be proportional to its population, in the ratio of 
one to a million. The total number of representatives from 
the Provinces was to be 292. Four members were to be added 
to represent the Chief Commissioner's Provinces and upto 
93 members were to be added to represent the Indian 
States. When later a decision was taken to bifurcate 
India into India and Pakistan, the members representing 
Pakistan went out of the Constituent Assembly for India 
and formed a separate Constitutent Assembly for 
25 Pakistan. 
After the passage of the Indian Independence Act 
1947, the Central Legislature ceased to exist on the 
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14th August, 1947. Henceforth, the Constituent Assembly 
was to function as the Central Legislature of India as 
well until the new Constitution was framed and thereafter 
until a new Legislature was constituted under the new 
Constitution. In other words, after the Independence, the 
Constituent Assembly discharged a dual function constituent 
as well as legislative. 
When the members of the Constituent Assembly 
considered the legislative provisions of the Draft 
Constitution, from January to May 1949, they agreed 
quickly on the desirability of electing members of the 
lower house of the central legislature by direct, 
universal suffrage, by a single vote system and mainly in 
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single member constituencies. The question of the 
reservation of seats for communal minorities was debated 
at greater length, and eventually it was agreed that 
separate electorates for communal groups, which had 
existed ever since 1909, should be abolished. Special 
provisions were made for scheduled Castes, Scheduled 
Tribes, certain other 'backward classes' and minority 
groups, but not on the basis of separate electorates. 
There was little support for the election of members of 
the lower House by proportional representation, as 
advocated by some members of the Assembly, but rather 
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complicated forms of this rather complicated system were 
adopted for the election of members of the Council of 
States (the upper House of the national Parliament) and 
the Legislative Councils in those States which were to 
have an upper House, and also of the President and 
Vice-President of India. 
During the discussions in the Constituent Assembly, 
there emerged almost from the very beginning a consensus 
of opinion that the right to vote should be treated as a 
fundamental right of the adult citizen; and in order to 
enable him to exercise this right freely, an independent 
machinery to control the elections should be set up, free 
29 from local pressures and political influences. K.M. 
Munshi's draft Article on Fundamental Rights included the 
following clauses: 
Every citizen has the right to choose the 
Government and the legislators of the 
Union and his State on the footing of 
equality in accordance with the law of the 
Union or the unit, as the case may be, in 
30 free^secret and periodic elections. 
The above clause was again considered by the Fundamental 
Rights Sub-Committee at its meeting held on March 29, 1947, 
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The Coriir.ittee came unanimonsly to the conclusion that : 
(1) Universal adult suffrage must be guaranteed by the 
Constitution, (2) Elections shall be free, secret and 
periodical, and (3) Elections shall be managed by an 
31 independent Commission set-up under Union Law. The 
Fundamental Rights Sub-Committee and the Minorities 
Sub-Committee were agreed that the following should be 
32 included in the list of fundamental rights : 
(1) Every citizen not below 21 years of age shall 
have the right to vote at any election to the Legislature 
of the Union and of any unit thereof, or, where the 
legislature is bicameral, to the lower chamber of the 
legislature, subject to such disqualifications on the 
ground of mental incapacity, corrupt practice or crime as 
may be imposed, and subject to such qualifications 
relating to residence within the appropriate constituency 
as may be required, by or under the law. 
(2) The law shall provide for free and secret voting 
and for periodical elections to the Legislature. 
(3) The superintendence^direction and control of all 
elections to the Legislature, whether of the Union or of a 
unit, including the appointment of election tribunals, 
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shall be vested in an election commission for the Union or 
the unit, as the case may be, appointed, in all cases, in 
accordance with the law of the Union. 
Nevertheless, the Advisory Committee, on Minorities, 
Fundamental Rights, while agreeing in principle with this 
clause, "recommended that instead of being included in the 
list of fundamental rights, it should find a place in some 
33 
other part of the Constitution". 
This specific recommendation was made to the 
Constituent Assembly on 2nd May 1947 and it was 
34 adopted. Accordingly, the Clause 24 relating to 
superintendence, direction and control of elections was 
inserted in the Report of the Union Constitution 
Committee as follows: 
The superintendence, direction and control of 
all elections, whether Federal or Provincial 
under this Constitution, including the 
appointment of election tribunals for 
decision of doubts and disputes arising out 
of, or in connection with such elections, 
shall be vested in a Commission to be 
35 appointed by the President. 
At one stage, during the framing of the Constitution 
by the Constituent Assembly, the idea was mooted that an 
Election Commission might be set up for the federal 
elections only, while there might be a separate Election 
25 
Commission in each state for elections to the State 
Legislature. In the end, however, a single Commission was 
provided for to be in charge of all elections to the 
Central and State Legislatures. 
The Constituent Assembly, framed the Indian 
Constitution, though elected under limited franchise 
provided by the provisions of the Indian Independence Act, 
1947 aimed at securing national and social revolution by 
adopting what has been termed as a Democratic Constitution 
37 for a free India. The Assembly's adoption of a 
democratic, centralised, parliamentary constitution meant 
the members believed that to achieve the objective of 
o g 
social revolution India must become a modern state. 
THE ELECTION COMMISSION 
The provisions of the Constitution relating to 
citizenship (Articles 5,6,7,8 and 9) and Article 324 
regarding the setting up of the Election Commission were 
brought into force on the 26th November, 194 9, while the 
rest of the Constitution came into force on the 26th 
January, 1950. The Chief Election Commissioner assumed 
charge on the 21st March, 1950. The Office of the Election 
Commission had already been set up on the 25th January, 
1950.^^ 
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ENACTMENT OF ELECTORAL LAWS 
The Constitutional did not make exhaustive 
provisions to cover the details of the law of elections. 
These details were left to be laid down by subsequent 
legislation. Parliament passed two major measures laying 
down the detailed law under which elections were to be 
conducted. The first of these measures was the 
Representation of the People Act, 1950 which was passed 
by Parliament on the 20th April, 1950. This Act mainly 
covered the preparation and publication of the electoral 
rolls and the delimitation of Constituencies. The Act also 
allocated the number of seats in the House of the People 
to the several States and fixed the number of seats in 
40 
each State Legislature. 
Provisions for the actual conduct of elections and 
matters ancillary thereto were left to be covered by a 
subsequent piece of legislation. Thus the second of these 
measures was the Representation of the People Act, 1951, 
the provisions of which covered the following important 
41 
matters: 
1. qualifications and disqualifications for membership 
of Legislatures; 
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2. notifications for election to the Legislature; 
3. administrative machinery for conducting the 
elections; 
4. conduct of elections and the various stages thereof; 
5. elections agents; 
6. procedure for elections in constituencies where 
seats are reserved for the Scheduled Castes or the 
Scheduled Tribes; 
7. the poll; 
8. - counting of votes; 
9. publication of election results; 
10. election expenses; 
11. disputes regarding elections - election petitions 
and Election Tribunals; 
12. corrupt and illegal practices; 
13. electoral offences; 
14. incurring of disqualifications and their removal; 
and 
15. bye - elections. 
STATUTORY RULES 
Under each of these two Acts, statutory rules were 
made by the Central Government. These were respectively 
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called the Representation of the People (Preparation of 
Electoral Rolls) Rules, 1950 and the Representation of the 
People {Conduct of Elections and Election Petitions) 
Rules, 195l/^ 
AMENDMENTS 
Subsequently, the two Acts were amended by the 
following measures: 
1. The Representation of the People (Amendment) Act, 
1950. 
2. The Representation of the People (Amendment) 
Act,1951. 
3. The Representation of the People (Second Amendment) 
Act, 1951. 
Amendments were made in the Rules from time to time as and 
when necessary. Thus the law came by instalments, as 
occasion arose. It was within the above frame-work of law 
that the first general elections were held in the country. 
The plenary powers, thus, vested in the Election 
Commission by the Constitution for the conduct of 
elections are supplemented further by Acts of Parliament, 
namely R.P.Acts, 1950 and 1951, the Presidential and 
Vice-Presidential Elections Act, 1952, the Government of 
29 
Union Territories Act, 1963, the Delhi Administration Act, 
1966 and the Rules and Orders made thereunder. These la\vs 
enacted by Parliament effectuate the powers of the 
Commission and cannot whittle down its inherent powers 
vested by Article 324/^^"^^ 
INDIA'S GENERAL ELECTIONS 
As has been noted the Constitution entered into effect on 
26th January, 1950r It provided for direct election to Lok 
Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies on the basis of 
universal adult franchise. Preparations were immediately 
begun to hold these elections. Pandit Nehru who was then 
heading the Government wrote to the Chief Ministers of^ 
States : 
I think the sooner we have general elections 
for Parliament and the provincial 
Legislatures, the bettern I am very anxious 
that this should not be delayed ... It would 
be exceedingly unfortunate if, for some 
reason or other, these elections have to be 
44 postponed even by a few months. 
Inspite of all best efforts the elections were not held 
until some two years later, in late 1951 and early 1952 as 
the details of the law and procedure for holding the 
elections had to be made by taking appropriate legislative 
measures. 
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The first General Elections attracted a good deal of 
enthusiara and attention in the country as well as abroad. 
In its report the Election Coimnission of India observed 
that it was "a great and fateful experiment unique in the 
world in its stupendousness and complexities. The carrying 
out of this unprecedented experiment attracted world-wide 
attention and journalists, politicians and other observers 
came from numerous foreign countries to study its working 
at first hand ... It appears probable that the main 
features of our system of elections will be adopted in 
45 future years by many of these countries". 
The voting "was scheduled at different times in 
different places, extending over a period of some four 
months, from 25 October 1951 to 21 February 1952, although 
46 
most of the voters went to the polls in January 1952. 
The size of the electorate was 173 million and nearly 88 
million of them actually voted. The total number of seats 
was 489. The first Lok Sabha was constituted on 17 April, 
47 1952. In the first Lok Sabha, 489 seats were filled by 
persons chosen by direct election from territorial 
constituencies by adult suffrage, 2 by persons nominated 
48 by the President under a constitutional provision and 8 
by persons nominated by the President under special 
49 
circumstances. 
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In its report on the first general elections the 
Election Commission observed : "The successful completion 
of the General elections in India can be said to 
constitute an important land-mark in the history of 
democracy. Never before has such a vast electorate gone 
to the polls. The future of the democratic way of life in 
India depends very largely on the success of the 
experiment as also on the extent to which these elections 
could evoke public enthusiasm and satisfaction". 
Thus the First Lok Sabha was duly constituted in 
1952 after the First General Elections. The new Lok Sabha 
constituted on 20 June, 1991 is the Tenth. 
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CHAPTER-III 
THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 
IMTRODOCTION 
Elections are a part of the electoral system, which 
embraces 'all those means whereby a person becomes a 
member of an elected assembly'. Thus they are a part of a 
larger political process, of which nominating procedures, 
campaigning, and the actual voting are only parts ___ 
although the most conspicuous, and culminating, 
parts. 
Who decides the poll schedule — the Government or the 
Election Commission? Section 14 of the R.P. Act 1951 says 
that a general election shall be held for constituting a 
new Lok Sabha on the expiry of its duration or on its 
(i-b) 
dissolution. In the present chapter an effort has been 
made to describe the various aspects of electioneering 
process. 
(A) REPRESENTATION AND CONSTITUENCIES 
I. Lok Sabha 
Article 81 of the Constitution provides that the Lok 
Sabha shall consist of not more than 530 members directly 
elected by the voters in the States; not more than 20 
members to represent the Union territories and the tribal 
areas to be chosen in such manner as Parliament may by law 
3S 
provide; not more than tv;o members belonging to the 
Anglo-Indian Community appointed by the President under 
Article 331. Article 81 further provides that : 
(a) There shall be allotted to each State a number of 
seats in the Lok Sabha in such manner that the ratio 
between that number and the population of the State 
is, so far as practicable, the same for all States; 
and 
(b) each State shall be divided into territorial 
constituencies in such manner that the ratio 
between the population of each constituency and the 
number of seats allotted to it is, so far as 
practicable the same throughout the State. 
The Thirty-first Amendment Act of 1973 added a proviso to 
sub-clause (b) of clause (2) of Article 81 to the effect 
that sub-claus (a) of clause (2) shall not be applicable 
for the allotment of seats in the House of the People to 
any State with a population up to six millions. 
For the purposes of allotment of seats, the 
population of States shall be taken to be the sane as 
ascertained at the last census. This is meant to secure 
uniformityin the scale of representation for the States 
in the Lok Sabha. 
37 
Under Article 330 of the Costitution, seats are to 
be reserved in the House of the people for the scheduled 
Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. 
2. State Legislative Assemblies 
Article 170 of the Constitution lays down that the 
Legislative Assembly of each State shall consist of not 
more than five hundred, and not less than sixty , members 
chosen by direct election from territorial costituecies in 
the State. Each State shall be divided into territorial 
constituencies in such a manner that the ratio between the 
population of each constituency and the number of seats 
allotted to it shall, so far as practicable, be the same 
throughout the State. 
Seats shall be reserved for the Scheduled Castes 
and the Scheduled Tribes in the State Legislative 
2 
Assemblies. 
3. Constituency 
For electoral purposes, the entire country is 
divided into geographical areas known as parliamentary 
constituencies each returning one member to the Lok Sabha. 
There are two types of constituencies : parliamentary 
constituencies and assembly constituencies. Each 
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parliamentary constituency consists of an integral number 
of Assembly constituencies. This number varies from State 
to State.^ 
The delimitation of constituencies is done by the 
Delimitation Commission. Article 82 of the Constitution 
declares that upon the completion of each census, the 
allocation of seats in the House of the People to the 
States and division of each State into territorial 
constituencies shall be readjusted by such authority and 
in such manner as Parliament may by law determine. 
Clause (3) of Article 170 makes provision in regard to the 
seats in the State Legislative Assemblies and the division 
of the States into territorial constituencies. Article 327 
gives specific power to Parliament to make elaborate 
provision for such readjustment including delimitation of 
constituencies and all other matters connected therewith 
(3-a) 
as also allocations to either House of Parliament. In 
the instant case the Supreme Court refused to interfere 
with an order of the Delimation Commission, thereby 
placing beyond doubt the finality of the Commission's 
authority. 
The Delimitation Commission is normally assisted in 
its work by ten Associate Members 5 Members from the 
House of the People representing the State and 5 members 
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from the Legislative Assembly of the State concerned, 
nominated by the Speakers of the House of people / the 
Legislative Assembly, having due regard to the composition 
4 
of the House or the Assembly concerned. For the purpose 
of determining the number of seats to be allotted to the 
States in the Lok Sabha and the seats, if any, to be 
reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, the 
total population of all the States is divided by the total 
umber of seats in the House of the People. This gives the 
average population per seat. The population of each State 
is then divided by this number to arrive at the number of 
seats to be allotted to that State. A uniformity of 
representation to Scheduled Castes ad Scheduled Tribes has 
also been ensured by stipulating that the number of seats 
reserved in any State or Union Territory for the Schedule)? 
Castes and Scheduled Tribes shall bear, as nearly as may 
be, the same proportion to the total number of seats 
allotted to that State or Union Territory in the House of 
the People as the population of the Scheduled Castes or of 
the Scheduled Tribes in the State or part of the State, as 
the case may be, in respect of which seats are so 
reserved, bears to the total population of the State or 
Union Territory. 
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(B) ELECTORAL ROLLS 
Article 325 provides for a general electoral roll 
for every territorial constituency for election to either 
House of Parliament or to the House or either House of the 
Legislature of a State. No person is to be ineligible for 
inclusion in any such roll or claim to be included in any 
special electoral roll on grounds only of religion, race, 
caste, sex or any of them. 
The preparations of the electoral rolls is a 
stupendous task carried out by the Election Commission. 
The electoral roll for a constituency shall contain the 
names of all the persons eligible to vote at an election 
in that constituency. The preparation and maintenance of 
complete and accurate electoral rolls are essential 
pre-requisites for the holding of elections. 
The electoral roll for each constituency is 
prepared in the prescribed manner by reference to a 
qualifying date. Unless otherwise directed by the Election 
Commission, the roll is revised before each general 
election and before each bye-election in a constituency. 
It may also be revised in any year if so directed by the 
Election Commission. The revision, like the initial 
preparation is also by reference to the qualifying date. 
41 
The roll is not prepared or revised separately for a 
parliamentary constituency. Its electoral roll consists of 
the rolls for the assembly constituencies comprised within 
that parliamentary constituency. In a Union territory 
where there is no Legislative Assembly and in J & K, rolls 
are prepared and revised separately for the parliamentary 
constituencies. While under the Constitution of J & K 
only permanent residents of the State are entitled to be 
registered in the electoral rolls for the Assembly 
constituencies, other citizens of India ordinarily 
residing in the State are also entitled to be registered 
7 
as electors for voting in parliamentary constituencies. 
Any person whose name is not included in the 
electoral roll of a constituency may get his name included 
by making an application to the electoral registration 
officer of the constituency concerned. No such application 
will, hov/ever, be entertained after the last date for 
filing the nominations for election in that constituency 
and before the completion of that election. The condition 
for such inclusion is that the person should be eligible 
for inclusion v/ith reference to the qualifying date 
originally fixed for the preparation or revision of the 
roll in which he seeks inclusion. A person seeking 
inclusion of his name in the finally published roll must 
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deposit the prescribed fee alongwith his application for 
. , . 8 inclusion. 
There are tv;o methods of revising the electoral 
rolls, (1) intensive revision; and (2) summary revision. 
Intensive revision is carried out by house to house visits 
by enumerators who enter the names of all citizens 
ordinarily residing in a house and v/ho have attained the 
age of 21 years (nov; 18 years) and above on the qualifying 
date. In summary revision, no house to house visits are 
made. The existing rolls with supplements, if any, are 
published for inviting claims and objections. After the 
disposal of claims and objections the rolls are finally 
(ft—a) 
published with supplements. ' 
At the time of the first general election the names 
of quite a large number of eligible voters could not be 
brought on the rolls in spite of all efforts. The reasons 
9 
v/ere: (I) ignorance and apathy on the part of the common 
oter, (II) lack of adequate organisation and experience 
in so far as the political parties were concerned and (III) 
inexperience and defective organisation of the government 
machinery in some of the States. The Commission during 
the preparation of the electoral rolls found that a large 
number of women voters had been enrolled in some States 
not by their own names but by the description of the 
V 
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relationship they bore to their male relations (e.g. A's 
mother, B's wife, etc.) Out of total of nearly 80 million 
women voters in the country, nearly 2.8 million failed to 
disclose their proper names, and the entries relating to 
them had to be deleted from the rolls. 
The Commission in its first report thus laid the 
responsibility on the general public for their ommissions 
of names from electoral rolls. However, in the recent past 
especially durig the eighth and nineth Lok Sabha 
electionns the Commission itself has been blamed for 
depriving a large number of voters from exercising their 
right to franchise. For example in 1984 Lok Sabha 
elections thousands of Delhi voters found their names 
deleted from the electoral rolls. Most disturbing was the 
deletion of names of a large number of Sikh voters from 
the electoral rolls in the areas that had witnessed the 
worst rioting in November 1984. Similar complaints were 
received in 1989 general elections too. In Jaipur, for 
instance, Rajmata Gayatri Devi's name was reported to be 
missing. Film star Sunil Dutt complained that the names 
of some top film stars were missing from electoral rolls 
in Bombay. 
Such complaints have been received from different 
nook and corners of the country. The Comission has sought 
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to pass on the blame to the voters for not ensuring 
whether or not their names were included in the electoral 
rolls. 
It has been, however, suggested that the following 
administrative steps would go a long way to remedying the 
situation : (1) voters' lists prepared for local bodies 
and those for assemblies should be constantly compared; 
(2) recognised associations of civil servants should be 
asked to help in getting the names of all their memabers 
and the members of their families included in the rolls. 
This could be facilitated by permitting, rather inviting 
and encouraging group applications for inclusion of names. 
Copies of draft rolls should be supplied free to such 
associations, just as they are supplied to candidates and 
political parties. The recognised parties may also be 
allowed to submit group applications locality-wise; (3) 
similar help can be taken from pensioner's organisation; 
(4) the telephone directories should be looked into to 
ensure that no person listed in the directory or members 
of his household (including family members and domestic 
servants, etc., living in the house) are missed out; 
(5) the various public sector organisations can also be 
asked to ensure that all their employees find their names 
(with families) included. They should also be supplied 
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copies of electoral rolls free so that they may keep them 
open for inspection by their employees; (6) all factories 
registered under the Factories Act should also be asked to 
ensure that their workmen and other employees are duly 
registered; (7) technical institutions and Universities 
should also be associated so that all students who have 
attained majority may have their names included; (8) other 
established organisations such as traders' associations, 
the Rotary Club, the Lions Club and other well-knov;n local 
clubs and societies should be similarly associated; (9) 
Municipal Boards and corporations maintain assessment 
lists for purposes of property taxes. These should also be 
utilised for checking that no household included in the 
assessment list is omitted; (10) the draft electoral rolls 
should be left open for inspection not only in that 
collectorate but in all offices where fifty or more 
persons are employeed. 
(C) QOALIFICATIONS FOR REGISTRATION 
The Constitution under Article 326 confers the 
right to vote at an election on every adult citizen 
unless disqualified uder the Constitution or lav/ on the 
ground of non-residence, unsoundness of mind, crime or 
corrupt or illegal practice. 
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The la\; provides that every person who is not less 
than eighteen years of age on the qualifying date, and who 
is ordinarily resident in a constituency is entitled to be 
registered as a voter in the electoral roll of that 
constituency. 
(I) Qualifying date - The qualifying date is the 1st of 
January of the year in which the electoral roll is 
prepared or revised. 
(II) Ordinarily resident - The test of ordinary 
residence is generally the fact of actual residence. The 
mere owning or possession of a dwelling house in a 
constituency will not entitle a person to the "ordinary 
residence" qualification. Temporary absence of a person 
from his place of ordinary residence will not amount to 
his ceasing to be ordinarily resident therein. A member of 
Parliament or of a State Legislature will not, during the 
term of his office, cease to be ordinarily resident in the 
constituecy where he is registered as a voter, by reason 
of his absence from that constituency in connection with 
his duties as such member, A patient in a hospital or a 
person detained in prison or other legal custody will not 
for that reason be deemed to be ordinarily resident 
therein. In cases of doubt as to where a person is 
ordinarily resident at a particular time the question will 
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be deternined with reference to all the facts of the case 
and to the rules in this behalf. 
(Ill) Who may not vote - Persons disqualified for 
registration as voters are : persons v;ho are not citizens 
of India, persons who are of unsound mind and stand so 
declared by a competent court, persons V7ho for the time 
being are disqualified from voting under the provisions of 
any law relating to corrupt practices and other offences 
in connection with elections. 
The name of a person who becomes disqualified after 
registration v/ill be struck off the electoral roll. The 
name of any person struck off the electoral roll for 
corrupt practice or other electoral offence will forv;ith 
be reinstated in that roll if the disqualification is 
17 
removed under any law. 
(IV) Service voter - The following persons (and their 
wives if they reside with them) have the right to be 
registered in the electoral rolls of the constituencies in 
which they would be residing but for their services : 
(a) Members of the armed forces of the Union. 
(b) Members of a force to v;hich the Army Act, 1950, 
applies. 
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(c) Members of an armed police force of a State 
serving outside the State. 
(d) Foreign service personnel and others employed 
under Government in posts outside India. 
They are required to make declarations in the prescribed 
form giving the addresses at which, but for their service, 
they would have been residing, and they are then 
registered accordingly. The declarations are to be sent to 
the registration officer of the constituency concerned. 
Special steps are taken with the assistance of the 
Ministry of Defence and the three Services Headquarters, 
•J g 
for the enrolment of the armed forces personnel. 
(V) Holders of certain offices (Special voters) - The 
holders of the certain offices (and their wives if they 
reside with them) are also entitled to be registered in 
the electoral rolls of the constituencies in v^ hich they 
19 
would be residing but for their holding such offices. 
(VI) Members of Parliament and State Legislatures - As 
members of Parliament and State Legislatures are required 
to remain away from their constituencies for a 
considerable part of the year in connection with their 
duties as such members, they may not be in a position to 
verify vi^ hether their names in the electoral rolls are 
49 
continued from time to time, particularly when the rolls 
are revised. The Election Commission has, therefore, a 
system of special check in regard to their inclusion in 
the electoral rolls. Exhaustive lists of the names of all 
sitting members of Parliament and the State Legislatures 
are prepared in respect of every assembly constituency. 
The Chief Election Officer sends this list to the 
electoral registration officer of the constituency 
concerned. This list is kept up-to-date and the electoral 
registration officer is kept informed from time to time of 
all changes therein. At the time of the publication of the 
draft electoral rolls the electoral registration officer 
concerned has to certify to the Chief Electoral Officer 
that the name of every member of Parliament or State 
Legislature is included in the roll if he continues to be 
20 
eligible for such inclusion. 
(VII) One Registration - No person is entitled to be 
registered in the electoral roll of more than one 
constituency; and no one can be registered in any 
21 
electoral roll more than once. 
(d) CANDIDATE 
(I) Disqualifications 
The qualifications for a member of Parliament as 
laid down under Article 84 of the Constitution are that he 
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should (i) be a citizen of India, (ii) be not less than 30 
years of age in the case of the Council of States and not 
less than 25 years of age in the case of the House of the 
people, and (iii) be possessing such other qualifications 
as may be laid down by Parliament. 
The R.P. Act, 1951 requires that his name should 
22 be registered in any parliamentary constituency. 
For seats reserved for Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes, a candidate should belong to those 
castes or tribes. A member of the Scheduled Caste or 
Scheduled Tribe is, however, not disqualified to contest 
election from a general seat, i.e., seat not reserved for 
members of those castes or tribes, if he is otherwise 
. . 23 
qualified to contest such a seat. A candidate is a]: 
required to make and subscribe before a person authorised 
in that behalf by the Election Commission, an oath or 
affirmation of allegiance to the Constitution and to 
24 
uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India. 
It may be recalled that in support of Article 84, 
Dr. Ambedkar, Chairman, Drafting Committee, had observed: 
.. . the object of the article is to prescribe 
qualifications for a person who wants to be a 
candidate at an election. Generally, the rule 
is that a person who is a voter, merely by 
reason of the fact that he is voter, becomes 
entitled to stand as a candidate for 
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election. In this article, it is proposed 
that while being a voter is an essential 
qualification for being a candidate, a voter 
who wishes to be a candidate must also 
satisfy some additional qualifications as 
laid down in this new article . .. The 
functions that he is required to discharge in 
the House require experience, certain amount 
of knov/ledge and practical experience in the 
affairs of the world, and I think if these 
additional qualifications are accepted, we 
shall be able to secure the proper sort of 
candidates who would be able to serve the 
House better than a mere ordinary voter might 
do. 
(II) Disqualifications 
Under Article 102 (1), a person is disqualified for 
being chosen as, and for being, a member of either House 
of Parliament if he/she (a) holds any office of profit 
under the central or any state government, other than an 
office declared by Parliament by law not to disqualify its 
holder; or (b) is of unsound mind and stands so declared 
by a competent court; or (c) is an undischarged insolvent; 
or (d) is not a citizen of India, or has voluntarily 
acquired the citizenship of a foreign state, or is under 
any acknov/ledgement of allegiance or adherence to a 
foreign state; or (e) is otherwise disqualified by or 
under any law made by Parliament. 
Clause (2) of the Article clarifies that a person 
shall not be deemed to hold an office of profit by reason 
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only that he is a Minister either for the Union or for 
such State.^^^"^^ 
The R.P. Act, 1951 disqualifies a person from the 
membership of a Legislature if he/she (a) has been 
convicted or found to have been guilty of any offence or 
corrupt or illegal practice in an election; (b) has been 
convicted by a court in India of any offence and 
sentenced to imprisonment for not less than two years; (c) 
has failed to lodge a return of election expenses within 
the time and in the manner required by the Act; (d) has 
any share or interest in a government contract for the 
supply of goods, or for the execution of any work, or the 
performance of any service; (e) is a director, or managing 
agent, or holds any office of profit in a government 
corporation; or has been dismissed from government service 
for corruption or disloyalty to the State. These 
disqualifications operate for a period of five years 
^ 27 
only. 
(Ill) Selection of Candidates 
The selection of candidates has always remained an 
important but controversial issue. The patterns of 
selection has undergone tremendous changes in the past 
four decades. In the early elections. Pandit Nehru used to 
dominate the political scene of his party. According to 
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him, "The test must be integrity first, integrity second 
28 
and integrity third, integrity and ability". On another 
occasion he said, "We must choose persons who can 
represent worthily Congress principles and ideals, who are 
men and women of proved integrity, and who have the 
ability to discharge the responsibilities of membership of 
the legislatures. Candidates chosen by us should not only 
possess integrity but be known to do so ... Any person 
whose past record is considered to be bad from the 
congress point of view should not be selected, even though 
he might be considered locally to have chances of winning 
29 the election". The experience, however, shows that 
almost all political parties take into cosideration 
factors like caste, community, region, minority status and 
traditional political loyalties. In the recent elections, 
parties have also tried to bring in popular cine and 
television stars besides some well-known muscle men. The 
entry of criminals into politics has criminalised the 
politics and the ultimate effect is that the corrupt 
practice of booth-capturing has become a regular feature 
of our electoral process. 
It is said that usually the criteria that are 
followed are : (1) money contribution; (2) dominant group, 
caste, or faction; (3) perception of advantages; (4) 
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ability to win; (5) locality of the candidate; (6) the 
candidate's role in post-election ministry-making; 
(7) patronage of the central leadership; and (8) the value 
30 
of the candidate in the legislature. 
(E) NOMINATION 
Nomination focusses the attention of the electorate 
upon relatively few persons who offer themselves as 
candidates and ensures that the successful candidate is 
31 the choice of a substantial part of the electorate. 
The electoral process for the elections to the 
Parliament starts with Presidential notification calling 
upon all the parliamentary constituencies to elect members 
to constitute a new House of the People either on the 
expiry of the tenure of the existing House or on its 
dissolution. As soon as the notification is issued, the 
Election Commission shall, by notification, appoint -
(a) the last date for making nominations which shall be 
the seventh day after the date of publication of the 
notification; 
(b) the last date for the withdrawal of candidatures, 
which shall be the second day after the date for the 
scrutiny of nominations; 
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(c) the date or dates on which a poll shall, if 
necessary, be taken, a date not earlier than the twentieth 
day after the last date for the withdrawal of candidatures, 
and 
(d) the date before v/hich the election shall be 
32 
completed. 
On the issue of notification, the returning officer 
shall give public notice of the intended election in such 
form and manner as may be prescribed, inviting nominations 
of candidates for such election and specifying place at 
33 
which the nomination papers are to be delivered. On or 
before the date appointed under section 30(a), each 
candidate shall either in person or by his proposer, 
deliver to the returning officer a nomination paper 
completed in the prescribed form and signed by the 
candidate and by an elector of the constituency as 
34 proposer. In a constituency where any seat is reserved, 
a candidate shall not be deemed to fill that seat unless 
his nomination paper contains a declaration specifying the 
particular caste or tribe of which he is a member and the 
area in relation to which that caste or tribe is a 
scheduled caste or tribe of the State. Where the candidate 
is a person, who, having held any office referred to in 
35 Section 9 has been dismissed and a period of five years 
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has not elapsed since the dismissal, such person shall not 
be deemed to be duly nominated unless his nomination paper 
is accompained by a certificate issued by the Election 
Commission that he has not been dismissed for corruption 
3 6 
or disloyalty to the State. On the presentation of a 
nomination paper, the returning officer shall satisfy 
himself that the names and electoral roll numbers of the 
candidate and his proposer as entered in the nomination 
paper are the same as those entered in the electoral 
37 
rolls. Where the candidate is an elector of a different 
constituency, a copy of the electoral roll of that 
constituency, or a certified copy of the relevant entries 
in such roll shall be produced before the returning 
38 
officer at the time of scrutiny. Not more than four 
nomination papers shall be accepted by the returning 
39 
officer in the same constituency. A candidate seeking 
election to the Parliament is required to deposit as 
security Rs.500/-. For Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes candidates the amount is Rs.250/-. For those seeking 
election to a State Legislature the deposit money is 
Rs.250/-, and 150/- for Scheduled Caste and Scheduled 
40 Tribes candidates. The deposit will be refunded if the 
candidate is elected or has obtained more than one sixth 
of the total number of valid votes polled in the 
constituency. In other cases, the deposit v;ill be 
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forfeited. If a candidate was a contesting candidate in 
more than one constituency for the same House of a 
legislature, he is entitled to the refund of only one 
deposit. If, however, he was contesting an Assembly seat 
and a Lok Sabha seat simultaneously, he would get a refund 
of the deposits made in both, provided that he obtains 
more than one-sixth of the total number of valid votes 
polled in each constituency. The deposit is intended to 
41 
ensure that the candidate is a serious contestant. The 
candidate is also required to make declarations in the 
nomination form regarding his affiliation to a political 
party, if any, with name, and the choice of three election 
symbols in order of his preference. A person can contest a 
number of seats simultaneously. However, in case he is 
elected from more than one constituency he must relinquish 
all except one seat within 14 days from the date of 
declaration of the result, otherwise all his seats shall 
become vacant. 
(II) Scrutiny of Nominations 
On the date fixed for the scrutiny of nominations, 
the candidates, their election agents, one proposer of each 
candidate and one other person duly authorised in writing 
by each candidate may attend the proceedings for 
42 
scrutiny. The returning officer is given the power to 
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examine the nomination papers and decide objections which 
may be made to any nomination. A nomination paper will be 
rejected if the candidate is either not qualified or is 
disqualified in law to be such member; the nomination 
paper has not been submitted in the prescribed manner and 
vjithin the stipulated time or is not accompanied by the 
necessary deposit; and the signature of the candidate or 
the proposer on the nomination paper is not genuine. The 
returning officer is not authorised to reject any 
nomination on the ground of any defect which is not of a 
substantial character. The returning officer is required 
43 to record reasons for rejecting a nomination paper. 
(Ill) Withdrawal of Candidature 
Any candidate may withdraw his candidature by a 
notice in writing either himself or through his proposer 
or election agent, who should be duly authorised by the 
candidate to present such notice on the last date fixed 
for such purpose. The notice of withdrawal is 
44 irrevocable. Immediately after the expiry of the period 
within which candidatures may be withdrawn, the returning 
officer is required to prepare and publish a list of 
45 
contesting candidates. 
If there is only one duly nominated candidate, the 
election will be an uncontested one and the returning 
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officer will declare that candidate elected immediately 
after the expiry of the time for the v;ithdrawal of 
46 
candidature. 
(IV) Death before Poll 
If a candidate whose nomination has been found 
valid on scrutiny and who has not withdrawn his 
candidature dies and a report of his death is received 
before the publication of the list of contesting 
candidates, or if a contesting candidate dies and a report 
of his death is received before the commencement of the 
poll, the returning officer is required to countermand the 
poll and report the fact to the Election Commission. If 
that happens all proceedings with reference to the 
election have to commence a new in ell respects as if for 
-14-- 47 a new election. 
However, on January 4, 1992 the President issued an 
ordinance amending the Representation of the People Act, 
1951 to restrict countermanding of elections only on the 
death of the candidate of a recognised political party and 
not that of an independent. The Ordinance has been 
necessiated by the rise in terrorist violence and also the 
phenomenal increase in the number of independent 
candidates seeking elections to the Lok Sabha and the 
48 State Legislature. 
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(F) RECOGNITION OF PARTIES 
Political parties, the life line of modern 
politics, constitute an integral part of any electoral 
system, for, they organise and educate voters, select 
candidates for filling various posts and undertake 
electioneering on their behalf, formulate legislative 
programmes and policies, muster parliamentary majority and 
49 form Government. However, there is neither any lav; 
regulating the formation of political parties in India nor 
do the Representation of the People Acts contain any 
reference to political parties. The Representation of the 
People Acts 1950 and 1951 simply regulate the conduct of 
elections. It is the Election Commission which determines 
what political parties will be recognised on both national 
and State levels and what symbols v/ill be assigned to each 
party. 
At the first general elections the Election 
Commission established a rule that has been in effect ever 
since, namely that only those parties which polled at 
least three per cent of the total valid votes in the 
previous general election would be recognised as national 
parties. The Conduct of Elections Rules,1961, provide 
that the Election Commission shall, by notification 
specify the symbols that may be chosen by candidates at 
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elections and the restrictions to which their choice shall 
be subject. The Commission has been specifying certain 
symbols as "reserved" and certain others as "free"; the 
former are reserved for candidates duly sponsored by 
recognised political parties and the latter are available 
for allotmet to other candidates. 
(G) ELECTION CAMPAIGN 
The law provides for an interval of not less than 
20 days between the last date fixed for the withdrawal of 
candidatures and the date of the poll. However, on 
January 19, 1992 the President issued an ordinance 
reducing the minimum period of campaign for elections to 
Parliament and Legislatures from 20 days to 14. This 
period is utilised by the candidates for canvassing and 
educating the electors. The candidate and his political 
supporters canvass householders, address people in the 
streets, take out processions, hold public meeting and 
bring out leaflets, pamphlets, handbills, etc., for 
explaining the policies and programmes of their political 
parties and solicit their support in making them 
successful in the election. All bills, leaflets and 
similar material must,however, bear in the front the name 
and address of the printer and publisher. The printer of 
any such document is also required to obtain from the 
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intending publisher a declaration regarding his identity 
signed by him and attested by two persons to v;hom he is 
personally known. A copy of the printed, document is 
required under the lav; to be sent to the Chief Election 
Officer/District Magistrate (within 10 days of its 
printing as per Commission's instructions). 
(I) Campaigning Guideliness 
On the eve of every general elections some 
guidelines are issued by the Election Commission whereby 
candidates are instructed to follow certain norms in 
carrying out their election campaign. Some of them, for 
example, are : Do not appeal to voters to vote or refrain 
from voting on grounds of religion, race, caste, community 
or language; do not make use of or appeal to religious 
symbols or national symbols; do not promote or attempt to 
promote feelings of enmity or hatred between different 
classes of citizens on grounds of religion, race, caste, 
community or language; do not publish false statements in 
regard to the personal character and conduct of any 
candidate or in relation to the candidature or withdrawal 
of any candidate, etc. 
(II) Issues and Slogans 
The parties generally coin catchy slogans and frame 
issues for and against one another to make the election 
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campaign more attractive and attentive. One cannot forget 
the famous slogan "Gharibi Hatao" (remove poverty) used by 
Mrs. Gandhi's party in the fifth general elections. As a 
reaction to "Gharibi" Hatao", the anti-Congress slogan 
"Indira hatao" (remove Indira) failed to click. In the 
history of free India, perhaps, the first important 
election from the point of view of issues and slogans was 
the post-emergency election of 1977. The captions of some 
of the posters were : "Talk less, work more", "The 
52 twenty-point programme is a blue-print for progress." 
"Our pledge - bread and liberty - vote Janta" was 
a famous slogan. Other types of slogans were: "Save 
democracy-vote for Janta Party"; "Problems are plenty, 
points are twenty, results are empty"; "What do you want -
Freedom or Slavery? For freedom elect Janata Party". In 
Amethi, the constituency of Sanjay Gandhi, Janata Graffiti 
claimed that the election was a fight between Samajwad and 
53 Sanjaywad, democracy and dynasty. Such slogans and 
issues raised by the opposition parties paid r J ch 
dividends to them. 
However, in 1980 again it was the turn of Mrs. 
Gandhi.Her slogan "Government that works became very 
successful and whatever was said against Mrs. Gandhi's 
party was totally ignored by the electorate because of the 
failure of Janata Government. 
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The assassination of Mrs. Indira Gandhi totally 
changed the complexion of Indian political scene and hence 
the slogan "Unity and Integrity of the country" or 
"Strengthen the Hand for Unity" became very appealing in 
the eight Lok Sabha elections. Rajiv Gandhi's election 
tour made him so confident of his party's success that he 
remarked, "After this poll, there will be no 
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opposition". In the ninth and tenth Lok Sabha the 
Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) with the active support of its 
sister organisations like the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), 
Akhil Bhartiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP), etc. played the 
"Hindutva" card in a big way. The Party's campaign for 
"Ram Rajya", "Ram Janmabhomi", "Ram - Roti" helped the 
party in Hindi belt. 
(H) THE POLL 
Following the last date of withdrawal of 
candidatures to the date of poll when the candidates and 
political parties are busy in electioneering the District 
Election Officer/Returning Officer makes necessary 
arrangements for holding the poll, such as setting up of 
the polling stations, appointment of polling parties to 
man the polling stations, etc. 
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(I) Polling Stations 
Each constituency is divided into a number of 
polling areas. For each polling area, one or more polling 
stations are provided according to the number of voters. 
A polling station usually caters to the need of 900 to 
1000 voters. Where necessary, separate polling stations 
are provided for women voters; but in such cases the 
polling stations for men and women voters are located in 
the same building. 
Outside each polling station there will be 
displayed prominently a notice specifying the polling 
area, the electors of which are entitled to vote at the 
polling station and a list of the contesting 
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candidates. 
(II) Fixing time for poll 
According to Section 56 of the Act, the Election 
Commission shall notify the hours during which the poll 
will take place, but the total period allotted on any date 
for polling in an election of a Parliamentary or Assembly 
constituency should not be less than eight hours. However, 
the proceedings at any polling station may be adjourned 
due to the interruption of riots, violence or on account 
of any natural calamity, or any other sufficient cause by 
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the presiding officer for such polling station or the 
returning officer presiding over such place, as the case 
may be. When a poll is adjourned, the returning officer 
shall immediately report the circumstances to the 
appropriate authority and the Election Commission. The 
votes cast at the polling station shall not be counted 
until such adjourned poll is completed. The electors who 
have already voted shall not be allowed to vote again. 
(Ill) Fresh Poll 
If any ballot box used at a pollling station is 
unlawfully taken out of the custody of the Presiding 
Officer or the Returning Officer, or is accidentally or 
intentionally destroyed or lost to such an extent that the 
result of the poll cannot be ascertained; or any voting 
machine develops a mechanical failure during the course of 
the recording of votes; or any such error or irregularity 
in procedure as is likely to vitiate the poll is committed 
at a polling station, the returning officer shall report 
the matter to the Election Commission. Thereupon the 
Election Commission shall, after taking all material 
circumstances into account, declare the poll at that 
polling station null and void and notify a new day and fix 
57 hours for a fresh poll. 
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If at any election booth capturing has taken place 
at a polling station in such a manner that the result of 
the poll cannot be ascertained; the returning officer 
shall forthwith report the matter to the Election 
Commission. The Commission shall, on the receipt of a 
report from the returning officer and after taking all 
material circumstances into account, either declare that 
the poll at that polling station be void, appoint a day 
for taking fresh poll; or if satisfied that in view of the 
large number of polling stations involved in booth 
capturing the result is likely to be affected, countermand 
the election in that constituency. ^' 
(IV) Ballot to be Secret 
The ballot is secret and the law lays down various 
safeguards : 
(I) Every elector to whom a ballot paper has been 
issued shall maintain secrecy of voting within the polling 
station. 
(II) No witness or other person (in an election 
petition) shall be required to state for whom he has voted 
at an election. 
(Ill) Every officer, clerk, agent or other person on 
election duty who performs any duty in connection with the 
recording or counting of votes at an election shall 
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maintain, and aid in maintaining, the secrecy of voting 
and shall not (except for some purpose authorised by or 
under any law) communicate to any person any information 
calculated to violate such secrecy. Any such violation 
will make him liable to punishment with imprisonment up to 
three months or with fine or with both. 
(V) Only one Vote 
No person shall vote in more than one constituency 
of the same class and no person shall vote in the same 
constituency more than once. 
(VI) Personation 
In order to prevent the same person from 
personating another voter ano voting again, every voter's 
left forefinger will be marked by one of the polling 
officers with indeliable ink before a ballot paper is 
issued to him. 
Any polling agent may challenge the identity of a 
voter by depositing a sum of Rs.2 in cash with the 
presiding officer. The presiding officer will hold a 
summary inquiry into the challenge. If the challenge 
succeeds or if the presiding officer is satisfied that the 
challenge was made in good faith and was not frivolous, 
S9 
the deposit will be returned to the polling agent 
immediately after the conclusion of the inquiry. In other 
cases the deposit will be forfeited to Government. 
(VII) Tendered Votes 
If a person who is not the real voter comes to a 
polling station and casts his vote in the name of the real 
voter, and the real voter comes to the polling station 
thereafter to cast his vote, he will be asked to vote on a 
special type of ballot paper. This ballot paper, after it 
is marked and folded, will not be inserted into the ballot 
box, but handed over to the presiding officer who will 
place it in a separate cover. These special votes which 
are called "tendered votes" will not be counted at the 
time of counting. They may, however, be scrutinised in 
connection with an election petition if it is represented 
that the result of an election has been materially 
affected by the improper reception of votes. In other 
words, the court shall take into account the tendered 
ballot papers and exclude those votes which were cast by 
persons other than the 'genuine voters'. 
(VIII) Voting by Post 
The following persons are entitled to vote by post: 
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(a) Special Voters 
The holders of the following offices (and their 
wives if they reside with them) are also entitled to be 
registered in the electoral rolls of the constituencies in 
which they would be residing but for their holding such 
offices: (1) The President of India; (2) The 
Vice-President of India; (3) Governors of States; (4) 
Cabinet Ministers of the Union or of any State; (5) Deputy 
Chairman & Members of the Planning Commission; (6) 
Ministers and Deputy Ministers^ (7) Speakers of the Lok 
Sabha or of any State Legislative Assembly; (8) Chairman 
of any State Legislative Council; (9) Lieutenant Governors 
of Union territories; (10) Deputy Speaker of the Lok Sabha 
or of any State Legislative Assembly; (11) Deputy Chairman 
of the Raj Sabha or of any State Legislative Council; (12) 
Parliamentary Secretaries of the Union or of any State. 
(b) Service Voter 
The following persons (and their wives if they 
reside with them) have the right to be registered in the 
electoral rolls of the constituencies in which they would 
be residing but for their service : Members of the armed 
forces of the Union; Members of a force to which the Army 
Act, 1950, applies; (c) Members of an armed police force 
of a State serving outside the State; (d) Foreign service 
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personnel and others employed under Government in posts 
outside India. 
Special voters and service voters are required to 
make declarations in the prescribed form giving the 
address at which, but for their service, they would have 
been residing, and they are then registered accordingly. 
The declarations are to be sent to the registration 
officer of the constituency concerned. Special steps are 
taken, with the assistance of the Ministry of Defence and 
the three Services Headquarters, for the enrolment of the 
armed forces personnel. 
(c) Voters on Election Duty 
(Polling agent, polling officers, presiding 
officers or other public servants on election duty). 
(d) Electors subjected to preventive detention 
These voters (other than service voters) are 
required to intimate the returning officer - of the 
constituency where they are registered - their wish to 
vote by postal ballot within a prescribed time : at least 
10 days before the poll, in the case of special voters; at 
least 7 days before the poll or such shorter period as may 
be allowed by the returing officer, in the case of a 
person on election duty; and within 15 days of the calling 
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of an election, in the case of persons under preventive 
detention. In the case of those under preventive 
detention, there is also a duty cast on the appropriate 
government to ascertain and intimate to the returning 
officer within 15 days of the calling of an election 
their names and other particulars such as electoral roll 
numbers, places of detention, etc.. The returning officer 
will in all these cases send to every voter a postal 
ballot paper. 
In the case of service voters, no individual 
intimation is required to be sent to the returning 
officer. The returning officer himself will send the 
ballot papers to them direct. Service voters are not 
entitled to vote in person. They can vote only by post. 
(e) Persons not entitled to vote 
The following persons are not entitled to vote at 
an election : 
(i) A person whose name is not entered in the electoral 
roll of any constituency; 
(ii) A person who is subject to any disqualification 
referred to in Section 16 for voting; 
(iii) A person who is confined in a prison, whether 
under a sentence of imprisonment or transportation or 
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otherwise or is in the lawful custody of the police (other 
than under preventive detention); 
(iv) A person shall not vote at a general election in 
more than one constituency of the same class, and if a 
person votes in more than one such constituency, his votes 
in all such constituencies shall be void; 
(v) A person shall not vote in the same constituency 
more than once, notwithstanding that his name may have 
been registered in the electoral roll for that 
constituency more than once, and if he does so vote, all 
his votes in that constituency shall be void. 
It shall be the duty of Presiding Officer to close 
the polling station at the hours fixed for it in the 
notification. But the electors who are already present at 
the polling station before the closing time, shall be 
permitted to cast their votes. If any question arises as 
to whether a person was present at a polling station or 
not, the decision of the Presiding Officer shall be final. 
At the completion of the poll the Presiding Officer 
closes the slit of the ballot box, seals it and delivers 
the sealed ballot boxes and the sealed packets, etc. to 
the Returning Officer as soon as possible. The sealed 
packets are kept under safe custody and cannot be opened 
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without the prior direction of a competent court. This 
ensures secrecy of the ballot. 
(I) COUNTING OF VOTES 
The votes polled at each constituency are counted 
by, or under the supervision and direction of, the 
Returning Officer by counting supervisors and assistants 
appointed by him. The candidate, his election agent and 
his counting agents have the right to be present at the 
70 
counting. 
The Returning Officer will give notice in writing 
at least one week before the date of poll, of the date, 
time and place of counting to each candidate or his 
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election agent. Each candidate is entitled to appoint as 
many counting agents as there are counting tables and one 
more for watching the counting at the table of the 
Returning Officer. Before commencing the counting of 
votes, all these persons shall take an oath of 
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'Maintenance of Secrecy'. 
The postal ballot papers are counted first. This is 
done by the Returning Officer himself. A postal ballot 
paper is kept under two covers, the outer cover contain a 
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declaration in a prescribed form regarding the identity of 
the voter and the inner cover the ballot paper. The outer 
cover is opened and the declaration contained in it is 
scrutinised. If the declaration is not found inside the 
cover or if the declaration has not been duly signed and 
attested or attested by an officer not competent to do so 
or is otherwise substantially defective, the cover 
containing the ballot paper is rejected. All the 
declarations which are found in order are kept in a 
separate sealed packet before the covers containing the 
postal ballot papers are opened, to ensure the secrecy of 
the postal ballot paper. Thereafter the inner covers are 
opened one after another and the validity of each ballot 
73 paper is scrutinised and decided. A postal ballot paper 
is rejected: 
(I) If no vote is recorded thereon; or 
(II) If vote is given in favour of more candidates 
than one; or 
(III) If it is damaged; or 
(IV) If it is spurious ballot paper; or 
(V) If it is not returned in the cover sent 
alongwith it to the elector; or 
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(VI; If it bears any mark of writing by which the 
elector can be identified; or 
(VII) If the mark indicating the vote is placed in 
such a way as to make it doubtful to which 
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candidate the vote has been given. 
As regards counting of votes polled at polling stations, 
first the Returning Officer satisfies himself that the 
ballot boxes received from the various polling stations 
are intact and permits the counting agents or the 
candidates to satisfy themselves on his score. 
(I) Destruction, etc., of ballot papers 
If at any time before the counting of votes is 
completed any ballot papers used at a polling station are 
unlawfully taken out of the custody of the returning 
officer or are accidentally or intentionally destroyed or 
lost or are damaged or tampered with to such an extent 
that the result of the poll at that polling station cannot 
be ascertained, the returning officer shall forthv;ith 
report the matter to the Election Commission. The 
Election Commission v/ill, after taking all material 
circumstances into account, issue directions to the 
returning officer either to stop the counting, declare the 
poll at that polling station to be void, and order a fresh 
77 
poll, or if satisfied that a fresh poll at that polling 
station will not affect the result of the election, to 
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resume and complete the counting. 
(II) Rejection of ballot paper 
7 ft 
A ballot paper will be rejected: 
(I) If it bears any mark or writing by which the 
elector can be identified; or 
(II) If it bears no mark at all or bears a mark made 
otherwise than with the instrument supplied for the 
purpose; or 
(III) If votes are given on it in favour of more than one 
candidate; 
(IV) If the mark indicating the vote thereon is placed 
in such manner as to make it doubtful to which 
candidate the vote has been given; or 
(V) If it is a spurious ballot paper; or 
(VI) If it is so damaged or mutilated that its identity 
as a genuine ballot paper cannot be established; 
or 
(VII) If it bears a serial numher, or is of a design, 
different from the serial numbers or, as the case 
may be, design of the ballot paper authorised for 
use at the partic^fS^^^oriln^f't^^ation; or 
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(VIII) If it does not bear the distinguishing mark 
prescribed by the Election Commission and the 
signature of the presiding officer. 
A ballot paper, however, will not be rejected :(I) 
if the defect mentioned at (VII) or (VIII) above is caused 
by any mistake or failure on the part of the presiding 
officer or a polling officer; or (II) on the ground merely 
that the mark indicating the vote is indistinct or made 
more than once, if the intention that the vote shall be 
for a particular candidate clearly appears from the way 
the paper is marked. Before rejecting any ballot paper as 
invalid, the counting agents of the candidate will be 
allowed to inspect the ballot paper. The Returning Officer 
will endorse on every rejected ballot paper the word 
'Rejected' and the grounds of rejection and initial such 
endorsemet. The rejected ballot papers will be kept in a 
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separate bundle. 
Interpreting the provision the Supreme Court in 
78 Iqbal Singh V Gurdas Singh held that if the Returning 
Officer was satisfied that the failure to affix the stamp 
or the signature v/as due to the fault of Presiding 
Officer, but the ballot paper was itself genuine he could 
include it among the valid ballot papers. Therefore, 
merely by giving evidence that the ballot papers did not 
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contain both the signature and the stamp it would not be 
established that the ballot paper concerned was not a 
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valid paper. In Bashir Ahmad Maqrey V Ghulam Quadir Mir , 
the Supreme Court opined that the first proviso to Rule 
56(2) which is based upon the principle that a vote 
validly cast should not be excluded from consideration 
because of the mistake or omission of the Presiding 
Officer or Polling Officer, made it plain that where the 
Returning Officer was satisfied that any defect mentioned 
had been caused by the mistake or failure on the part of a 
Presiding Officer or Polling Officer, the ballot paper 
shall not be rejected merely on the ground of such defect. 
The fact that the Returning Officer in the present case 
did not reject the ballot papers in question on the ground 
that they bore only the initials and not the full 
signatures of the Presiding Officer would go to show that 
the Returning Officer was satisfied that the alleged 
defect was caused by the mistake or failure on the part of 
81 the Presiding Officer. 
(Ill) Recording of Result 
After the completion of the counting, the total 
number of votes polled by each candidate is recorded in a 
result sheet (in the prescribed form) and is also 
announced to those present at the counting. 
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(IV) Equality of votes 
If two candidates contesting any seat happen to 
secure the highest number of votes and their votes are 
81 
equal in number, the result will be decided by lot. 
(V) Declaration of Result 
When the counting of the votes is finally 
completed and the Returning Officer has completed and 
signed the result sheet, he will forthwith declare the 
candidate who has obtained the largest number of valid 
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votes to be duly elected. The Election Commission may, 
for any special reason, direct the Returning Officer not 
to declare the result; and in that event the declaration 
will be withheld in accordance with such direction. 
(VI) Recount 
When the announcement of the total votes polled by 
a candidate is made, a candidate or his agent dissatisfied 
with the counting may, in writing, apply for recounting. 
The application should give reasons why such recount is 
asked for. A recount may be demanded when the votes 
obtained by two candidates are very close and there may be 
a possibility of a small number of votes changing the 
result. The Returning Officer's decision on any such 
application is final. 
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No demanded for a recount can be made after the 
Returning Officer has completed and signed the result 
sheet. The Supreme Court has held that there can never 
be any hard and fast rule as to the circumstances when an 
order of recount would be permissible and it should always 
87 be dependent upon the circumstances of the case. 
Discussing the attitude of the Supreme Court in various 
cases, Sarkaria, j., speaking for the Court in Beliram 
Q O 
Bhalaik V J.B. Khachi, observed : 
Although no cast-iron rule of universal 
application can be or has been laid down, yet 
from a beadroll of the decisions of this 
Court, two broad guidelines are discernible: 
that the court would be justified in ordering 
a recount or permitting inspection of the 
ballot papers only where (I) all the material 
facts on which the allegations of 
irregularity or illegality in counting are 
founded, are pleaded adequately in the 
election petition and (II) the Court/Tribunal 
trying the petition is prima facie satisfied 
that the marking of such an order is 
imperatively necessary to decide the dispute 
and to do complete and effectual justice 
89 between the parties. 
It be concluded that since an order for recount 
touches upon the secrecy of the ballot paper, it should 
not be made lightly or as a matter of course. 
(VII) Report of the Result 
As soon as may be after the result of an election 
has been declared, the Returning Officer shall report the 
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result to the appropriate authority and the Election 
Commission shall get it published in the official gazette 
90 in India. The date on which a candidate is declared by 
the Returning Officer to have been elected to any House of 
Parliament or State Legislature, shall be date of election 
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of that candidate. 
CONCLDSION 
Thus in the present chapter one can find an 
elaborate and effective system of electoral process 
designed for holding a fair and free election. It is a 
process in which the aspiring decision-maker is fully 
involved, with greater or lesser intensity over time. 
Election is the most important exercise of the 
people in a democracy and it is the responsibility of the 
Government, the Commission, political parties and the 
electorate to make the process a success. First of all, 
questions like poll schedule should be settled on the 
basis of a clear understanding between the Government and 
the Commission. Secondly, the Government should extend all 
help to the commission to conduct fair elections. The 
question, who is supreme the Government or the 
commission should not arise in this matter. 
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CHAPTER -IV 
MECHANISM FOR FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
There are three main ingredients in a truly 
democratic electoral system-an awareness on the part of 
the public of the significance of their' vote, a spirit 
within the community that looks tov/ards the welfare of, 
and a sound electoral machinery. A constitution or the 
laws can provide only one of these ingredients the 
system through which the people can give effect to the 
other two. 
In the following pages an effort has been made to 
find out what machinery the Constitution has devised for 
the purpose of conducting free and fair elections, and to 
make an assessment of its efficacy as an institution. 
The chief electoral authority is the Election 
Commission, with its headquarters at New Delhi. In the 
Commission is vested complete pov/er to superintend, direct 
and control the entire elections. This power is to be 
exercised in accordance with the provisions of the 
Constitution and the Representation of the people Acts, 
1950 and 1951. 
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THE ELECTION COMMISSION 
The Committee on Fundamental Rights had made a 
report that it should be recognised that the independence 
of the elections and the avoidance of any interference by 
the executive in the elections to the legislature should 
be regarded as a fundamental right and provided for in 
the chapter dealing with Fundamental Rights. The 
Constituent Assembly agreed that the question of fair 
elections was a matter of great importance but it was not 
in favour of embodying a right to that effect in the 
chapter dealing with Fundamental Rights. Accordingly, the 
Drafting Committee removed the matter from the category 
of Fundamental Rights and put it in a separate part. 
When the matter came up for discussion in the 
Constituent Assembly Dr. Amedkar, the Chairman of the 
Drafting Committee explained that there were two 
alternatives before the Drafting Committee : (a) to have a 
permanent body consisting of four or five members of the 
Election Commission who would continue in office 
throughout without any break, or (b) to permit the 
President to have an a6_ hoc body appointed at the time 
when there is an election on the anvil. The Committee 
steered a middle course. What it purported was to have 
permanently in office one man called the Chief Election 
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Commissioner, so that the skeleton machinery would always 
be available. The Committee's view was based on the 
assumption that though elections would generally take 
place at the end of five years, a bye-election might have 
to be conducted and consequently, the electoral rolls 
would have to be kept up-to-date all the time. The 
Assembly agreed to accept the Committee's recommendations 
that there should be permanently in session one officer to 
be called the Chief Election Commissioner, with a power 
with the President to further add to the machinery by 
3 
appointing other members to the Election Commission. 
Dr. Ambedkar further observed that the original 
proposal was that there should be one Commission to deal 
with the elections to the Central Legislature, both the 
upper and the lower House, and that there should oe a 
separate Election Commission for each province and each 
State, to be appointed by the Ruler or the Governor of the 
State. Comparing the original proposal with the present 
Article 289, Dr. Ambedkar said : "This article proposes 
to centralise the election machinery in the hands of a 
single Commission to be assisted by regional 
Commissioners, not working under the provincial 
government, but working under the superintendence and 
control of the Central Election Commission. This is 
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undoubtedly a radical change. But, this change had become 
necessary because we find that in some of the provinces of 
India, the population is a mixture. There are what may be 
called original inhabitants, so to say, the native peple 
of a particular province. Along with them, there are other 
people residing there, who are either racially, 
linguistically or culturally different from the dominant 
people who are the occupants of that particular province. 
It has been brought to the notice of both of the Drafting 
Committee as well as of the Central Government that in 
these provinces the executive Government is instructing or 
managing things in such a manner that those people who do 
not belong to them either racially, culturally or 
linguistically, are being excluded from being brought on 
the electoral rolls. The House will realise that franchise is a 
most fundamental thing in a democracy. No person who is 
entitled to be brought into the electoral rolls on the 
grounds which we have already mentioned in our 
Constitution, namely, an adult of 21 years of age, should 
be excluded merely as a result of the prejudice of a 
local Government, or the whim of an officer. That would 
act at the very root of democratic government. In order, 
therefore, to prevent injustice being done by provincial 
governments to people other than those who belong to the 
province racially, linguistically and culturally, it is 
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felt desirable to depart from the original proposal of 
having a separate Election Commission for each province 
under the guidance of the governor and the local 
government. Therefore, this new change has been brought 
about, namely, that the v7hole of the election machinery 
should be in the hands of a Central Electin Commission 
which alone would be entitled to issue directives to 
returning officers, polling officers and others engaged in 
the preparation and revision of electoral rolls so that no 
any 
injustice may be done to'citizen in India, who under this consti-
tution is entitled to be brought on the electoral rolls. Tiiat alone 
is, if I may say so, a radical and fimdamental departure from the 
4 
existing provisions of the Draft Constitution". 
COMPOSITION AND APPOINTMENT 
Article 324, Clauses (2), (3) and (4) of the Constitution 
provide: 
The Election Commission shall consit of the Chief Election 
Commissioner and such number of other Election 
Commissioners, if any, as the President may from time to 
time fix and the appointment of the Chief Election 
Commissiner andother Election Commissioners shall, subject 
to the provisions of any law made in that behalf by 
Parliament, be made by the President. 
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When any other Election Commisioner is so appointed the 
Chief Election Conmissiner shall act as the Chairman of 
the Election Commission. 
Before each generalelectionto the House of the 
People and to the Legislative Assembly of each state, and 
before the first general election and thereafter before 
each biennial election to the Legislative Council of each 
State having such Council, the President may also appoint 
after consultation with the Election Commission such 
Regional Commissioners as he may consider necessary to 
assist the Election Commission in the performance of the 
functions conferred on the Commission by clause (1). 
Thus the chief features of the composition of the 
Election Commission as given under Article 324 ^ r e that 
the Commission shall always consist of a permanent 
incumbent, viz, the Chief Election Commissioner. The 
President has also been given the power to appoint such 
number of other election commisioners as he may, from 
time to time, fix. In other words, while the appointment 
of the Chief Election Commissioner is a must, the 
appointment of the other election Commissioner or 
Commissioners is not obligatory. Moreover, the number of 
other election commissioners to be appointed in future is 
left to the discretion of the President depending upon the 
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need felt from time to tine. 
A perusal of ArtJcal 324, it has been rightly 
the 
pointed out,reveals that/constitution neither prescribes 
any qualification administrative,legal or judicial 
for eligibility to the post of Chief Flection 
Connissioner nor does it lay down the procedure of his 
appointment. 
TERM OF OFFICE Aim CONDITION OF SERVICE 
In connection with the term of office and service 
condition. Dr. Ambedkar, in the Constituent Assembly, 
observed that the matter had been left to the President to 
determine the condition of service and the tenureofoffice 
of the members of the Election Commission, subject to one 
or two conditions that the Chief Election Commissioner 
would not be liable to be removed except in the same manner 
as a judge of the Supreme Court. He explained that if the 
object of the House v/as that all matters relating to 
elections should be outside the control of the Executive 
Government of the day, it is absolutely necessary that the 
Election Commissioner should be irremovable by the 
executive by a mere fiat . Hence the Chief Election 
Commissioner has been given the same status so far as 
removability is concerned as it has been given to the 
judges of the Supreme Courts "We, of course, do not 
propose to give the same status to the other members of 
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the Commission. We have left the matter to the President 
as to the circumstances under which he would deem fit to 
remove any other member of the Election Commission, 
subject to one condition that the Chief Election 
Commissioner must recommend that the removal is just and 
proper". 
Artical 324, clause (5) of the Constitution lays 
down that subject to the provisions of any law made by 
parliament, the conditions of service and tenure of office 
of the Election Commissioners and the Regional 
Commissioners shall be such as the President may by rule 
determine. This is with the condition that the Chief 
Election Commissioner shall not be removed from his office 
except in like manner and on the like grounds as a judge 
of the Supreme Court and the conditions of service of the 
Chief Election Commissioner shall not be varied to his 
disadvantage after his appointment. The Article further 
provides that any other Election Commissioner or a 
Regional Commissioner shall not be removed from office 
except on the recommendation of the Chief Election 
Commissioner. 
It has been pointed out that the method of removal of 
Chief Election Commissioner is similar to that of the 
judges of Supreme Court, or the High Court, is undoubtedly 
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very complicated, but his tenure is not similar to that of 
Q 
a judge . A Supreme Court judge holds office till the 
completion of a definite age, i.e., sixty five years, but 
the tenure of the Chief Election Commissioner depends upon 
the rules framed by the President and is subject to 
statutory regulations . Till 1972, he could be appointed 
for any period of time. His tenure could also be further 
extended. For example, in the cases of tv/o former Chief 
Election Commissioners, Sukumar Sen and K.V.K. Sundaram, 
both of whom held office for approximately eight years, 
though initially each of them had been appointed for a 
period of five years only . In 1972 the terms and 
conditions of service for the post of Chief Election 
Commissioner v/ere prescribed by rules made by the 
President. As per these rules, the Chief Election 
Commissioner holds office upto the age of sixty five or 
12 for a perid of five years, whichever is less 
Hwever, recently the Government of India has enacted 
the Chief Election Commissioner and other Election 
13 Commissioners (Conditionsof Service) Act, 1991 . Section 4 
of the Act prescribes that the Chief Election Commissioner 
or an Election Commissioner shal holld office for a term 
of six years from the date on which he assumes his office: 
Provided that where 
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(i) The Chief Election Commissioner attains the age of 
sixty-five years; or 
(ii) An Election Commissioner attains the age of 
sixty-two years,before the expiry of the said term of six 
years, he shall vacate his office on the date on which he 
attains the said age. 
It has been further provided that the Chief Election 
Commissioner or an Election Commissioner may, at any 
time, by writing under his hand addressed to the 
President, resign his office. The term of six years in 
respect of the Chief Election Commissioner or an Election 
Commissioner holding office immediately before the 
commencement of this Act, shall be computed from the date 
on v;hich he had, assumed office. 
As far as appointment and removal of an Election 
Commissioner is concerned, it gained significane when in 
1989 for the first time two Election Commissioners were 
appointed by the President and subsequently, their 
services \7ere terminated. The matter v;as challenged before 
14 the Supreme Court in S.S.Dhanoa V. Union of India . The 
facts of the case \7ere that on 7 October, 1989, by a 
notification issued in exercise of the powers conferred by 
Cl. (2) of Article 324 of the Constituticn, the President 
fixed, until further orders, the numVer of Flection 
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Conmissioners (other than the Chief Election 
Coinnissioner) , at tv70. By a Bubsequent notification of 16 
October, 1989 issuer" under the sane provisions, the 
President appointed the petitioner and one V.S. Seigell as 
Election Commissioners from that very date. On the same 
day, the President made rules to regulate the conditions 
of service and tenure of office of the Election 
Commissioners. These condition laid dovm, among other 
things, that an Election Commissioner shall hold office 
for a term of five years or until he attains the age of 
sixty-five years whichever happens earlier 
On 1st January, 1990, in exercise of the pov7ers 
conferred under Article 324(2) of the Constitution, the 
President issued tv/o notifications one rescinding, 
v/ith immediate effect, the notification of 7 October, 1989/ 
creating the two posts of Election Commissioners and 
another rescinding, v/ith immediate effect, the 
notification of 16 October, 1989^ by v/hich the appointment 
of the petitioner and V.S. Seigell was made. It v/as these 
two notifications of 1st January 1990 v/hich were 
challenged before the Court. The grounds of attack, inter 
alia, were that once appointed, an Election Commissioner 
continues in office for his full tenure determined by the 
rules made under Article 324 (5) of the Constitution which 
is five years or till the attaintment of sixty-five years 
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of age whichever is earlier. The President could remove 
the petitioner only on the recommendation of the Chief 
Election Commissioner. He had otherv/ise no power to cut 
short the tenure either under the Constitution or under 
the rules. Hence, it was contended, the recission of the 
notifications of 7th and 16th October, 1989y by the 
impugned notifications of 1st January, 1990, was illegal. 
The Supreme Court held that it was a clear case of 
the abolition of posts and the termination of the service 
of the Election Commissioner was a consequence thereof. 
Hence, the termination of service was not open to 
challenge on the ground of illegality. In the opinon of 
the Court the creation and abolition of post was the 
prerogative of the executive. Article 324 (2) leaves it to 
the President to fix and appoint such number of Election 
Commissioners as he may from time to time determine. "The 
power to create the posts is unfettered. So also is the 
15 pov/er to reduce or abolish then 
The Court further pointed out that if the President 
finding that there was no work for the Election 
Commissioners or that the Election Commission could not 
function, decided to abolish the posts, that was an 
exigency of the office held by the Election Commissioner. 
As far as the appointment of Regional Election 
Commissioners as provided for under Article 324 (4) is 
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concerned, the President sanctioned four posts for the 
First General Elections/ 1951-52. Hov;ever the system of 
Regional Commissioners was discontinued at the time of the 
Second- General Elections. The Joint Committee on 
Amendments \to Election, however, recommended the 
appointment of Regional Election Commissioners on the 
ground that "there are so many matters on which orders of 
the Election Commission are necessary under the provisions 
of the election laws and it is not possible for the 
Election Commission at Delhi to take prompt and 
appropriate steps without the first hand knowledge at 
17 their disposal ". 
For the first time in 1956, a new post of Deputy 
Election Commissioner was created replacing Regional 
Election Commissioners. Three Deputy Election 
Commissioners were appointed for the Second General 
Elections for a period of six months. One of these posts 
18 
was subsequently retained on a permanent basis . 
For more effective and efficient functioning of the 
Election Commission, the Joint Committee on Amendements to 
Election Law recommended its expansion into a multi-member 
body as laid down in Article 324(2) of the Constitution. 
Its recommendation was: "An enlarged Commission will be 
able to discharge more effectively the responsibilities 
l O B 
relating to elections and in exercise of its 
quasi-judicial functions, a broad-based Commission is 
likely to reach generally acceptable decisions and command 
19 . . . 
respect ". To the same effect is the suggestion given by 
the Supreme Court in S»S Dhanoa . Sawant, J., speaking 
for the divison bench, held that two heads are better than 
one, and particularly when an institution like the 
Election Commission is entrusted with vital functions, and 
is armed with exclusive uncontrolled powers to execute 
them, it is both necessary and desirable that the powers 
are not exercised by one individual, however, all-wise he 
may be. "However, the fact remains that where more 
individuals than one, man an institution, their roles have 
to be clearly defined, if the functioning of the 
21 institution is not to come to a naught 
STAFF FOR CONDUCTING ELECTIONS 
One of the questions before the Constitutent 
Assembly was whether the Commission should have authority 
to have an independent staff of its own to carry on the 
work which had been assigned to it. It was felt that to 
allow the Election Commission to have an independent 
machinery to carry out all the work of preparation of the 
electoral rolls, the revision of the rolls, the conduct of 
the elections and so on would be really duplicating the 
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machinery and creating unnecessary administrative expense 
22 
which could be easily avoided . Dr. Ambedkar observed 
that the work of the Electoral Commission might be at 
times heavy and at other times it might have no work. 
Therefore it should be open for the Commission to borrow 
from the provincial government such clerical and 
ministerial agency as might be necessary for the purposes 
of carrying out the functions v/ith which the Commiss n 
23 had been entrusted . When the work was over, t 
ministerial staff .would return to the pr jial 
government. During the time that it was working unoer the 
Electoral Commission no doubt administratively it would be 
responsible to the Commission and not to the executive 
24 
government . R.K. Sidhva (C.P. and Berar) argued that 
separate staff v/as essential for securing independence and 
impartiality of the Eection Commission. He insisted t-v>r^  
the staff of the Central and State Governments, 
temporarily placed under the supervision and control of 
the Election Commission for the period of election, would 
otherv/ise be responsible to the executive and would as 
such act according to the wishes of the executive . The 
member argued that although maintaining of separate staff 
\;ould be very expensive^ the suggested system would be 
nearer to perfection . The proposition that the EC should 
have an independent staff cadre of its own did not find 
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favour with the Asseir^ bly, which ultimately adopted the 
suggestion put forward by Dr. Ambedkar. 
The Constitution under Article 324, clause (6)^accordingly 
provided: The President or the Governor of e State, shall 
when so requested by the Election Commission, make 
available to the Election Commission or to a Regional 
Commissioner such staff as may be necessary for the 
discharge of the functions conferred on the Election 
Commission. 
MACHINERY AT STATE LEVEL: 
There is for each State a chief electoral officer 
v/ho is such officer of government as the Election 
Commission may in consultation with that government 
27 • . 
designate or nominate . An executive or judicial officer 
of the State cadre "v/ith necessary background and 
independent training" is usually picked up for this 
25 post . The duties of the Chief Electoral Officer are to 
supervise the preparation of the electoral rolls and the 
conduct of elections in the State. In discharging his 
duties, he functions under the authority and control of 
29 the Election Commission . Every Chief Electoral Officer 
in a State is assisted by a permanent and whole-time 
deputy v/ho is incharge of the office and maintains 
30 
continuity of supervision and control. The organisation 
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and administrative structure of the office of the Chief 
Electoral Officer varies from State to State depending 
upon the size of the State and the volume of work 
involved. The office of the Chief Electoral Officer 
generally forms part of the State Government Secretariat 
31 
at the headquarters of the State. The Election 
Commission has, however, no say in the selection of the 
staff employed in the offices of the Cfhief Electoral 
32 Officers. 
For each district in a State, other than a Union 
Territory, the Election Commission, in consultation with 
the Government of the State,, designates or nominates a 
district election officer who is an officer of 
33 . . . 
Government. The Election Commission may designate or 
nominate more than one such officer for a district if the 
Commission is satisfied that the functions of the office 
cannot be performed satisfactorily by one officer. Where 
more than one district election officers are designated or 
nominated for a district, the Election Commission also 
specifies the area in respect of which each such officer 
would exercise jurisdiction. The district election officer 
is subject to the Superintendence, direction and control 
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of the Chief Electoral Officer. He co-ordinates and 
supervises all work in the district or in the area within 
his jurisdiction in ccnr.ection with the preparation and 
revision of electoral rolls for all parliamentary, 
assembly and council constituencies within the district. 
He provides, with the prior approval of the Election 
Commission, the polling stations for every constitutency, 
34 V7hich lies within his jurisdiction . He appoints the 
presiding and polling officers for the various polling 
stations in the v;hole district. The accounts of election 
expenses are tc be lodged with him. He is also the 
custodian of the papers relating to all elections held 
within the district after the completion of the 
election 
The responsibility to prepare and revise the 
electoral rolls of every constitutncy is vested in an 
officer called the electoral registration officer (ERO). 
An ERO may, subject to any prescribed restrictions, employ 
such persons as he thinks fit for the preparation and 
revision of the electoral rolls for the constituency . 
The Election Commission may appoint one or more persons as 
assistant electoral registration officer to assist any 
electoral registration officer in the performance of his 
functions 
Ill 
The election in every contituency is supervised by 
an officer known as the Returning Officer nominated or 
designated by the Election Commission in consultation v^ ith 
the Government of the State. The same officer can be 
nominated as Returning Officer for more than one 
38 
constituency . The Election Commission may appoint one or 
more persons to assist any returning officer in the 
performance of his functions. Every such person is an 
39 
officer of Government or of a local authority . The 
returning officer receives the nomination papers of 
candidates in each constituency. He is the authority to 
scruntinise the nomination papers. His decision can be 
cha] lenged only on an election pe-tition after the election 
is over. He is also responsible for the counting of the 
votes and the declaration of the results. 
In the Union Territories, the provision of polling 
stations and the appointment of polling personnel are 
entrusted to the returning officers, as there are no 
district election officers in these territories 
The staff for the actual conduct of the poll 
normally comprise one presiding officer and four or five 
polling officers. Their appointment is made by the 
41 district election officer . it is the general duty of the 
presiding officer at a polling station to keep order there 
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at and to see that the poll is fairly taken . And it is 
the duty of the polling officers at a polling station to 
assist the presiding officer for such station in the 
45 performance of his function . Usually such polling 
personnel are drawn from central and state government 
employees, teachers of schools and colleges, etc. In case 
of absence of the Presiding Officer due to illness or some 
other cause, his duties are performed by one of the 
polling officers V7ho is previously so authorised by the 
District Election Officer. The presiding officer occupies 
an important position in the electoral machinery of the 
country as he plays a key role on the day of the election. 
He keeps order at the polling station and ensures fair 
conduct of the poll. 
The above discussion gives a picture of the entire 
electoral mechanism which the framers of the Indian 
Constitution provided for a free and fair election. The 
entire electoral administration has been vested in the 
Election Commission which alone has the authority to issue 
directions to the sub-ordinate staff engaged in the 
preparation and revision of electoral rolls and the 
conduct of elections. Hence from the Chief Electoral 
Officer down to the presiding officers everyone is 
accountable to the Election Commission. This electoral 
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machinery may be c h a r a c t e r i s e d a s a b a s t i o n of democracy 
44 i n I n d i a 
The electoral mechanism, in the words of Krishna 
Iyer.J., may be suir.med up as: " The Super-authority is the 
Election Ccmmission, the kingpin is the returning officer, 
the minions are the presiding officers in the polling 
stations and the electoral engineering is in conformity 
45 
with the elaborate legislative provision 
POWERS OF THE ELECTION COMMISSION: JUDICIAL DELIMITATION 
A leading case in which the Supreme Court examined 
the powers of the Election Commission at great length is 
46 Mohinder Singh Gill . In order to appreciate the points 
it will be necessary to know the facts of the case. 
In the general elections to Parliament held on 
March 16, 1977, the appellant and the third respondent 
v/ere the principal contestants from 13-Ferozepore 
parliamentary constituency in Punjab which consisted of 
nine assembly segments. Voting end counting of votes took 
place as notified, but at the final stage of the counting, 
when postal ballots were being counted, its completion was 
aborted by muscle tactics, allegedly mobilised at the 
instance of the third respondent. The ballot boxes from 
the Fazilka segment were also done av/ay viith en route, and 
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the returning officer was terrified in to postponing the 
declaration of the result. An observer of the Election 
Commission was also present at the crucial stage of the 
counting. He as well as the returning officer submitted 
their respective reports to the Election Commission. The 
appellant met the Election Commissioner with the request 
that he should direct the returning officer to declare the 
result of the election. His contention was that he had a 
substantial lead over the respondent when the panicked 
opposite party halted the process by muscle tactics. 
The Election Commission, however, issued an order 
cancelling the v/hole poll, and followed it up, a few days 
later, with a declaration to hold a fresh poll for the 
whole contituency. Thereafter, the appellant filed a writ 
petition before the High Court. In an affidavit filed by 
the Election Commissioner, it v>?as stated that after taking 
into consideration all the circumstances and information 
including the oral representation of the appellant he had 
passed the order cancelling the poll. The High Court 
dismissed the petition on the ground that it had no 
jurisdiction to entertain it. An appeal was then filed 
before the Supreme Court. In the meantime, at the repoll 
the third respondent was declared elected and the 
appellant filed an election petition. The grievance of the 
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appellant was that v/hile he had, in all probability won 
the poll, he had been deprived of his valuable and 
hard-won victory by the arbitrary action of the Commission 
going contrary to fair play and in negation of the basic 
canons of natural justice. 
The . Supreme Court held that the Constitution 
contemplates a free and fair election and vests 
comprehensive responsibilities of superintendence, 
direction and control of the conduct of elections in the 
Election Commission. This responsibility may cover power, 
duties and functions of many sorts, administrative or 
other, depending on circumstances. The court noted that at 
least two limitations are laid on the plenary character of 
the powers. Firstly, when Parliament or any State 
Legislature has made valid law relating to or in 
connection v;ith elections, the Commission shall act in 
conformity with, not in violation of, such provisions. But 
v;here such lav? is silent Article 324 is a reservoir of 
power to act for the avowed purpose of, not divorced from, 
pushing forward a free and fair election with 
. . 47 
expedition . Secondly, the Commission shall be 
responsible to the rule of law, act bona fide and be 
48 
amenable to the norms of natural justice . 
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Krishna Iyer J. , who delivered the judgment en 
behalf of himself, Beg,C.J., and P.N. Bhagwati,J., observed 
that a repoll for a whole constituency under compulsion of 
circumstances may be directed and can be saved by Article 
324 provided it is bona fide necessary for the 
vindication of the free verdict of the electorate, and the 
abandonment of the previous poll was because it failed to 
achieve that goal. 
The Court observed that Article 324 (1) is couched 
in very wide terms. The Commission may be required to cope 
with some situations which may not be provided for in the 
enacted laws and the rules. That seems to be the raison 
detre for the opening clause in Article 327 and 328 which 
leaves the exercise of power under Article 324 operative 
and effective when it is reasonably called for in a 
49 
vacuous area. 
But V7here laws are non-existent, and yet a 
situation has to be takcled, then, according to Goswami, 
J., in a concurrent opinion: 
The Chief Election Commissioner has not to 
fold his hands and pray to God for divine 
inspiration to enable him to exercise his 
functions and to perform his duties or to 
look to any external authority for the grant 
of powers to deal with the situation. He 
must lawfully exercise his power 
independently, in all matters relating to 
the conduct of elections, and see that the 
election process is completed properly, in a 
free and fair manner.50 
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About the maintainability of the writ petition, the 
Court held that under Article 329 (b) of the Constitution 
the sole remedy for an aggrieved party, if he wants to 
challenge an election, is by way of an election petition 
and the exclusion of all other remedies includes 
constitutional remedies like the one provided by Article 
226 because of the non - obstante clause. The Court 
observed: 
The paramount policy of the Constitution 
framers in declaring that no election shall 
be called in question except the way it is 
provided for in Article 329 (b) and the 
Representation of the People Act, 1951, 
compels us to read, as Fazal Ali J. did in 
Ponnuswami, the Constitution and the Act 
together as an integral schem.51 
The Court also held that the compendious expression 
'election' connotes the 'rain-bow' of operations 
commencing from the issue of the notification under 
Section 14 to the declaration of the result under Section 
66 of the Act. 
Tv;o conclusions are clear: Firstly, the Election 
Commission being the 'reservoir' of power is competent in 
an appropriate case to order re-poll of an entire 
wherever necessary, 
constituency/ It will be an exercise of power within the 
ambit and scope of its functions under Article 324. 
Secondly, as Krishna Iyer, J., noted. Article 329 (b) is a 
'blanket ban' on litigative challenges to electoral steps 
118 
taken by the Commission for carrying forward the piocess 
of election to its culmination in the formal declaration 
of the result. The sole idea is that elections should be 
concluded as early as possible according to time schedule 
and all controversial matters and dispsutes arising out of 
elections should be postponed until after the elections 
are over, so that the election proceedings may not be 
unduly retarded or protracted. 
An important question is: Can the Commission in 
exercise of the powers available to it under Article 324 
exercise powers of a legislative nature also apart from 
the power to frame rules wherever delegated to it by the 
52 Parliament? In A.C. JOSE V Sivan jillai , the Supreme 
Court v/as called upon to answer the question whether the 
Commission had the competence to introduce voting by 
electronic machines. In the Court's view any change in the 
existing mode of voting could be effected only through a 
law V7hich the Parliament alone was competent to enact. 
The Court's observation was that Article 324 did authorise 
the Commission to exercise powers of superintendence, 
direction and control of the preparation of electoral 
rolls and the conduct of elections but then the Article 
has to be read harmoniously with the Articles that follow 
and the powers that are given to the Legislatures under 
entry 72 in the Union List and entry 37 of the State List 
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of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. It further 
observed; 
The Commission in the garb of passing orders 
for regulating the conduct of elections 
cannot take upon itself a purely legislative 
activity which has been reserved under the 
scheme of the Constitution only to 
Parliament and the State Legislatures.., 
Merely being a creature of the Constitution 
will not give it plenary and absolute power 
to legislate as it likes without reference 
to the law enacted by the legislatures^.^ 
Murtaza Fazal Ali, J., speaking for the Court on 
behalf of himself, Varadarajan and Ranganath Misra J.J. 
summed up the legal and constitutional position of the 
54 • Commission as follows 
(a) When there is no Parliamertary legislation or 
rules made under the said legislation, the Commission is 
free to pass any orders in respect of the conduct of 
elections, 
(b) Where there is an Act and express Rules made 
thereunder, it is not open to the Commission to override 
the Act or the Rules and pass orders in direct 
disobedience to the mandate contained in the Act or the 
Rules. In other words, the powers of the Commission are 
meant to supplement rather than supplant the law (both 
statutes and Rules) in the matter of superintendence, 
direction and control as provided by Article 324, 
ii\} 
(c) Where the Act or the Rules are silent, the 
Comission has no doubt plenary powers under Article 324 to 
give any direction in respect of the conduct of election, 
and 
(d) Where a particular direction by the Commission 
is submitted to the Government for approval, as required 
by the Rules it is not open to the Commission to go ahead 
with implementation of it at its ovm svjeet will even if 
the approval of the Government is not given* 
The conclusion of the Court, thus, was that 
Articles 324 to 328 relate to the manner in which 
elections are to be held, the rights of persons who are 
entitled to vote, preparation of electoral rolls, 
delimitation of constituencies, etc,. But this is merely 
the storehouse of the powers and the actual exercise of 
these powers is left to Parliament under Articles 325 to 
329. Article 324 has to be read in harmony with, and not 
in isolation of Articles 326 to 329. 
On the facts of the case the Court's unanimous 
opinion was that the word 'ballot' in its strict sense 
vrould not include voting by the use of voting machines. 
The Act and the Rules completely excluded the mechanical 
process which, if resorted to, would defeat in a large 
measure the mandatory requirements of the Rules. Hence the 
121 
order of the Commission dircting casting of ballot by 
machines in some of the polling stations was vvrithout 
jurisdiction and could not have been resorted to. 
Two more verdicts of the Supreme Court which have 
amply demonstrated the width of the powers of the Election 
Commission require a mention here. The first one is 
55 Inderjit Barua V Election Commission in which the 
petitioners sought to challenge the election by a writ 
petition under Article 2 26 on the ground that the 
electoral rolls on the basis of which the impugned 
elections were held by the Commission to the /^ ssam 
Assembly, wer invalid. The petitioners sought to escape 
from the ban of Article 329 (b) by contending that they 
were challenging the impugned elections as a whole and not 
any individual election and that the ban of Article 329 
(b) therefore did not stand in the way of the writ 
petitions filed by them. A five-judge bench of the Supreme 
Court rejected the contention and held that under the Act 
there was no concept of elections as a whole. "What that 
Act contemplates is election from each constituency and it 
is that election which is liable to be challenged by 
filing an election petition... Even where in form the 
challenge is to the elections as a whole, in effect and 
substance what is challenged is election from each 
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constituency and Article 329 (b) must therefore be held 
to be attracted 
The petitioner's contention was that the Court should 
direct the Election Commission to suo. motu carry out an 
inquiry for the purpose of determining whether any of 
the persons whose names were included in the electoral 
rolls of 1970 or earlier electoral rolls were citi2ens 
or not and if they were not found to bee citizens their 
names should be deleted from the electoral rolls. The 
Supreme Court refused and held that it was entirely for 
the Commission to decide in theexercise of its 
discretion whether it should carry out any such revision 
suo motu under Rule 25 of the Electoral Registration 
Rules, 1960. The Court also held it neither desirable 
nor proper to lay down as to what quantum of proof 
should be required for the purpose of substantiating any 
such claims or objections lodged before the Election 
Commission. It would be for appropriate electoral officer 
to consider and decide in the light of such material as 
may be produced before him by the objector as also by 
the person whose name is sought to be deleted from the 
electoral rolls . The Supreme Court also refused to 
issue any direction to the Commission not to hold any 
elections to Parliament from Assam untilthe revision of 
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electoral rolls is completed. On this propositionthe court 
58 followed its earlier stand in Hassan__ Uzzaman where a 
Constitution Bench had observed: 
...though the High Court did not lack the 
jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition 
and to issue appropriate directions therein, 
no High Court in the exercise of its pov.'ers 
under Article 226 of the Constitution should 
pass any order, interim or otherwise, which 
has the tendency or effect of postponing an 
election, which is reasonably imminent and 
in relation to v\?hich its writ jurisdiction 
KG 
is invoked. 
Commission 
The second case is Election of India V State of 
Haryana . The facts of the case were that a bye-
election to an Assembly Constituency in Haryana was 
due.The Election Commission fixed the date of poll and 
informed the Chief Secretary of Haryana who was also the 
Chief Election Officer (CEO). The Commission fixed an 
identical programme for filling 23 other vacancies in the 
legislative Assemblies of A.P., Karnataka & West Bengal. 
The Commission received the reply from the Chief 
Secretary, conveying the request of the Government that 
the proposed bye-election should be held along with the 
general elections to the Lok Sabha, which were due later 
that year. The Commission informed the Chief Secretary 
that it had decided to adhere to the programme of 
bye-elections to 24 vacancies in their respective 
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jurisdiction. The message mentioned that the Commission 
had taken into consideration the replies received by it 
from various State Governments and their CEOS on the 
question of holding the elections. 
The Chief Secretary wrote to the Commission that it 
would not be possible to hold the election during the 
proposed period because, the neighbouring State of Punjab 
was going through a serious problem of law and order, that 
there was a dispute regarding territorial adjustment and 
division of waters between the State of Haryana and Akali 
Party in Punjab and that there was serious threat to the 
lives of many important persons in Haryana. The Commission 
again replied that it had taken the decision to hold the 
bye-election after taking into consideration all factors 
and that the political parties who were duly informed of 
the proposed election programme had not opposed the 
holding of the bye-election programme at this point of 
time. On the same date that the Commission wrote the 
aforesaid letter, the Government of Haryana filed a writ 
petition in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and 
obtained an ex parte order. 
The Election Commission, too, rushed to the Supreme 
Court challenging the order of the High Court. 
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The High Court had held that the law and order 
situation in the State of the Pujab and Haryana v/as such 
as not to permit the holding of the poll. 
The centre of the controversy before the Supreme 
Court was the question as to who, the Government of 
Haryana or the Electio Commission, had the final say in 
the matter of deciding about the exact time when an 
election should be held. 
The Supreme Court by a ratio of 4:1 was divided in 
its opinion. The majority view affirmed the Supreme Court 
stand taken in A.K.M. HASSAN UZZAMAN^^^"^^ that the 
imminence of the electoral process is an important factor 
v/hich must guide and govern the passing of orders in the 
exercise of the High Court's writ jurisdiction and that, 
the more immient such process, the greater ought to be the 
reluctance of the High Court to take any step which will 
result in the postponement of the elections. Chandrachud, 
C.J., speaking for himself, Tulzapurkar, Pathak and Madon, 
J.J. observed that the Government of Haryana v;as 
undoubtedly in the best position to observe the situation 
of lav/ and order in areas within its jurisdiction and 
under its control. "But the ultimate decision as to 
whether it is possible and expedient to hold the elections 
12B 
at any given point of time must rest with the Election 
Commission . "It is not suggested", the Court further 
observed, "that the Election Commission can exercise its 
discretion in an arbitrary or male*, fide manner. 
Arbitrarines and malefs. fides destroy the validity and 
"62 
efficacy of all orders passed by public authorities« "A 
sense of realism, objectivity and non-alignment must 
inform the decision of the Election Commission on that 
issue 
The Court found that the correspondence between the 
Chief Secretary of Haryana and the Election Commission 
shov/ed that the latter had taken all the relevant facts 
and circumstances into consideration while taking the 
decision to hold the bye-election toa constituency, and 
against this backdrop opined that the High Court should 
not have exercised its power to postpone the election. 
Thakkar, J., delivered a note of dissent. The 
learned judge did not differ on the basic proposition that 
the courts should be reluctant to interefere v/ith the 
Commission's programme. He tried to make a distintion 
between general elections and bye-elections. For a 
bye-election the learned judge observed, "there can be 
no question of imminence" or "indefinite postponement of 
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election" which would stall the installation of a 
64 democratically elected government . On the issue of law 
ad order situation in the State it was observed that "the 
Election Commission appeared to have been altogether 
oblivious to the dimension as regards the bona fide 
apprehension pertaining to the life and security of the 
National leaders v7ho might address public meetings, the 
candidates, the officers engaged in the election V7ork and 
65 the voters" . Justice Thakkar supported the ex parte 
order of the High Court passed in favour of the State on 
its v/rit petition/staying the holding of bey-election on 
the date determined by the Commission. 
On the minority opinion a learned commentator ssys that 
"If the minority view is accepted, it would tantamount to 
saying that in deciding the election schedule, it is the 
satisfaction of the court and not that of the Commission 
that matters. In this respect, the majority view is more 
viable. By apportioning the respective responsibilities of 
the State, the Commission and the Court, it holds 
categorically that the eventual decision in the matter has 
to be that of the Commission" . 
Reviewed Mohinder Singh Gill and A.C. Jose the 
conclusions that emerge from the judgments are that the 
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Commission can legitimately exercise all powers necessary 
for the conduct of a free and fair poll. It cannot, 
however, exercise a power which by its very nature must be 
a preserve of the Parliament. This distinction is fine and 
what powers are outside the Commission's purview must remain 
a question of fact. This position defies a generalisation 
as there are not manay cases fought in the courts. 
Even in Inderjit Baru^ which involved serious 
allegations as to the inclusion of a large number of names 
of non-citizens in the electoral rolls in Assam and the 
question before the Supreme Court was whether or not to 
direct the Comission to carry out an enquiry suo motu in 
the matter, the Court declined to intervene. The reason 
for the refusal to intervene is to be found inter alia in 
the Court's reliance of its confidence in the Commission's 
institutional integrity and impartiality and its 
assumption that the Commission being a constitutional body 
should be left free to act within its 
jurisdictionalspheres unhindered. 
Election Commission V State of Haryana is the first 
case which had involved a court litigation between a State 
as the complainant and the Election Comission as the 
respondent. The State of Haryana had taken the position 
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that primarily it was the state government to decide 
whether the law and order situation was congenial to 
holding a bye-election in a constituency and that the 
Commision's decision to fix a date for the election must 
be guided by the State government's decision. The 
government had put forward forceful arguments in 
justification of its stand. The Supreme Court, while 
admitting that the government was the best judge to 
determine primarily the question of time, upheld the 
position of the Commission saying that the ultimate 
decision whether it was in fact possible to hold the 
election must rest with the Election Commission. The 
judgment is debatable to the extent it gave primacy of 
place to the Election Commission rather than to the State 
governmert in a matter which did not concern the 
jurisdiction of the Commission as much as it concerned the 
government's prerogative to determine oji facts the question 
of feasibility. Here the minority view expressed by 
justice Thakkar seems to carry weight. The learned judge 
disfavoured a situation where the Commission is conceded a 
power to have a conclusive word in the matter of law and 
order situation in the State. It is this reason that the 
learned judge favoured the ex parte order of the High 
Court passed in favour of the State on its writ petition. 
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But that the majority sided with the Commission may be 
explained by an equally weighty argumet that a State 
government may have been persuaded by political 
consideration to postpone the election to buy time to make 
the election produce favourable results. 
It would be fair to conclude that the Supreme Court 
has taken asympathetic view of the Election Commission as 
the constitutional functionary and has done its possible 
best to widen the scope of its jurisdictional competency. 
WORKING OF THE MACHINERY; AN EVALUATION 
The sustenance of political instituations in this 
country depends very largely on the success of the 
electoral machinery and on the extent to which the 
elections conducted by it would evoke public confidence. 
The Election Commission which had been vested with the 
power of superintendence, direction and control of 
elections has conducted ten general elections and a score 
of bye-elections. The Commission/ until the 1991 general 
elections^had acquired for itself a respectable status in 
the constitutional scheme of the governance of the 
country. Indeed, in matters that pertain to elections, the 
only authority v/ith credibility, apart from the courts, to 
has generated public confidence in the electoral process, 
and a faith in the people that the electoral process would 
bring a government of their choice and preference. People 
have accepted major changes of pov/er because the 
Commission's integrity has hardly ever been a subject of 
controversy. The Comission as an institution has brought 
credit to our parliamentary democracy. 
However, the way the Commission has functioned in 
the recent past, particularlyon the occasion of the tenth 
general elections has evoked reactions which have left its 
institutional integrity greatly eroded. Very soon after 
the commencement of the electoral process of the tenth 
general elections, the Commission came to be heavily 
criticised. Almost all the major political parties 
criticised the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC), though 
each for different reasons and some even went to the 
extent of making out a case of impeachment against T.N. 
CO 
Seshan, the CEC . On the allegations of large scale 
electoral malpractices, the Commission decided to 
countermand the elections in five Lok Sabha and fifteen 
Assembly constituencies in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar by a 
seemingly long period of three weeks. The criticism mainly 
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centered round two issues: Firstly, whether the decision 
of the CEC to countermand a number of elections was a 
decision taken in haste and with the dubious objective of 
favouring some political party or parties. Secondly, 
whether the CEC was legally competent to follow the 
procedure he had followed in arriving at his decision. The 
issue thus involved both the propriety of the decision as 
also its legality. On the first issue, the basic 
allegations were that the countermanding of an election^^ 
as permitted by Section 58-A of the Representation of the 
People Act is an extreme step which in the particular 
circumstances was hardly warranted. The core of the 
accusations was that the CEC instead of ordering a repoll 
in as many booths as he suspected of having been affected 
by the use of unfair means, opted for a longer process* 
countermanding out of his own preference without either 
waiting of on - the - spot reports of the elctoral 
officers or in scant disregard of their reports. In some 
cases, the CEC did not wait for on - the-spot reports 
from the electoral officers and in others the reports 
depatched by the Returning Officers/Observers indicated 
malpractices in only some of the following booths, and as 
such necessiating a re-poll only in the affected booths. 
In Patna parliamentary constituency, for instance, the 
Central observer had reported to the Commission that 
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allegations about booth-capturing were received for 23 
polling booths in the Patna constituency on the polling 
day. It also reported that there were reports of snatching 
of ballot-papers at six places and bomb explosions in 
three other places. The Bihar Chief Electoral Officer in 
his report talked about the incidents as the above, but 
stated that the polling was peaceful and went on 
uninterrupted at all places . He added that the trend of 
polling "does not indicate any booth capturing" at a large 
scale. The Central observers also noted that voting was 
about 50 to 65 percent. None of them thus reported any 
large scale incidents of violence or booth capturiang. The 
Bihar Chief Secretary in a message to the Commission noted 
that no report was sought by the Commission from the State 
government before passing the countermanding order. As to 
other constituencies too where the elections were 
countermanded, the criticisms were based on similar 
fact-situations. 
On the second issue indeed a corrolory of the first 
issue, the main allegations were that the correct 
procedure for the CEC would have been to act upon the 
reports of the Returning Officers/Observers. What other 
sources, of information did the Commission have to rely 
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upon for a crucial., decision? If the CEC's judgment was 
based on media reports or on the complaints of specific 
individuals or a specific political party, was it a 
violation of the procedure indicated in Section 58-A? 
This brings us to the question whether the CEC's 
order of countermanding the elections was an error of 
judgment or a violation of a statutory mandate. The CEC's 
decisions must be seen against the political and social 
perspective in which the 1991 elections were to be 
conducted. It was a common allegation that large-scale 
transfers of officials had taken place. The ruling parties 
and groups had managed to get pliable officials posted in 
their - constituencies. Almost every opposition party had 
filed complaints with the CEC against such transfers long 
before the elections. During the 1989 elections, the mass 
media had exposed the professionalisation of rigging and 
booth capturing as also the violence on a very large scale 
in some States^ particularly in U.P. and Bihar which 
indeed are notorious for such incidents. The apprehensions 
that the 1991 eLections may see violence, booth-capturing 
and other electoral malpractices even on a wider scale 
came to be almost true when the first phase of the 
elections started on May 20, 1991. 
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It is true, as the facts have established, that the 
CEC did not depend on the reports of the returning 
officers in case of Bihar and U.P. But it is also true, 
and it is a common belief indeed, that electoral 
malpractices cannot take place in a constituency without 
some kind of connivance, if not active encouragement, of 
the local bureaucracy. The CEC was aware of it and had on 
its records the complaints about mass transfers submitted 
by almost all the political parties. The CEC's defence was 
that the political parties and the local bureaucracy were 
actively involved in the pursuit of unfair practices; the 
situation V7as really bad in U.P. and Bihar while in other 
States the issues were marginal. In defence of its 
position, the CEC even openly observed that the 
"impartiality" of the polling staff, including some 
returning officers "left something to be desired". 
Section 58-A is the lav; which authorises the 
Commission to countermand an election. It lays down that 
if at any election booth capturing has taken place, the 
returning officer shall forthwith report the matter to the 
Election Commission. The Election Commission shall, on the 
receipt of a report from the returning officer and after 
taking all material circumstances into account, either 
declare that the poll at that polling station be void. 
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appoint a day for taking fresh poll at that polling 
station; or if satisfie'^ that in viev/ of the large number 
of polling stations involved in booth capturing the result 
of the election is likely to be affected, or that booth 
capturing had affected counting of votes, countermanc' 
electionin that constituency. 
Secton 58-A does not indicate the sourc 3, apart 
from a report from the returning officer on which the 
Commission may place its reliance for arriving at a 
judgment whether or not the circumstances actually 
warrant a countermanding of the entire election. At law, 
therefore, the CEC is competent to take a decision 
independently of any advice, and to that extent the CEC's 
decision would seem to be unimpeachable. 
But then all said, the alternative availa 
to orde fresh poll in only such polling booths about. WLixCh 
complaints of malpractices were received by the CEC would 
have been perhaps a better course to follow. The CEC may 
or may not have been partisan or politically motivated. 
What is apparent on the face of the situation is that it 
was certainly a case of over-reaction which was hardly 
justifiable on facts as disclosed. The well-known dictum 
that "Justice must not only be done but must be seen to 
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have been done" holds good here too. While the CEC's power 
to countermand an election cannot be questioned, the 
Commission ought to use it only if all other options under 
the law fall short of the objective. In no case should the 
decision appear hasty, partisan and harsh. The people too 
have a right to know the basis on which the CEC takes a 
decision which ultimately concerns them. 
CONCLUSION " 
The above discussion leads to the conclusion that 
all this would call for a fresh look at the electoral 
machinery which is a sine qua non of a viable political 
system. Fairness in elections is the foundation of 
democracy, and this can be achieved only if the electoral 
mechanism, so fondly devised by the Constitution, is able 
to work independently of extraneous pressures. 
The 1991 general elections have badly shaken the 
public confidence in the Commission's institutional 
integrity, which hitherto had been its prized possession. 
It is high time that a fresh look is given to its 
functioning and positive legal measures are taken not only 
to erase the bruises it has suffered but also to make it 
70 
more efficacious a mechanism of regulation and control. 
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provide identity-cars to all eligible voters by 
September 30, 1995 so that the identity-cards can 
be used by the voters in the next Lok Sabha 
elections scheduled in June next year: The 
Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 23 January, 1995. 
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CHAPTER - V 
INDUCEMENT THROUGH BRIBERY 
INTRODUCTION 
Bribery is an offence punishable under Section 171 E 
of the Indian Penal Code which provides for a term 
punishment of one year or fine or both. It further 
provides that where bribery takes the form of 
'treating', i.e. where gratification consists in food, 
drink or any similar entertainment, the punishment would 
be fine only. Under Section 123(1) of the Representation 
of the People Act;,1951 bribery is one of the grounds 
constituting 'corrupt practices'. In election matters, 
bribery may be committed in a variety of ways and at 
various stages of the electoral process. Bribe may be 
offered to the officials at the stage of the scrutiny of 
nomination papers for the purpose of eliminating rival 
candidates or eliminating a name even from the electoral 
rolls, or to a candidate to withdraw from the contest, or 
to a voter to favour the bribe offeror, and in a host of 
other situations. Bribery may take other forms, short of 
offering money, and may be in the nature of treating and 
entertainment or a promise to do some beneficial act. It 
is a common observation that on the eve of an election 
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money plays a big role in the ultimate role of v.'inning an 
election. In the past, a number of elections have been 
challenged on the ground that bribe (in some form or 
other) played its role which materially affected the 
outcome of an election result. In this chapter an attempt 
will be made to find out the nature of the disputes 
brought up for judicial resolution, and also to ascertain 
the basic premise on which the courts have proceeded to 
view 'bribe' as a ground of corrupt practice. 
SCOPE OF THE TERM BRIBERY 
Section 123 (1) of the Act incorporates an 
elaborate definition of the term 'bribery' covering the 
following : 
(A) Any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his 
agent or by any other person with the consent of a 
candidate or his election agent of any 
gratification, to any person whomsoever, with the 
object, directly or indirectly of inducing 
(a) a person to stand or not to stand as, or to 
withdraw or not to withdraw from being a 
candidate at an election, or 
(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at 
an election, or as a reward to 
Wt 
(I) a person for having stood or not stood, or for 
having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his 
candidature, or 
(II) an elector for having voted or refrained from 
voting. 
(B) The receipt of, or agreement to receive, any 
gratification, whether as a motive or a reward 
(a) by a person for standing or not standing as, 
or for withdrawing or not withdrawing, from 
being, a candidate; or 
(b) by any person whatsoever for himself or any 
other person for voting or refraining from 
voting, or inducing or attempting to induce 
any elector to vote or refrain from voting, or 
any candidate to withdraw or not to v/ithdraw 
his candidature. 
Clause (1) explains that the term 'gratification' 
is not restricted to pecuniary gratification or 
gratification estimable in money; it includes all forms of 
entertainment and all forms of employment for rev/ard, but 
does not include the payment of any expenses bona fide 
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incurred at, or for th purpose of, any election and duly 
entered in the account of election expenses referred to in 
Sectio 78 '. 
'Gratification', in its ordinary connotation means 
'satisfaction'. It means something valuable which is 
calculated to satisfy a persons' aim, object or desire, 
whether or not that is estimable in terms of money. Thus 
the explanation to clause (1) of S. 123 makes it clear 
that it is not restricted to pecuniary gratification or 
gratification estimable in money so that it embraces all 
forms of gratification in the ordinary and simple meaning 
of the term. It has also been made clear that the term 
includes all forms of entertainment and all forms of 
employment for reward. 
FORMS OF GRATIFICATION 
It may be noted that the definition of the term 
'gratification' under Section 123 is extensive but not 
exhaustive. The very common forms of gratification and 
modes of offering them may be classified as follows : 
(I) Entertainment 
(II) Employment 
(III) Charity 
(IV) Withdrawal in favour of another 
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(I) Entertainment 
'Gratification' has been explained by Section 123 
to include all forms of entertainment. Voters may be 
induced to vote for candidates who spend lavishly on 
entertaining them with food and drink on a large scale. 
Section 123 seems to prohibit bribery by entertaining or 
treating. 'Treating' is a way of getting at the voters 
through their mouths and through their stomachs t Feeding 
the voters is a common experience. Such entertainment is a 
good means of inducing voters to vote. It cannot be 
excluded from corrupt practice. However, sometimes there 
may be mere ordinary hospitality with no corrupt intention 
to gain votes. 
In the following cases it will be seen how the 
courts/Tribuals have decided whether a particular treating 
would be regarded as innocent or corrupt. An earlier case 
on the point is Daulat Ram V Maharaja Anand Chand & 
2 
others in which the allegation was that respondent 
Maharaja Anand Chand, an ex-Ruler of Bilaspur State, had 
given feeding on a large scale to the members of the 
village Panchayats with a view to influencing them and 
other voters and thereby they committed corrupt practice 
of bribery. 
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The respondent clarified the background that 
previously there existed Halqa Committees in the State. 
After the merger, the Central Government enforced the 
Punjab Panchayat Act in the State and Panches were 
elected by the various Panchayats so established, previous 
Halqa Committees having been dissolved. The election of 
these Panches had taken place in April, 1951. The 
respondent was in his Bilaspur constituency after these 
elections till June 1951 when he left for Bombay. After 
his return from there in September, he issued invitations 
to all the Panches inviting them to a meeting at his 
palace on 2nd October, 1951. In response to these 
invitations nearly all the Panches who had been invited 
attended. The Raja was absent at the time when these 
guests arrived. He returned from a village in the 
afternoon and then met and addressed the invitees. In the 
meantime, the guests were fed by the palace servants.There 
was lunch at noon, tea was served in the afternoon and the 
Panches dined at the palace at night and then dispersed. 
There was no dispute about the above mentioned 
facts. The dispute was only as regards the objects with 
which the meeting had been called and what was spoken to 
the assembled people by the respondent and whether what 
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took place that day vjould amount to the corrupt practice 
of bribery under Section 123(1). 
The petitioner's case was that the Panches had been 
invited with the object of enlisting their support in the 
impending election since the Raja contemplated offering 
himself as a candidate _^—the idea being to approach the 
entire electorate of the State through those 
representative Panches. The respondent, on the other hand 
stated in evidence that he had no such purpose in viev; and 
had called the Panches for a meeting as had been customary 
with him while he was Ruler of that State to occasionally 
meet the representatives of the people y some hospitality 
being extended to them on such occasions. The respondent 
contended that he was not a candidate on 2nd October since 
it was only after 15th October that he began to think 
about his candidature. 
The Election Tribunal, Bilaspur, found that it had 
been traditionally with the respondent as Ruler to provide 
meals to the people when they were invited from long 
distances to meet him at Bilaspur which tradition he had 
continued to maintain even after he ceased to be a Ruler 
after merger. The meals served were ordinary meals which 
persons of the status of those Panches would take, and 
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since the entertainment offered was not thus exceeding the 
limits of customary hospitality, the Tribunal held that 
such customary hospitality was not within the term 
'gratification'. The Tribunal clealy emphasised that a 
corrupt intention was a necessary ingredient to change 
innocent treating into bribery. In the opinion of the 
Tribunal, there was no corrupt intention as the 
entertainment was that of a routine nature. Thus in this 
case the intention to bribe was missing. 
A similar issue of feeding though in a different 
manner arose before the Election Tribunal, Bareilly, in 
3 
Shri Krishna V Rajeshwar Singh . The allegation was that 
one Sri Prakash Chandra Sharma, who was de facto agent of 
respondent No.l toured the whole constituency on 24th, 
25th and 26th September, 1954, and distributed biris, 
cigarettes, gram and qur to the voters for the purpose of 
inducing them to cast vote for respondent No.l. 
The Tribunal held that the allegations, if clearly 
established would certainly amount to bribery as laid down 
in Section 123 (1) which was comprehensive enough to 
embrace within its wide sweep any offer by a candidate or 
his agent or by any other person with the connivance of a 
candidate or his agent, of any gratification whether 
pecuniary or otherwise and all forms of entertainments to 
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any person whomsoever, with the object directly or 
indirectly of inducing an elector to vote or refrain 
from voting at an election. 
However, it was not proved that Prakash Chandra was 
the agent of respondent No.l. Names of the voters who were 
alleged to have been so bribed or the persons through whom 
Prakash Chand offered the bribe were also not given in the 
petition. The Tribunal, therefore, held the charge as 
vague and indefinite. However, the Tribunal was of opinion 
that offer of a biri, cigaretts, etc. is not bribery. It 
observed : 
... it would indeed be doing violence to the 
provisions of the statute and straining it 
unduly if a triffling and customary mode of 
entertainment and courtesy as the offer of a 
biri or cigarette or even of a handful of 
qur and gram ... be termed as 'bribery* 
It seems that the Tribunal's view was that the 
traditional Indian ways of treating people did not amount 
to bribery. However, it is to be noted here that the 
Tribunal first observed that such allegations, if proved, 
v/ould amount to bribery . But at the same time it also 
held that "it would be doing violence to the provisions 
of the statute if a triffling and customary mode of 
entertainment and courtesy be termed as bribery". The 
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apparent cetradiction might be due the fact, and which the 
Commission also took note of, that the articles were not 
distributed at any election meeting or house but 
throughout the constituency. It seems that in the 
Tribunal's view the degree of bribery v/as too low, and 
this did not warrant an interference with the result of 
the election. 
An interesting question before the Allahabad High 
5 
Court in Braj Bhushan V Raia Anand Brahma Shah & others 
was whether distribution of sweets to children following 
procession and raising slogans would amount to bribery. 
The allegation was that sweets were distributed to the 
children in four villages by one Chandramni who had been 
canvassing for the respondent. The corrupt practice 
alleged was said to have been indulged in with the object 
directly or indirectly of inducing electors to vote at the 
election. The respondent took the position that whenever 
he visited those places it was his practice to give some 
money for distribution of sweets among the children of 
that place. 
The Counsel for the petitioner urged that even 
distribution of sweets to some children in the 
constituency when the election was imminent was by itself 
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a corrupt practice. In support of his contention he relied 
upon an English case of Borough of Kingston upon Hull in 
which an election was set aside on account of distribution 
of sweets to school children as well as coal to poor 
people on the election dhy. 
But Sahai J. who wrote the judgment of the Court 
and with whom Desai J., concurred held that even in 
England, in several election cases it has been stressed 
that elections to Parliament have never been "intended to 
dry up the founds of charity". In order to show his public 
spirit, the candidate for election to Parliament is 
expected to render financial assistance to movements, such 
as child welfare, boy scouts and girl guides and the 
clubs, rendering assistance to the unemployed and 
ex-soldiers. They are even expected to render some help to 
the poor and needy. "Cases have arisen in England too wherein 
it has been found difficult to find when charity has 
7 
ended and bribery begun". The Court referred to East 
Nottingham, one of the leading cases on the point, in 
which it was found that the election agent of the 
candidate who had been returned had relieved the necessity 
of several poor people in the constituency during the 
period of election, and the candidate made a clear 
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admission that it was meant to win popularity. The 
election was held to be valid. 
Hov;ever, Sahai J. held that he did not v/ant to make 
any comparision between the English and the Indian 
position. To him, the terms of Section 123 (l)(a) of the 
Act make it clear that it is the motive behind the charity 
that should be taken into consideration to find whether it 
is a " subtle form of bribery" or not. If the motive is 
corrupt, then it is bribery. If it is with a benevolent 
motive then it cannot amount to 'bribery'. Thus the court 
has to find out the motive which actuated the distribution 
of sv;eets in question. 
The Court concluded that in the instant case the 
distribution of sweets to the children who participated in 
the procession of the Raja and raised slogans on his 
behalf could not be said to be a case of 'bribery' and as 
such it did not constitute any corrupt practice even 
though the object behind the distribution of sv^ eets was to 
make the Raja popular in the constituency. 
The Andhra Pradesh High Court in Murlidhar Reddy V 
9 
Paqa Pulla Reddy, while discussing the ambit of 
"treating" was faced with a situation in which it was 
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alleged that tix^ n voters were not approached "through their 
mouths and their stomachs", but by other senses, such as 
eyes and ears. The allegation was that the appellant 
staged a drama, named "Satya Harish Chandra" in his 
constituency to induce the electors to cast their votes in 
his favour. 
The Election Tribunal had held that the said drama 
was staged for the purpose of entertaining the innocent 
voters to gain popularity and hence the appellant was 
guilty of corrupt practice. The High Court, commenting on 
the finding of the Tribunal that "the drama is an 
attraction for the villagers to congregate or assemble 
and, therefore, the meeting and drama were made the forums 
of the election campaign", observed that if really the 
drama was to attract people to assemble at the meeting, 
surely it would not amount to a corrupt practice. In the 
opinion of the Court the drama was staged as part of the 
election campaign and not as an inducement to the 
electorate to vote for the appellant. Delivering the 
judgment, Chandra Reddy C.J. observed : 
... to bring an act within the ambit of 
Section 123 (1), it must be made out that 
the treating was administered "with the 
evil feelings and evil intentions" of 
procuring their votes. Thus, even if the 
drama is within the connotation of 
treating, if it was not got up with the 
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sole object of influencing the voters, it 
cannot be regarded as a corrupt practice. 
It should be remembered that some kind of 
attraction is needed to get the people 
attend a meeting. 
Thus the whole discussion in this case was whether 
the idea behind the staging of the drama was to induce the 
voters to vote or it was simply to attract the people of a 
locality to assemble and listen to the speaker campaigning 
for elections. In the opinion of the High Court, it was 
simply to attract people to assemble and not to induce to 
vote. 
There is no dispute about the proposition that 
treating as such is innocent unless proved that there is 
motive to induce the voters to vote. How to prove this is 
difficult and no satisfactory solutions have been 
provided. 
What seems to be quite obvious from the judgment in 
the above cases is that the judicial opinion does not 
favour reversal of the results of an election if the 
allegation involves a matter too trivial or too 
inconsequential on the outcome of the process of election. 
(II) Employment 
The term 'gratification' under Explanation to 
Section 123 (1) includes all forms of employment for 
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reward. In judging whether an employment amounts to 
corrupt practice of bribery what has to be seen is whether 
the employment is with the object, directly or indirectly, 
of inducing electors to vote for the employer. In other 
words, an employment may amount to corrupt practice of 
bribery if the object of such employment is not to perform 
the work for which he has been employed, but to secure 
votes for the employer. 
The scope of 'employment' was discussed by the 
Orissa High Court in Pyari Mohan Das V Durga Shankar 
Das wherein the allegation was that the respondent had 
paid money by v/ay of gratification to several workers who 
were also electors of his constituency in order to induce 
them to vote for him and also to induce other voters 
likewise. It was also alleged that those persons had 
granted receipts to the respondent for having received 
money from him to vote. 
The respondent argued that he never paid any money 
by way of gratification to anybody either to vote for him 
or to induce others to vote. He also stated that twenty 
five persons named in the petition were workers of the 
respondent and the amounts paid to them represented the 
payments of expenses bona fide incurred at, or for the 
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purpose of election duty entered in the accounts of 
elections expenses, and consequently did not amount to 
corrupt practice of bribery. The respondent further stated 
that he appointed about fifty persons including the 
persons named in the petition for doing the prachar work 
(propaganda); that they had charged only the feeding 
expenses; that the prachar work consisted of distribution 
of leafflets, pasting of posters and calling up the voters 
to vote for the party; that they were each having under 
them 5 to 10 volunteers who were paid their actual 
expenses. 
Balakrishna Rao, J. held that payment of fcoding or 
travelling charged was a legal expenses and could not 
amount to corrupt practice of bribery. It vi?as found that 
there were only two vouchers which showed that the amounts 
were paid not only tov/ards feeding charges, but also 
towards parisramika (labour charges). The appellant 
strongly argued that atleast the payment towards 
parisramika v;as in lav; a payment to a canvassing agent, 
and as such amounted to bribery. But the learned Judge 
held that there was absolutely no evidence that the 
persons who gave the vouchers (i.e. the workers) had in 
any way solicited or persuaded any individual voter to 
vote for the respondent. The learned Judge further held 
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that if a worker was doing the work of putting up posters, 
etc., the worker had to be paid labour charges for the 
work and if money was paid towards that labour, styling it 
as parisramika, it could not be held that it was a 
remuneration paid to a canvassing agent. 
Discussing the scope of the relevant provision, 
BalaKrishna Rao, J. , observed that to come under Section 
123 (1), the act done by the person who was paid 
gratification directly or indirectly, must be something 
more than mere asking the electors to vote for the 
candidate. There must be some influence brought to bear 
upon the will of the voter. In the instant case there was 
no evidence that the workers prevailed upon any voter or 
incited any voter to vote for the respondent. The learned 
Judge concluded that it was oly a colourable employment of 
voters as workers and payments to them that it could be 
treated as bribery. But if the payment v/as commensurate 
with the work done and the number of voters engaged as 
v;orkers V7as commensurate with the work to be done in the 
constituency the payment to such workers could not he held 
as bribery. The Court also took into consideration the 
fact that the number of workers engaged (i.e. 50) by the 
respondent v^ as proportionate to the number of polling 
booths (i.e. 40) and the area of the constituency. 
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Narasimham, C.J., echoing the same feeling observed 
that the respondent had duly entered into accounts all 
payments made to his v;orkers, and, therefore, his bona 
fides were undoubtedly beyond question as the explanation 
to sub-section (1) of Section 123 expressly says that "the 
payment of any expenses bona fide incurred at or for the 
purpose of an election and duly entered in the account of 
election expenses" wouldnot amount to bribery. The sums 
paid to the workers v/ere not so large as to lead to an 
inference that they did not represent the expenses 
incidental to canvassing, i.e., espenses connected with 
travelling allowance, food expenses, cost of posters, etc. 
A similar question like the one in Pyari Mohan Das 
came for consideration before the same High Court in 
17 Akshoya Narayan Prahara:] V Maheshwar Bag. The contention 
was that the appellant was guilty of bribery because he 
engaged paid convassers who were themselves voters in the 
constituency, in order to induce the voters to vote on his 
behalf. It was argued that as revealed from the accounts 
book the payment to workers was made by way of "rewards", 
and this would amount to bribery within the meaning of 
Section 123 (1). The appellant clarified the point by 
saying that the v;ord was wrongly used by his son who wrote 
the accounts and that by "reward" he only meant food 
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charged (khoraki). He, hov;ever, accepted that he engaged 
50 to 60 propagandists v;ho went about in the constituecy 
asking the people to vote for him, and that he paid them 
some money towards their expenses. One of' the witnesses 
admitted that he received Rs.15/- and gave a voucher to 
the appellant for doing prachar work for him in the 
constituency, but he stated that for such propaganda work 
he had purchased paper, gum and also got printed pamphlets 
and that the sum actually spent for these purposes was much 
more than the money he received from the appellant. The 
Court accepted that the amount was given as incidental 
expenses, as there v;as no other evidence except the 
entries in the account book. The respondent argued that 
under the English law, as mentioned in Halsbuiy's Laws of 
18 England, though expenses incidental to a canvassing are 
permissible, the employment of a paid canvasser would 
amount to a corrupt practice. The Court did not decide 
that issue and held it as "unnecessary to decide" whether 
if a person was engaged as a convasser for a candidate at 
an electionand he was paid for working as a canvasser, 
such payment would amount to bribery on the ground that it 
was made with the object of indirectly inducing the 
electors to vote, canvassing being only a medium through 
v;hich a candidate induced the voters to vote for him. The 
Court held that the sums were very small and would 
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ordinarily just suffice to the boarding, travelling and 
other incidental expenses of the workers. Narasimham, 
C.J./ who delivered the judgment of the"Court on behalf of 
himself and Balakrishna Rao, j., observed : 
If the sums paid are large and disproportionate 
to the expenses incidental to election, the 
legal question will have to be discussed at 
great length. On the facts of this case this 
question is academic and I would leave it 
^ 19 open. 
In this case no decision was taken regarding paid 
canvasser. Since the amount involved was low, the Court 
accepted it as incidental charges; in other words, 
proportionate. The Court did not decide as indeed it was 
.would 
not called upon to decide what^happen if sums were large 
and disproportionate. 
Employing voters and workers on remunearation would 
not amount to bribery under Section 123 (1) unless it is 
established that they were so employed by the candidate 
with the object of inducing them to vote in his favour or 
20 to refrain from voting at the election. 
(Ill) Charity 
Charity with the object of securing votes is a common 
category of bribery.If donation is given in charity it 
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V7ill become bribery if corrupt motive exists. Sometimes, 
hovjever, there are genuine acts of charity. Usually it is 
very difficult to ascertain where charity ends and bribery 
begins. "It is obvious that what are called charitable 
gifts may be nothing more than a specious and subtle form 
of bribery, a pretext to veil the corrupt purpose of 
gaining or securing the votes of the recipient. A motive 
originally pure cannot become corrupt by reason of a 
misuse of what was originally intended to be a benefit 
21 
• • • 
A number of elections have been challenged in the 
courts and the basic question the courts were called upon 
to determine was whether in a given case a charitable act 
v/as actuated by a genuine desire to render help or was 
designed with a corrupt motive to secure an electoral 
gain. Following are a set of examples in each of which the 
concerned court found itself reluctant to intervene in the 
absence of a positive proof of a corrupt motive: 
(I) Offer of land and cattle to the landless and the poor 
22 In Swaminatha Merkondar V Ramalingam, the 
Election Tribunal, Tiruchirapalli, discussing the scope of 
the phrase "Offer of gratification to any person 
whomsoever" occuring in Section 123(1) of the Act held 
that i±...=fihould held that it should be given a liberal and 
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reasonable interpretation as the legislature could not 
have intended thata narrow interpretation should be put 
upon it. The Tribunal held that offer of land and cattle 
to the landless and the poor, irrespective of caste, 
creed, community and religion did not constitute an offer 
of such a nature as to constitute an offence of bribery. 
"For, giving of land to the landless and improving the 
position of the poor in general is in line with the 
lessening of inequality of wealth and income which is a 
commonly accepted aim and object of statesmen and 
23 governments m most modern democratic countries". The 
Tribunal concluded that it is the corrupt motive and 
improper and unfair intention v;hich is contemplated by 
the legislature (by a reasonable and proper interpretation 
of the Section) as necessary to make out the 'corrupt 
practice' of bribery, under Section 123 (1). 
(II). General promises to redress public grievences 
General promises to redress public grievances or to 
secure amentes for the public, like hospitals, schools, 
etc., camefor consideration in Radha Krishna Shukla V Tara 
24 Chand Maheshwar. The allegation was that the 
respondents, their workers and agents openly said that no 
development scheme would be undertaken in the constituency 
until and uless the electors voted for the respondents. 
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The respondents denied all the allegations and the 
petitioners did not succeed in establishing those charges. 
However, the Election Tribunal, Lucknow, held that even if 
those allegations were true they would not amount to 
bribery or undue influence. It observed that it is the 
right and privilege of every candidate and every party 
setting up a candidate to put before th electorate his or 
ts views and programmes so that the electorate might 
decide which of the rival candidates to prefer. "Such 
election manifestos or programmes are quite usual in 
democracies and no serious objection has ever been taken 
in respect of them. Clause (b) of the proviso to clause 
(2) of Section 123 appears to have been enacted with this 
25 purpose m view. Following the liberal interpretation 
p (• 
given in Swaminatha , che Tribunal pointed out that the 
things which were promised to be constructed would have 
been of use to every elector even if he did not vote for 
him. In Bankabehari Das V Chittranjan Nair^^^^^ ^^^ 
petitioner's contention was that in all the several 
villages mentioned in the petition the respondent promised 
gratification by circulating a pamphlet entitled 'My 
Binjiharpur programme' in which the respondent made 
several promises regarding, inter alia, construction of 
roads, improvement of agriculture and irrigation. 
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education, housing, health etc. — all with the object of 
inducing the electors to vote for the respondent and 
thereby the respondent committed the 'corrupt practice' of 
bribery. The Orissa High Court observed that if a 
candidate for election gives a promise of obtaining 
personal advantage to the voters, he commits a corrupt 
practice of bribery as defined in Section 123 (1) of the 
Act. But it cannot be a promise of gratification, where 
the promise is one under which no personal advantage can 
be obtained by any voter, and such advantage for the 
benefit of the whole constituency is obtained by the 
respondent by using his influence in such a way that 
public action by the State Government in its development 
plans is to ensure to the benefit of the residents of his 
constituenvjy. "it means that it is not promise of 
gratification when a promise is a promise relating to a 
public action and is not a promise relating to any private 
or personal benefit to any voter. In fact when elections 
are held, the very purpose of the election is that the 
Government and its public action would be influenced by 
the candidate for the benefit of the voters who send him 
as a representative. Being a representative of the voters 
of his constituency it is one of his duties and functions 
to influence the decisions of the executive in such a 
manner that the residents of his constituency should be 
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(III) Promise to see that Harijans get well 
27 In Sarla Devi Pathak V Birendra Singh it was 
alleged that the respondent had, in pursuance of a demand 
made by Harijans at a meeting addressed by her attended 
the auspicious digging ceremony of a well for Harijans, 
and while performing the ceremony, promised to have a well 
constructed for Harijans at the village, after the 
elections were over. In other words, the crucial issue in 
the case was whether the appellant promised to the 
Harijans to construct a v/ell for them with the object of 
directly or indirectly inducing them to vote for her. The 
Election Tribunal held that the appellant was guilty of 
the corrupt practice alleged and consequently it set aside 
her election. The judgment of the Tribunal was set aside 
by the M.P. High Court, In the opinion of the Court there 
v/as no specific allegation that the promise was to give 
any financial help, not of the fact that the promise was 
made with a corrupt motive, nor that it was made with the 
object of directly or indirectly inducing all or some of 
the Harijan voters of the village to vote for the 
appellant. The Tribunal had mainly relied on the oral 
evidence of two v;itnesses, coupled with some 
circumstantial evidence. In this connection the High Court 
found that the evidence of the v^ 7itnesses relied upon by 
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the petitioner-respondent in support of his allegations 
regarding the corrupt practice of a promise of bribery in 
question was inherently weak and unreliable in itself; it 
was not consistent in that one witness did ot agree with 
another on important points; nor did it accord with the 
other evidence on record. Therefore the Court rejected the 
evidence and held that the appellant was not guilty of a 
corrupt practice of bribery. In deciding the case the 
Court kept in mind that the sound principle of natural 
justice that the success of a candidate, who has won at an 
election, should not be lightly interfered with, and any 
petitioner seeking such interference must strictly confirm 
to the requirements of the law. 
(IV) Promise to get new allotment of lands 
28 
In a case before the Punjab High Court the 
allegation was that one Mehr Singh had promised that he 
would get the allotment of lands of Bahawalpuri displaced 
persons in Faridkot Tehsil cancelled and instead get them 
land allotted in Tehsil Sirsa and get the valuation of 
their lands in Bahawalpur State revised by the Government 
in case they voted for him, and he actually caused the 
Revenue Minister to visit some villages to support him in 
this promise. 
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Falshv.'a, J., agreeing v,'ith the findings of the 
Tribunal held that there was no corrupt practice. He 
observed that even if the cadidate did make a promise 
that he would try to get grievances remedied and get the 
Revenue Minister to reinforce his promise, this amounted 
to only a promise of public action and not individual 
benefit to such persons. 
(V) Declaration to develop constituency 
Again, a general declaration by a candidate that if 
he is elected he would see that expenditure on development 
plans are incurred in his constituency was held not to be 
a corrupt practice as the promise was of a general 
29 
nature. The Tribunal held that, infact, the legislature 
intended propaganda relating to a public action to be 
freely permitted. 
(VI) Promise to retain old moscpie as temple 
30 In Balwant Rai Tayal V Bishan Saroop the 
allegation v/as that the candidate while canvassing made a 
promise to the Harijans of a locality that he would do his 
best to help them in retaining an old mosque as a temple 
and for getting land for building houses. It was alleged 
that the promise directly induced the Harijans to vote for 
the candidate. The Punjab High Court, reversing the order 
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of the Tribunal/ held that it was a kind of promise which 
any candidate was entitled to give to any section of his 
electors and hence no act of bribery was committed. 
(VII) Gift of land to Bhoodan Saniiti 
31 It was alleged in Mast Ram V Iqbal Singh that the 
respondent made a gift of 48ii bighas of land to Bhocdaii 
Samiti whose object was to directly induce the tenants, 
electors and Bhoodan workers to vote and work for the 
respondent. 
The Election Tribunal, Amritsar, held that the 
Bhoodan movement was started to improve the lot of the 
poor in general, and to narrow down the inequality of 
wealth and income in the society and hence it was not 
covered by the definition of 'bribery'. It also emphasised 
"that in Bhoodan movement the donated land is distributed 
several months after the donation and it is not known at 
the time of donation who would ultimately be benefitted by 
a particular gift. 
(VIII) Publication of a person's photograph 
The contention that the publication of a person's 
photograph in a newspaper amounts to gratification as the 
Explanation to sub-section (i) of Section 123 of the Act 
17! 
refers to "all forms of entertainment and all forms of 
employment for reward", was not accepted by the Bombay 
33 High Court. 
(IX) Construction of wellsr etc. by the Chairman of Local 
Board on the eve of election 
In a petition before the Assam High Court in 
Brijesh Misra V Ram Nath Sarma & Others, it was 
contended that the candidate, who was also the chairman of 
a Local Board, on the eve of election sanctioned the 
construction of wells and tube-wells and granted financial 
help to the primary schools. The evidence, however, showed 
that the Board sanctioned the construction of these v/ells 
and the public works' sub-committee made the selection of 
the sites in the normal course of business of the Board 
and hence the court opined that there v/as no any illegal 
gratification offered by the candidate to the voters so as 
to constitute an offence of bribery. 
(X) Promise to obtain benefit if elected 
Where it was said that persons other than belonging 
to the Congress party had not proved beneficial to the 
constituency and that if the Congress candidate was 
elected he v/ould obtain benefits for the voters, because 
he was a member of the Congress party; but there was 
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no threat that the Congress candidate v;ould use his 
influence as a Congress member or would influence the 
Ministers not to carry out the beneficial schemes in the 
constituecy in case he v\ras not elected, it was held that 
no corrupt practice had been committed. 
In the following cases, however, the plea of 
corrupt motive behind charity was accepted. 
(I) Offer of money to complete school building 
. 3 4 In Shankare Gowda V Mariyappa , the respondent 
offered some money to the members of the Managing 
Committee of a High School for its construction, as its 
building was incomplete, if they influenced voters 
surrounding the High School in his favour. In this case it 
was proved that the respondent offered Rs.4000/- for the 
construction of High School and when it was pointd out 
that it was a bribe, he wanted it to be treated as a 
donation. The question was whether the amount could be 
treated as donation. The Election Tribunal, Mysore, 
answered in the negative and held that it was meant to 
secure votes at the time when election was imminent. It 
observed: 
... that there should be no sort of influence 
on the electorate in the guise of charity for 
securing votes when the election is imminent. 
173 
It is the motive which is behind charity that 
should be taken into consideration in finding 
whether it is a "subtle form of bribery" or 
not. If the motive is corrupt, then it is 
bribery ... If it is with a benevolent 
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motive, then it cannot amount to bribery. 
In this case it was proved on facts that the 
respondent had first asked the voters to accept the amount 
for construction of a High School to get him votes, and 
when the grant attracted objections, he wanted it to be 
treated as a donation. The Tribunal refused to treat it as 
donation, but considered the gesture as a motive to secure 
votes. 
(II) Promise to construct well on villagers' demand 
It v/as alleged in Magan Lai Baqdi V Hari Vishnu 
Kamath that the appellant who was a Congress candidate 
along with another candidate, Sarla Devi Pathak, had 
addressed a public meeting of voters in village Singhpur 
where the villagers demanded the construction of the well 
and for that purpose a site was selected and there the 
appellant and Sarla Devi performed the consecrating 
ceremony and promised to construct the well after the 
election. It was alleged that this was done with the 
object of inducing the voters to vote for the appellant. 
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The M.P. High Court accepted the finding of the 
Tribunal that the appellant and Sarla Devi had in fact 
deposited Rs.500/- for the construction of the well. The 
appellant admitted that he was present in the village on 
the date when the well was being dug. On the basis of such 
facts the Court held that the well was being dug at his 
instance and as a bait for voters. 
(Ill) Promise to repair a Durgah 
An offer or promise to repair and renovate a Durgah 
with the object of inducing the Muslim voters in the 
locality to help a candidate in his election is covered by 
the definition of bribery under Section 123(1) of the 
37 Act. 
SDPREME COURT ON CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTION 
In an earlier decision of the Supreme Court in 
38 Khader Sheriff V Munnuswami Gounder & others , 
Venkatarama Ayyar J., speaking for himself and S.R. Das, 
Acting C.J., said, "It has been frequently pointed out 
that while it is meritorious to make a donation for 
charitable purposes, if that is made at the time, or on 
the eve of an election, it is open to the charge that its 
real object was to induce the electors to vote in favour 
of the particular candidate, and that it should therefore 
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able to obtain full advantage of all plans prepared by and 
action sought to be taken by the executive 
Government. The High Court further observed that even 
if a candidate does make promise that he will try to get 
grievances remedied and in fact gets the executive to 
reinforce his promise, this amounts to only a promise of 
public action and not individual benefit to such persons. 
Such promise does not amount to corrupt practice. In the 
opinion of the Court, the word 'gratificaton' in Section 
123(1) must not be interpreted narrowly but liberally and 
an offer made by a candidate of general amenities to 
public or to a section of the public irrespective of 
caste, creed, community and religion does not constitute 
an offer or promise of such a nature as to constitute 
'bribery'. "The Court is always to consider whether the 
promise in question has degenerated to a promise of 
private or personal advantage in which case it will amount 
to promise of gratification within the meaning of Section 
123(1). ^^' The Orissa High Court has thus made it clear 
that it is not an offer or promise of gratificaton to any 
of the voters, if a propaganda is carried out by a 
candidate for the purpose of telling the voters that he 
would be only doing his duty towards them by influencing 
Government actions so as to obtain benefit for them. 
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39 be treated as election expense". In order to give 
further support to his argument the learned Judge referred 
40 to the well known observation in the Wigan case. Therein 
Bawen J. had observed: 
"Charity at election times ought to be kept 
by politicians in the background ... In 
truth, I think, it will generally be found 
that the feeling which distributes relief 
to the poor at election time, though those 
who are the distributors may not be aware 
of it, is really not charity, but party 
feeling following in the steps of charity, 
v/earing the dress of charity, and mimicking 
h'?r gait". 
In Khader Sheriff, the Tamil Nad Congress 
Committee rules provided that a person who wished to 
contest as a candidate on the Congress ticket had to 
apply to the Committee and pay a subscription of Rs.lOO, 
which was not returnable, and also a deposit of Rs.4O0 
which was to be returned if the person concerned was not 
selected as party candidate. The appellant submitted an 
application to the Committee seeking the Congress ticket 
for himself, fulfilling all formalities. He also paid 
another Rs.500 to the District Congress Committee as a 
donation. It was beyond dispute that candidates were 
selected on the recommendation of the District Congress 
Committee which spent money out of the donation for 
carrying on propaganda for Congress candidates. The 
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appellant, however, did not show these two items of Rs.500 
in the return of election expenses and had he included 
them the expenses would have exceeded the maximum 
permitted by the Rules. 
The Supreme Court, affirming the decision of the 
Election Tribunals held that the payment in question could 
not be regarded as innocent and not motivated by the 
desire to obtain the recommendatios of the District 
Congress Committee. Thus the amount (Rs.500/-) was not 
considered a charitable donation but an expenditure 
incurred for furthering his prospects as a candidate and 
this sum also should have been shown in the return. 
It is to be noted that the observation in this case 
was made in conection with the question whether the amount 
so spent should be treated as election expense. The 
necessary effect of the gift beig to induce the electors to 
vote for a particular candidate, the same may constitute 
corrupt practice within the meaning of Sectio 123 (1) of 
the Act. 
The above discussion shows that under Section 123 
(l)(a) of the Act it is the motive behind an act of 
charity that decides whether it amounts to bribery. 
Unless the motive is to induce an elector to vote or 
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refrain from voting or to reward him for having done so, 
acts of charity would not amount to bribery. 
Ascertainment of the motive behind a charitable act 
is a different judicial task. Similar facts may lead two 
courts to arrive at varying conclusions on the question 
whether a particular act is actuated by a desire to be 
charitable or to 'bargain' for votes. This explains why 
some of the judgments discussed above are hardly 
reconcilable with one another. 
(IV) Ministerial Grace 
Wooing the electorate through election-eve 
largesses seems to have become an established practice 
now-a-days. It has been seen that the government in power 
rushes through sanctioning development projects and other 
welfare schemes, pending before it, soon after the poll 
schedule is announced. Even wholly new schemes are hastily 
drawn and approved which may win favour of the electorate. 
There have been instances when certain schemes already 
pending before the government were in fact deliberately 
kept in abeyance for quite sometime and were cleared only 
after the poll dates were announced. Central as well as 
State Ministers are inclined to render special services to 
their constituencies because such favouritism sometimes 
pc ys rich political dividends. 
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There have been numerous judgments by the courts in 
India which have decided whether the acts of the ministers 
would be categorised "nursing" or "bribing" the 
constituency. The first well-known judgment of the Supreme 
Court on the point which has become locus classicus is 
41 Ghasi Ram V Dal Singh. The appellant Ghasi Ram 
challenged the election on the grounds, inter alia, that 
prior to his election, the respondent, who was a Minister 
for Irrigation and Power in the State Government and had 
available with him a sum of Rs.50,000 in his discretionary 
fund, had used the funds to bribe the voters. The 
Minister, it was further alleged, had prior to the 
election visited several villages in his constitutency and 
the voters had told him that they would not vote for him 
as he had done nothing for their welfare. He had therefore 
made discretionary grants to Gram Panchayats, given funds 
for the construction of a sacred tank in one village, for 
building public utility works, community centres and for 
repairs of Harijan wells in different villages. 
The supreme Court, accepting the verdict of the 
High Court which had dismissed the petition, held that a 
corrupt practice involving bribery must be fully 
established. The evidence must show clearly that the 
promise or gift directly or indirectly was made to an 
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elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election. 
However, Hidayatullah J., who delivered the judgment, made 
it clear that a Minister stood on a different footing.In 
the words of the learned Judge : 
The position of a Minister is difficult. It 
is obvious that he cannot cease to function 
when his election is due. He must improve 
the image of his administration before the 
public. If everyone of his official acts 
done bona fide is to be construed against 
him and an ulterior motive is spelled out 
of them, the administration must 
42 
necessarily come to a stand-still. 
In the instant case, the Court held that there was 
no evidence to show that the Minister bargained directly 
or indirectly for votes. Whatever the public work was done 
by the Minister was done for the benefit of the whole 
village community. Moreover the money was not distributed 
among the voters directly but was given to Panchayats and 
the public at large. 
Although the proof of corrupt practice of bribery 
was rejected by Hidayatullah, J. , but, it seems, that the 
learned Judge was convinced that during election days 
politicians do take undue advantage of their positions and 
hence he coutioned: 
Election is something which must be conducted 
fairly. To arrange to spend money on the eve 
of elections in different constituencies 
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although for general public good, is when all 
is said and done an evil practice, even if it 
may not be corrupt practice. The dividing 
line between an evil practice and a corrupt 
practice is a very thin one. It should be 
understood that energy to do public good 
should be ... not on the eve of elections but 
much earlier and that even slight evidence 
might change this evil practice into corrupt 
practice. Payments from discretionary grants 
43 
on the' eve of elections should be avoided. 
After pronouncing judgment in Ghasi Ram on 
February 7, 1968, Hidayatullah,J., decided Om Prabha Jain 
44 V Abnash Chand on the same day dealing with the same 
issue, i.e., whether making of discretionary grant by a 
Minister on the eve of election amounts to bribery or not. 
Applying the test laid down in Ghasi Ram, i.e., "that a 
Minister in the discharge of his duties may be required to 
do some acts of administration including the granting of 
money for the uplift of a certain communities and this 
action of the Minister is not to be construed against him 
unless it can be establishd that there was a bargain v/ith 
the voters for getting their assistance at the 
45 
election", Hidayatullah, J., held that whatever the 
Minister had dcaie was done in the course of her duties as 
Minister and no direct or indirect bargain was involved 
thereby bringing the situation within the ambit of 
corrupt practice of bribery. 
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. 46 In Bhanu Kumar Shastry V Mohan Lai Sukhadia , too, 
the commission of corrupt practice of bribery on the eve 
of election was the issue before the Supreme Court. The 
election of respondent Mohan Lai Sukhadia who was the 
Chief Minister of Rajasthan at the time of the election, 
was challenged. The appellant contested the election on 
Jan Sangh ticket. The respondent v/as a Congress candidate 
and had won the election. In an appeal against the 
judgmen of the Rajasthan High Court the appellant pressed 
allegations first about Pattas in Raigar colony; secondly, 
about roads in Tekri, thirdly, covering of Nallah in 
Baluchistan colony, fourthly, construction of 
47 
water-taps. 
Considering the position of ministerial 
responsibility the Supreme Court relied on Ghasi Ram and 
Om Prabha Jain and observed : 
The provisions in the Representation of the 
People Act are intended to preserve the 
purity of the election, but at the same 
time these provisions should not be 
subverted for the impure purposes of 
maligning candidates who happen to be in 
the Government on the eve of election. The 
normal bona fide acts of persons who happen 
to be Ministers have to be kept separate 
from abuse of the opportunities of power 
and resources which are not available to 
their opponents. 
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The Court further observed 
The Court is alv;ays vigilant to watch not 
only the conduct of the candidates and to 
protect their character from being 
defamed but also to see that the 
character and conduct of the public is 
not corroded by corrupt motive or evil 
purposes of candidates. The genuine and 
bona fide aims and aspirations of 
candidates have to be protected on the 
one hand and malafide abuse and arrogance 
of power will have to be censured on the 
49 
other. 
The Supreme Court, dismissing the appeal for want 
of proper evidence, made it emphatically clear that in all 
cases a Minister would not be left untouched simply 
because he had undertaken public work on the eve of 
election, if it is found that a Minister had abused his 
power and position by utilising public revenues for 
conferring benefit on a particular group of people for 
achieving votes, the story would be different. 
There were two allegations of corrupt practices of 
bribery in Iqbal Singh V Gurdas Singh. The first one was 
that large sums of money were distributed by the brother 
of the respondent, Prakash Singh Badal, who was the then 
Chief Minister of Punjab, to Harijans in the form of 
contribution towards construction of Dharamshalas for the 
purpose of inducing them to vote in favour of the 
respondent. Regarding the promise of construction of 
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Dharamshalas at the election time, the Supreme Court held 
there is no doubt that during election period people in 
power as well as ordinary politicians become very active, 
address meetings and make all sorts of promises. There is 
nothing wrong if the people get certain amenities a little 
easily because it happens to be an election time. 
Alagiriswami, J. who delivered the judgment said : 
... It may not amount to setting up a very 
high standard and it may be very desirable 
that whatever is done for people should be 
done by persons in authority throughout the 
period of their office. But they naturally 
are more active at election time than other 
times. That cannot be said to amount to 
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corruption. 
The second allegation was that the Chief Minister 
directed two Assistant Returning Officers to distribute 3, 
304 and 485 gun licences respectively to induce voters to 
vote for the respondent as the Chief Minister in various 
public meetings had promised to help the voters in various 
ways. In this connection the Supreme Court first said that 
it must be proved that the Cheif Minister had addressed a 
number of meetings promising to issue gun licences if they 
would vote for his brother. But the Court found that there 
was no allegation in the election petition relating to 
the meetings he addressed or his having held out the 
promise in those meetings that he would issue gun licences 
if the people vote for his brother. 
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But at the same time the Court also clarified that 
even if it is proved that the returned candidate or his 
agent held out an incumbent to get licences issued for 
people v/ho voted for the returned candidate, it vi?ould not 
amount to bribery. It thus observed: 
We are of opinion that the word gratification 
should be deemed to refer only to cases where 
a gift is made of something which gives a 
material advantage to the recipient ... A gun 
licence gives no material advantage to its 
recipients. It might gratify his sense of 
importance if he has a gun licence in a 
village where nobody else has a gun licence. 
So might the conferment of an honour like 
52 Padma Bhushan ... 
In the opinion of the Court there was thus no 
bargaining involved in the promise of granting licences. 
It also defined the term "bargain" for the purpose thus: 
"If a candidate or his agent pays money to a voter saying 
that he wants him to vote it is a bargain for the purpose 
of this Section. It is not necessary that the voter should 
say that he would vote and thereafter the candidate or his 
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agentshould pay the money. 
Relyig on its earlier decisions, the Supreme Court 
held that the promise to grant licences would really 
amount to a redressal of the grievances of a class of the 
public or rendering them any help. Since in the instant 
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case there was no evidence of obtaining a promise from the 
voters in return, there was no bargaining. 
This case is important from different angles. 
First, this is for the first time that the word "bargain" 
vvas defined for the purpose of Section 123(1) of the Act. 
Earlier the Supreme Court had only held that 'ministerial 
grace' would amount to bribery once it v/as proved that 
•bargain' v/as involved behind the distributicn of fundson 
the eve of election. Secondly, the case also deviates 
from the meaning of the word "gratification". It may be 
recalled that the Explanation to Section 123 Clause (1) of 
the Act defines gratification thus : "For the purposes of 
this Clause the term 'gratification' is not restricted to 
pecuniary gratifications or gratifications estimable in 
money and includes all forms of entertainment 
'Gratification', in its ordinary connotation, means 
satisfaction or something that pleases. It means something 
valuable which is calculated to satisfy a person's aim, 
object, or desire, whether or not that is estimable in 
terms of money. On the other hand, in the case under 
discussion, the Supreme Court defined the said term as 
"something which gives a material advantage to the 
recipient". It further said, "A gun licence gives no 
material advantage to its recipients". But the Court also 
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said, "It might gratify his sense of importance if he has 
a gun licence in a village where nobody else has a gun 
licence. So might the conferment of an honour like Padma 
Bhushan". 
The decision, thus, it is submitted, is contrary 
to the meaning of the word "gratification" laid down 
under the Act. There is also no sense in comparing the 
distribution of licence with the conferment of an honour 
like Padam Bhushan. Titles like Padma Bhushans, etc. are 
conferred by the Government of India on its citizens and 
sometimes also non-citizens, once a year in recognition of 
their distinguished public services rendered in different 
disciplines of life. The awardees belong to different 
religions and different regions. Their number is 
insignificatn keeping in view the number of electorates in 
India. There is not a single instance in the history of 
free India to prove that such awards paid rich political 
dividends to the Government at the centre. Although there 
has been criticism against award of such titles as they 
are generally political in nature, but that politics has 
nothing to do with election. 
54 In Dhartipakar V Rajiv Gandhi, one of the 
allegations was that Amethi railway station (Amethi being 
Rajiv Gandhi's Lok Sabha Constituency) was being 
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constructed and during the election its work was speeded 
up which persuaded the voters to cast their vote in favour 
of the returned candidate. The Supreme Court held that 
there was no allegation that Rajiv Gandhi or his workers 
with his consent made any gift, offer or promise to any 
elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election. "If 
some development activity was carried on in the 
constituency and if it was completed during the election 
period it could not amount to any gift or promise to the 
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voters . 
The above discussion shows the cases in which 
allegations of corrupt practices were levelled whenever 
the Ministers concerned were personally involved in the 
distribution of funds or promising developmental schemes 
on the eve of elections. Sometimes, however, there are 
situations in which the party in power gives certain 
benefits to the electorate in general or to a class of 
electorate based on region or profession. Whenever and 
wherever such benefits are announced. Ministers publicly 
highlight such schemes either for their personal 
canvassing or for their party candidature. Again, the 
question is, whether such campaigning will come under the 
rubric of corrupt practice of bribery? One such question 
arose in Soowalal V P.K. Chaudhary of which the facts 
were that a Minister of State addressed a meeting at which 
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he canvassed for the respondent, the candidate set up by 
the Congress Party. The salt traders of the locality 
brought to the notice of the Minister the pathetic 
condition of salt traders because of deterioration in the 
salt trade. The Minister promised to give concession to 
the salt traders. The Rajasthan Government raised the 
quota of salt from 20 percent to 50 percent, a week before 
the date of polling and thereafter a pamphlet stating that 
the quota had bee increased was widely circulated by the 
Congress candidate and his agents to improve the chances 
of his success. It was urged that the said act of the 
Government amounted to bribery on a large scale. 
There was no denying the fact that the quota was 
increased and the news was given wide publicity. A 
division bench of the Rajasthan High Court observed : 
It is the duty of the Government as a welfare 
state to do everything in their power to 
increase the prosperity of the people of the 
State, and this is so, notv/ithstanding that 
the election may be close at hand. The 
Government cannot disregard its duty of 
granting relief to the people for the reason 
that the election may be in progress. 
However, if the grant of relief by the 
Government to the people may be shown as an 
inducement for casting votes for the 
candidate of their party, the act of 
Government may come within the mischief of 
section 123(1) of the Representation of the 
57 People Act. 
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The High Court further held that mere increase in 
the quota of salt by the Government during election days 
by itself could not raise a presumption that the increase 
was for the purpose of securing success for the Congress 
candidate. However, the Court held, i^f it can be 
satisfactorily established that the increase in the quota 
of salt was granted for the purpose of securing votes for 
the Congress candidate, the cotention that the election 
was not free might be accepted as proved. And the Court 
found that there was no sufficient evidence to prove that 
the quota was increased by the Government at the request 
of the respondent or his agents for the purpose of 
inducing salt traders to vote for the respondent. Finally, 
the Court pronounced that it would not amount to corrupt 
practice for a candidate to make a propaganda about the 
policy and achievements of the Government of his party in 
order to secure votes in his favour. Consequently the 
election was not set side on the ground of corrupt 
practice of bribery as it could not be shown that the 
increase in the quota of the salt was granted as a price 
for the votes. On similar lines was the decision of the 
58 Supreme Court in H.V. Kamath V Nitarj Singh in which the 
appellant v/as the Praja Socialist Party candidate and the 
respondent represented Congress Party. The respondent was 
declared duly elected. At the time of the election, the 
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Congress Party was in pov:er headed by D.P. Mishra as the 
Chief Minister. The first charge was that two months 
before the election, Chief Minister D.P. Mishra promulated 
an Ordinance exempting agriculturalists holding land less 
than 7.50 acres or paying land revenue not exceeding 
Rs.5/- from payment of land revenue, that D.P. Mishra as 
the agent of the respondent and with his consent made 
speeches announcing the benefit of such exemption and that 
the respondent thus committed the corrupt practice of 
bribery. 
The evidence showed that the exemption of 
uneconomic holding from payment of land revenue was being 
agitated for some time past. Towards the close of 1966 a 
resolution was moved by the Opposition groups in the M.P. 
Vidhan Sabha urging such exemption. But at that time no 
bill was passed. Later the Government reconsidered the 
matter and exemption was granted, which was welcomed by 
all the parties including the Praja Socialist Party. In 
spite of this, the opposition parties raised slogan : 
"Lagan Maaf Zamin Saaf", on the eve of election. On the 
other hand, refusing the propaganda, D.P. Mishra raised 
the slogan "Lagan Maaf Sab Party Saaf". The Court also 
found that a pamphlet was published by a Congress Party 
member refuting the false propaganda that the exemption 
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was temporary and was granted in order to benefit the 
lands. Bachawat, J., speaking for the Court, held that it 
was impossible to say that the respondent committed the 
corrupt practice of bribery. His Lordship observed: 
The Ordinance was passed by the Government 
of Madhya Pradesh. As a result of the 
Ordinance a large number of agriculturists 
got exemption from land revenue. Such an 
exemption does not amount to a gift, offer 
or promise of any gratification within the 
meaning of Section 123(1). Nor is it 
possible to say that the Government was 
the agent of the respondent. It is true 
that the Congress Party was then in power. 
But the exemption was not given by the 
Congress Party. It was given by the 
Ordinance which was passed by the 
Government. 
Another allegation levelled in the instant case was 
that the Government of Madhya Pradesh headed by Mishra had 
declared that class III and class IV government employees 
would get icreased dearness allov/ance according to the 
rules sanctioned for the Central Government employees; 
that D.P. Mishra \7ith the consent of the respondent and 
his agent announced the grant of these benefits and hence 
the respondent committed the corrupt practice of bribery. 
It was found that the employees had given a threat to go 
on strike in case their demand was not conceded. Without 
their cooperation the entire election would have been at a 
standstill. Moreover, in the opinion of the Government, 
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the demand for increased dearness allowance was justified, 
and hence an announcement to this effect was made. The 
Court held that the grant of the increased dearness 
allowance could not be regarded as a gift, offer or 
promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 
123(1) (A) nor was it possible to say that the government 
or D.P. Mishra was the agent of the respondent. 
Politicl impact of the Judicial Pronouncement 
In all the cases discussed above it has been seen 
that the distinction between evil and corrupt practice as 
laid dov^ n by Hidayatullah, J., in Ghasi Ram has been 
followed. The result has been that during the last twenty 
years or so. Ministers in power have continued to nurture 
their constituencies on the eve of election obviously 
with an eye on retaining their seats. Justice 
Hidayatullah's advice that "energy to do public good 
should be ... not on the eve of election but much earlier" 
has gone unnoticed. As such, there are innuemrable 
examples of ministers' misconduct and a few of them may be 
noted here. 
K. Gopal Krishnan, in his write-up "The Lucky 
Constituties" gives the example of Amethi constituency 
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represented by Rajiv Gandhi in the 1984 General Elections. 
'The development propagrammes announced since 1982 
involved an investment of Rs.2,000/- crore. Major projects 
announced so far and on which investment was being made 
included BHEL (Rs.lOO crore), HAL (Rs.50 crore) and Indo-
Gulf Fertilizers (Rs.750 crore). The U.P. Irrigation 
Department had already earmarked Rs.5 crore for water 
supply schemes in the constituency. Private sectors like 
Samrat Cycles and Lohia Machinery Tools set up their 
factories costing crores of rupees. Free licences were 
given to small scale industries, the cumulative effect on 
investment being Rs.lOO crore. Under the IRDP programme 
each block was given funds amounting to Rs.8 lakh. Other 
developments already noticeable in the constituency were: 
1.000 Kilomerers of irrigation canals, 3000 hand pumps, 
5000 pumps owned by private individuals, a Rs.15 crore 
Sanjay Gandhi Memorial Hospital, 1000 bio-gas plants, 250 
Kilometers of pucca road, an excellent railway station, 
etc. Thus the investment in the Amethi Constituency was 
more than the total outlay of the Sixth Plan (1980-85) of 
eleven States and nine Union Territores. Amethi enjoyed a 
unique position being P.M.'s constituency. 
In Malda, Ghani Khan Chowdhry, a former Railway 
Minister, invested on different projects costing Rs.62 
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crore. He also laid the foundation-stone of the RCC 
sleeper plant (expected to cost Rs.l crore) at Malda 
v/ithout any clearance from the Railway Board. 
A vote for development was the slogan of Jaffer 
Sharief, who as Minister of State for Railways, was able 
to locate the Rs.250-crore wheel and axle plant of the 
Railways in Karnataka". 
On the eve of 1989 Lok Sabha elections the Delhi 
Administration decided to recommend the regularisation of 
unauthorised colonies which had come up by January 1984, 
provide civic amenitiies to those which had existed 
before January 1981, waive building regulations in 
regularised extensions of village 'abadis' and approve 
the adhoc registration of industrial and commercial units 
in non-conforming areas. The Municipal Corporation decided 
to construct 20,000 hutments for sweepers at a cost of 
Rs.305 crore without realising whether it had adequate 
funds for the scheme being announced by it. At a meeting 
of the Delhi Factory Owners Association, the Chief 
Executive Counsellor had assured that industries located 
in non-conforming areas in the Union Territory would not 
be asked to shift unless they proved to be hazardous. 
An important example of ministerial grace was the 
announcement by the then Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, on 
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19 November 1990 of a proposed comprehensive Rs.5,000 
crore "Indira Mahila Yojna" for the welfare of women in 
the country. Announcing the proposal, Rajiv Gandhi said 
that on receiving the people's mandate in the forthcoming 
Lok Sabha poll, his party would recommend to the 
Government to earmark an outlay of Rs.5000 crore to be 
spent for the implementation of Indira Mahila Yojna every 
62 year. 
The whole idea behind the announcement of the 
Scheme was to woo women voters. There was a hue and cry in 
the political circles after the announcement and the 
Election Commission promised to look into the affair. 
Another well - known example is the case of a 
former Chief Minister of Bihar, K.B. Sahay, v7ho was 
charged before the Aiyar Commission. The charge against 
the said Chief Minister was that he had passed an order on 
2 February, 1967, for the laying of new water pipe-lines 
in certain localities in Patna from where he was standing 
for election, without administrative sanction, without the 
approval of the Council of Ministers, and without even a 
sanctioned scheme. This was done on the eve of election 
for political consideration and it resulted in a loss of 
nearly Rs.2 lakhs to the State. 
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This matter was later on examined by the Aiyar 
Commission v/hich remarked that the order was not only bad 
in law but "also improper as in disregard of the rules and 
procedures laid down for ensuring that the scheme is 
properly planned. When these facts are considered in the 
back-ground of the impending election it is difficult to 
resist the conclusion that the order in question was 
passed not on its merits but with a view to influencing 
the voters of this locality from which the respondent was 
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standing for election. I must hold this charge proved". 
(V) Withdrawal from candidature 
The point at issue in Umed V Raj Singh was 
v^ hether a candidate who offered gratification to another 
v/ith the object, directly or indirectly of inducing him to 
retire or not to retire from the contest after the last 
date for withdrawal of candidature v;as past would come 
within the purview of Section 123(1)(A)(a) of the Act 
which relates to the corrupt practice of bribery. Any 
gratification given to a person to withdraw or not to 
v;ithdraw from being a candidate at an election is bribery 
under the section. Interpreting the words "withdraw ... 
from being a candidate" the Supreme Court (Palekar 
Bhagv7ati and Sarkaria, jj.) came to the conclusion, in the 
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context of the Act, that they cannot include retirement 
from contest after the last date for withdrawal of 
candidature is past. Bhagwati, j., observed in the course 
of his opinion that the only way in which the argument 
could be attempted to be put on behalf of the respondent 
was that though legally the candidature cannot be 
withdrawn after the time-limit under Section 37 is pasti 
it may be withdrawn factually by the candidate announcing 
that he does not wish to contest the election. Rejecting 
this reasoning/ the learned Judge observed: 
But factual withdrav/al has no legal effect. 
It is no withdrawal at all, because the 
candidate continues to be a contesting 
candidate and he is as much in the contest 
as he was before the announcement. The word 
•withdrawal', in the context in which it 
occurs cannot be read in a loose and 
in exact sense to mean something which it 
plainly does not. 
The Court held that the word 'withdraw' does not 
stand alone. "It is part of a composite expression. The 
crucial words are 'to withdraw - from being a candidate'. 
They clearly indicate that what is contemplated is ... 
termination of the state of being a candidate. When a 
person v/ithdraws from being a candidate, he is no more a 
candidate. The only mode in which a candidate can withdraw 
his candidature and cease to be a candidate is that set 
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out in Section 37. Until the last date for withdrawal of 
candidature, he has a locus penitentiae and he can 
withdraw from being a candidate by giving a notice in 
writing to that effect under Section 37. But once that 
date is past, he becomes a 'contesting candidate' and then 
he has no choice. He is irrevocably and irretrievably in 
the contest". 
Palekar, j . , (for himself and on behalf of Bhagwati 
and Sarkaria, JJ.) concluded: 
We are, therefore, of the view that the words 
"to withdraw or not to withdraw from beig a 
candidate" ... refer to the stage of 
withdrav/al of candidature under Section 37 
and they do not apply to a situation where a 
contesting candidate announces that he does 
not wish to contest the election or declare 
his intention to sit down after the last date 
of withdrawal of candidatures under Section 
37 is past. 
69 The Supreme Court in Kalyan Singh V Genda Lai 
observed that money paid by one candidate to another 
candidate to retire from contest and for canvassing would 
not amount to bribery. The facts were : Three candidates, 
K.G. and P. were candidates in an election to the State 
Legislative Assembly of Madhya Pradesh some time after 
expiry of the v/ithdrawal date, by paying Rs.8000 (Rs.4000 
in cash and Rs.4000 by execution of promissory note)-K 
made P to retire from the contest, support the candidature 
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of K and publish a pamphlet to the effect that the 
electors should vote for K and not for P. Accordingly a 
pamphlet to that effect was published and distributed in a 
meeting in which the withdrawal from the contest of P was 
announced and the voters were asked to vote for K. In an 
election petition the question was whether the acts of the 
returned candidate K came within the purview of the 
definition of bribery. The Supreme Court held that K was 
not guilty of the corrupt practice of bribery, as the 
inducement was not to withdraw from being a candidate. The 
object of the payment was the candidate's retirement from 
active contest and his canvassing for K. Without 
establishing any nexus between the money and the 
inducement to the voter it will not be enough to argue tht 
the voter is indirectly induced on account of the payment 
of gratification to a third person. In the opinion of the 
Supreme Court, payment of any gratification to any person 
to work or canvass at an election is outside the ambit of 
the definition of bribery. Untwalia, J., who delivered 
the judgment of the Court observed : 
If the inducement to the voter is free from the shade 
or colour of the gratification paid to the third 
person, then it will not be bribery. If, however, the 
inducement in a given case is coloured or shaded by 
the payment of the gratification to a third person 
then it v/ould be an indirect inducement to the voter 
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himself within the frame of the definition. In other 
words, it is the fact of payment to the third person 
that must induce the voter. It is not enough that 
70 the third person induces the voter. 
On the facts of the case the Supreme Court found 
that respondent No.3 after having retired from the contest 
merely canvassed to the voters some of whom might be his 
so-called voters, to vote for the appellant. Distribution 
of the pamphlet and announcement in the meeting held on 
23rd February 1972 to that end did not transgress the 
limit and made the act an indirect inducement to the 
voters to cast vote for the appellant on account of 
payment of the gratification by him to the third 
respondent. 
71 In Han Singh V Popat Lai , the facts were that m 
an election to the Lok Sabha a nominee of the 
Congress (R) was declared elected as against the second 
respondent, nominee of the Congress (0). The appellant, a 
voter in the constituency, also belonging to the 
Organisation Congress,filed a petition challenging the 
validity of the election. The allegation was that the 
first respondent and his election agent and the first 
respondent's son (with the consent of the first 
respondent) had made a gift and a promise of gratifiction 
to the appellant for voting in first respondent's favour. 
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It v;as alleged that on February 9, 1971 the first 
respondent and his agent came to the appellant's residence 
and persuaded him to leave Congress (0) and join Congress 
(R) offering : (1) to secure a party ticket for the 
appellant for the election to the Gujarat Legislative 
Assembly in 1972, (2) to meet all his expenses for that 
election and to pay him Rs.10,000 towards the said 
expenses and (3) to construct a hostel for the Kashtriya 
students of that district. The Prime Minister was 
addressing a meeting at Palampur on that day. The 
appellant/ his wife and another influential Congress(O) 
member were taken to the helipad at Palampur v;hen the 
Prime Minister landed there and also to dais from which 
the Prime Minister was addressing a public meeting. The 
convencer of the District Congress Committee announced 
that the appellant and the Congress (0) had joined 
Congress (R) and asked the appellant to say a few words. 
The appellant went to the microphone, took out the bundle 
of notes of Rs.10,000 given to him and flung it in the air 
and told the gathering that he and his colleagues could 
not be purchased and they would remain loyal to the 
Organisation Congress. 
The High Court held that the son of the first 
respondent, handed over Rs.10,000 to the appellant as a 
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bribe to bring about the appellant's defection from 
Congress (O). But it was held that the object of the gift 
was to bring about the appellant's defection and not to 
induce directly or indirectly any voter to cast their 
votes for the Congress (R) candidate or to refrain from 
voting in favour of the second respondent. 
The Supreme Court agreed with the finding of the 
High Court that the payment of Rs.10,000 to the appellant 
v/as with a viev; to inducing him to defect from Congress 
(0) to Congress (R). It may carry with it, the Supreme 
Court held, the implication that he was expected to use 
his influence with the voters to vote for the candidate 
set up by the Congress (R). The Court referred to its 
earlier decision in Kalyan Singh to which two of the 
present Judges (Untwalia and Alagiriswami J.J.) were 
party, "that a payment made to a person in order to induce 
him to canvass votes on behalf of the bribe giver would 
not be bribery V7ithin the definition of that word in 
Section 123(1) of the Act". It was held that "it is only 
in a case where the payment to a third person by itself 
induces the voter to vote for the bribe giver that it would 
fall under section 123(1)". 
Under Section 123(1)(B)(b) the receipt of, or 
agreement to receive, any gratification, whether as a 
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motive or a reward by any person v/homsoever for himself or 
any other person for voting or refraining from voting, or 
inducing or attempting to induce any elector to vote or 
refrain from voting, or any candidate to withdraw or not 
to withdraw his candidature is bribery. The Supreme Court 
/this 
held that under/clause any person who receives or agrees 
to receive any gratification as a reward for inducing or 
attempting to induce an elector to vote would be receiving 
a bribe. "The law therefore contemplates that when a 
person makes any payment to another person in order to 
make him use his influence to induce a third person to 
vote for him that is not bribery by the person who pays 
but the receipt of money by the second person for inducing 
or attempting to induce another elector to vote is 
bribery. It is also bribery for the voter himself to 
receive the money. We, therefore, reiterate the view that 
when a candidate or anybody on his behalf pays any 
gratification to a person in order that the payment made 
to him may induce the voter to vote for the bribe giver it 
is bribery. But where the gratification is paid to a 
person in order that he may induce the other person to 
vote for the bribe giver it is not bribery on the part of 
the bribe giver. It is, however, bribery on the part of 
the bribe taker even when he takes it in order to induce 
72 
an elector to vote for the bribe giver". 
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In the instant case the Court found that the 
primary object of the payment made on the appellant was to 
induce him to defect from the Congress (O) to the 
Congress (R) which is not a corrupt practice under the 
Act. "The bargain v;as not for vote, the bargain was for 
73 his defection". The situation would have been different, 
the Court pointed out, had there been a specific request 
by the first respondent to the appellant that he should 
vote for him. In that case, the Court further observed, it 
vi?ould be bribery and even bribery to one person is enough 
to make an election void. A specific allegation to that 
effect had been made in the election petition and that had 
not been considered by the High Court. 
74 Following its earlier decision in Onkar Singh the 
Supreme Court held that "the distinction between a gift or 
offer combined v;ith the request to vote and the gift or 
offer to a person asking him to work for him v;ith the 
incidental resuslt that the person might vote for him 
should always be kept in mind. In such a case there is no 
specific bargain for the vote. Were it not so it would be 
impossible for persons standing for election to get any 
person to work for them who is not also a voter in the 
75 
constituency". The Court, therefore, held that the case 
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that the first respondent bargained for the appellant's 
vote had not been made out. 
{VI) Buying influence of important person 
n c 
In Abul Hussain Mir V Shamsul Huda , the Supreme 
Court had to decide as to whether payment or offer to an 
important person in an area to 'work' for a candidate is 
bribery or not. The allegation was that the appellant 
offered some amount to a Mulla to collect votes for him. 
In evidence, the Mulla narrated the situation thus: "The 
respondent No.l approached me and said that he wanted to 
have a talk vjith me. Then respondent No.l took me inside 
one of the rooms ... and there offered me Rs.2,000 if I 
worked for him in the election in the two villages of which 
I happened to be a Mulla. I turned down the proposal since 
it was unbecoming of me and then came out of the room". 
Although the above statement of the Mulla was not 
found to be trustworthy but the Supreme Court decided to 
express its views on the point at issue. Krishna Iyer, J., 
speaking for himself and Sarkaria, J., observed: 
If the payment is to induce an elector to 
vote, be it direct or vicarious, it is 
corrupt. If it is any other oblique 
object, it may be evil, not necessarily 
corrupt in the eye of law ... you may buy 
influence of important persons which is 
bad in morality but not yet in law. 
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The learned judge fxirtber observed 
If the candidate pays money to a VIP of the 
locality to use his good offices and 
canvass votes for him, it is a borderline 
case, but if the money is paid as 
conjfi deration for votes promised to be 
secured by him using his sway, it is 
bribery even though indirectly exercised. 
If the Mulla had bee paid the money 
striking a bargain for getting the votes in 
his ambit of influence, it is electoral 
corruption. On the other hand, if it is 
money received for the purpose of 
organising effectively the election 
campaign by hiring workers, going round to 
places in car, meeting people and 
persuading them to vote for the candidate, 
it is proper election expenses. In between 
these two extremes 3ies the case of a man 
who just receives a large sum of money, 
pockets it himself and promises to use his 
good offices to secure votes. This is a 
gray area. We have no doubt that a mammoth 
election campaign cannot be carried on 
without engaging a number of workers of a 
hierarchical sort. Many of them niay be men 
commanding influence through good will in 
the locality. Some of them may be village 
VIPs, social or religious. The touchstone 
in all these cases of payment or 
gratification is to find out whether the 
money is paid in reasonable measure for 
work to be done or services to be 
rendered ... 
In this case the third learned Judge A.Alagiriswami, 
agreed with the conclusion arrived at by Krishna Iyer, J. 
but did not join in the views expressed in the passage 
just extracted above from the majority decision and 
considered it unnecessary to discuss whether if money is 
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paid or offered as consideration for votes promised to be 
secured by a person using his influence it is bribery or 
not. It is a good policy, the learned judge observed, not 
to discuss in a judgment questions which do not arise out 
of the facts of the case. 
PROOF OF BRIBERY 
It is a sound principle of natural justice that the 
success of a candidate, who has won at a election, should 
not be lightly interfered with, and any petitioner seeking 
such interferece must strictly conform to the requirements 
79 
of the law. It is always to be borne m mmd that though 
the election of a successful candidate is not to be 
c^that 
lightly interfered with, one of the essentials'lavi7 is 
also to safeguard the purity of the election process and 
also to see that people do not get elected by flagrant 
80 breaches of that law or by corrupt practices. 
Charges of bribery, which is a form of corrupt 
81 practice, are quasi-criminal in character. Due proof of 
a single act of bribery by or with the knowledge and 
consent of the candidate or by his agents, however 
insignificant that act may be, is sufficient to invalidate 
the election. The judges are not at liberty to weigh its 
importance, nor can they allow any excuse, whatever the 
op 
circumstances may be. 
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CharJlriJ^ le gifts, at the time of an election may, 
in conceivab]o cases amount to corrupt practice of bribery 
8 3 provided the motive behind the charity was corrupt. A 
distinction has been made between bribery to voters and 
treating thrni. In the latter class of cases, names of 
persons trentod by the candidate have not been demanded 
though the election petitioner would be ordered to 
specify the character and extent of the alleged 
84 
corruption. 
CONCLUSION 
A review of the above discussion v/ould show that 
serious allegations involving bribery have been made a 
ground of attack to challenge an election. The courts seem 
to have put a narrow construction on Section 123 (1) and 
have in most of the cases rejected a plea based on bribery 
as a ground of corrupt practice. The courts seem to be 
fairly disinclined to reverse the result of an election, 
possibly in viev; of the fact that the role of money in 
elections can, as things are, hardly be minimised. The 
narrow approach of the courts may also be due to the 
reason that reversing the results of an election on the 
ground of bribery may open an easy way to frame up 
allegations and an easy ground of attack. The courts, 
possibly in view of these factors, insist upon" positive 
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evidence for substantiating an allegation. They generally 
do not seem to be content with what the evidence on the 
face of it shows but tend to go beyond it and ascertain 
the motive (corrupt or innocent) behind an alleged act of 
bribery. Since it is always difficult to trace out a 
motive on objective facts, the determination in each case 
is likely to be based on subjective satisfaction of the 
court itself. In the process of ascertainment of a motive 
(good or bad) the court seems to have often faltered. And 
this explains the reason why the courts in similar 
situations have arrived at different conclusions. Sarla 
Devi Pathak and Magan Lai Baqdi cases are a good example 
v/here similar fact situations led the two courts to come 
out with opposite conclusions. 
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35. I^ at 113. 
36. 15 E.L.R. 205. 
37. Katatria Takandas V Pinto Frederick Michael, 
18 E.L.R. 403. 
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39. Id at 214. 
10. 4 O'M & H.I. 
41. (1968) 3 S.C.R. 102. 
42. Id^  at 109. 
43. Id at 110. 
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44. (1968) 3 SCR 111. 
In the instant case the facts were that after 
the State of Haryana came into existence on 1st 
November 1966, the Cabinet placed certain sums of 
money at the disposal of the Ministers, one of whom 
was the appellant, to be used at their discretion 
for public purposes. The money was to be disbursed 
by the end of the Financial year 1967 through 
Panchayat, Municipal or Government agencies. The 
appellant sanctioned certain payment for building 
two dharamashalas in two wards of a Municipality. 
Long after the sanction, her candidature for 
election to the Vidhan Sabha of the State was 
recognised and she stood for election from a 
constituency which included these tv/o wards. She 
was elected and later the money was made available 
to the wards though the recipients were writing 
that the money should be made available at once. 
The election was challenged alleging that the money 
which had quickly come in was as a result of the 
bargain entered into between the Minister and the 
people of the constituency. However, evidence 
showed that one Bhalla (who was not favourable to 
the appellant) himself wrote saying that the money 
should be made available at once, and this money 
came to the hands of one Om Prakash Shorewala, who 
was helping the respondent in his election. The 
Court found that it was the recipients of money 
who were in a hurry to get the sanctioned amount. 
It was because there was always a risk of a change 
of attitude after the election was over more 
particularly v/hen the promisor did not succeed in 
the election. 
45. Id at 116-17. 
46. AIR 1971 S.C. 2025. 
47. The appellant's case with regard to Raigar Colony 
was that Sukhadia, his agents and other persons 
with the consent of Sukhadia promised to the voters 
of the Raigar Colony, Udaipur, at a meeting that 
he would get them Pattas issued at a moninal rate 
of Re.l/- only for the construction of their 
houses and under this inducement he asked the 
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Raigar voters to vote for him. Because of this 
inducement many Raigar voters voted for respondent 
Sukhadia. It was further alleged that Sukhadia by 
his undue influence as Chief Minister got issued 
an order from the Director, Social V7elfare 
Department, Jaipur, to grant Pattas to Raigars of 
Thakker Bapa Colony for construction of houses at a 
nominal price of Re.l/- for each Patta only. The 
respondent stated that the order passed by him and 
the order by the Director of Social Welfare were in 
furtherance of the policy of the State Government 
eight years ago. 
The second corrupt practice alleged was that 
respondent Sukhadia ordered Public Works 
Department (P.W.D.) to construct a road at Tekri 
though it was a municipal area and the P.W.D. had 
no jurisdiction and further that the respondent 
held a meeting and during the speech said that he 
v/as arranging for construction of roads and 
installation of water-taps and requested the people 
to vote for him. 
The High Court had held that there was no 
evidence to prove that Chief Minister Sukhadia got 
the work on Tekri road started. The High Court had 
also found no evidence of bargain for voting at the 
election. 
Similarly, the third allegation that respondent 
Sukhadia, his election agent, other agents with the 
consent of Sukhadia misused his position as Chief 
Minister and ordered the P.W.D. to construct roads 
and nallah in Baluchistan Colony* Sukhadia, the 
appellant alleged, visited the colony and induced 
the voters to vote for him and in turn promised to 
get the construction of nallah. 
The Supreme Court accepting the findings of the 
High Court accepting the findings of the High Court 
found that there were long standing public 
grievances and the Government from time to time 
made suggestions for redress of the grievances of 
the people of the said colonies and there was no 
sudden or spontaneous outburst of public activity 
on the eve of election. In this connection Ray, J., 
held that "If a roller v;as used on the date of the 
election that should not be interpreted to mean 
ZIB 
that the Chief Minister was utilising his position 
to obtain votes. Such a view would suspend and 
paralyse normal activities of the State". 
48. Supra note 46 at 2039. 
49. Ibid 
50. AIR 1976 S.C. 27. 
51. ^ at 32. 
52. Id at 34. 
53. Id^  at 35. 
54. AIR 1987 S.C. 1577; Roliteswar Saikia V Tonu Konwar, 
AIR 1990 Gauhati, 41. 
55. Id^  at 1591. 
56. 21 E.L.R. 137. 
57. 16_ at 149 - 50 
58. AIR 1970 S.C. 211 
59. Id at 213. 
60. See for more examples : K Gopala Krishnan, "The 
Lucky Constituencies" The Week 31 - 32 (Jan. 
6-12, 1985). 
61 A.R. Wig. "Poll-eve promises to Woo Voters", The 
Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 22 October, 1989. 
62. The Hindustan Times, Nev? Delhi, 20 November, 1989. 
The Scheme v;as challenged before the Allahabad 
High Court in A. Sinqhani Bhaqwandas Madhar Singh V 
Rajiv Gandhi, AIR 1991 Alld. 145. It was pointed 
out that the respondent had announced "Indira Yojna" 
for the ladies promising favour of the ladies 
through Indira Yojna and in that way the respondent 
induced the lady voters to vote for him. It v/as 
pointed out that the Election Commission demanded 
the explanation of the respondent on "Indira Yojna", 
which was substituted by the respondent to the 
Election Commission and the Commission declared 
that the "Indira Yojna" was in violation of the 
Conduct Rules for contesting the election. It was 
pleaded that the announcement of "Indira Yojna" 
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amounted to "bribe" within the meaning of Section 
123 (1) of the Act. The petitioner further pleaded 
that V7hile announcing the said scheme, the 
respondent knev; that the "Yojna" was false and that 
he would not be abale to fulfil his requirements. 
This amounted to corrupt practice within the 
meaning of Section 123 (4) of the Act. 
The High Court rejected the contention. "What 
is 'Indira Yojna', what are the details of this 
Yojna, v/hen namely (date, time and place) was it 
announced by the respondent, what promise was held 
out to the ladies ... have not been set out in the 
petition. In the absence of these details it cannot 
be said that the ingredients of any corrupt 
practice contemplated by Section 1123(1) ... were 
set out in the petition". It was further held that 
in the instant case the statement relied upon by 
the petitioner to constitute a corrupt practice 
within the meaning of Section 123 (4) did not 
relate, to the personal character or conduct of any 
candidate nor could it be said to have been made in 
relation to the candidature or withdrawal of a 
candidate. The statement relied upon by the 
petitioner was a statement made by the respondent 
regarding 'Indira Yojna'. "It cannot, therefore, be 
said that any corrupt practice contemplated by 
Section 123 (4) of the Act v;as pleaded". 
For more examples of such announcement on the 
eve of 10th Lok Sabha elections see The Hindustan 
Times, 29th March, 1991, 5 and 18 April, 1991. 
See A.G. Noorani, Ministers' Misconduct 278 (1973). 
Id at 279. 
Some more examples of pre-election sops. In the 
1987 Haryana Assembly elections, for example, the 
following promises were made : 
(A) By the Central Government : 
(1) Completion of 343 crore Sutlej-Yamuna Link 
Canal Project without any further delay. 
(2) Prime Minister's package of concessions and 
assistance worth Rs.402 crores announced in 
December 1986. 
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(3) A Rs.1500 crore refinery in Karnal. The 
foundation stone was laid by the P.M. in 
March 1987. 
(B) Promises by State Government 
(1) Rural drinking v;ater supply schemes worth 
Rs.2 crore. 
(2) Allocation of Rs.4 crores to municipal 
committees for urban improvement 
(3) Rs.12 crores allocated to Haryana Electricity 
Board to ensure connections to 25,000 new 
tubewells. 
(4) Personal loans for tractors and houses to the 
tune of Rs.55 crores for flood-hit areas and 
Rs.17 crores for drought-stricken areas. 
(5) Installation of a gas turbine for power 
generation in Faridabad; super thermal power 
station in Yamuna Nagar 
(6) Improvement of the existing canal system at a 
cost of Rs.lO crores. 
(B) Opposition (Promises by Devi Lai) 
(1) Promises to write-off loans provided to 
agriculturists through banks. 
(a) Government can v/rite-off Rs.700 crores. 
(b) Devi Lai will write-off Rs.lOO crores 
(2) To initiate debt conciliation bonds. 
(3) Increase pension for retired personnel. 
(4) Provide greater employment opportunities. 
(5) Ensure free travel facilities to students and 
unemployed youth appearing for interviews. See 
The Hindustan Times Sunday Magazine, May 24, 
1987. 
65. AIR 1975 S.C. 43. 
66. Id at 64. 
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67. Id at 44. 
68. 2^ at 64. The Court also observed that Md. Yunus 
Saleem's case AIR 1974 S.C. 1218 "in so far as it 
takes a different view, must be regarded as wrongly 
decided". 
Since Bhagwati, j., was a party to the decision 
he said that the vievi? taken in that case was 
"erraneous and needs to be corrected". '""To 
perpetuate an error is no heroism. To rectify it is 
the compulsion of judicial conscience". The learned 
Judge quoted Justice Bronson in Pierce V Delameter, 
(1847) 3 AMY 18: 
"a judge ought to be wise enough to know that 
he is fallible, and therefore ever ready to 
learn; great and honest enough to discard all 
mere pride of opinion, and follow truth 
wherever it may lead; and courageous enough to 
acknowledge" 
It may be recalled that in Mohd. Yunus Saleem 
case the S.C. had observed: "For the purpose of 
Section 123 the words to withdraw or not to 
withdravi? from being a candidate are of wide 
amplitude to include a subsequent withdrawal or 
non-withdrawal even at the last stage prior to the 
poll". Goswami, j., in the course of his opinion, 
observed: "Since purity of elections is the most 
important object of the Act a narrow meaning to the 
word 'VJithdraw' to refer only to legal withdrawal 
under section 37 would, defeat the very aim. We 
have, therefore, to give a meaning to the word 
"VJithdraw" keeping in mind the object and scheme of 
the Act with a view to effectuating the intention 
of the legislature to ensure purity in election; 
else there will be an absurd position v/here actual 
withdravral after the time limit by taking bribe 
will be free from the vice of corrupt practice 
whereas that prior to it will not be so. Such an 
intention cannot be attributed to the legislature 
from deletion of the words "retire from contest''.'' 
The v7ord "withdraw" is comprehensive enough to 
connote also "retire from contest". 
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70. Id at 1637. 
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accomplished". The Court relied on AIR 1968 S.C. 
1191 and AIR 1968 S.C. 1083. 
79. 9 E.L.R. 231 at 234. 
80. Id^  at 234 - 35. 
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CHAPTER-VI 
UNDUE INFLUENCE 
INTRODUCTION 
The freedom of election is two fold : (1) Freedom 
in the exercise of judgment. Every voter should be free to 
exercise his ovm judgment, in selecting the candidate he 
believes to be best fitted to represent the constituency; 
(2) Freedom to go and have the means of going to the poll 
to give his vote without fear or intimidation. 
The second category of corrupt practice as 
specified under Section 123 of the Act is 'Undue 
Influence'. Sub-section(2) of the said Section relates to 
undue influence which may be stated to be any attempt to 
interfer with the free exercise of the electoral rights of 
any person including a candidate, his agent or any voter. 
Section 123(2) does not bar or penalise legitimate 
canvassing or appeals to reason and judgment of the voters 
or other lawful means of persuading voters to vote or not 
to vote for a candidate. Indeed such proper and peaceful 
persuasion is the real force of a democratic process. 
Abuse of influence and not the natural operation of 
influence is meant to be prohibited. 
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A number of elections have in the past been 
challenged in courtson the ground of undue influence. In 
what follows, an attempt will be made to find out the 
nature of such challenges, the reaction of the courts to 
such challenges, and the way courts have sought to construe 
Section 123(2). 
THE PROVISION 
Section 123(2) defines undue influence as follows : 
"Undue influence, that is to say, any direct or 
indirect interference or attempt to interfere on the 
part of the candidate or his agent, or of any other 
person (with the consent of the candidate or his 
election agent)^with the free exercise of any electoral 
right: 
Provided that — 
(a) Without prejudice to the generality or the 
provisions of this clause any such person as is 
referred to therein who — 
(1) threatens any candidate or any elector,or any 
person in whom a candidate or an elector is 
interested, with injury of any kind including 
social ostracism and excommunication or expulsion 
from any caste or community; or 
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(ii) induces or attempts to induce a candidate or 
an elector to believe that he, or any person in whom 
he is interested, will become or will be rendered 
an object of divine displeasure or spiritual 
censure, shall be deemed to interefere with the 
free exercise of the electoral right of such 
candidate or elector within the meaning of this 
clause; 
(b) a declaration of public policy, or a promise of 
public action, or the mere exercise of a legal 
right without intent to interefere with an electoral 
right^ shall not be deemed to be interference 
within the meaning of this clause". 
Under Section 123(2) undue influence is thus any 
attempt to interfere with the free exercise of the 
electoral rights of any person including a candidate, his 
agent or any voter. 
It may be by threatening any candidate or an 
elector, or any person in whom a candidate or an elector is 
interested v/ith injury of any kind including social 
ostracism and excommunication or expulsion from any caste 
or community. Or it may be by inducing or attempting to 
induce a candidate or an elector to believe that he, or 
any person in whom he is interested, will become or will 
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be rendered an object of divine displeasure or spiritual 
censure, shall be deemed to interfere with the free 
exercise of the electoral right of such candidate or 
elector. It may be noted that the injuries contemplated in 
the priviso are illustrative and not exhaustive. There may 
be other categories of injuries too. 
The definition of "undue influence' is thus very 
wide. It includes a threat that may have its physical 
consequences. It also includes any inducement that may 
have the effect of persuading a voter to vote in a 
particular way or else be prepared to incur divine 
displeasure. The definition is too wide, and this makes 
the court's job a bit too difficult. For, in each 
allegation of undue influence the court has to determine 
the actual nature of othe threat or inducement and the 
degree of its influence upon the choice of a voter. It may 
often be difficult to say with any degree of certainty as 
to when the right of a candidate to influence his voter 
ends and when the prohibition contained in Section 123(2) 
would begin to apply. 
(A) THREAT OF INJURY 
Threat of causing injury is a common form of undue 
influence. The nature and the degree of threat may differ 
from case to case. The tribunals and courts are supposed to 
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determine an allegation of threat on the basis of the 
intention of the person exercising it, the degree of its 
seriousness, and consequently its likely effect upon the 
free choice of an elector. In a given case a tribunal or 
coqnet 
court may have before it/ ana convincing evidence to prove 
that a candidate did exercise a threat of causing injury 
and that a voter must have voted underits influence. Where 
such an evidence is not available, as may often be the 
case, the task of the court would indeed be difficult. Two 
courts on the same facts of othe case may arrive at 
different conclusions. 
In a number of cases, the validity of elections has 
been challenged on the ground of threat of causing injury 
and the tribunals and courts have been called upon to 
determine the scope of Section 123(2) (a) (i). The 
following discussion pertains to that aspect. 
2 In Juihar Singh V Bhairon Lai & Others, a poster 
was published with the slogan: "Jagirdaron Ke atyacharon 
Ko Khatam Karne Ke Liye Congress Ko Vote Do" (Vote for the 
Congress in order to put an end to the atrocities of the 
Jagirdars). 
On the left - hand side, a person apparently a 
tenant was shown tied up to a tree with a rope. On the 
right, there was a well dressed Jagirdar asking his man, 
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who v;as seen waving a whip, to flog the tenant. Eidently, 
the tenant's wife, who had apparently attempted to 
intervene, had been thrown down prostrate on the ground. 
To the right hand side of the picture there was the symbol 
of "two bullocks, with yoke on" and near about the slit 
there were the hands of so many voters, attempting to cast 
their votes in the ballot box. 
On the facts of the case the Election Tribunal 
observed: 
The poster was . .. clearly designed not only 
to catch voters for respondent No.l, but 
also, to overawe voters, the majority of 
whom were men of no better intelligence than 
ordinary illiterate villagers and to create a 
feeling of positive prejudice if not of 
terror as well, in their minds against the 
petitioner... we accordingly hold that the 
demonstration or distribution of the poster 
was an attempt at indirect interference with 
the free exercise of the electoral right of 
the voters and therefore amounted to a 
corrupt practice under section 123 (2) of 
the... Act of 1951'3. 
The Tribunal concluded that an attempt to interfere 
by the method of compulsion is not necessary and that even 
the method of inducement may be sufficient, provided it be 
of such a powerful type as would leave no free will to the 
voter in the exercise df his choice. In other words, 
actual physical compulsion is not necessary, but, positive 
mental compulsion may be enough to give rise to undue 
influence. Though there was no physical compulsion. 
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the manner in which the poster was published produced 
mental effect of compulsion on the voters who were mostly 
illiterate. 
The Assam High Court in Maulana Abdul Jalil 
4 
Choudhxtry V Rathindra Nath Sen had to decide whether the 
following facts amounted to undue influence: 
"A publication in the newspaper read out in a public 
meeting that leftists did not admit the 
independence of India and if they were elected, the 
Muslims would be driven out of the country and 
feuds would be created with neighbouring countries 
and as such. Congress was the only dependable 
organization of the Muslims." 
Mehrotra, J., with whom Sarjoo Prasad, C.J. agreed, 
held that mere publication of the article by itself did 
not amount to undue influence but reading out the article 
and distribution of copies at meetings did amount to the 
commission of corrupt practice of undue influence within 
Section 123 (2) of the Act. 
In this case the appellant argued that the article 
was only an expression of opinion and as such it could not 
be regarded as an attempt to interfere with the free 
exercise of an electoral right, and in any case it did not 
amount to a threat of injury of any kind. The learned 
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Judge did not accept this contention and held that the 
article clearly stated that in case the leftists were 
allowed to be elected, it might result in the Muslims 
being driven out of India. If this article was read out in 
the meetings as a part of his election propaganda by the 
candidate himself, Mehrotra, J« f observed, it would 
constitute a threat of injury to the electors and in that 
view of the matter, it would constitute corrupt practice 
by undue influence. 
Thus the Court made it clear that mere publication 
of the article as such was beyond the ambit of undue 
influence as no body was to take it seriously. But when it 
was being read out and distributed in every electoral 
meeting, it amounted to undue influence. There 
wasseriousness on the part of the distributor of the 
pamphlet. By its action the Congress party was creating a 
sort of mental psyche, a mental terror in the minds of a 
section of the electorate. The clear threat was either 
vote for Congress or be ready to leave the country in case 
/Came 
the other party'into power. This, again, was nothing short 
of positive prejudice or mental terror. 
In Biresh Misra V Ram Nath Sarma & Others it was held by 
the Assam High Court that a statement "not to vote for 
the Congress will be like committing betryal of the 
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country'' was a mere expression of opinion and did not 
amount to a threat. The facts were that a meeting of the 
prominent people of the minority community was held and in 
pursuance ofa resolution of the meeting a leaflet was 
published. The relevant portion of the leaflet was as 
follows: 
So to the Muslim community and as a matter of that 
to all minority communities it is the humble appeal 
that in the ensuing general election all should try 
utmost for the success of the Congress and that 
gentlemen assembled there emphatically declared 
that not to vote for Congress will be like 
committing betryal of the country . 
After carefully examing the contents of the 
pamphlet Mehrotra, J. who wrot the judgment and with whom 
Deka, J., agreed held that it contained only an expression 
of opinion. In the opinion of the learned Judge the 
language of the publication was not such as was likely to 
interfere with the free exercise of the right of voting. 
It only stated that the failure to vote for the Congress 
would be like an act of betryal of the country. It was 
further observed that ''Even if it is said that the 
failure to vote for a particualr candidate will be like 
committing an offence, that by itself will not constitute 
any threat or interference with the exercise of free 
7 
right of voting'' . 
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2 
In Maqanlal Baqdi V Hari Vishnu Kamath it has been 
laid down that if a threat is used only figuratively and 
not literally it will not amount to corrupt practice. The 
appellant in this case was found to have addressed a 
public meeting of voters, where he gave a threat to the 
effect that whether he won or lost he would see that the 
respondent and Niranjan Singh (Praja Socialist Party 
candidate for the State Assembly ) were burried deep in the 
valley of Narmada river and that he would go only after 
performing the 13th day Sharadha ceremony. 
Hidayatullah, C.J. , and G.B. Bhutt, J. who 
delivered the judgment of the M.P. High Court held that 
the question whether the threat was intended literally or 
was used figuratively was one of fact and since the 
Tribunal had found that it was only used figuratively as 
meaning the political burial of the respondent and 
Niranjan Singh, no threat could be deemed to have been 
intended by the appellant within the meaning of Section 
123 (2) of the the Act. 
The judgment has been commented upon on the ground 
that what should have been examined was whether the words 
were ordinarily to be taken to be used figuratively and 
not literally. It does not appear why it was not examined 
if threat of political burial itself amounted to undue 
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influence or not. It is submitted that if a threat, 
pDnsidering it in the light of surrounding circurnstances, is taken or is 
in all probability to be taken to mean what it literally 
means and to be serious it should not matter whether the 
person extending it actually did not mean it seriously or 
9 
extended it in anger''. 
The comment does not seem to be well placed. An 
election campaign is primarily a political campaign and 
political challenges should not be literally construed. 
Again, a catchy slogan "Jo vote deho Jhopariya man, 
to joote parihen khopariya man was the point at issue. The 
allegation in Radha Krishna Shukla V Tara Chand 
Maheshwar was that the afore-mentioned slogan was 
shouted at many places by the workers or agents of the 
respondents with the obvious intention to intimidate the 
voters and to impress upon them that if they voted for the 
Praja Socialist Party candidates who had the symbol of 
hut, they woixld be shoe-beaten. Relyinn on Jujhar Singh 
it was contended that the slogan caused undue influence. 
The Election Tribunal, lucknow, did not accept the 
contention and referred to the test laid down in an 
12 English case, Norlfolk (Northern) m which it was 
observed that ''before a threat can be considered to 
amount to undue influence, the question must be put, was 
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it a serious and deliberate threat uttered with the 
intention of carrying it into effect". Applying the test 
the Tribunal held that the persons who shouted the slogan 
could not have had any intention of shoe-beating anyone or 
causing any personal injury to the voters who did not 
support the respondents. The slogan was shouted, in the 
opinion of the Tribunal, simply because it contained a 
catchy phrase and "jhopariya" rhymed with "Khopariya" . 
The slogan was not meant to be taken literally and nobody 
13 
could have taken it seriously . It was found by the 
Tribunal that even one of the petitioner's own witnesses, 
Sri Pal Singh stated that, "I did not object to the 
shouting of the slogan because it would not have carried 
any effect • 
The Tribunal thus found that even the workers and 
agents of the petitioners did not take any serious note of 
the slogan and did not complain about them to any 
responsible person. The Tribunal also very rightly held 
that Jujhar Singh was not helpful in the instant case as 
both were distinguishable on facts. 
Mere tendering of advice to a candidate by an 
important party leader will not constitute undue 
15 influence. In Amir Chand V Smt. Sucheta Kripalani, for 
example, an old and active Congress candidate Smt. Man 
Mohani Sehgal applied for the party ticket in 1957 general 
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elections. In the 1952 general elections, she had lost 
her election from the same constituency against 
Mrs.Kripalani who fought the election on the Kisan Mazdoor 
Praja Party ticket. This time the ticket was given to 
Mrs. Suceeta Kripalani from the same constituency who had 
by now joined the Congress Party. The Parliamentary Board 
had chosen Mrs. Kripalani and rejected the application of 
Mrs. Sehgal. The decision had also the approval of 
Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru who was a member of the Board. 
Mrs. Sehgal then filed nomination papers as an Independent 
candidate. She was asked by the All India Congress 
Committee to withdraw her nomination, but she refused. 
Thereupon she was expelled from the Congress Party 
alongwith her workers. In the meantime an interview took 
place between her and Prime Minister Nehru. As a leader of 
the Congress Party, the Prime Minister advised her in the 
interest of the discipline of the Cogress Organization to 
abide by the decision of the Congress Parliamentary Board 
and not to leave the party. She thought that her 
withdrawal from contest would not have the approval of the 
public, on which Pt. Nehru said that she should consult 
her workers and should convey to them his advice to her. 
Next day, she consulted her workers who advised her to 
respect Nehru's wishes. She then withdrew from the 
contest. 
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The petitioner's contention was that Pandit Nehru 
who wielded a stupendous force in India both as Prime 
Minister and acknowledged leader of Congress exercised 
undue influence either with the consent of the respondent 
or in her interest on her (Mrs. Man Mohani Sehgal) which 
coerced Mrs. Sehgal to retire from the contest. The Punjab 
High Court negatived the contention of the petitioner in 
the light of facts as discussed above. Bishan Narain, J. 
Who wrote the judgment and with whom Capoor, J. agreed, 
observed that what Ft. Nehru said was merely an advice to 
Mrs. Sehgal to decide after consulting her party workers. 
''I am unable to see how this advice can be said to be 
exercise of undue influence or to be interference with the 
electoral right of Shrimati Man Mohani Sehgal'' . The 
learned judge concluded: 
A political leader is within his rights to 
keep discipline in his party and to stop 
party rift therein particularly at the time 
of general elections. When a political 
leader exercises this right then it cannot 
be said to be exercise of undue influence 1^ 
This is true that a political leader has to 
discipline his party whenever he finds that something is 
going wrong. It will, however, depend on facts whether the 
leader was simply stopping party rift or was exercsing 
undue influence in the guise of discipline. In the instant 
case, it is clear, that what Pandit Nehru told Mrs. Sehgal 
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was nothing more than a piece of advice in the interest of 
Congress Party. 
Undue influence was alleged against the returned 
1 8 Congress candidate in Bachan Singh V Prithvi Singh on 
the ground that posters with the photographs of Prime 
Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi, Defence Minister Jagjivan Ram 
and Foreign Minister Swaran Singh were published in the 
first row. Beneath the first row were the photograph of 
three Chiefs and four Generals of the Armed Forces. It 
bore the caption ''Pillars'' of victory. Below these 
photographs was printed the Congress symbol of cow and 
calf. 
On a complaint being made, the Election Commission 
of India issued directions to the Punjab congress 
Committee to withdraw the posters and which in consequence 
v/ere withdraw. 
It was contended that the publication of the poster 
not only amounted to the exercise of undue influence 
within the contemplation of Section 123 (2) but also 
constituted an attempt to obtain or procure assistance 
from the members of Armed Forces of the Union for 
furtherance of the prospects of the returned candidate's 
election within the purview of Section 123 (7). 
The Supreme Court, speaking through Sarkaria,J., 
observed: 
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Doubtless the definition of 'undue influence' 
in sub-section (2) of section 123 is couched 
in very wide terms, and on first flush seems 
to cover every conceivable act which directly 
or indirectly interferes or attempts to 
interfere with the free exercise of 
electoral right. In one sense even election 
propaganda carried on vigorously, blaringly 
and systematically through chrismal leaders 
or through various media in favour of a 
candidate by recounting the glories and 
achievements of that candidate or his 
political party ... does meddle with and 
mould the independent volition of 
electors... That such a wide construction 
would not be in consonance with the 
intendment of the legislature is discernible 
from Proviso to this Clause... The prefix 
'undue' indicates that there must be some 
abuse of influence. 'Undue influence' is 
used in contradistinction to 'proper 
influence'. Construed in the light of the 
Proviso, clause (2) of section 123 does not 
bar or penalise legitimate canvassing or 
appeals to reason or judgment of the voters 
or other lawful means of persuading voters 
to vote or not to vote for a candidate. 
Indeed such proper and peaceful persuasion 
is the, Qmotive force of our democratic 
process 
The Supreme Court held that thus the publication of 
the posterneither interfered nor was calculated to 
interfere with the free exercise of the electoral right of 
any person. There was nothing in it which amounted to a 
threat of injury or undue inducement of the kind inhibited 
by Section 123 (2). In short, accordiang to the Supreme 
Court, the publication of the poster was an act of 
improprietary but not one of corrupt practice falling 
within the mischief of Section 123 (2). 
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In another verdiet the Supreme Court upholding the 
findings of the Patna High Court in Janak Sinha V Mahant 
20 Ram Kishore Das found that the voters were threatened 
and terrorised at several places on the the polling day 
and before by the supporters of the appellant. In the 
pamphlets distributed appeals on the basis of caste were 
made. The Supreme Court through Vaidialingam, J., held 
that when a voter was prevented from exercising his vote 
by the supporters of the appellant and in his presence and 
without any attempt made by the latter to stop his 
supporters from so doing, the only interference was that 
the voter was prevented from voting by the supporters of 
the appellant with the latter's consent. There was, thus, 
a direct interference with the free exercise of the 
electoral right. And hence the appellant had Comr.ritted the 
corrupt practice of undue influence. 
In Kataria Takandas Hemraj V Pinto Frederick 
21 Micheal , an appeal was made to Mahrashtrlans not to vote 
for the Congress candidate as the Congress Government had 
resorted to firing and killed Maharashtrian leaders for 
demanding a separate Maharashtra State and photos of 
martyrs who had been killed were attached to the appeal 
and it was even stated that the ballot box of the Congress 
Party was filled with the blood of Maharashtriyan martyrs. 
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It was held that the did not amount to undue influence as 
a candidate had every right to persuade people to vote in 
his favour. 
One question which has arisen time and again is 
whether canvassing by a Minister would amount to exercise 
of undue influence by the Minister concerned or not. The 
Supreme Court comprising a five-judge Bench (Wanchoo, 
C.J. Bachawat, Ramaswami, Mitter and Hegde, JJ) gave a 
unanimous verdict in Shri Baburao Patel V Dr. Zakir 
22 
Husain. Before examining the various allegations of 
undue influence made therein the Supreme Court surveyed 
the various decisions delivered by various Election 
23 Tribunals and concluded that it had been consistently 
held in this country that itwasopento Ministers to canvass 
for candidates of their party standing for election. Such 
canvassing does not amount to undue influence but is 
proper use of the Ministers' right to ask the public to 
support candidates belonging to the Ministers' party. '"It 
is only where a Minister abuses his position as such and 
goes beyond merely asking for support for candidates 
belonging to his party that a question of undue influence 
may arise. But so long as the Minister only asks the 
electors to vote for a particular candidate belonging to 
his party and puts forward before the public the merits of 
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his candidate it cannot be said that by merely making such 
request to the electorate the Minister exercises undue 
influence. The fact that the Minister's request was 
addressed in the form of what is called a whip is also 
immaterial so long as it is clear that there is no 
compulsion on the electorate to vote ... 
After laying down the above mentioned principle, 
the Court examined the various allegations made in the 
instant case. 
The first allegation was that Prime - Minister 
Indira Gandhi addressed a letter to all the electors in 
which she commended Dr. Zakir Husain and requested the 
electors to vote for him. It was urged that Prime Minister 
being a person of great influence should not have written 
the letter because she was Prime—Minister and the mere 
fact that she wrote the letter amounted to undue influence 
i.e. interference with the free exercise of electoral 
right. 
Rejecting the contention, the Supreme Court held 
that Mrs. Gandhi was certainly the Prime Minister, but she 
was also one of the leaders of the party to which 
Dr. Zakir Husain belonged and as a leader of the party she 
was entitled to ask the electors to vote for Dr. Zakir Husain and the f act-that 
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she was the Prime Minister made no difference to her right 
to make an appeal of that nature. Regarding the contents 
of the letter the Court found nothing in the letter which 
could be said -fco ^ improper or which could even remotely amoiont to 
interference with the free exercise of the electoral rights. 
The second allegation was based on two letters 
written by Sri Ram Subhag Singh as Chief whip to all 
members of the Congress Party in Parliament. The fact that 
he signed the letters as Chief Whip, the Supreme Court 
observed, was of no consequence as members of the Congress 
Party in Parliament must be knowing that he was the Chief 
Whip. Moreover, the letter merely explained to members of 
his party the situation with respect to the election of 
President and Vice-President which were to be 'held 
simviltaneously. 
In the second letter. Ram Subhag Singh had pointed 
out the manner of election of the President. He had also 
said in his letter that it was the desire of the Congress 
Party that Dr. Zakir Husain should be returned with a 
thumping majority. He also advised them not to mark the 
second or any other preference in favour of any other 
candidate. The Supreme Court found that the letter was 
merely a request to members of the party to vote for 
Dr. Zakir Husain. Regarding the direction that no member 
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should mark the second or any other preference in favour 
of any other candidate, the Supreme Court observed that 
there was nothing improper if the party members are told 
in the course of canvassing that it will be better if they 
only mark their first preference and no other preference 
in a system where voting is by single transferable vote. 
Such a request or advice, in the opinion of the Court, 
does not interfere with the free exercise of their 
electoral right for the electors still will be free to do 
what they desire in spite of the advice. Finally, the 
allegation was that the Prime Minister had deputed certain 
senior members of her cabinet to the various States to 
make doubly certain that Dr. Zakir Husain was elected. It 
was argued that sending of the Ministers to various States 
was to influence the members of the electoral college to 
vote for Dr. Husain and this amounted to undue influence. 
This contention too was rejected by the Court as in its 
opinion all that was done was to canvass support for 
Dr. Zakir Husain. Mere canvassing cannot possibly be held 
to be undue influence. It was further observed, '"Once 
canvassing is permissible, and we have no doubt that in a 
democratic set up where parties put up candidates for 
election it is not only permissible but necesary, it 
follows that if a leader of the party asks members of his 
party for whom to vote he is merely canvassing. The voting 
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is after all secret and every elector is free to vote for 
whomsoever he likes, even though he may have been asked by 
« 25 
the leader to vote for a particular candidate 1 . 
Chief Justice Wanchoo who wrote the judgment of the 
Court made an important observation while considering the 
difference between canvassing and exercise of undue 
influence. In the words of the learned Chief Justice: 
It is difficult to lay down in general terms 
where mere canvassing ends and interference 
or attempt at interference with the free 
exercisde of any electoral right begins. 
That is a matter to be determined in each 
case, but there can be no doubt that if what 
is done is merely canvassing it would not be 
undue influence...^o. 
This is an important judgment in the sense that it 
clarifies the ambit and extent of canvassing by Ministers. 
As noted above a leader of a political party is entitled 
to declare to the public the policy and programmes of his 
party and ask the electorate to vote accordingly. Thus mere 
canvassing by a Minister or a Chief Minister cannot amount 
to undue influence unless it is shown that anything 
improper was done whereby the free will of the electorate 
was interfered with. This will be presumed when an elector 
has no choice but to vote as ordered. The law of election 
does not strike at the root of due influence and what is 
forbidden is only undue influence. . Thus there is a 
difference between canvassing and the excercise of undue 
influence. 
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(B) DIVINE DISPLEASURE OR SPIRITUAL CENSURE 
This part of the discussion on undue influence 
covers cases which fall under the category of 'divine 
displeasure' or 'spiritunal censure' as defined in the 
proviso (a) (ii) of section 123 (2). In a number of cases, 
the court had occasion to determine the questions as to 
when the above would amount to undue influence. 
Perhaps the locus classicus of the law on the 
subject is to be found in the judgment of the Supreme 
27 Court in Narbada Prasad V Chhaqanlal. It was alleged 
that during the election campaign the returned candidate 
who represented Jan Sangh and his election agent made 
speeches in villages in which they referred to their 
election manifesto and claimed that Congress had not 
abolished cow-slaughter in India, whereas Jan Sangh would 
do that. The returned candidate and his agent, it was 
further mentioned, had also added to those statements that 
to vote for the Congress was to commit the sin of qohatya 
and that the Congress candidate Shrimati Manjulabai 
herself ate beef. 
Thus the question before the Supreme Court was 
whether a speech exhorting the voters that if they voted 
for Congress or a Congress candidate they would be 
committing the sin of qohatya and thereby it amounted to 
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to an attempt to induce voters to believe that they would 
become objects of divine displeasure or piritual censure 
falling within the mischief of Section 123 (2) of the Act. 
Hidayatuallah, C.J. , who delivered the judgment of the 
Court on behalf of himself and Grover, J., upheld the 
verdict of the Madhya Praesh High Court and found that 
there was ample evidence in the instant cae that there was 
a reference to cow-slaughter and the campaign of the Jan 
Sangh that cow-slaughter should be abolished in India. 
' 'One cannot say that it is wrong to make such a 
propaganda. It would be perfectly legitimate for any party 
to promise that if it came into power it would abolish cow-
slaughter. That is not the gravamen of the charge. The 
gravamen of the charge is that it was added that if the 
voters voted for the Congress candidate, they would be 
guilty of the sin of gohatya and here the law of election 
28 
steps in ''. After analysing the speech in the light of 
Section 123 (2), the learned Chief justice concluded: 
It is not necessary to enlarge upon the fact 
that cow is venerated in our country by the 
vast majority of the people and that they 
believe not only in its utility but its 
holiness. It is also believed that one of 
the cardinal sins is that of gohatya. 
Therefore, it is quite obviou that to remind 
the voters that they v/ould be committing the 
sin of gohatya would be to remind them that 
they would be objects of divine displeasure 
or spiritual censure.29 
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Thus, in the opinion of the Supreme Court, the 
appellant and his agent attempted to induce the voters to 
believe that they would become objects of divine 
displeasure or spiritual censure. This is a remarkable 
judgment in the sense that on the one side it legitimises 
the right of a candidate to promise certain steps to be 
taken if he came into power and on the other hand it also 
lays down the ambit and extent within which such rights 
may be exercied. The question of cow— laughter is a 
sensitive issue and the judgment is a check on arousing the 
feeling of divine displeasure or spiritual censure. The 
judgment is in the same spirit in which Clause 2 of 
Section 123 of the Act was framed keeping in mind the 
superstitions and God-fearing attitude of a vast majority 
of illiterate Indian voters. Hidayatullah J's words have 
become locus classicus on the issue and a subsequent 
judgment of the Supreme Court with a different Bench 
followed them in Kanti prasad Jayshanker Yagnik V 
Purshottamdas Ranchhodas Patil . In the instant case the 
following three passages of a speech were objected to: 
" (1)... The Congress Party is carrying on its propaganda 
deperately but what I want to say is that if 
Swatantra Party comes into power then it will not 
turn your roof-tiles into gold. Only God gives 
happiness. There is frost, there is rust in the 
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crops, there is excess of rains, there is a 
famine,* all these are due to the workings of God. 
Every day twenty four crores of cows are being 
slaughtered, then how God will tolerate that and 
how will you get happiness? 
(2) Look at the Congressmen who are destroyer of Hindu 
Religion. 
(3) Every year we get one or the other natural calamity 
like excessive rain, or failure of rain or 
.earthquake. This happens because they ask for votes 
in the name of live bullock, where as they get the 
bullocks slaughtered. The symbol should be of 
butcher and except ruthless and hardhearted 
Congress nobody else will get bullocks 
slaughtered." 
Sikri, J., who delivered the judgment of the court on 
behalf of himself and Bachawat, J., held that "It seem to 
us that the first and third pasages, read together, 
constitute an attempt to induce the electors to believe 
that they would become objects of divine displeasure if 
they voted for the Congress and thereby Allowed cow-
31 
slaughter to be continued". In the first and third 
passages, the Learned Judge cncluded, "there is clear 
implication that if you vote for the Congress who are 
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responsible for 24 crores of cows being slaughtered then 
God will be displeased; in other words there will be 
divine displeausre and the voters will not get 
L. • ..32 happiness". 
On the contents of the second passage of the said 
speech, the Supreme Court agreed with the finding of the 
High Court that it was not objectionable. Hegde, J., who 
constituted a third member of the Bench gave a dissenting 
note. The learned Judge however agreed with the majority 
that the said statements amounted to a corrupt practice 
under Section 123 (2) of the Act and also agreed that 
those tatements were made with the consent of the returned 
candidate. Hence the appealhad to be dismissed "but I am 
unable to agree that before a statement can be considered 
as an attempt to induce an elector to believe that he will 
be rendered an object of spiritual censure if he acts in a 
particular manner that statements must have been made by a 
person who is a religious head of the majority of the 
33 
electors in the constituency concerned" . What Section 
123 (2) requires, the learned Judge observed/ is to induce 
or attempt to induce "an elector"which means even single 
elector that he will be rendered an object of spiritual 
cansure if he exercises or refuses to exercise his 
electoral right in a particular manner. "But undoubtedly 
the inducement or an attempt to induce complained of 
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should be such as to amount to a direct or indirect 
interference or attempt to interfere with the free 
exercise of electoral right. Whether a particular 
statement comes within Section 123 (2) or not depends on 
various factors such as the nature of the statement, the 
person who made it and the persons to whom it is 
addressed. No doubt the nature of the statements in 
question is of utmost importance. They may exploit well 
accepted religious beliefs but that is not the only thing 
that comes within the mischief of Section 123 (2). A 
respected religious preacher may induce or attempt to 
induce the illiterate and superstitious voters who form 
the bulk of our voters that they will become the object of 
divine displeasure if they do not exercise their franchise 
in a particular manner. His statements may not have any 
support from the religious books but yet they may amount 
34 to a corrupt prctice in law" . They learned judge 
concluded that there was no justification to cut down the 
scope of Section 123 (2). "It will not be in public 
35 interest to do so" 
An appeal to the voters in the name of Quran that 
the election of a woman is against the injunctions of the 
Quran came for consideration before the Gauhati Election 
36 Tribunal in Jyostna Chandra V Mehrab Ali . In this case 
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the petitioner's (i.e. Jyostna Chandra, a defeated 
candidate) contention was that there was undue influence 
excercised by the respondent (i.e. Mehrab Ali, the 
successful candidate) or with his connivance, by 
extensively appealing to the Muslim voters that the Quran 
prohibits election of woman to a public body like 
Legislative Assembly and by further exhorting that a 
Muslim voting for a woman candidate would be an object of 
divine displeasure or spiritual censure. 
The Tribunl observed that to set aside the election 
on the ground of undue influece in the present 
circumstances it was necessary to see that the persons 
said to have addressed the meetings were really persons 
whose words carried considerable wieght with the people 
37 thus addressed, and in matters of religion . The Tribunal 
clearly laid down that such types of appeal to the voters 
as mentioned above would have been held in the nature of 
mental coercion if they were proved to have emanated from 
persons whos opinion in matters of religion carried 
considerable influence with them. In the instant case, 
although some persons versed in Islamic Theology addressed 
meetings, but there was no evidence to prove how much of 
religious influence they actually carried with the people 
addressed. And hence the contention of undue influence was 
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not accepted, though the case was set aside on some other 
grounds. 
Another case in which the status became relevant is 
38 
RadhaKanta Mishra V Nityananda Mohapatra in which one of 
the allegations v;as that the respondent and his agents had 
committed the corrupt practice of causing undue influence 
by issuing pamphlets containing copies of a telegram from 
one Maulana Habibur Rahman, who was a leader among the 
Muslims, and making a propaganda that the Maulana had 
imposed a condition on all Muslims to vote for the 
respondent and that if his commands were disobeyed they 
would be rendered objects of divine displeasure. The case 
was heard by a division bench of the orissa High Court 
consisting of Rao and Barman, J J.>There was a difference 
of opinion between the two on the point. Barman, J. held 
that he was satisfied that Maulana Habibur Rahman was a 
religious leader among the local Muslims of the 
constituency and he was held in such high estimation by 
his religious followers that he was capable of inducing 
the voters to believe that if they did not vote for the 
respondent they would become or would be rendered objects 
of divine displeasure or spiritual censure. The learned 
judge relied on the statement of a witness that the 
Maulana used to lecture to Sunnis in Allahabad. The 
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respondent had also said in his evidence that Maulana 
Habibur Rahman was a Zamindar and a respactable person 
revered by both Hindus and Muslims alike. In the opinion 
of Barman, J. the status of Maulana was sufficient to 
prove that he was capable of unduly influencing the mind 
of the voters. Rao, J., on the other hand ^  did not agree 
with Barman, J.. In the pinion of the former there was no 
doubt that Maulana Habibur Rahman had some influence over 
the Muslims of Bhadrak because of his past political 
affiliations, he being an influential member of the then 
exsiting Muslim League. But there was no reliable evidence 
that the Maulana was a religious leader and held influence 
over the community as such. There were some witnesses who 
stated that Maulana Habibur Rahman was being looked after 
as a Peer and that he was having several disciples in the 
community, but no witness could name any such disciple. 
Rao, J., observed that even if the Maulana was regarded as 
Peer and a religious leader of the Muslim community there 
was nothing wrong in his canvassing for the respondent; 
the telegram was only a symbol of his sympathies with 
Nityananda. On the basis of principles laid down by the 
English Court, the learned judge observed: 
The priest may counsel, advice, recommend, 
entreat, point out and explain why one 
candidate should be preferred to another.-^^ 
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To further substantiate his arguments Rao J. referred to 
the Bellary case which was quoted with approval in 
40 Sivathanu Pillai V Nesamany and Others as follows: 
"If a Pir supports a candidate he is entitl-
ed to take full advantage of this fact, 
provided of course that nothing was said to 
make voters fear that the Pir would invoke 
spiritual penalties against them if they 
displease him". 
Under such circumstances, the learned Judge did not 
accept the contention that in distributing the copies of 
the telegram the respondent or his agents verbally induced 
the voters to believe that the Maulana had forbidden them 
to vote for Mohammad Hanif and that in case of disobedience 
they would be rendered objects of divine displeasure. 
Thus there was a conflict of opinion between the two 
judges constituting the Bench. Rao, J. was of opinion that 
corrupt practice of undue influence was not proved by the 
petitioner against the successful candidate. On the 
contrary. Barman, J. held that the petitioner had 
successfully proved the corrupt practice of undue 
influence. 
Under the circumstances, the case was heard by a 
third judge. Das, J. 
Regarding the stature of Maulana Habibur Rahman, 
the learned Judge simply found that the Maulana was a 
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local Muslim leader; he was the leader of the Muslim 
League in that area before the Indpendence. There was also 
evidence on record that he was a learned man, and 
accordingly, was being called 'Maulana' and 'Haji' since 
he had gone to Mecca on Haj. There was no evidence to 
prove that the Maulana was a 'Peer'and hence Das, J., held 
that even if assumed that the Maulana was a leader of the 
Muslim community, there was nothing wrong in his 
canvassing for the returned candidate. The telegram was 
only to the-effect that he had full sympathies with 
Nityananda. 
Another case on the same pattern is Jagajeevandas 
41 Shetty V Sanjeeva Shetty in which the allegation based 
on undue influence was that the trustee or the Hegde of 
the Sri Manjunatha temple is not merely the trustee of the 
temple but is regarded as a mouthpiece of lord Manjunatha 
and is said to have attracted the appellation of the 
"Manjunatha who speaks" It was alleged that it is the 
general belief "that observance with faith of Sri Hegde's 
injunctions will win the Lord's grace and displeasure if 
the injunctions are not heeded" • The petitioner further 
contended that extensive propaganda was done and thousands 
of voters were induced to believe that he or she and their 
family will be rendered an object of divine displeasure or 
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spiritual censure if they do not vote for the K.M.P.P. 
candidate and hence it was not a free and fair election. 
Fortythree witnesses were examined by the Tribunal. 
The evidence showed that the said temple was very famous. 
It attracted a fairly large number of worshippers, and the 
deity installed therein, the Manjunatha, was held in great 
regard and veneration. 
The petitioner contended that "Hegde is a person 
having divine characteristics, that his utterances are 
invested with infallability, that he is considered as a 
talking God and that his injunctions are obeyed without 
question". However, the Tribunal found the oral evidence 
about the divine character of the Hedge conflicting. But 
at the same time it was also proved that the "Hedge has a 
particular seat in the temple wherefrom at the time of the 
Mahapooja he gives decisions on hoilus (plaints), if both 
parties appear and agree to abide by his decision. He does 
not issue any injunctions to the people at large but only 
gives decisions if they seek it at the temple. He himself 
says that there is no compulsion attached to his decisions 
42 
m the temple". The Tribunal further observed, 
"whatever may be his position inside the temple, it does 
not appear that he is looked upon as a sacred personality 
outside. He is Jain grahastha leading a family life. He is 
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not a sanyasi; nor a religious leader like the acharyas or 
matadhipathis; and having regard to the accepted Hindu 
notions we find it difficult to believe that he is looked 
43 
upon as divine or sacred . 
However, the Tribunal found the Hegde as man of 
status in the public life of the district who was 
associated with different organisations for the 
development of art, literature, etc., but there was no 
evidence to show that he was in a position to influence 
the voters. It was also not proved, the Tribunal further 
observed, that there was any representation made to the 
voters that it was part of the Hegde's injunction that if 
they did not abide by his wishes, spiritual injury would 
accrue to them, or that they would incur divine 
displeasure. Dismissing the pettion, the Election Trbunal, 
Mangalore, observed, 'it is clear law that, however 
eminent a person might be whether in the religious or 
secular field, he is as much entitled as any other to take 
part in election, and to advise or direct electors in the 
44 
matter of the exercise of their franchise". At the same 
time the Tribunal made it emphatically clear that if a 
case of undue influence described in Section 123 (2) of 
the Act is sought to be rested on the use of spiritual 
authority, then the proviso comes in and restricts it to 
cases where threats of divive displeasure or spiritual 
25B 
censure (not mere promises of divive grace are made. The 
mere holding out of an inducement of pious hopes, 
spiritual benefits, divine pleasure, etc., in the absence 
of any such spiritual threat would not constitute undue 
influence, the Tribunal concluded. 
However, it is important to note here that the 
44(a) instant decision when referred to in a later case 
before the Pubjab High Court, did not find an approval and 
termed the decision as "narrow construction" . It 
observed, "An appeal from a religious head issuing a 
command to his followers to vote in a particular way by 
inducement of pious hopes of reward and by promising 
spiritual benefits, divine pleasures, etc., has implicit 
in it a suggestion that the followers disobeying such a 
command are likely to incur divive displeasure and 
spiritual censure. The view that mere holding out of an 
inducement of pious hopes, spiritual benefits and divine 
pleasures would not, in the absence of spiritual threats 
or censure fall within section 123 (2) is not 
correct".^^(^^ 
Similarly an allegation of undue influence was 
in a case on the publication o 
"Congress Par War Krna Mahan Pap Hai" 
45 
raised f a poter entitled 
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The contention of the petitioner was that by 
publishing such a pamphlet the respondent attempted to 
induce and in fact induced the electors to believe that if 
they did not vote for the respondent, they would be 
rendered objects of divine displeasure and spiritual 
censure. The respondent admitted that the said poster was 
published by him under the signature of one Dr. Satya Pal, 
but contended that in no way caused undue influence. On 
the other hand, the petitioner submitted that the word 
" Mahan Pap" in the title of the poster (although nothing 
was pointed in the body of the poster) implied that the 
electors by not voting for the respondent would be 
rendered objects of divine displeasure or spiritual 
censure. Dr. Satya Pal, the petitioner contended, was a 
great public leader and his words would be very effective 
on the electorate. The Election Tribunal, Ludhiana, held 
that " the word 'pap' though it originally meant 'sin' has 
come to be applied to anything ethically undesirable, 
especically when it is not used by a spiritual or 
religions leader ... It was proved that Dr. Satya Pal 
was not a spiritual leader and the poster hence no where 
meant that not voting for the Congress would bring divine 
displeasure or spiritual censure within the meaning 
of Section 123 (2) (a) of the Act and hence its 
publication did not amount to undue influence, the 
Tribunal observed. 
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The Indian social structure is dominated by 
different religious groups and sects. During election days 
they become much more conscious of their position and 
power and hence a large number of them give their views 
for and gainst candidates contesting elections. Sometimes 
it is not that only vie\;s are expressed but in fact 
certain commands/orders or farmans are issued by Pirs and 
Gurus to their followers for choosing or rejecting a 
candidate. There are cases in which farmans have been 
challenged as being in the nature of divine dipleasure or 
spiritual censure covered by the corrupt practice of undue 
influence. One such farman was challenged before the 
47 Supreme Court in Ram Dial V Sant Lai . The text of the 
farman as translated into English was; "A command from 
Shri Satguru Sacha Padshah to the Namdharis of Halqa 
Sirsa. Every Naradhari of this Halqa is commanded by Shri 
guru that he should make every effort for the success of 
Shri Ram Dial Vaid, a candidate for the Punjabi Vidhan 
Sabha, by giving his own vote and those of his friends and 
acquaintances, it being our primary duty to make him 
successfull in the election. The election symbol of Shri 
Vaid is a riding horse man". On the basis of this farman 
the following allegations were made: 
(1) That Sat Guru Maharaj Pratap Singh of Jiwan 
Nagar, the religious head of Nmdharis sect of the Sikhs 
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had some personal grievances aginst Shri Devi Lai of 
Chautala, a prominent Congress leader of the constituency 
and the Chief supporter of the petitioner at this 
election. Respondent .No.l fully knowing of this grievance 
of the Sat Guru approached him and through him also 
approached Maharaj Charan Singh, the religious head of the 
Radha Swami Samaj, and got issued farmans (orders) by both 
these religious heads to their followers in this 
constituency to the effect that their Dharma required them 
to whole-heartedly support respondent No.l and to oppose 
the candidature of the petitioner and that if any of the 
followers dared to act against their farmans, the wrath of 
the aforementioned Gurus would fall upon him and he would 
be the objects of divine displeasure. These farmans of the 
two Gurus were orally conveyed throughout the constituency 
wherever the followers of these two sects resided. The 
followers were also threatened that if they did not follow 
the farmans of the two Gurus they would be expelled from 
the sect and samaj if they went against the wish of the 
Gurus. 
(ii) That Sat Guru Pratap Singh himself in the 
presence of respondent No.l in the big Diwan of his 
followers... preached and commanded all those present that 
it was the primary Dharma of all his followers to help the 
2B0 
candidature of respondent No.l and to oppose the 
petitioner with all their might... 
(iii) That respondent No.l got issued posters in 
thousands containing the orders of Satguru Pratap Singh. 
These posters contained in verbatim the farmans of the 
Satguru to the effect that it was the primary Dharma of 
every Namdhari of this constituency to give his own vote 
as well as to canvass votes of all their acquaintances for 
respondent No.l. 
Here it will be relevant first to see the judgment 
of the Election Tribunal as its findings were first 
accepted by the Pub jab High Court and finally by the 
Supreme Court. 
With respect to clause (1) allegation the Tribunal 
had observed that no evidence had been produced to support 
the allegations that the farmans of the two religious 
heads of the Namdharis and Radha Swamis were orally 
conveyed to the followers of the Gurus in the 
constituency, or that while conveying the farmans of the 
Gurus they threatened the followers with expulsion from 
the sect if the followers went against the wishes of the 
Gurus in the •'matter. 
The allegations contained in clause (II), however, 
were proved and it was fund that Maharaj Pratap Singh and 
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others had addressed various Dewans held for the 
purpose of canvassing in favour of respondent No.l though 
it appeared to the Tribunal to be an exaggeration when it 
was stated that those who omitted to vote for Ram Singh 
Dial, appellant, would be blackened or digraced in this 
world or the next or would be expelled from the sanqat. 
Concerning the allegations contained in clause (11), the 
Tribunal came to the conclusion that posters were issued 
by the appellant and were widely distributed throughout 
the constituency. On these findings the Tribunal concluded 
that the illiterate and ignorant villagers professiong 
Namdhari faith who were voters in the constituency were 
subjected to the undue influence of Maharaja Pratap Singh 
to vote in favour of the appellant and, therefore, the 
election in question could not be considered to be a free 
election. "Such a command emanating as it does, from a 
Satguru or supreme religious head of a sect to his 
followers who are mostly illiterate and ignorant 
villagers... may well be construed as undue influence 
because in the presence of such a command the disciples 
cannot vote contrary to the command; election under these 
. . 48 
conditions cannot thus be called a free election". 
It was further observed, "It has in addition been 
found that even if there was no spiritual undue influence 
asdefined in Section 123 (2) of the... Act the evidence 
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certainly proved the Commission of corrupt practices of a 
systematic appeal by the appellant or by his agents, etc., 
to vote or refrain from voting on the ground of religion, 
caste or community, and that for this reason it clearly 
49 fell within the mischief of section 123 (3)". 
The case came in appeal before a division bench of 
the Pub jab High Court. The High Court also accepted the 
oral evidence adduced on hehalf of the respondent and with 
particular reference to the publication and wide 
distribution of the poster. It observed: 
The language of the mandate and the general 
background and circumstances of this case 
including the obvious conscionsness of 
Maharaj Pratap Singh and Ram Dial of the 
probable and likely effect of such commands 
on the illiterate, ignorant and credulous 
followers of the Maharaj can lead but to one 
conclusion that it was intended to convey to 
them the threat of divine displeasure and 
spiritual censure if they dared to disobey 
the farman of their supreme spiritual and 
religious head^O 
Dismissing the contention that the farman had been 
motivated not by religious considerations but by a 
personal grievance, the High Court held that "Motive in 
such circumstances is wholly immaterial". It observed: 
If the influence exercised by the religious 
and spiritual head has the effect of creating 
in the minds of the voters a feeling or 
divine displeasure or spiritual censure 
then, whatever the motive, the influence 
would amount to undue influence. The 
contents of the poster... unequivocally 
establish the mandatory nature of the 
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command. Religious sanction is ... implicit 
in it... on a reassonable construction of 
its contents, it must be held that Maharaj 
Pratap Singh intended to convey to his 
followers who are mostly illiterate, 
ignorant, credulous and unsophiscated 
villagers, having blind and implicit faith 
in their religious head that if they did not 
vote for Ram Dial, they would incur divine 
displeasure and spiritual censure. With this 
class of villagers the displeasure of the 
religious head is usually associated with 
divine displeasure".^! 
Finally, the case came in appeal before the Supreme 
Court'Affirming the decision of the Punjab High Court the 
Supreme Court held ''that the crucial words, like hukam of 
Shri Sat Guru Sacha Padshah, etc., have been printed in 
very bold letters, conveying the distinct impression to 
the large number of Namdharis, who are voters in the 
constituency that it was a mandate from their spiritual 
guru who wielded great local influence amongst them, that 
it was their bounden duty, under the strict orders of 
their religious leader, not only to cast their own votes 
in favour of the particular candidate, but also to exert 
their influence amongst their friends and acquaintances in 
favour of that candidate, and that any infringement of 
that mandate had implicit in it divine displeasure or 
52 
spiritual censure'' 
The appellant further contended that a religious 
leader has as much the right to freedom of speech and 
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expression as any other citizen and, hence, his 
exhortation in favour of a particular candidate should not 
have the result of vitiating the election. 
Sinha, J., who delivered the judgment of the court 
on hehalf of himself, Kapoor and Hidayatullah, JJ., agreed 
that a religions head, like any other individual, had the 
right to freely exercise his opinion in favour or against 
a candidate. "He has a right to express his opinion on 
the individual merits of the candidates. Such a course of 
conduct on his part, will only be a use of his great 
influence amongst a particular section of the voters in 
the constituency; but it will amount to an abuse of his 
great influence if the words he uses in a document, or 
utters in his speeches, leave no choice to the persons 
addressed by him, in the exercise of their electoral 
rights". 
The learned Judge, agreeing with the findings of 
the Tribunal and the High Court, held that the religious 
leader practically left no free choice to the Namdhari 
electors not only by issuing the hukam or farman, but also 
by his speeches implying that disobedience of his mandate 
would carry divine displeasure or spiritual censure and 
thus the case was hit by the second paragraph of the 
proviso to section 123 (2) of the Act. 
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54 In Gurnam Singh V Pratap Singh, the contention 
before the Ludhiana Election Tribunal was that the 
respondent by publishing posters with the following words 
caused spiritual undue influence: 
(1) Apnian parichan, panthak umaidwar nun pa ke 
"Guru Kalgi Dhardhian Khushian prapat Karo. .'.' (By casting 
your votes in favour of Panthik candidates, have the 
pleasure of Guru Kalgi Dhar (Guru Gobind Singh). 
(2) "Sikh dharam nun tabah karan wale Kistara 
vote de haqdar ho sakdehan" ... (how can the persons who 
are out to finish Sikh dharam, be entitled to your votes). 
(3) "Guru ghar dhian khushian prapat Karo" ... 
(Have blessings of Guru). 
Rejecting the contention of undue influence the 
Election Tribunal, Ludhiana, held that the above mentioned 
expressions only made a reference to the "pleasure of 
gurus" if the votes were cast in a particualr manner and 
did not expressly or even impliedly indicate that those 
who would not so vote would become the object of divine 
displeasure. Discussing the scope of the provision it 
observed that undue influence as defined in section 123 
(2) (a) involves an element of inducing fear in the mind 
of the voters that they would be rendered "an object of 
divine displeasure or spirtitual censure", it would not 
come within the definition of spiritual undue influence. 
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The contention of the petitioner in Mathai Mathew 
55 Manjuran V K.C. Abraham was that ecclesiastical 
authorities carried on propaganda in the constituency 
against the petitioner exhorting Roman Catholics (who 
formed over 35 per cent of the voters) not to vote for him 
on thethreat of divine displeasure and spiritual censure . 
It was stated that the Archbishop of verapoly issued a 
circular which denounced the petitioner's party as 
"immoral" . In accordance with the directive in the 
circular, it was read and explained to the congregation in 
the churches that non-conformity with the mandates of the 
circular would entail divine displeasure and spiritual 
censure. The circular was printed and circulated in large 
numbers throughout the constitutency, and along with it, a 
pamphlet was also circulated. The pamphlet prominently 
displayed a threat that Catholics who supported the 
petitioner's party would be ex-communicated. 
The Election Tribunal, Ernakulam, relied on the 
following well-known observation of Fitzgerald J in 
Longford 
The Catholic priest has, and he ought to 
have, great influence. His position, his 
sacred character, etc., ensure it to him... 
In the proper exercise of that influence on 
the electors the priest may counsel, advise, 
recommend, entreat, and point out the true 
line of moral duty, and explain why one 
candidat should be preferred to another, and 
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may,if he thinks fitythrow the whole weight of his character 
in the scalejbut he may not appeal to the fears, or terrors 
or superstition of those he addresses. He must not hold out 
hopes of reward here or thereafter,and he must not use 
threats of temporal injury or of disadvantage, or of 
punishment hereafter. He must not threaten to ex-
communicate or withhold the sacraments". 
The Tribunal after referring to the above mentioned observation 
and some other English judgments held that the law does not 
strike at the existence of influence or its due exercise over other. 
"Such influence is implicit in human personality and the advantages 
that wealth, education or way of life may confer on an individual. It 
is only with the abuse of such influence that the law is concerned and 
it cannot be said that there has been an abuse simply because influence 
57 has been proved and its operation established" . 
In a case the issue was that the corrupt practice of undue influence 
was practised by the respondent himself and through his agents by 
getting it preached by Muslim leaders to the Muslim voters that 
Muslims as a community would have to quit the country if they did not 
cast their votes in favour of the respondent, he being the nominee 
of the Congress which was characterised as the saviour of Muslims 
in India. It was further stated in that paragraph that the Muslim 
leaders administered the oath of Quran to the voters to follow 
CO 
its dictates to support only that party which was in power. 
It was held that as far as the first part of the allegation 
was concerned, it did not by itself amount to a corrupt 
practice in as much as even if preaching in that form was 
resorted to, it amounted only to an argument in favour 
of the Congress to the effect that as a non-communal party 
it had protected the Muslims in India and in case a 
candidate of any other party, particularly a communal 
party was returned to power the Muslims might 
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have to quit the country. " This form of preaching does 
not amount to intimdation or to undue influence within the 
meaning of section 123 (2) of the Representation of the 
59 
People Act read with clause (II) of its proviso". 
Regarding the second part of the allegation as to the 
administrtion of oath of the Quran to the voters to follow 
its dictates to support only the party in power and its 
candidate, the Court held that it ''also does not seem to 
attract the provisions of section 123 (2) read along with 
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clause (II) of its proviso • 
(C) PROMISE OF PUBLIC POLICY 
Clause (b) of Section 123 (2) is an exception to 
what is prohibited by Section 123. It provides that "a 
declaration of public policy, or a promise of public 
action or the mere exercise of a legal right without 
intent to interfere with an electoral right shall not be 
deemed to be interference within the meaning of this 
clause".. In other words, clause (b) exempts declaration 
of public policy or promise of public action or the mere 
exercise of a legal right without intent to interfere with 
an electoral right from the mischief of this clause. 
Elaborating the provision, the Election Tribunal, 
Lucknow, observed that "it is the right and privilege 
of every candidate and every party setting up a candidate 
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to put before the electorate his or its views and 
programme so that the electorate may decide which of the 
rival candidate to prefer. Such election manifestos or 
programmes are quite usual in democracies and no serious 
objection has ever been taken in respect of them. 
Clause(b) of the proviso to clause{2) of Section 123 
appears to have been enacted with this purpose in 
62 
view". As such in the instant case it was held that 
general promises by the agents or workers of a candidate 
or by the Ministers or Deputy-Ministers to redress certain 
public grievances or to create public amenities like 
hospitals, if the electors voted for the candidate who had 
been put by that party, did not amount to bribery or undue 
influence within the meaning of Section 123(2) of the Act; 
such promises being promise of public action within the 
meaning of the proviso to Section 123 (2). 
Similarly, giving the rationale of the proviso, the Punjab 
High Court observed, "In a welfare state like ours, where 
the popularly elected representatives of the people hold 
reins of the Government and run the state administration 
solely for the general benefit of the people, it is only 
fit and proper that those in power actually and promptly 
react to the needs and demands of the 
people v/hose chosen representatives they profess to 
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be. This basic and fundamental principle appears to me to 
6 ? 
underlie proviso (b) to Section 123 (2)". 
The Supreme Court in Shiv Kirpal Singh V 
64 V.V.Giri held that the expression "free exercise of the 
electoral right" does not mean that voter is not to be 
influenced. This expression has been read in the context 
of an election in a democratic society and the candidates 
and their supporters must naturally be allowed to canvass 
support by all legitimate and legal means. This exercise 
of the right by a candidate or his supporters to canvass 
support does not interfere or attempt to interfere with 
the free exercise of the electoral right. What does amount 
to interference with the exercsie of an electoral right 
is "tyranny over the mind". 
Recently the Supreme Court in Dhartipakar Mohan Lai 
Aqarwal V Rajiv Gandhi reiterated the principle that a 
candidate, his workers and supporters have every right 
under the law to canvass for the success of a particular 
candidate saying that if elected he would work for the 
development of the constituency. Such a promise does not 
in any way interfere with the free exercise of electoral 
right of the electors. Refuting the allegation of undue 
influence, the Court held that Mrs. Indira Gandhi who was 
the leader of the party was entitled to ask the electors 
to vote for Rajiv Gandhi and the fact that she was the 
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Prime Minister made no difference to her to make an appeal 
of that nature. There was no allegationthat there was any 
element of bargaining or undue influence in making appeal 
to the voters for casting their votes in favour of Rajiv 
Gandhi. " Declaration of public policy or a promise of 
public action or promise to develop the constituency in 
general do not interfere with free exercise of electoral 
rights as the same do not consitute bribery or undue 
influence". Thus a general promise made by the Prime 
Minister or Minister to redress public grievances or to 
provide for public amenities for developing the 
constituency if elected, does not amount to corrupt 
practice. This is protected by Section 123 (2) (b) of the 
Act. 
The provision embodied under Section 123 (2) (b), 
it is submitted, indirectly shields the exercise of undue 
influence by the party in power,which has a definitely 
upper hand in making big promises. That is why Ministers 
seldom lose their seats. 
(D)ONDUE INFLDENCE; DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ENGLISH AND INDIAN LAW 
On the scope of undue influence as defined in 
Section 123 (2) of othe Act, the Supreme Court in Ram Dial 
V Sant Lai brought out the difference between Eglish and 
Indian Law. It held that the law in England relating to 
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undue influence at elections is not the same as the law in 
India as it will appear from the following definition of 
undue influence ...: 
"Every person who shall directly or indirectly, by 
himself or by any other person on his behalf, make use of 
or threaten to make use of any force, violence, or 
restraint, or inflict or threaten to inflict, by himself 
or by any other person, any temporal or spiritual injury, 
damage, harm, or loss upon or against any person in order 
to induce or compel such person to vote or refrain from 
voting, or on account of such person having voted or 
refrained from voting at any election, or who shall by 
abduction, duress, or any fraudulent device or contrivance 
impede or prevent the free exercise of the franchise of 
any elector, or shall thereby compel, induce, or prevail 
upon any elector either to give or to refrain from giving 
his vote at any election, shall be guilty of undue 
influence". 
The words of the English statute as quoted above, 
the Supreme Court observed, lay emphasis upon the 
individual aspect of the exercise of undue influence. The 
Indian law, on the other hand, does not emphasize the 
individual aspect of the exercise of such influence, but 
pays regard to the use of such influence as has the 
tendency to bring about the result contemplated in the 
clause. According to the Supreme Court, what is material 
under the Indian law is not the actual effect produced, 
but the doing of such acts as are calculated to interfere 
with the free exercise of any electoral right. 
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It has already been seen earlier that the Court held 
on the facts of the case that the circular, with the 
printing of the word "Hukam" in very bold type, conveyed 
the impression that it was a mandate from their Spiritual 
"Guru" that it was their bounden duty to vote for the 
appellant and that any infringement of that mandate had 
implicit in it divine displeasure and spiritual censure; 
and distribution of such a circular, therefore, amounted to 
a corrupt practice under section 123(2) of the Act. 
OFFENCE OF UNDUE IHFLDENCE 
Section 171-C of the Indian Penal Code lays down that: 
(1) Whoever voluntarily interferes or attempts to 
interfere with the free exercise of any electoral right 
commits the offence of undue influence at an election. 
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the 
provisions of sub-section (1), Whoever 
(a) threatens any candidate or voter, or any person 
in whom a candidate or voter is interested, with injury of 
any kind, or 
(b) inducesor attempts to induce a candidate or voter 
to believe that he or any person in whom he is interested 
will become or will be rendered an object of Divine 
displeasure or of spiritual censure, shall be deemed to 
interfere with the free exercise of the electoral right of 
such candidate or voter, within the meaning of sub-section(l), 
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(3) A declaration of public policy or a promise of 
public action, or the mere exercise of a legal right 
without intent to interfere with an electoral right, shall 
not be deemed to be interference within the meaning of the 
Section. 
Section 171-F of the Code lays down punishment for 
undue influence or personation at an election. It says: 
Whoever commits the offence of undue inluence or personation 
at an election shall be punished with imprisonment of 
either description for a term which may extend to one year, 
or with fine, or with both. 
Section 171-G provides that whoever with intent to 
effect the result of an election makes or publishes any 
statement purporting to be a statement of fact which is 
false and which he either knows or believes to be false or 
does not believe to be true, in relation to the personl 
character or conduct of any candidate shall be punished 
with fine. 
As already noted in the beginning of this chapter 
Section 123 (2) of the Act defines undue influence. The 
definition there is more or less in the same language as 
in Section 171-C of the Indian Penal Code except that the 
words "direct or indirect" have been added to indicate the 
nature of interference. 
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The scope o Section 171-C of the Indian Penal Code 
was considered by the Supreme Court in Baburao Patel V 
Dr. Zakir Husain . Wanchoo, C.J./ speaking for the Court 
observed: 
It will be seen from the above deinition 
that the gist of undue influence at an 
election consists in voluntary interference 
or attempt at interference with free 
exercise of any electoral right. Any 
voluntary action which interferes with or 
attempts to interfere with such free 
exercise of electoral right would amount to 
undue influece. But even though the 
definition in sub-section (1) of Section 
171-C is wide in terms it cannot take in 
mere canvasing in favour of a candidate at 
election. If that were so, it would be 
impossible to run democratic elections. 
Further sub-section (2) of Section 171-C 
shows what the nature of undue influence is 
though of course it does not cut down the 
generality of the provisions contained in 
sub-section (1). Where any threat is held 
out to any candidate or voter or any person 
in whom a candidate or voter is interested 
and the threat is of injury of any kind, 
that would amount to voluntary 
interference or attempt at interference 
with the free exercise of electoral right 
and would be undue influence. Again where a 
person induces or attempts to induce a 
candidate, or voter to believe that he or 
any person in whom he is interested will 
become or will be rendered an object of 
divine displeasure or of spiritual censure, 
that would also amount to voluntary 
interference with the free exercise of the 
electoral right and would be undue 
influence. What is contained in 
sub-section (2) of 171-C is merely 
illustrative... but there can be no doubt 
that what is done is merely canvassing it 
would not be undue influence. 
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As sub-ection (3) of Section 171-C shows 
the mere exercise of a legal right without 
intent to interere with an electoral right 
would not be undue influence?^ 
In short it has been held by the apex Court that if what 
is done is merely canvassing it would not be undue 
influence. The mere exercise of a legal right without 
intent to interfere with an electoral right would not be 
undue influence. 
Subsequently this case was relied on by the Supreme 
71 Court in Shiv Kirpal Singh V V.V.Giri . In the instant 
case the majority judgment delivered by Sikri, J., on 
behalf of himself, Shelat and Vaidialingam, J.J., observed 
that the scope of section 171-C was very wide. "There can 
ba undue influence even at the stage when the elector go'^ s^ 
through the mental process of weighing the merits and 
72 demerits of the candidates and makes his choice ". The 
learned Judge on the facts of the case observed that a 
pamphlet which after giving various fictitious incidents 
of sexual immorality, described a candidate as debauch 
without any sense of shame or morality and asked the 
electors whether the name of the Congress be lowered to 
such depths that such moral leper, such depraved man 
should be set up as the Congress candidate for the highest 
post of President and further added that if such a 
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candidate became President he would turn Rashtrapati 
Bhawan into a harem, a centre of vice and immorality. The 
Court held that the pamphlet was covered by Section 171-C, 
even if it might be covered under Section 171-G. 
It was further held that if distribution of the 
pamphlet by post to electors or in the Central Hall of the 
Parliament was proved it would constitute undue influence 
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within section 18 - of Presidential and Vice Presidential 
Elections Act and it was not necessary for the election 
petitioners to go further and prove that statements 
contained in the pamphlet were made the subject of a 
verbal appeal or persuasion by one member of the 
electoral college to another and particularly to those in 
the Congress fold. "It is the degree of gravity of the 
allegation which will be the determining factor in 
deciding whether it falls under Section 171-C or Section 
171-G. If the allegation, though false and relating to a 
candidate's personal character or conduct, made with the 
intent to affect the result of an election does not 
amount to interference or attempt at such interference the 
offence would be the lesser one. If, on the other hand, it 
amounts to interference or an attempt to interfere it 
would be the graver offence under Section 171-F read with 
Section 171-C "'^^. 
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In the opinion of Sikri., J., the concerned 
pamphlet came under Section 171-C even though it was 
issued anonymously. If a member of Parliament distributed 
a pamphlet, he was identifying himself with it unless he 
expressly dissociated from the pamphlet. The distribution 
in the Central Hall by members of Parliament had the same 
. . 75 
effect as if they had endorsed the pamphlet an writing 
In the instant case Bhargava and Mitter, J.J., 
wrote dissenting notes. The former was of the opinion that 
the offence of undue influence comes in at the stage when 
the offender interferes or attempts to interfere with the 
free exercise of the choice of voting in accordance with 
the decision already taken by the voter. "If any acts are 
done which merely influence the voter in making his choice 
between one candidate or another, they will not amount to 
interference with the free exercise of the electoral 
right. In fact, all canvassing that is carried on and 
which is considered legitimate is intended to influence 
the choice of a voter at the first stage when the elector 
goes through the mental process of taking a decision that 
he will vote in favour of a particular candidate and that 
is quite permissible. Mere false propagands as to the 
personal character of a candidate or even relating to the 
party sponsoring the candidate cannot amount to the 
corrupt practice of undue influence. False statements 
about the personal characteror conduct of the candidate 
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may, of course, be scurrilous and foul; but, even then 
the offence committed would fall under Section 171-G, 
Penal Code." 
Mitter,J., in his dissent held that before any 
publication of a defamatory matter relating to a candidate 
could be treated as commission of the offence of undue 
influence there must be some overt act in addition to the 
mere publicationrsome attempt or persuasion of a voter to 
restrain the free choice of a candidate. The learned Judge 
was of opinion that if anonymous posters containing 
defamatory matter about a candidate's personal conduct or 
character were to be displayed in prominent places in the 
constituency so as to attract the notice of the electors, 
it would come within the mischief of Section 171-G but 
would fall short of exercise of undue influence under 
Section 171-C . But if an unsigned pamphlet containing 
matter defamatory of the personal conduct or character of 
a candidate be pressed personally upon an elector by 
another with an attempt to make the receiver believe that 
there was some basis for the charges levelled against the 
candidate, the person receiving the pamphlet would be 
likely to give credence to the imputations made therein 
and would thus be subject to a restraint on his franchise. 
The publication of a false statement of fact relating to 
the conduct and character of a person coupled with an 
attempt to persuade electors- by such publication would 
attract the operation of Section 171-C^^ 
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Sikri, J., did not agree with the contrary opinion 
expressed by Bhargava, J., as noted above. The learned 
judge observed that they did not think that the 
Legislature while framing chapter IX A of the Code ever 
contemplated such a dichotomy or intended to give such a 
narrow meaning to the freedom of franchise essential in a 
representative system of government, "in our opinion the 
argument metioned above is fallacious. It completely 
disregards the structure andthe provision of Sectio 171-C. 
Section 171-C is enacted in three parts. The first 
sub-section contains the definition of undue influence. 
This is in wide terms and renders a person voluntarily 
interfering or attempting to interfere with the free 
exercise of any electoral right guilty of committing undue 
influence. That this is very wide is indicated by the 
opening sentence of sub-section (2), i.e., without 
prejudice to the generality of the provisions of 
sub-section (1)'. It is well settled that when this 
expression is used anything contained in the provisions 
following this expression is not intended to cut down the 
78 generality of the meaning of the preceding provision. ". 
"It follows from this that we have to look at sub-section 
(1) as it is without restricting its provisions by what is 
contained in sub-section (2). Sub-section (3) throv;s a 
great deal of light on this question. It proceeds on the 
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assumption that a declaration of public policy or a 
promise of public action or the mere exercise of a legal 
right can interfere with an electoral right, and therefore 
it provides that if there is no intention to interfere 
with the electoral right it shall not be deemed to be 
interference within the meaning of this section. At what 
stage would a declaration of public policy or a promise of 
public action act and tend to interfere? Surely at the 
stage when a voter is trying to make up his mind as to 
which candidate he would support. If a declaration of 
public policy or a promise of public action appeals to 
him, his mind v/ould decide in favour of the candidate who 
is propounding the public policy or promising a public 
action. Having made up his mind he v/ould then go and vote 
and the declaration of public policy having had its effect 
it would no longer have any effect on the physical final 
79 
act of casting his vote" 
The learned Judge also found support in this 
connection in the statement of Objects and Reasons 
attached to the bill which ultimately resulted in the 
enactment of Chapter IX A. That statement explins in clear 
language that undue finfluence was intended to mean 
voluntary interference or attempted interference with the 
right of any person to stand or not to stand as or 
withdraw from being a candidate or to vote or refrain from 
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voting, and that the definition covers all threats of 
injury to person or property and all illegal methods of 
persuasion, and any interference with the liberty of the 
candidates or the electors ". 
The scope of Section 171-C was once again 
considered by the apex court in Charan Lai Sahu V Giani 
81 
Zail Singh . This time Chandrachud, C.J., speaking for 
the Court on behalf- of himself, B.hagwati, Sen, Madon 
and Thakkar, JJ., observed: 
Therefore,in order that the offence of undue 
influence can be said to have been made out 
within the meaning of S. 171 C... something 
more than the mere act of canvassing for a 
candidate must be shown to have been done by 
the offender. That something more may, for 
example, be in the nature of a threat of an 
injury to a candidate or a voter as stated 
in sub-S.2 (a) of S. 171 C... or, it may 
consist of inducing a belief of divine 
displeasure in the mind of a candidate or a 
voter as stated in sub-s.2 (b). The act 
alleged as constituting undue influence must 
be in the nature of a pressure or tyranny on 
the mind of the candidate or the voter.82 
In the instant case one of the allegations of the 
• petitioner was that Shri Beg, Chairman of the Minorities 
Commission, asked the voters to cast their votes in favour 
of Respondent 1 and not to cast them for Shri H.R, Khanna 
on the ground that the latter was not a suitable candidate 
as compared with Respondent 1. The court rejected the 
c*-
argument. The point of the matter is that by conveying to 
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the voters that Respondent 1 was a r.uch safer candidate 
than Shri Khanna and that Shri Khanna would not be a 
suitable candidate to hold the office of the President of 
India by reason of a judgment of his, Shri Beg could not 
be said to have interfered with the free exercise of the 
p o 
right of the voters to vote at the election" . The Court 
remarked that if the mere act of canvassing in fvour of 
one candidate as against another were to amount to undue 
iflu^nce, the very process of a democratic election should 
have been stifled because, the right to canvass support 
for a candidate was as much important as the right to vote 
for a candidate of one's choice. 
CONCLUSION 
The above discussion shows that the true scope of 
Section 123 (2) involves an element of fear in the mind of 
the voter that he would be subjected to physical injury, 
social deprivation or would incur divine displeasure. The 
provision does not strike at the right of a candidate to 
influence the voters. Parties and candidates do and must 
exercise their influence upon the voters in order to 
attract their support. It is only the-abuse of influence 
that Section 12.3 (2) seeks to prohibit. It is only when 
the influence .has been unduly exercised, that is an 
improper method has been used, that Section 123 (2) would 
come into play. in other words^ the law cannot strike at 
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the existence of influence. It is the abuse of influence 
v;ith which alone the law can deal. Influence cannot be 
said to be abused because it exists and operates. 
The courts have rightly interpreted undue 
influence' to mean coercion of any sort. Any influence 
short of this would not attract judicial intervention. The 
cases reviewed above demonstrate that the courts have put 
a restricted construction to Section 123 (2). Alive of the 
fact that democarcy in India has got to take its roots 
firmly and that unfair methods are quite widespread in 
election matters, the courts do not find themselves 
readily willing to interfere with an election outcome. 
When the allegations are serious and substantiated on the 
facts submitted that undue influence was so serious that 
its absence must have brought out a different result, the 
courts would likely intervene. In all other cases, a 
judicial remedy is hard to achieve. The restrictive 
judicial attitude is also due to the reason that undue 
influence is, more often that not, exercised behind the 
scene and beyond the eyes of probable witnesses. In the 
absence of written evidence, as is the case in most 
situations, undue influence is hard to prove. Resultantly, 
the cases in which the courts have reversed election 
results are extremely rare. This is probably the reason 
2sn 
why the cases which have been brought for judicial 
evaluation are only few in number. A prospective 
petitioner knows, in the absence of a definite evidence in 
his possession, that the outcome is likely to be 
unfavourable. The efficacy thus of Section 123 (2) is 
vastly limited. 
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CHAPTER - VII 
SECTARIAN CAMPAIGNING - I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Constitution of India grants to every citizen 
the right of equality of status, an' discrimination on 
grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth has 
been prohibited. One can find gleanings of the philosophy 
of a secular State in the various provisions of the 
Constitution. For instance, Article 15 says that the State 
shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds 
only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any 
of them. Article 16 guarantees equality of opportunity for 
all citizens in matters relating to employment or 
appointment to any office under the State. Under Article 
325, the right of vote is granted to all and it has been 
provided that no person shall be ineligible for inclusion 
in any electoral roll for any such constituency on grounds 
only of religion, race, caste, sex or any of them. 
Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution provide for 
religious freedoms to every person. Articles 29 and 30 
protect the interest of minorities in matters of cultural 
29] 
and educational rights. One of the fundamental duties of 
the citizens of India as provided in clause (e) of Article 
51-A is to promote harmony and the spirit of common 
brotherhood amongst all the people of India transcending 
religious, linguistic and regional or sectional 
diversities. Another fundamental duty is to value and 
preserve the rich heritage of our composite culture. The 
word 'secular' is also found in the preamble of the 
Constitution which talks of justice -—social, economic 
and political. It is, infact, under this Constitutional 
perspective that one has to analyse clause(3) of Section 
123. 
STATDTORY PROVISION 
Appeal to vote or refrain from voting on grounds 
of religion, etc. falls under the corrupt practice 
specified in clause(3) of Section 123 of the Act. The said 
provision reads as follows; 
The appeal by a candidate or his agent or by 
any other person with the consent of a 
candidate or his election agent to vote or 
refrain from voting for any person on the 
ground of his religion, race, caste, 
community or language or the use of, or 
appeal to religious symbols or the use of, 
or appeal to, national symbols, such as the 
national flag or the national emblem, for 
the furtherance of the prospects of the 
election of that candidate or for pre-
judicially affecting the election of any 
candidate. 
23 
Thus Section 123(3) of the Act, positively forbids any 
appeal to vote or refrain from voting for any person on 
the ground of hjLs religion, race, caste, conununity or 
language, by making it a corrupt practice. 
RATIONALE 
The rationale of the provision has been spelt out 
by the Supreme Court in its various pronouncements. In the 
words of the former Chief Justice, P.B. Gajendragadkar, 
"The corrupt practice as prescribed by Section 123(3) 
undoubtedly constitutes a very healthy and salutary 
provision which is intended to serve the cause of secular 
democracy in this country. In order that the democratic 
process should thrive and succeed, it is of utmost 
importance that our elections must be free from the 
unhealthy influence of appeals to religion, race, caste, 
community or language. If these considerations are allowed 
in any way in election campaigns, they would vitiate the 
2 
secular atmosphere of democratic Ixfe". Similarly, M.H. 
Beg, j. observed, " .... our democracy can only survive if 
those who aspire to become people's representatives and 
leaders understand the spirit of secular democracy .. . 
Heresy hunting propaganda on professedly religious grounds 
directed against a candidate at an election may be 
o 
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permitted in a ^  theocratic State but not in a secular 
republic like ours ... It is forbidden in this country in 
order to preserve the spirit of equality, fraternity/ and 
amity between rivals even during elections. Indeed, such 
prohibitions are necessary in the interest of elementary 
3 
public peace and order." And, in the words of Krishna 
Iyer, j., "The founding faith of our poll process is to 
ostracise the communal vice from the campaign, having 
suffered from this virus during the Raj. This great idea 
must brighten the legal phrases so that the purpose, the 
whole purpose and nothing but the purpose may be carried 
into effect".^^~^^ 
CONSTRDCTION OF SECTION 123(3) 
In order to see as to whether a particular appeal 
falls within the mischief of clauseO), Gajendragadkar, 
4 
C.j., speaking for the court in Kultar Singh , observed 
that the document must be read as a whole and its purport 
and effect determined in a fair, objective and reasonable 
manner. "In reading such document", the learned Chief 
justice further observed, "it would be unrealistic to 
ignore the fact that when election meetings are held and 
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appeals are made by candidates of opposing political 
parties, the atmosphere is usually surcharged with 
partisan feelings and emotions and the use of hyperboles 
or exaggerated language, or the adoption of metaphors, and 
the extravagance of expression in attacking one another, 
are all a part of the game; and so, when the question 
about the effect of speeches delivered or pamphlets 
distributed at election meetings is argued in the cold 
atmosphere of a judicial chamber, some allowance must be 
made and the impugned speeches or pamphlates must be 
construed in that light". The Chief Justice, at the same 
time, also cautioned that in doing so, however, it would 
be unreasonable to ignore the question as to what the 
effect of the said speech of the pamphlet would be on the 
mind of the ordinary voter who attends such meetings and 
reads such pamphlets or hears such speeches. 
The Supreme Court in a later judgment in Aabdul 
Hussain Mir reiterated the same principle. Krishna Iyer, 
J., speaking for the Court observed that "words of wide 
and vague import like appeal to religion, must receive 
restricted construction lest law run riot and upset 
7 
accepted political standards." "The sharp edge of the 
appeal, not its elitist possibility or over-nice 
29r» 
implication, is the crucial, commonsense test." Recently 
in the same context the Bombay High Court has further 
elaborated that in cases of speeches, whether or not a 
corrupt practice has been committed, would depend not only 
on the overall effect and impression, but also on the 
emphasis on sentences, words, manner of utterance, 
conjunction of sentences and words, etc. Thus some times, 
depending on the context and manner in which it is said or 
emphasized, a sentence, vrhich by itself may be innocuous, 
innocent or even laudable, may ultimately amount to a 
corrupt practice. S.N. Variava, J., who spoke for the 
Court gave an example: The sentence, "Garva Se Kaho Hum 
Hindu hain" (say with pride we are Hindus) by itself would 
be innocent. I would, in fact, say that it is a sentence, 
the sentiments of which are highly laudable and shared by 
all right minded citizens of India. There can be no doubt 
that the race or religion of Hindus has within it great 
virtues. Howver, even a sentence as innocent and laudable 
as above can be converted into a corrupt practice. If such 
a sentence is made at an election time with the intention 
of furthering the prospect of election of a candidate or 
prejudicially affecting the prospect of another on the 
ground of religion, race, caste and or community it would 
become a corrupt practice. This would necessarily depend 
29H 
on the context in which it is made, the context of the 
speech itself and to a certain extent the manner in which 
it is said and emphasised. For example at election time, 
the speaker talks about the superiority of Hindus. This 
mae be in context of Hindus as a race, religion, caste or 
community. Persons other than Hindus may be termed 
inferior and or 2nd class citizens. Depending on the 
context and emphasis this may again be on grounds of race, 
religion, caste or community. The speaker may call for the 
creation of a "Hindu Rashtra" and talk about either 
decimating or exporting all people of other races, 
religion, caste or community who refuse to accept such a 
"Hindu Rashtra". By the speech "Hindus" may be called 
upon to vote for a "Hindu" candidate or refrain from 
voting for a non-Hindu candidate. This again may be on 
grounds of race and/or religion and/or caste and/or 
community. By the speech it is made out, that for the 
protection of Hindus as a race and/or religion and/or 
caste and/or community it is absolutely necessary that 
people vote only for Hindus. In a speech such as this, 
even the laudable sentence "say with pride we are Hindus" 
could be made to completely change its context, depending 
on the manner in which and time at which it is said and 
emphasised. Whether the utterance of such a sentence is or 
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is not a corrupt practice ... can only be finally decided 
after the full import and effect of the speech is 
analysed. 
(a) APPEAL OF THE GROUND OF RELIGION 
What is Religion ? 
There is no precise and coherent definition of 
religion. The term 'religion' has been given different 
interpretations by different writers. Ronald Roberston 
states that 'Religion refers to the existence of 
supernatural beings which have a governing effect on 
9 
life'. For Emile Durkheim, 'Religion is a unified system 
of beliefs and practices related to sacred things, that is 
to say things set apart and forbidden'. And in Marx's 
words, 'Religion is the sign of the oppressed creature, 
the sentiment of a heartless world and the soul of 
soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people'. 
However, in the words of Harry M. Jonson, 'Religions vary 
so widely in doctrine, practice, and organization and 
religious feelings are so personal and difficult to 
29S 
describe objectively that any definition of religion will 
necessarily seem inadequate • 
Claused), of Article 25 of the Indian Constitution 
guarantees to every person the freedom of conscience and 
the right freely to profess, practise and propagate 
religion. Freedom of conscience connotes a person's right 
to entertain beliefs and doctrines concerning matters 
which are regarded by him to be conducive to his 
13 
spiritual well-being. A person has freedom to believe in 
religious tenets of any sect or community. However, the 
right is subject to public order, health and morality, 
etc. It has been rightly remarked that "Even the freedom 
of religion was guaranteed in this secular State not out 
of concern for religions, generally, much less for any 
particular religion, but solely and unmistakably out of 
concern for the individual, as an aspect of the general 
schemes of his liberty, and as incidental to his well 
being ".•'•^  
Religious appeal and the Courts 
The Supreme Court in Kultar Singh has held that 
it is not necessary for an appeal to come within the ambit 
of Section 123(3) that there be a conflict of religions. 
Gajendragadkar. C.j., speaking on behalf of a five-judge 
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division bench, observed that a corrupt practice under 
Section 123(3) can be committed by a candidate by 
appealing to the voters to vote for him on the ground of 
his religion even though his rival candidate may belong 
to the same religion. In the instant case both the 
appellant as well as the respondent were Sikhs. The facts 
were that the appellant who was elected to the Punjab 
Legislative Assembly by defeating the respondent had 
stood for election on the Akali Dal ticket. The respondent 
represented the Congress Party. 
After the election of the appellant was declared 
the respondent filed an election petition alleging that 
the appellant's election was void in as much as for the 
purpose of securing votes, he had appealed to his religion 
and thereby committed a corrupt practice. The point at 
issue before the apex Court was the contents of a poster 
Ext. P-10. It reads thus: 
"Dear resident Sikhs, 
We, who are living in Singapore, Malaya, 
and South East Asia, place this before you, 
most respectfully, that at this critical 
juncture it is your duty to keep high the 
honour of the Panth. This is not the time to 
criticise weaknesses of the leaders of the 
Panth; the need is that in the coming 
General Elections you should defeat the 
opponents of the Panth the same way as you 
did in the last Gurdwara Elections. Every 
Sikh vote should go to the representatives 
of the Akali Dal, and we hope that this 
prayer of ours from far off will be accepted 
by you and you will once again preserve the 
honour of the Panth. Victory of the Panth 
will maintain the honour of the Panth. By 
maintaining such honour we will reach our 
final goal, that is Punjabi Suba. 
We remain anxious to keep the honour and 
prestige of the Panth ever high. 
Yours, 
Non-resident brothers" 
The respondent had contented before the Tribunal and the 
High Court that this appeal plainly and unambignously 
invited the voters to vote for the appellant in order to 
preserve the honour and prestige of the Panth and it was 
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urged that in that context, the Panth meant the Sikh 
religion. Since the pamphlet clearly appealed to the 
voters to vote , for the appellant and proceeded on the 
assumption that the election of the appellant would 
uphold the honour and prestige of the Sikh religion that 
amounted to a corrupt practice, because the appeal was 
based on the ground of the appellant's religion. This 
contention was accepted by the courts below. 
The Supreme Court opined that the views taken by 
Tribunal and the High Court were inconsistent with a fair 
and reasonable construction of the impugned poster. The 
Court analysed the meaning of the word "Panth" in the 
context of the pamphlet the distribution of which was 
alleged to constitute corrupt practice. The word "Panth" 
occurs in six places in the pamphlet. First, reference is 
made to the honour of the Panth; then it is said that it 
is not the time to criticise the leaders of the Panth. In 
both these places, according to the Court, the word 
"Panth" may conceivably mean the Sikh religion. "But when 
we go to the use of the word "Panth" in the next sentence, 
it becomes clear that the said word cannot possibly mean 
(15-a) the Sikh religion". The relevant portion of the 
pamphlet says to the electors to defeat the opponents of 
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the Panth the same way as they did in the last Gurdwara 
election. Gurdwara elections were fought between different 
parties of the Sikhs and the Akali Dal Party triumphed at 
the said elections. "Therefore", the Court observed, 
"there is no doubt whatever that in this sentence, the 
Panth cannot possibly mean the Sikh religion". The 
expression "the opponents of the Panth" obviously means 
the opponents of the Akali Dal party and what the pamphlet 
purports to tell the electors is, just as at the last 
Gurdwara Elections the Akali Dal Party succeeded over its 
opponents, so should the Akali Dal Party triumph in the 
(15-c) election in question. The next sentence makes it 
still clearer that the Panth and the Akali Dal Party are 
treated as synonymous in his portion because it says 
"every Sikh vote should go to the representatives of the 
Akali Dal", and that can be reconciled with the previous 
sentence only on the basis that in the minds of those who 
drafted the impugned poster, the Akali Dal Party and the 
Panth are the same. Then the poster says that the prayer 
made in the poster if accepted, will once again preserve 
the honour of the Panth; the words "once again" take us 
back to the triumph which the Akali Dal Party achieved at 
the last Gurdwara elections, and so the Panth in this 
context must mean the Akali Dal Party; and in the end when 
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the pamphlet refers to the victory of the Panth and the 
honour of the Panth, it must be taken to refer to the 
victory . and honour of the Akali Dal Party. The last 
sentence is very significant. It says that by maintaining 
such honour meaning the honour of the Panth which is the 
Akali Dal, we will reach our final goal, that is, the 
Punjabi Suba. It is not disputed that at these elections, 
the Akali Dal Party propagated for the creation of the 
Punjabi Suba and the crux of the appeal made by the 
impugned posters is that if the voters returned the Akali 
Dal candidate, the honour and prestige of the Akali Dal 
would be maintained and the ideal of the Punjabi Suba 
attained. In the end, the poster also says that those who 
issued it were anxious to keep the honour and prestige of 
the Panth ever high. 
After the above analysis of the said poster, the 
apex Court deliberated that the High Court did not appear 
to have considered the different places in the poster 
where the word "Panth" had been used and no attempt had 
been made to co-relate those sentences and to enquire 
whether the meaning attributed by the High Court to the 
word "Panth" was justified in regard to all the sentences 
in which the word occurred. The Court further held that 
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the impugned poster was issued in furtherance of the 
appellant's candidature at en election, and the plain 
object which it. had placed before the voters was that the 
Punjabi Suba could be achieved if the appellant was 
elected; and that necessarily meant that the appellant 
belonged to the Akali Dal Party and the Akali Dal Party 
was the strong supporter of the Punjabi Suba. The 
significance of the reference to the Punjabi Suba in the 
impugned poster arose from the fact that it gave clue to 
the meaning which the poster intended to assign to the 
word "Panth". "Therefore", the Court observed, "we are 
satisfied that the word "Panth" in this poster does not 
mean Sikh religion; and so, it would not be posssible to 
accept the view that by distributing this poster, the 
appellant appealed to his voters to vote for him because 
of his religion". ^-"-^ "^ ^ 
The appeal was allowed. In the opinion of the apex 
Court the High Court was in error in coming to the 
conclusion that the impugned poster Ext. P-10 attracted the 
provisions of Section 123(3) of the Act. 
The Supreme Court in a leading judgment on the 
point in Ziyauddin Burhanuddin Bukhari V Brijmohan Ramdass 
Mehra has held that candidates at an election to a 
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legislature, which is a part of "the State", cannot be 
allowed to tell electors that their rivals are unfit to 
act as their representatives on grounds of their religious 
professions or practices. "To permit such propaganda would 
be not merely to permit undignified personal attacks on 
candidates concerned but also to allow assaults on what 
17 
sustains the basic structure of the Democratic State". 
The facts were that in the election petition by a 
voter it was alleged that the appellant Bukhari, a 
successful Muslim League candidate, had made speeches in 
the course of his election campaign calculated to induce a 
belief in the voters that they would be objects of divine 
displeasure or spiritual censure if they voted for Shaukat 
Currimbhoy Chagla a Congress Party candidate, who 
according to Z.B. Bukhari, represented all that was 
opposed to Muslim religion and belief while he alone stood 
for all that was Muslim. 
The appellant had further attacked Chagla's 
religion by stating that everyone had to observe his 
religion wholeheartedly and not like one who was "neither 
fish nor fowl"* He, therefore, called upon the voters to 
vote for him. It was alleged that the appeal was to 
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further the chances of Z.B. Bukhari and to prejudically 
affect the prospects of the election of Shaukat C. Chagla. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the findings of the 
Bombay High Court and held that Bukhari's statements hit 
the provisions of Section 123(3) of the Act. Beg, J., who 
delivered the judgment of the Court on behalf of himslef, 
Alagiriswami and Untwalia, jj., observed: 
[v;]hat is relevant in such a case is what is 
professed or put forward by a candidate as a 
ground for preferring him over another and 
not the motive or the reality behind the 
profession which may or may not be very 
secular or mundane. It is the professed or 
ostensible ground that matters. If that 
ground is religion, which is put on the 
same footing as race, caste or language as 
an objectionable ground for seeking votes, 
it is not permissible. 
Thus the appellant wanted votes for himself mainly on the 
ground that he staunchly adhered to what he believed to be 
Mulsim religion as contrasted with Chagla who did not. It 
was a speech by the appellant which had made a direct 
attack of personal character upon the competence of 
Chagla to represent the Muslims as "Chagla was not a 
Muslim of the kind who could represent Muslims" and 
thereby his speech contracened the provisions of Section 
123(3) of the Act relating religion. ^ -^ "^^ ^ 
30 
On similar-fact situation is the decision of the 
19 Supreme Court in Rahim Khan V Khurshid Ahmad. "^  The 
offending handbill issued at the time of the election 
which was challenged as contravening Section 123(3) was as 
follows: 
"Introduction of Ch. Khurshid Ahmed and some 
question to him 
(1) You being a Muslim got dug a grave of a 
Mohammadan and got the dead body out due 
to your personal enmity, which is 
against Islam ... Do you still claim 
yourself to be a Muslim ? 
(2) XXX 
(3) You being Health Minister violated the 
modesty of numerous lady doctors and 
nurses .. . 
(4) You while being a Minister got some 
Muslims . . . arrested on allegation of 
cow slaughter and made them to eat meat 
of the pig. Do you want to be elected 
again so that you may be able to make 
all Muslims eat the meet of the Pig ? 
Khurshid Sahib: public wants to tell you, 
that you yourself have become a 'Kafir' 
by eating the meet of the pig/ but the 
remaining Muslims do not want to become 
'Kafirs' at your hands. 
Public should pay attention, and 
should give crushing defeat to such a 
'Kafir'. I am rightly entitled to your 
vote. 
Rahim Khan" 
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The Supreme Court held that the copies of the offending 
hand-bill whcih the appellant (an elected Muslim 
candidate) got' printed and distributed among his 
constituencies exhorting the Muslim voters to support his 
candidature for his Islamic way of life and to repel the 
first respondent for his heathen habits amounted to the 
corrupt practice of appeal in the name of religion. It 
also amounted to 'character assassination' falling under 
Section 123(4) because the hand-bills contained statements 
of personal vilification of respondent like womanising 
which were untrue and which the appellant did not believe 
to be true and knew to be false. 
Thus the Supreme Court found that appeal to 
religion, in that context, was influencing Muslim voters 
to prefer the appellant for his authentic Islamic way of 
life and to repel the first respondent for his heathen 
habits. In the opinion of the Court it is not appeal to 
religion if voters are told that a candidate consumes 
unorthodox food. What is "vice is injection of religion 
into politics and playing up fanaticism to distract 
20 franchise". Krishna Iyer, j., who spoke for the Court on 
behalf of himself, Palekar and Bhagwati, jj., observed 
that "what is appeal to religion depends on time and 
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circumstances, the ethos of a community, the bearing of 
the deviation on the cardinal tenets and other variables. 
To confound communal passion and crude bigotry with 
religion is to sanctify in law what is irreligion in 
fact".^ -'-
Once again Krishan Iyer, j., speaking for the 
Supreme Court on behalf of himself and Sarkaria, j., 
discussed the scope of sub-section{3) in Abdul Hussain Mir 
22 V Shamsul Huda and observed that mere reference to one's 
tribe ancestry or genetic commingling might not be tainted 
with the legal vice of religious or communal appeal 
exceptional situations apart. In the instant case one of 
the allegations was that the reutrned candidate sought 
support from tribals on account of his ethnic origins; he 
claimed to be a half-tribal, as his mother was a Kachari, 
one of the tribes of Assam. However, she had embraced 
Islam before she married the appellant's father. The 
learned judge observed that there was no religious 
exploitation by the candidate of his religion or 
community, legally or factually. "Tribalism may perhaps be 
stretched to embrace communalism but the accent in the 
23 
evidence was on half-Hindu bias, not tribal identity". 
It was further observed that an appeal by a candidate that 
310 
he personified Hindu-Muslim interplay did not cross the 
line of corrupt practice. "To declare oneself an offspring 
24 
of a religious renegade is not to appeal to religion". 
Thus, in the opinion of the learned judge, the said 
statement lacked the "sharp edge of the appeal". 
2 In Harcharan Singh V S. Sajjan Singh it was alleged 
that Hukamnamas were issued urging the voters to vote for 
respondent No.3 and not to vote for the eppellant. It was 
also alleged that in the meetings speeches were made by 
eminent public persons appealing to the voters that as 
respondent No. 3 -was the candidate of the Akal Takht and 
his nomination was supported by the Hukamnamas of Akal 
Takht the people should vote for him and not to vote for 
him would be against the tenets of the Sikh religion and 
would be a blasphemous act against the Sikh religion. In 
publications like the Akali Times the same view was 
propounded and it was indicated that Indira Congress was 
always against Sikh people and Sikh religion and as such 
to vote for Congressd) would be to vote against Sikh 
religion, were pointed out at the meetings. Thus, the 
allegations against respondent No.3 were that he, his 
election agent and other persons with his consent appealed 
to the voters in the name of religion, namely Sikh 
religion. 
311 
The Punjab and Haryana High Court held that the 
appellant had failed to prove the corrupt practice alleged 
against respondent No.3. The Court emphasised that 
allegations of corrupt practices in an election petition 
are in the nature of quasi-criminal charges and must be 
proved beyond reasonable doubt as such. In the opinion of 
the High Court the appellant had no succeeded in proving 
the said charges beyond reasonable doubt and hence the 
said election petition was dismissed. 
The Supreme Court, in appeal, observed that "in our 
opinion it is not a technical question whether exhibit P-4 
was a Hukamnama or not". Sabyasachi Mukharji, j., who 
wrote the judgment on behlaf of himself, Murtaza F. Ali 
and vadrajan, jjw followed the principle of 
interpretation laid down by the Supreme Court in Ziyauddin 
. 27 Burhanuddin that the "Court has to examine the effect of 
the statements made by the candidate or on his behalf upon 
the minds and the feelings of the ordinary average voters 
of this country", and observed: 
It is undisputed that Shri Akal Takht enjoys a 
unique position amongst the Sikhs. It is 
indubitable that any communication from Shri 
Akal Takht which is represented by eminent 
members of the Sikh community as Hukamnama 
would have great religious persuasive value even 
though strictly speaking it might or might not 
be a Hukamnama ... 28 
Q 1 1 1 "^ 
The Court did not consider it necessary to decide vhether 
in strict textual sense and strict rules of the Sikh 
community, the 'said Hukamnama was a Hukamnama or not and 
observed: 
[H]aving regard to the background, it cannot 
be said that it did not have the effect of a 
Hukamnama on the community at large of 
inducing them to believe that ignoring the 
claim of the candidate nominated by Shri 
Akal Takht and represented to be supported 
by Hukamnama would be an act of sacrilege on 
29 the part of a good Sikh. 
Thus, under the circumstances, according to the Court, the 
Hukamnama fell within the ambit of Section 123(3). The 
Court at the same time reiterated its stand that religious 
leaders have every right to freely express their opinions 
on the comparative merits of the contesting candidates and 
also to canvass for such of them as they considered worthy 
of the confidence of the electorate. It further clarified 
the issue in the following words: 
It would not be an appeal to religion if a 
candidate is put up by saying 'Vote for 
him' because he is a good Sikh or he is a 
good Muslim, but it would be an appeal to 
religion if it is publicised that not to 
vote for him would be against Sikh 
religion or against christian religion or 
against Hindu religion or to vote for the 
other candidate would be an act against a 
particular religion. It is the total 
effect of such an appeal that has to be 
borne in mind in deciding whether there 
313 
was an appeal to religion as such or not. 
In each case, therefore, substance of the 
30 
matter has to be judged. 
In the light of the above observation the Supreme court 
examined the evidence and came to the conclcusion that 
appeal in the name of religion was made on behalf of 
respondent No.3. 
From the above case may be contrasted the decision 
. 31 
of the Delhi High Court m Pritpal Singh V Ranjit Rai. 
The allegation was that Sant Harcharan Singh Longowal, 
President of the Shiromani Akali Dal,issued two appeals in 
the name of the Panth to all the Sikh voters to boycott 
elections and respondent No.l widely circulated the 
printed appeals issued by the Sant and thereby asked the 
Sikh voters to refrain from voting for the petitioner. 
Thus respondent No.l and his agents exploited the 
religious feelings of the Sikhs and thereby committed the 
corrupt practice as defined in Section 123(3) of the Act. 
The two appeals were as follows: 
1st Appeal 
"God is one. God can be visualised with the 
blessing of Gurus. Boycott Elections in 
Delhi. Sant Longowal's Appeal. 
Brave and unique Sikhs of Delhi in the 
perennial 'Dharmaydh' conducted under the 
leadership of Shiromani Akali Dal against 
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the injustice and excess of the Government 
in independent India 77,672 Sikhs have 
courted their arrest since 4th August, 
1982. 108^  Sikhs have cheerfully become 
martyrs in the process of undergoing 
highhandedness and atrocities of the 
Government under one pretext or the other. 
The Government has refused to accept the 
legitimate and constitutional demands of 
the Sikhs . .. 
I in the capacity of being a servant of 
the followers of Guru earnestly appeal to 
all the Sikhs of Delhi thereby boycotting 
the forthcoming ... election substantiating 
Panthak unity and the Panthak Supermacy ..." 
Second Appeal 
"Sardar Sahib Ji 
Vahe Guru Ji ka Khalsa 
Vahe Guru Ji ki Fateh 
You are fully aware that since 4th 
August, 1982 Shiromani Akali Dal composed 
of martyrs' brave Sikh community has 
launched a consistent Dharamyudh (crusadity) 
against the injustice and high-handedness 
to which the Sikhs have been subjected ... 
The attitude of the Government towards 
Sikhs during Asian Games clearly 
demonstrated its discrimination and excess 
Every Sikh was looked down with 
suspicion and numerous innocent were put 
behind the bars without any law. By 
cardoning the pious religious places the 
Sikhs aspiring to have Guru Darshan were 
harassed ... The Congress Government in 
Punjab has eclipsed even the Nathershah 
atrocities. Hundreds of Sikh youths have 
been killed in fake police encounters . . . 
The Government is repeatedly saying that it 
is prepared to accede the religious demands 
of the Sikh community but even that has not 
been announced. 
At this juncture the Supreme authority 
of Sikh Panth, Sri Sant Harcharan Singh 
Longowal . . . has appealed to the entire 
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Sikh community to boycott Delhi Municipal 
Corporation and Metropolitan Council 
Elections by not casting their votes ..." 
The contention bf the petitioner was that respondent No.l 
exploited the religions sentiments and feelings of the 
Sikhs and promoted the feelings of enmity and hatred 
between the Congress(I) Government and Sikhs and this 
prejudicially affected his election prospect because the 
Sikh voters did not vote for him. The petitioner mainly 
relied on Section 123(3) and (3-A) of the Act. 
The Delhi High Court held that the appeal issued by 
the Akali leader could not be said to be a religious 
appeal. The appeal was issued by a leader of Akali Dal - a 
recognised political party by the Election Commission - to 
the members of the party that they should not participate 
in the election for achieving their rights and more unity. 
The appeal was, in the opinion of the Court, not born out 
of the Sikh religion but out of a dissatisfaction with the 
party in power, though religion was relied in its support. 
The appeal was a "protest against the apartheid and 
genocide policy of the Congress towards the Sikhs". The 
Akali Dal president made an appeal to the members of the 
party to boycott election, not because their religion 
forbade them to vote but because the Congress Government 
B I R 
did not keep its promises. Thus, in the opinion of the 
Court, it was essentially a protest against the ruling 
party from a political platform for total abstinece from 
elections which was an apparatus devised for participation 
by all parties in the democratic process. It was an appeal 
for non-intercourse for political reasons. 
The Court further observed that the critical words 
in sub-section (3) are "on the ground of his religion" 
meaning the religion of the candidate. Hence that was not 
an appeal by the respondent. Ranjit Sharma, the returned 
candidate, "on the ground of his religion". He was a 
Brahmin and not a Sikh. Thus the appeal of the Akali 
leader, in the opinion of the Court, did not fall within 
the ambit of Section 123(3) of the Act. 
Sometimes the question is whether a line is to be 
drawn between an appeal on the ground of religion, etc., 
which will hit Section 123(3) and a simple critism of 
political parties which will be beyond the purview of 
corrupt practice. The Allahabad High Court answered this 
32 question in Ghayur Ali Khan V Keshav Gupta. It held that 
even if the appeal is to the members of a particular 
community, it does not necessarily fall within the 
mischief of sub-section 3 of Section 123 of the Act, 
unless the appeal was made on the ground of religion or 
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conmiunity. Suppose, the High Court observed, the action 
of the political party in power is criticised on the 
ground that it Has passed improper legislation interfering 
with the Hindu usages and customs in the matter of 
marriage and divorce and that the persons professing Hindu 
faith should, therefore, vote against the candidate set up 
by such a party. This would be an appeal to the members 
professing a particular religion, but it is not an appeal 
on the ground of religion. It is an appeal to vote against 
a candidate set up by a party, because the policy of the 
party is not liked by the maker of the appeal. It is a 
criticism of that party. What he does, the Court further 
observed, is to criticise the measure of social reform, 
which the party in power has brought about, though the 
appeal is an appeal to the members belonging to a 
particular religion. Such an appeal is, in the opinion of 
the Court, not on the ground of religion but on the 
allegation that an improper act has been done by the party 
in power, and the persons affected by that improper act 
should not vote for the candidate of that party. 
The High Court also admitted that sometimes there 
may be cases where, in the garb of criticism of the Act or 
supposed acts of a political party, an attempt will be 
31^ 
made to make an appeal on the ground of religion. In such 
a situation, the appeal would be covered by Section 123(3) 
of the Act. And hence, the High Court observed, the 
contents of a particular document have to be taken as a 
whole and; after a consideration of the entire document, a 
decision has to be arrived at whether the document 
contains merely a criticism of the actions of a political 
party or it is really an appeal on the ground of religion. 
The Court gave an example: If a political party is 
criticised on the ground that it has a communal outlook 
and that its policy is to suppress the members of 
another community, such as, the Jan Sangh or the Muslim 
League, and it is stated that people should not vote for 
any of these communal organisations because the essential 
policy of these organisations is to further the ends of 
the Hindus or the Muslims, at the cost of the members of 
the other community, the appeal in such ,cases also would 
be to the members of the Hindu or the Muslim community, 
but it would not be on the ground of religion or 
community, but on the ground of the wrong policy of the 
particular organisation. "This be criticism of the policy 
of the organisation and not an appeal to vote or to 
refrain from voting on the ground of religion or 
3n 
community. If the Legislature really meant to prohibit an 
appeal to a community, it could easily have said so, 
instead of saying "on the ground of". 
Ghayur Ali Khan was followed by the Assam High Court 
33 in Amjad Ali V Nazmul Hague. In that case it was held 
that criticism of the Congress Government in public 
meetings for its administrative policy in the matter of 
its enforcing or passing legal measures or adopting 
methods prejudicial to Muslims (e.g. the passing of the 
Cattle Preservation Act which prohibits cow slaughter, 
singing of Ramdhun in schools, banning burial of dead 
bodies, etc.), did not by itself amount to an appeal to 
Muslims to vote or refrain from voting on the ground of 
caste, race, community or religion within the meaning of 
Section 123(3). 
The High Court further held that where both the 
rival candidates were Muslims and there was no evidence as 
to the actual statements that were made at such meetings 
and it was not possible to find definitely whether only 
the policy of the Congress Government in the matter of 
passing or enforcing legislation prejudicial to Muslims 
was criticised or an appeal was made to vote or refrain 
from voting on the ground of religion or community under 
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the garb of discussing such measures, the respondent was 
not guilty of corrupt practice under Section 123(3). 
The net result of both the cases discussed above 
decided by two different High Court is that as such an 
appeal is not hit by clause 3 of Section 123 simply 
because it touches the sentiments of some caste or 
community, but it will have to be proved that the appeal 
was made on the ground of religion, race, etc.; and for 
this the best course would be to read the document as a 
whole, for, sometimes it will be found that the so-called 
appeal was nothing more than a severe criticism of the 
policy of a party. 
Distinguishing the facts of the two cases, Dek, j., 
who delivered the judgment of the Assam High Court held 
that in the Allahabad case, there was handbill and the 
nature of the statements could be definitely ascertained 
from the document itself, taking it as a whole, but in the 
case of Amjad Ali, the learned judges were not able to get 
an accurate version of what had happend and what were 
the actual words used by the speakers. Giving benefit of 
doubt under the circumstances to the person who was 
alleged to be guilty of corrupt practice it was held that 
the charge of communal propaganda covered by Section 
123(3) was not made out. 
321 
(b) APPEAL ON THE GROUND OF CASTE 
One of the distinctive and pervasive features of 
34 Indxan society is the division into castes. Caste system 
provides rules of social behaviour which cannot be 
violated. Each caste tries to maintain its hold over its 
members and controls their behaviour. The traditions, 
customs and rules of behaviour differ from caste to caste. 
"Caste is undoubtedly an all-India phenomenon in the sense 
that there are everywhere heriditary, endogamous groups 
which form the hierarchy, and that each of these groups 
has a traditional association with one or two occupations. 
Everywhere there are Brahmins, untouchables, and peasant, 
artisan, trading and service castes. Relations between 
castes are invariably expressed in terms of pollution and 
35 purity". It has been estimated that there are 2,000/- or 
3,000/- such castes (or sub-castes, as they are sometimes 
3 c 
called) in present day India. 
Caste-ridden Society 
The caste system enjoyed both legal and religious 
sanctions in traditional India society. Different 
castes were assigned different rights, not only in 
economic matters, but over a wide range of social 
phenomena. In traditional society punishment differed not 
32 
only according to the nature of the offence committed, but 
also according to the caste of the offender. 
The Constitution of India resolves to secure all its 
citizens social, economic and political justice and 
equality of status and opportunity. The first task of this 
Assembly (Nehru told the members) is to free India through 
a new constitution, to feed the starving people, and to 
clothe the naked masses, and to give every Indian the 
fullest opportunity to develop himself according to his 
•^  37 capacity. 
However, there was no unanimity among the makers of 
the Constitution regarding the abolition of the caste 
system. Nehru, Ambedkar, K. Santhanam and some others 
were strongly against the caste system. According to 
39 Nehru, caste is an 'anachronism and objectionabale'. K. 
Santhanam wanted India 'to get out of the medievalism 
based on birth, religion custom, and community and 
reconstruct her social structure on modern foundations of 
' 40 law, individual merit, and secular education. On the 
other hand, Mahatma Gandhi, Vallabhbhai Patel, Rajendra 
Prasad, K.M. Munshi and others did not favour the 
41 
abolition of the caste system. Their differences came to 
surface in the drafting of Article 17 regarding the 
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abolition of untouchability draft with the following 
provision 'Any privilege or disability arising out of 
rank, birth, person, family, religion or religious usage 
42 
and custom is abolished'. Ambedkar's draft was accepted 
neither by the drafting committee nor the Constitutent 
43 Assembly. Moreover, the provisions of protective 
discrimination for the scheduled castes were mainly 
confined to those who were Hindus. They were not aimed at 
abolishing the caste system, which is one of the root 
44 
causes of untouchability. K.M. Munshi said that the 
Harijans are part and parcel of the Hindu community and 
safeguards are given to them to protect their rights only 
till they are completely absorbed in the Hindu 
45 Community' . It has been rightly pointed out that the 
establishment of a casteless society as a national goal 
does not find place in the directive principles or the 
preamble of the Constitution. "Thus one finds 
contradictions on the objective of the state regarding 
social order. The Constitution envisages building an 
egalitarian society within the capitalist framework 
without uprooting the caste system. Today the Indian 
society is so much cast-ridden that its virus has even 
infected the electronics media as one saw the castiest 
bias when it gave massive coverage to anti-Mandal 
demonstrations and the suicide by young upper caste 
324 
students, but completely ignored the silent support of 
the masses to the decision to reserve Central Government 
47 jobs for the backward. Thus caste consciousness and 
identity more than, religion, region, class or language, 
remain the dominant ethnic characteristics of the Indian 
society. What is surprising is that the die-hard sense of 
caste has affected not merely the Hindu hierarchy but also 
48 the Muslim brotherhood. 
Caste and Electoral Politics 
The elections in India are contested very much on 
the basis of caste. The voters are asked to vote for their 
caste candidate. Even seats are adjusted by different 
parties keeping in view caste consideration of the 
constituency. 
A study of the 1951-52 election exazmined the 
49 influence of caste in different areas. In Delhi, neither 
caste, class nor religious affiliation seem to have had an 
important influence on the electors, who had heavily voted 
in favour of the Congress Party. The report on Rajasthan 
observed that caste, tradition, religious beliefs, even 
threats and bribes, influenced the voter even more than 
51 they did m other States. But a survey of a village in 
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Gujrat shov?ed that neither caste norreligion had a 
preponderant influence upon the voter's choice. A major 
factor in the voters' choice was economic interest; the 
large landowners voted mainly against the Congress Party, 
while government employees and small landowners voted for 
.. 52 it. 
53 Another survey also lays down that caste provides 
an extensive basis for organization of democratic 
politics. According to the author caste identities and 
solidarities become the primary channels through which 
electoral and political support is mobilized within the 
political system. Thus, as Kothari puts it, "it is not 
politics that gets caste-ridden it is caste that gets 
> 54 
politicised. Similarly, it has been found that caste, 
however, is used more extensively in mobilizing support in 
rural than urban areas. In urban areas regional and 
linguistic identities, or class and occupational 
interests, or considerations of governmental policies and 
performance are often more salient as influences in voting 
*. 55 than caste. 
Casteist Electoral Appeal and the Courts 
It has been seen that caste plays a crucial rule in 
election campaigning. As the Supreme Court pointed out 
32r, 
that Indian leadership has long condemned electoral 
campaigns on the lines of caste and community as being 
destructive of the country's integration and the concept 
of secular democracy which is the basis of our 
constitution and it is this condemnation which is 
reflected in Section 123(3) of the Act. In spite of the 
repeated condemnation, the Court further pointed out, 
experience has shown that where there is such a 
constituency it has been unfortunately too tempting for a 
candidates to resist appealing to sectional elements to 
cast their votes on caste basis. 
It is against this background to see how the courts 
have interpreted 'caste' as violative of Section 123(3). 
(I) Appeal by candidates of one caste to voters of others 
Castes 
The Patna High Court in Sant Prasad Singh V Dasu 
57 Sinha had to decide whether an appeal by a candidate of 
one caste to voters of other castes to cast their votes in 
his favour as he belonged to Congress which was supported 
by their caste organisation, was hit by Section 123(3) of 
the Act. The facts were that a leaflet published by the 
successful Congress candidate who was Kurmi by caste"'-* "•* 
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appealed to the vctcrs of other castes viz. Kusbahas, 
Yadawas, Duradha and other Harijans, to support him on the 
ground that their caste organisations supported the Indian 
National Congress. After having referred to the various 
castes, in the leaflet it was mentioned that the voters 
must not cast their votes in favour of those who demanded 
their votes on the ground of caste. Such people were out 
to damage the cause of the country. Avoiding the trap laid 
by castists, public should cast their votes exclusively in 
favour of the Congress. 
The judgment of the Court was delivered by Misra, 
J., with whom Bahadur, J., agreed observed that the 
expression "for any person on the ground of his religion, 
race, caste, coir^ munity or language" clearly lays down 
that the appeal to be made by the candidates to the voters 
to support him should be on the ground that he belongs to 
a particular religion, caste, etc. In the present case, 
the learned judge pointed out, there was no reference at 
all to the Kurmis. Misra, j., further opined that if the 
respondent had appeared to the Kurmis to support him on 
the ground that he was an Awadhia Kurmi and that his 
castemen should support him on that ground, the case might 
have been hit by sub-section(3). "As it is, however, 
32.S 
reference to Kusbahas, Yadavas, Dusadha and other Harijans 
to support him because their caste organisations supported 
the Indian National Congrees does not appear to me to be 
C O 
covered by sub-section(3) of Section 123." Further, it 
was pointed out that in order to judge whether the 
concerned leaflet would bring the case within 
sub-section(3) would depend upon the construction to be 
put upon the document read as a whole and not a sentence 
here and there. "After having referred to the various 
castes, in the leaflet it was mentioned that the voters 
must not cast their votes in favour of those who demanded 
their votes on the ground of caste. Such people were out 
to damage the cause of the country. Avoiding the trap laid 
by castists, public should cast their votes exclusively in 
favour of the Congress. In my opinion, even if paragraphs 
2,3 and 4 were construed as asking for votes in the name 
of castes, the last paragraph of which distinctly exhorted 
the people not to cast their votes on the ground of 
castes, etc., would nullify the effect of the appeal in 
the three preceding paragraphs and, therefore, read as a 
whole this document would have the effect of warning 
voters against exercising their franchise under the 
influence of a caste-feeling and not inviting them to do 
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so on that ground." The learned judge accepted the 
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finding? of the Tribunal that the content of the concerned 
leaflet could not be regarded as a corrupt practice within 
the meaning of s.ub-section{ 3) of Section 123 of the Act. 
'Appeal on caste' was once again the issue before 
the Patna High Court in Bhupendra Narain Mandal V E.K. 
Narain Lai Das. At the Parliamentary election from the 
Saharsa Parliamentary constituency there were three 
contestants, one each belonging to the Socialist, the 
Swatantra and the Congress party. B.N. Mandal, the 
Socialist candidate, was declared duly elected. Therefore, 
election petitions were filed seeking two-fold 
declarations, namely, (1) that the election of B.N. Mandal 
was void and should be set aside and (2) that Shri Lalit 
Narain Mishra, the Congress candidate should be declared 
to have been duly elected. Earlier the election of B.N. 
Mandal was declared to be void by the Tribunal, but the 
other prayer was rejected. 
The main allegation was that the appellant, his 
election agent and other agents of his with his consent 
made appeals to the voters through meetings and 
propaganda, in particular, by distribution of printed 
hand-bills and leaflets to vote or refrain from voting on 
grounds of caste. 
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It was alleged that the appellant, who belonct.' to 
the Yadav caste, his election agent and others v.-ith his 
consent with a view to further the prospects of this 
elections prejudicially affected the election of the 
respondent, who belonged to the Brahmin caste, appealed 
to the voters belonging to the Yadav cate scattered 
throughout the Parliamentary Constituency, being in 
majority in some areas and ranging between 15 to 20 per 
cent in others, to refrain from voting for the respondent 
on the ground of his being a Brahmin and to vote for him 
on the ground that he was a Yadav. It was further alleged 
that the unwholesome propaganda carried on by the 
appellant on caste basis inevitably induced an atmosphere 
of hostility and acrimony between the people of the Yadav 
and the Brahmin castes and thus promoted enmity and hatred 
between the castes. 
On the above allegations, the petitioners asserted 
that the appellant and his election agent and other 
persons with the consent of the appellants or his election 
agent had committed corrupt practice under sub-section(3) 
and (3-A) of Section 123 of the Act, and accordingly, his 
election should be declared to be void. 
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The Election Tribunal had earlier accepted the 
petitioner's case and had come to the conclusion that 
from the context, language and tenor of the leaflet, it 
was clear that it constituted an appeal to the Yadav 
voters to vote for the appellant and to refrain from 
voting for the respondent on the ground of caste. 
Delivering the judgment of the High Court, Sinha, 
J., with whom Misra, J., agreed, accepted the finding of 
Tribunal. The learned judge observed: 
From the tenor of this document it is clear 
that the emphasis is on the castes of the 
respective candidates and not on whether 
they were members of the Congress or of the 
Socialist party. It is the Yadav caste 
voters who, according to the leaflet, had 
been wronged by the machinations of certain 
Brahmins including respondent No. 3 in the 
interests of Brahmins and, it had become, 
according to the leaflet, the duty of the 
members or voters of that caste to avenge 
that wrong and give a fitting reply by 
electing one of their own castemen, viz. 
the appellant, ... the Tribunal has rightly 
held that in the last sentence of the 
leaflet the stress is on the caste of the 
appellant and not on his being a "rising 
Socialist leader". There were words of mere 
description. The leaflet read as a whole 
gives the unmistakable impression that the 
caste loyalty of the voters belonging to 
the Yadav caste was being played upon and 
they were being requested in the name of 
caste to vote for one of their castemen and 
refrain from voting for respondent No.3 the 
candidate who belonged to the Brahmin caste. 
On the term of the leaflet itself, it was 
clear that the appeal on caste lines was for 
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the furtherance of the prospects of the 
election of the appellant and for 
prejudicially affecting the election of 
respondent No.3". 
(II) Appeal to vote on being members of the caste 
The allegation before the Supreme Court in 
Bishwanath Rai V Sachhidanand Singh was that one Swami 
Bimlanand Saraswat accompanied by the appellant and one 
Bhola Rai of the same caste went to a number of villages 
and appealed to individual voters there to vote for the 
appellant on the ground that he was a member of the caste, 
that he had, with great difficulty, obtained a ticket, and 
that if he was defeated on this occasion, the members of 
the caste would lose prestige and position in various 
villages. He also wrote letters to some important members 
of the caste, including one Ram Chandra Sharma of village 
Harpur, who was working for the respondent. Ram Chandra 
Sharma was also Bhumihar by caste and was not on good 
terms with the appellant. Swami Bimlanand appealed to 
him, on the ground of caste, to give up the disputes and 
support the appellant. 
The Patna High Court held that an appeal was made 
on the ground of caste was established. But, in the 
opinion of the Supreme Court, the letter, by itself did 
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not constitute any corrupt practice since it did not 
contain any appeal to any voter to vote or not to vote on 
the ground of caste. The appeal was to Ram Chandra Sharma 
to support the candidature of the appellant on the ground 
of caste and to ignore personal differences with the 
appellant in the interests of the unity and success of 
the members of the caste. "However", the Supreme Court 
observed, "the letter is of great value in assessing the 
evidence of witnesses who have been examined to prove the 
oral appeals on the ground of caste made by Swami in 
various villages". After assessing the evidence of 
witnesses, the Supreme Court held that the finding of the 
High Court that Swami Bimlanand made appeals to various 
persons in several villages to vote for the appellant on 
the ground of being members of the Bhumihar Brahmin caste 
in the presence of the appellant was correct and so that 
the appellant was guilty of commission of the corrupt 
practice falling under Section 123(3) of the Act. 
Appeal to vote on the basis of candidate's caste 
was one of the issues for annulling the election before 
- • 
the Supreme Court in Kanti Prasad Jayshankar Yagnik V 
Purshottam Das Rauchhoddas Patel , The speech objected to 
on the ground of being delivered on caste basis was the 
following: 
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"Vijay Kumar Bhai has gone. A Brahmin minister 
must be there and hence Kantilal Bhai is going 
to be a minister, hence vote for him. We must 
have at least one minister who is a Brahmin. 
Hence vote for Kantilal Bhai. At the same time 
vote for Bhaikaka and H.M. Patel by putting 
your voting mark on the star". 
Two judges (S.M. Sikri & R.S. Bachawat) upheld the finding 
of the Gujrat High Court. The third judge K.S. Hegde 
dissented. Thus the Supreme Court by a majority of 2:1 
held that the passage at issue clearly fell within the 
mischief of Section 123(3). Sikiri, j., who wrote the 
judgment for himself and Bachawat, j., referred to the 
observation of the High Court on the point and held that 
the High Court was correct in drawing the inference that 
Shambhu Maharaj was asking his voters to vote for the 
first respondent because he was a Brahmin. The observation 
of the High Court was "The reference to Vijay Kumar Bhai 
is to Vijay Kumar Trivedi who was a Brahmin and was a 
minister in the Gujrat Government till March 1967, and 
when this speech was delivered. The reference to Kantilal 
Bhai is to the first respondent who is also a Brahmin and 
the reference to Bhaikaka is to Bhailalbhai Patel, leader 
of the Swatantra party and H.M. Patel is- another leader of 
the .^wantantra Party and wli^ t Shambhu Maharaj was asking 
in this connection was that it was necessary that there 
should be one Brahmin in the Gujrat State Ministry and if 
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one Brahmin, Vijay Kumar Trivedi, was to leave the 
Ministry another Brahmin Minister, viz. the first 
respondent should be first elected so that he might get 
seat in the Legislature and thereafter become a minister, 
and thus it is clear that in the passage, Shambhu Maharaj 
was asking the people to vote for the first respondent 
because he was a Brahmin by caste. It has been stated as a 
categorical statement that there must be atleast one 
Minister, who was a Brahmin. Under Section 123(3) of the 
Act, an appeal by any person to vote for any person on the 
ground of his caste or community is a corrupt practice, 
provided, of course, that such person had made such appeal 
with the consent of the candidate concerned. ... 
it is clear 
that in this particular passage an appeal was being made 
to the electors to cast their votes for the first 
respondent because the first respondent is a Brahmin and 
also because of the promise which had been put forward in 
this passage, that there should be atleast one Brahmin 
Minister in the Ministry. I may point out that so far as 
the petitioner is concerned, the petitioner is a Patidar 
and it is in the context of this background that an appeal 
is made in the name of caste of the first respondent and 
the people are asked to vote for the first respondent 
because he was a Brahmin". Hegde, J., on the other hand, 
33r) 
did not agree that the appeal to vote for the appellant on 
the ground that he was likely to be a Minister as 
according to Sh^mbhu Maharaj there should be atleast one 
Brahmin Minister in the cabinet was an appeal to vote on 
the ground of the appellant's caste* "There is no use 
holding the fact that communal and regional 
representations in all our political institutions have 
become a must. Shambhu Maharaj merely gave expression to 
that fact from public platforms. One may not appreciate 
his campaigning for that point of view but I am unable to 
agree that his statements in that regard amount to corrupt 
practice under Section 123(3) ... The caste of the 
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appellant has come into the picture incidentally". 
(Ill) Appeal by a prominent Yadav to his "Yadav brother" 
In Rustam Satin _V Dr. Sampoornand, one of the 
contentions concerning an appeal was that it was based on 
caste consideration and hence a corrupt practice under 
Section 123(3) of the Act. The appeal was made by a 
Prominent Yadav • to his Yadav brethren in the following 
form: 
"I, therefore, appeal to you to cast your 
valuable vote for the Congress to 
strengthen the nation. Heavy industrial 
centres are being established at Varansi 
also on behalf of the State Government. 
337 
There are several schemes for Kashi also 
which will make her an industrial 
centre. The citizens of Kashi and 
particularly the Yadav brethren of the 
South constituency should not forget how 
costly and harmful one wrong step on 
their part might prove. All Yadav 
brethren should do their duty to the 
country by voting for the Congress". 
It was contended before the Allahabad High Court that the 
appeal was made on the basis of caste. But in the opinion 
of Takru, J., who spoke for the Court on behalf of himself 
and Bhargava, j . , the passage did not contain any appeal 
to vote for the respondent on the ground of caste, 
community or religion. The learned judges agreed that the 
passage contained an appeal to the Yadavs, they were not 
prepared to hold that appeal was on the ground of caste, 
community or religion. "In fact, in the whole of this 
leaflet there is not even a passing reference to any 
matter of particular interest to the Yadav caste alone and 
hence it cannot in our opinion, be held to contain an 
appeal to the Yadavas to vote for the first respondent on 
the ground of caste, community and religion". 
(c) APPEAL ON THE GROUND OF COMMUNITY 
One of the grounds of corrupt practices under 
clauseO) of Section 123 is to prevent campaigning on the 
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ground of community. The literal meaning of the voro 
'Community' is: "body of people living in one district, 
etc., or having common interests or origins; state of 
being shared or alike". It is also defined as "a body of 
persons in the same locality, a body of persons leading a 
common life, etc". 
"Community" in recent Indian usage is used to refer 
to a section of the population differentiated by religion 
or caste or both (e.g., the Muslim Community, the Brahmin 
69 Community, the Agarwal Jain Community). The meaning 
shifts according to the context (e.g. Hindu Community 
comprises both Brahmin and non-Brahmin Communities and 
"7 n 
these in turn may be divided into Communities^ 
Judicial interpretation of the word 'Community' 
In an early decision before the Election Tribunal, 
Faizabad, the word "Community" came for consideration in 
Shiv Putt V Bansidas Dhangar. ~ Briefly, the facts 
were that a leaflet published by the respondent which was 
signed by the members of several castes contained an 
appeal to wage earners (Kameray Bhai) such as peasants, 
workers, artisans, petty shopkeepers and petty servants 
like patwaris and school teachers, to unite against the 
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big men and zamindars and not to vote for them, but to 
vote for the respondent as he was a worker. 
Two members of the Tribunal forming the majority 
held that the appeal was not an appeal on the ground of 
caste or community but an appeal on economic consideration. 
One of them observed that the word "Community" must be 
given a narrower meaning than the dictionary meaning of a 
body of people having common interest. 
The dissenting member, on the other hand, held that 
the respondent and the persons to whom the appeal was made 
were a body of people having a common interest and 
therefore "a community" and the distribution of the 
leaflet amounted to a corrupt practice. 
The important point that emerges from the above 
case is the interpretation of the word "Community" as used 
in Section 123(3) of the Act. As noted, the majority held 
that the word has to be given a narrower meaning than the 
dictionary meaning of a body of people having a common 
interest. 
The following judicial pronouncements by different 
courts will show the way the courts have interpreted the 
word 'Community'. 
340 
(i) Paharis as a community 
71 In N.L. Verma V Muni Lai, the Punjab High Court 
had to decide whether paharis were a conununity within the 
meaning of Section 123(3) of the ACt. The main ground of 
contention was that the respondent, his agents and 
and 
supporters systematically/vigorously propagated, the cult 
of pahari and non-pahari, and of Kanait and non-Kanait 
(the respondent being Kanait by caste was born and brought 
up in the constituency for which he was a candidate), 
throughout the constituency and thus secured votes for 
him of the preponderant Pahari population by appealing on 
grounds of caste and community and thereby contravened the 
provisions of Section 123(3) of the Act. 
Later the appellant did not press the ground of 
caste but he strenously argued that the election was won 
on community consideration. Negating the contention, 
Capoor, J., who delivered the judgment for himself and 
Daulat, J., held that if the argument be that merely 
because there are persons residing in a particular 
locality that locality must be deemed to be inhabited by a 
distinct community, I would find myself unable to accept 
it". The learned judge also held it unnecessary in the 
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instant case for an academic discussion to ascertain what 
constitutes a separate community. Capoor, j., relied on 
the findings of the Tribunal "that the appeal made to the 
electors by the respondent and his workers was really on 
the ground that they were living in the special locality 
of the hills which had certain peculiar economic and other 
problems, the redress and solution of which could be 
obtained if they returned in the election some one who was 
born and brought up in that area and was intimately aware 
of those problems". Thus, under the circumstances, the 
learned judge found that the electors were exhorted to 
return the respondent who, having been born and brought up 
in that area, would work zealously for the amelioration of 
their economic and educational backwardness. There was 
nothing more than this — no appeal whatsoever was made 
to their sentiments to vote on the ground of being son of 
the soil. The learned judge concluded, "There appear to me 
to be quite legitimate appeals to the reason of the 
electors and not to their sentiments or passions as 
belonging to a particular communi^ ty,* and I am unable to 
find in these speeches anything which would offend the 
72 provisions of the election law". 
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(ii) Appeal to Marathas 
The following appeals published in a newspaper 
bearing the signature of the respondent were challenged 
before the Bombay High Court in Sudhir Laxman Hendre V 
7 ^  S.A. Dange "^  on the ground that they were made on the 
basis of 'Community' and undue influence and hence fell 
within the mischief of corrupt practices as defined in 
Section 123 of the Act. The statements were: 
(1) "Brother workers, in the name of Maharashtra 
and 105 martyrs do not go out on 11th without 
giving votes and do not betray Samyukta 
Maharashtra. 
(2) Lions of Maharashtra, make the Congress 
bullocks bolt away. Saints and warriors of 
Maharashtra, give us your blessings. Worship 
the Shivashakti (power of Shivaji) of 
Maharashtra with the bel (Leaves) of your 
votes". 
This was followed by photographs of persons who 
were killed in the Bombay firing with a heading "Marathas 
of Bombay take revenge of this devilish murder", and the 
words "the Congress ballot box is besmeared with the blood 
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of the martyrs ... It is be smeared v/ith the blood of the 
Marathas". 
Regarding the first point mentioned above, Gokhale, 
J.J who delivered the judgment of the Court on behalf of 
himself and Patel, j .^  held that such an appeal would 
neither be an appeal to the voters to vote on grounds of 
community nor v/oulc it amount to undue influence. The 
learned judge held that the appeal was addressed to the 
workers and it could not, therefore, be said that it was 
an appeal to any particular community. The appeal was 
published in the newspaper just before the date of the 
election which was declared to be a holiday. The workers 
were, therefore, enjoined not to go out without recording 
their votes. 
It was also contended on behalf of the appellant 
that the statement referred to the duty of the workers "in 
the name of Maharashtra and 105 martyrs" to give their 
votes. Gokhale, J. held that on that ground it v.-ould 
neither amount to any threat or injury of any k; or 
social ostracism and excommunication or expulsion from 
caste or community or of the electors being threatened 
that they would be objects of divine displeasure or 
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spiritual censure within the meaning of Section 123(2), 
proviso(a)(i) and (ii) of the Act. Nor could this appeal 
be regarded as -an appeal to voters to vote on grounds of 
community or religion. 
Regarding the second point it was observed^ "If we 
were to construe the appeal in the Maratha of 11th March, 
1957, as an appeal to the "Marathas" as a caste, then 
undoubtedly it would fall within the mischief of this 
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section. But it cannot be so interpreted". It was held 
that the picture published in the paper as well as in 
other posters issued by the Communist Party contained 
pictures of Gujrat victims of police firings, who appeared 
to be described as being residents of Ahmadabad. The 
pictures of other victims also were not confined to 
persons belonging to the Maratha caste or community. The 
Court found that there was no dispute that candidates 
standing on the Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti ticket were 
drawn from all communities speaking Marathi and 
non-Marathi languages. It was under these circumstances 
that the Court was not prepared to hold that either these 
appeals were intended to be addressed to the caste and 
community of Marathas or intended to be an appeal to the 
Marathi speaking electors to vote on the ground of their 
3-^ ^  ,1 
being a separate community. In short, the Court 
observed: 
... that in construiny the word "Community" 
in Section 123(3) the word must be given 
its natural meaning and it cannot, in the 
context, be confined to e religious 
community only and an appeal to the 
"Marathas" as a caste, would fall within 
the mischief of this clause, but these 
appeals were not intended to be addressed 
to the caste or community of Marathas or 
intended to be appeal to the Marathi 
speaking electors to vote on the ground of 
. 7 5 their being a separate community ... 
The finding of the Tribunal that these publications 
did not fall within Section 123(3) of the Act was accepted 
as correct. 
In Kataria Takandas Hewrai V Pinto Frederick 
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Michael, it was observed that a Maharashtrian includes 
all people residing in Maharashtra, whatever their race, 
caste or community or religion may be, so Maharashtrian 
are not a distinct community within Section 123(3). The 
word "community" in that section must be given a narrower 
meaning than the dictionary meaning of a body of persons 
having a common interest. 
(ill) Appeal to Sindhies 
The Rajasthan High Court had to decide whether an 
appeal to sindhies to vote for Sindhies would amount to an 
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appeal on the ground of comir^ unity in the case of Khilumal 
77 Topandas V Aryundas Tulsidas. The allegation was that 
the respondent systematically appealed to the Sindhies to 
vote in favour of the respondent who was himself a Smdhi, 
by publication of pamphlets. 
It was urged by the counsel for the appellant that 
the respondent had clearly admitted in the pamphlet that 
he was a candidate of Purshrathi Panchayat which was 
nothing but a body of Sindhies. It was further urged that 
the words "our votes" referred to in paragraph I of the 
pamphlet had reference to the votes of sindhies. 
The Election Tribunal as well as the High Court 
found that the Purshrathi Panchayat assumed the form of a 
political organisation in the city of Ajmer and was 
recognised as such even by the Election Commission. It was 
wrong to say that the Panchayat was a body composed of 
Sindhies only and exclusively; the Tribunal found that 
even non-Sindhies and non-refugees were the members of the 
Panchayat. 
It was further urged by the counsel for the 
appellant that even if the refugees who had migrated from 
Sindh had formed a party which might have become a 
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political party for the purpose of the election, the 
members or adherents or supporters of such party formed a 
"community" within the meaning of that term in Section 
123(3). 
The High Court held that the dictionary meaning of 
the word community is very wide. It may even mean a body 
of men having common interest. Such interest may be social, 
economic or political. Thereafter the High Court opined 
that the word "community" could . not be construed in its 
wider sense when it was used in Section 123(3). In India a 
community is often organised on the basis of caste or 
religion. We speak of the Khatri Community or the Agarwal 
Community on the basis of caste. We speak of the Hindu 
Community or the Muslim Community on the basis of 
religion. When a community is organised on the basis of 
caste, race or religion it is evident that such an 
organisation does come within Section 123(3). At the time 
we have some Communities organised not on the basis of 
caste, race or religion but on social^ economic or 
political basis. 
Thus we may have an organisation of the mercantile 
community based on economical consideration aiming at the 
development of trade. We have also political parties 
7 8 
organised on different ideologies". 
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It was further observed: 
The word "community" used in Section 123(3) has 
to be confined only to such an organisation 
which in effect divides the citizens of the 
country into groups sometimes opposed to one 
another. It is only when the organisation of 
the corTiraunity is such as aims to divide the 
citizens of the country and releases forces 
antagonistic to the unity of the country that 
it comes v/ithin the purview of Section 123(3). 
Communities organised for the purposes of 
cementing the citizens for the purpose of 
social, economic and political progress of the 
country, do not come under Section 123(3). 
Bhandari, J. who delivered the judgment of the Court on 
behalf of himself and Dave, J. concluded: 
Having regard to the intention of the 
legislature and to the association of 
v/ords "caste, race and religion" v;ith the 
v,'ord "Community" we are of opinion that 
the meaning of the v;ord "Community" must 
be restricted and it should be read as 
meaninc a body which has been formed, 
organised or has come into existence on 
the basis of caste, race or religion or 
any other factor contributing or leading 
79 to the division of the nation". 
Dismissing the appeal the learned judge held that 
in the instant case an appeal to the other members of the 
party to vote for him, was not an appeal to Sindhies on 
the ground of community within the meaning of Section 
123(3) of the Act. 
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(iv) Muslims as a Convmunity 
Muslims, whether a community came for consideration 
before Chaturvedi and Takru, 3.J. of the Allahabad High 
P 0 Court in Ashfaq Ali Khan V Darshan Singh. Chaturvedi, 
j., v;ho delivered the judgment of the Court observed that 
the expression "Muslim Community" signifies that the 
constitution of the community is based on the ground of 
their being common religion. "So, if an appeal is made to 
the members of the Muslim Community to vote on the ground 
of their being Muslims, the appeal is really on the ground 
of religion, the community itself having been constituted 
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on that ground". "Usually the word "Community" in 
sub-section(3) of Section 123 of the Act would refer to 
communities formed on the basis of common interest other 
than religion, for example, the Bengali community or the 
Punjabi community in Uttar Pradesh. In Oxford Dictionary 
one of the meanings of the word "community" is given as 
body of men having religion, profession, etc. in common, 
e.g., mercantile community, Jev;ish community. In Websteria 
Nev; International Dictionary, Vol. I, at page 54 2, no 
reference is made to community as having been constituted 
on the basis of religion. It is constituted on the basis 
of residence in a particular locality or having other 
srio 
interests in common". Thereafter the learned judge 
interpreted the word community as commonly used in Indiai 
"But in India persons belonging to the same religion are 
also referred to as being members of community and the 
meaning as given in the Oxford Dictionary appears to be 
the meaning in which the word is used in this country. 
But, assuming that Muslims are spoken of as belonging to 
the Muslim Community, it does not mean that when an appeal 
is made by one member of it to the other, the appeal is 
not made on the ground of religion, because the basis of 
the constitution of the community is common religion and 
nothing else. So such an appeal would be an appeal on the 
83 ground of religion". 
Thus, according to the decision of this case, an 
appeal to vote for a Muslim candidate on the ground that 
he is a Muslim is not on the ground of community but on 
the ground of religion. Practically the difference is of 
no value as the election can be set aside on the proof of 
either. 
(d) APPEAL ON THE GROUND OF LANGUAGE 
Under Articles 29 and 30 of the Indian Constitution 
certain educational and cultural rights are guaranteed. 
Claused) of Article 29 provides: 
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Any section of the citizens residing in the 
territory of India or any part thereof 
having a distinct language , script or 
culture of its own shall have the right to 
conserve"the same. 
Thus clause (1) gives protection to every section 
of the citizens having a distinct language, script or 
culture by guaranteeing their right to conserve the same. 
On the other hand, ClauseO) of Section 123 of the 
Representation of the People Act, 1951, holds that an 
appeal by a candidate or his agent or by any other person 
with the consent of a candidate or his election agent to 
vote or refrain from voting for any person on the ground 
of his ... language ... shall be a corrupt practice. 
An appeal to vote or refrain from voting for a 
candidate on the ground of his language was brought within 
the purview of Section 123(3) of the Act from the year 
1961 only. 
The relationship between Section 123(3) of the 1951 
Act and Article 29(1) of the Constitution was discussed by 
the Supreme Court in Jagdev Singh Sidhanti V Pratap Singh 
84 Daulta. In the instant case the appellant, who was 
declared elected to the House of the People, was alleged 
to have used corrupt practices to promote communal enmity 
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between the Sikh and the Hindu Communities prohibited by 
Section 123(3) of the Act. One such instance given by the 
respondent, a defeated sitting member, in support of his 
allegation was that the appellant by taking help of the 
Hindi agitation, propagated that the respondent was an 
enemy of the Arya Samaj and the Hindi language. 
The Supreme Court unanimously allowed the appeal 
and set aside the judgment of the Punjab High Court. Shah, 
j., who delivered the judgment of the Court read clause 3 
of Section 123 in the light of the fundamental right 
guaranteed in Article 29(1) of the Constitution. He 
observed: 
... This clause must be read in the light of 
the fundamental right which is guaranteed by 
Article 29(1) of the Constitution, for in 
ascertaining the true meaning of the corrupt 
practice, the area of the fundamental right 
of citizen must be steadily kept in view. The 
clause cannot be so read as trespassing upon 
that fundamental right .. . 
The Constitution has thereby conferred 
the right, among others, to conserve their 
language upon the citizens of India. Right to 
conserve the language of the citizens 
includes the right to agitate for the 
protection of the language. Political 
agitation for conservation of the language of 
a section of the citizens cannot therefore be 
ragarded as a corrupt practice within the 
meaning of Section 123(3) of the Act. That is 
clear from the phraseology used in Section 
123(3) which appears to have been deliberately 
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and carefully chosen. Unlike Article 19(1), 
Article 29(1) is not subject to any 
reasonable restrictions ... 
The learned judge continued; 
The corrupt practice defined by clauseO) of 
Section 123 is committed when an appeal is 
made either to vote or refrain from voting 
on the ground of the candidate's language. 
It is the appeal to electorate on a ground 
personal to the candidate relating to his 
language which attracts the ban of Section 
100 read with Section 123(3). Therefore it 
is only when the electors are asked to vote 
or not to vote because of the particular 
language of the candidate that a corrupt 
practice may be deemed to be committed. 
Where, however, for conservation of language 
of the electorate appeals are made to the 
electorate and promises are given that steps 
would be taken to conserve that language, it 
will not amount to a corrupt practice. 
The observation of the Supreme Court in Jagdev Singh on 
the relationship between Section 123(3) of the Act and 
Article 29(1) of the Constitution was followed by the 
Andhra Pradesh High Court in V.R. Sreerama V 
87 Telugudesam. The facts were that Telugu film star N.T. 
Rama Rao formed a political party called 'Telugu Desam'. 
all-round development of the Telugu people. Telugu Desam 
applied for an election symbol to the Election Commission 
of India. The petitioner opposed the grant of an election 
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symbol to Telugu Desam on the ground that Telugu Desam 
preached chauvinism and propagated sectarian tendencies. 
In para 3 of his affidavit, the petitioner said: 
"I am certainly against the promotion of 
chauvanism, propagation of sectarian 
ideas which invariably lead to senseless 
violence and the creation of illusions 
in the minds of the public, that a State 
organised on purely linguistic basis can 
solve all multifarious problems arising 
at a given time in the society". 
In para 4 of the affidavit, the petitioner stated that "he 
is opposing the grant of an election symbol to the Telugu 
Desam on the ground that granting of an election symbol to 
the Telugu Desam would be contrary to the letter and 
spirit of the 16th Constitutional Amendment Act 1963 .. . 
and also to Section 153-A of the Indian Penal Code and 
Section 123 clause 3 of the Representation of the People 
Act". N.T. Rama Rao argued that Telugu Desam never 
preached or propagated secessionist tendencies. According 
to him, the objectives of his party v/ere not to secede 
from the rest of the country, but only to promote the 
welfare of the people of Andhra Pradesh without reference 
to their linguistic or ethnic compositions. He also 
stated that the formation of Telugu Desam as a regional 
party was fully in harmony with the federal principle of 
the Constitution. He gave the examples of Muslim Majlis in 
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U.P., Akali League in Punjab and Kerala Congress in Kerala 
to show that regional parties, based even on entirely 
narrow sectarian considerations of caste and religion, 
were already in the electoral field recognised by the 
Election Commission as political parties with election 
symbols alloted to them. 
The Andhra Pradesh High Court held that the 
formation of a Regional political party under a federal 
constitution should be considered as a legitimate 
political activity. The formation of such a regional 
political party, the High Court further observed, wholly 
or partially devoted to the problems of a federal unit 
even without being concerned with national political 
issues must be taken to have been envisaged and approved 
by the Federal Principle which underlie our Constitution. 
And hence Telugu Desam could not be denied the allotment 
of an election symbol on any of the grounds that either it 
was a regional political party or it was based on appeal 
to Telugu Sentiment or Telugu language for its political 
support, the High Court observed. 
As regards the argument that adoption of any 
linguistic name perse constituted a violation of the 
spirit of the 16th Constitutional Amendment, the Court 
35f^  
held that "The Constitution has always recognised and 
still recognises in Article 29 Claused) Indian Citizens' 
right to conserve their heritage of language. One 
undoubted and recognised means of conserving one's ov.'n 
language is to enlist political support for that cause. 
Political appeals made for conserving one's language 
either at the time of elections or before them or after, 
clearly fall within the protection of Article 29 claused) 
of the Constitution which is itself a part of the 
88 Fundamental Rights Chapter". 
Thus, the High Court held, that appeals made for 
resurgence of Telugu language or rejuvenation of Telugu 
culture could not be forbidden or prescribed so long as 
Article 29 Claused) confined to be a part of the 
Fundamental Rights Chapter. It was further observed by the 
Court that the real purpose of the 16th Constitutional 
Amendment was not to forbid all election appeals based on 
language as such. "Section 123(3) of the Act should be 
understood in the light of the 16th Constitutional 
Amendment and the prohibition contained in Section 123 
Clause(3) of the Act should be read as applicable only to 
such language appeals that endanger the integrity of the 
nation. Further the provisions of the Act or the Criminal 
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law Amendment Act would apply only to those particular 
individuals who would commit those forbidden acts. They 
had nothing to do either with the formation of a political 
party or a grant or a refusal of a symbol to such a 
89 political party by the Election Commission". 
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CHAPTER - VIII 
SECTARIAN CAMPAIGNING - II 
IWTRODDCTION 
ClauseO) of the R.P.Act 1951 as amended by Act 40 of 1961 
falls into two parts; (1) an appeal by a candidate, his 
agents or by other persons with the consent of the 
candidate or his election agent to vote or refrain from 
voting for any person on the ground of his religon, race, 
conununity or language, and (2) use of or appeal to 
religious symbols, national symbols or national emblems 
for the furtherance of the prospects of the election of 
the candidate or for prejudicially affecting the election 
of any candidate. This chapter examines the scope of the 
second part of Clause (3). 
RELIGIOUS SYMBOL 
The Supreme Court for the first time considered the 
question of religious symbol in Shubnath Deogam V Ram 
Narain Prasad Yadav. In the instant case the appellant 
who belonged to the Adibasi community and was put up as a 
candidate by the Jharkhand Party, whose symbol was the 
"Cock", was declared elected. The main allegation in an 
election petition to set aside the election of the 
appellant was that he had committed the corrupt practice 
3G!) 
of making a systematic appeal on the ground of religion, 
inasmuch as he and his supporters had widely circulated 
and orally explained amongst the electorate, who were 
mostly composed of Adibasis, a leaflet to the following 
effect: 
"In the box of the Jharkhand Party is printed 
the symbol of Cock. Put your votes in the 
box with Cock symbol. 'O'rise ye children of 
men - Respected sons of men, open your 
eyes, lend your ears, recognise me and my 
crow. In your services and worships, in the 
worship of your forest God (Buru). In 
stomach pain and headache, at the time of 
your distress and miseries^ I am with you 
even after giving my life. You recover (from 
illness) even by applying knife at my neck. 
This thought gives me pleasure. In exchange 
of this give me chara in the shape of vote. 
I am victorious. Do not forget me, otherwise 
I tell, ye sons of men will suffer eternal 
miseries. Crow of Cock, Cock, crowed, rise 
now, open your eyes, be prepared for duty. 
Yours only Cock". 
The Supreme Court first referred to the findings of 
the High Court and the lower Court that the cock was not a 
religious symbol of the Adibasis but it formed an integral 
part of the religious ceremonies which they performed 
while worshipping some of their important deities. 
How a cock is found to be an integral part of the 
religious ceremonies of the Adibasis, the Supreme Court 
referred to the observation of the High Court that one of 
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the recognised modes of worship of these deities or some 
of them is that cocks are sacrificed before these deities 
to get happiness and to get rid of miseries. A cock is 
kept tied for two days without any food and on the day of 
the sacrifice it is taken to the puja asthan where some 
rice is put and after prayers to the Bongas, namely, the 
deities, for getting happiness, and to get rid of 
miseries, the cock is placed near the rice. If the cock 
pecks at rice, the Adibasis consider their Bongas to be 
pleased. They, thereafter, sacrifice the cock. If the 
cock does not peck at the rice, they consider their 
deities to be displeased and prayers are offered until the 
cock pecks at the rice when it is sacrificed. 
The apex Court by a majority opinion consisting of 
S.K. Das, P.B. Gajendragadkar, A.K. Sarkar and 
Hidayatullah, J.J. held that an appeal in which the 
candidate identified himself with the cock and made 
references to the religious ceremonies and invoked the 
wrath of the deities on the electorate in case they did 
not vote for him was an appeal on the ground of religion. 
"When the leaflet stated that food should be given to the 
cock in the shape of votes, what was meant was that the 
deities would be pleased if votes were cast in the box 
with the cock symbol ... the reference to the religious 
3G » ( 
ceremonies involving the sacrifice of the cock and the 
alleviation of pain and miseries thereby, is clearly a 
reference to religion ... When the cock in the leaflet 
said "give me chara in the shape of vote", what it said in 
substance was that the giving of such votes would result 
2 in the deities being pleased ..." 
Subba Rao, j. (later C.J.), on the other hand, 
dissented from the majority opinion. The learned judge 
held that to constitutethe corrupt practice "the appeal 
should, expressly or by necessary implication, seek votes 
3 
on grounds of religious affinity or religious conflict." 
The section is not obviously intended to prevent appeals 
in picturesque or metaphorical language drawing analogies 
from mythology, religion or folklore. When most of the 
voters are illiterate the candidate or his agent can 
attract and enthuse the evidence or drive home his points 
only by parables, similes or metaphor drawn particularly 
from religious lore which most of the people understand 
and appreciate. A distinction must, therefore, be drawn 
between canvassing on ground of religion and seeking of 
votes in graphic or picturesque language with analogies 
4 
from religious lore". To illustrate, the learned judge 
observed, a candidate may appeal to the electorate 
3C.S 
consisting of persons professing different relicions, say 
Hindus; Mohammadan; Christian, etc., to vote for him and 
say that he would sacrifice his life in the cause of his 
constituency just like Christ sacrificed his life to 
redeem the world. He may also say that like Rama, the 
virtuous, who killed Havana, the rakshasa, the embodiment 
of evil, he would, if elected, put down corruption, 
nepotism and like in Government. He may even say that he 
would sacrifice himself as a goat before Kali to bring 
happiness and prosperity to his constituency. 
Subba Rao, J., concluded that all these similes were 
drawn from religion, but they did not embody an appeal, 
directly or indirectly, to vote for the candidate on 
grounds of religion. Thus Subba Rao did not dissent from 
the major premise of the Court distinguishing between the 
sacred and profane spheres of life but he significantly 
modulated it through the distinction between myth and 
religion. And, it was his opinion that has been 
mostly followed by later courts. Subba Rao, j. drew a 
distinction between religious symbol and myth, even though 
the difference between appeal to mythology and appeal to 
religious symbols wears thin if it is remembered that the 
myth is also used to reinforce solidarity. Religious 
3C/J 
objects and mythical stories both perform the function of 
reinforcing solidarity of the candidate with the voter. 
The distinction between myth and sacrificial object is 
one without difference particularly in the context of 
, .^ (4-b) 
elections. 
In Jagdev Singh Sidhanti V Pratap Singh Daulta , the 
Supreme Court, while considering the attributes of a 
religious symbol, observed, "A symbol stands for or 
represents something material or abstract; in order to be 
a religious symbol, there must be a visible representation 
of a thing or concept which is religious". 
The question before the Supreme Court in the instant 
case was whether the word 'Om* used on a flag was a 
religious symbol. Shah, j., (later C.J.) who delivered the 
judgment of the Court on behalf of himself and other four 
7 judges answered in the negative. The Court agreed that 
the expression "Om" is respected by the Hindus generally 
and has a special significance in the Hindu scriptures. It 
is recited at the commencement of the recitations of Hindu 
g 
religious works. The Court referred to Macdonell's "A 
Practical Sanskrit Dictionary" which states that "Om" is 
the sacred syllable used in invocations, at the 
commencement of prayers, at the beginning and the end of 
3 V 0 
Vedic recitation, and as a respectful salutation: it is a 
9 
subject of many mystical speculations. The Court also 
referred to the Sanskrit - English Dictionary by Monier -
William wherein it is said that "Om" is a sacred 
exclamation which may be uttered at the beginning and end 
of a reading of the Vedas or previously to any prayer: it 
is also regarded as a particle of auspicious 
salutation. However/ the Supreme Court held, "But it is 
difficult to regard "Om" which is a preliminary to an 
incantation or to religious books, as having religious 
significance". The Court admitted that "Om" is regarded 
as having high spiritual or mystical efficacy: it is used 
at the commencement of the recitations of religious 
prayers. "But the attribute of spiritual significance will 
not necessarily impart to its use on a flag the character 
of a religious symbol in the context in which the 
12 
expression religious symbol occurs m the section". "To 
'Om' high spiritual or mystical efficacy is undoubtedly 
ascribed; but its use on a flag does not symbolise 
13 
religion, or anything religious". The Court's conclusion 
was: "It is not easy therefore to see how the Om flag 
which merely is a pennant on which is printed the word 
14 
'Om' can be called a religious symbol." 
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In shorty Justice Shah distinguished between symbols 
of spiritual significance and symbols of religions 
significance. Jn order to be a religious symbol^ the 
learned judge observed, there must be a visible 
representation of a thing or concept which is religious. 
"•Om' was not a religious symbol because it did not represent 
a thing or concept which was religious. As if afraid of 
his own temerity the Judge took recourse to the doctrine 
of burden of proof claiming that it was for the petitioner 
to prove that the candidate or his agent had used the 
symbol of 'om which burden they had failed to discharge. 
But if that was so Shah should have avoided expressing an 
opinion about the religious nature of the Om 
symbol. ^ 1^^^ 
Similarly the Mysore High Court was called upon to 
consider the question of 'Om' flag as religious symbol in 
Shankara Gouda V Veerabhadrappa. ~ In the instant case 
one of the allegations relating to corrupt practices 
against the successful Congress candidates in elections to 
the Mysore State Legislature was that the printed cover 
page of a pamphlet, called Congress Mahatme, used for 
propaganda bore a picture showing the portraits of Gandhi, 
Nehru and Vallabhbhai Patel , they being described as 
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"Brahama", "Vishnu" and "Rudra" respectively, that, all 
those v;ere inserted in the letter "Om". It was alleged 
that in that printed block, there was also the picture of 
"Bharata Mata" with the words "Vande Mataram" with the Sun 
flag in the one hand and Star and Cresent in the other 
hand. On the top of the picture of "Bharata Mata", Lord 
Shivas third eye was drawn over "Tripundra". 
The Mysore High Court did not accept the contention 
• and held that when the printed block was taken into 
consideration as a whole, it did not represent any 
religious symbol : nor did any component part thereof, 
when viewed in the setting in which it was to be 
considered to be a religious symbol. 
The main question before the Supreme Court in 
Ramanbhi Ashabna V Dabhi Ajitkumar Fulsinji was whether 
the appellant was guilty of a corrupt practice under 
sub-section(3) of Section 123 of the Act by reason of the 
fact that his election symbol, a star, was described as 
'Dhruva star' in the pamphlets published and distributed 
by him or by his agents and in which the qualities of 
Dhruva star were also set out. This was done, it was 
. contended, to give religious impetus and to appeal to the 
voters to vote for him in the name of religion. 
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The Supreme Court observed that the question had to 
be examined in two branches: Whether the symbol used bars 
any special religious significance and whether its 
inscription on leaflets and pamphlets which were 
distributed amounts to the use of a religious symbol. The 
Court held that if the Dhruva star had no religious 
significance, its use in the manner made would not convert 
that use into a use of a religious symbol, for the object 
underlying the prohibition enacted in Section 123(3) is 
stirring up religious sentiments by use of or appeal to a 
religious symbol. If what is done docs not tend to arouse 
religious sentiment. Section 123(3) would not be 
transgressed. Thereafter the Supreme Court considered 
. . . 17 
the five qualities which are associated with Dhruva and 
which were inscribed on some pamphlets. After briefly 
1 o 
tracing the history of the Dhruva star , the Court 
observed that the five qualities associated with the Star 
are indeed noble qualities but they have no significance 
peculiar to Hindu religion, the significance of these 
qualities to the Hindus would be in no way different from 
that to persons professing other religions or systems of 
beliefs. The Court held that since Dhruva. is not regarded 
as a Deity or Godhead, a reference to him cannot be said 
to have religious significance, even to an ortiiodox or an 
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19 illiterate or religiously minded Hindu. The Court held 
that there was no basis for saying that the mere mention 
of the Dhruva star would arouse the religious sentiments 
of Hindus amongst the electorate. "To say, therefore, that 
voters who saw or read these leaflets were likely to 
conjure up in their minds the picture of a highly 
religious person and therefore their religious sentiments 
may have been aroused would be too farfetched a conclusion 
20 to be justified". 
Accordingly the decision of the Gujrat High Court 
•^  21 was set aside. 
Referring to its earlier decision in Shubnath 
22 Deoq am, the Supreme Court held that "a reference to 
prophets or religions or to deities venerated in a 
religion or to their qualities and deeds does not 
necessarily amount to an appeal to the religious sentiment 
of the electorate. Something more has to be shown ... if, 
for instance, the illiterate, the orthodox or the 
fanatical electors are told that their religion would be 
in danger or they will suffer miseries or calamities 
unless they cast their votes for a particular candidate 
that would be quite clearly an appeal to the religious 
sentiment of the people. Similarly if they are told that 
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the wrath of God or of a deity will visit their, if they do 
not exercise their franchise in a particular way or if 
they are told that they will receive the blessings of God 
or a deity if they vote in a particular way, that would be 
an appeal to the religious sentiment. Similarly if they 
are told that they should cast their votes for a particular 
candidate whose election symbol is associated with a 
particular religion just as the Cross is with 
Christianity* that will be using a religious symbol for 
obtaining votes. But where, as in the case of the Hindu 
religion, it is not possible to associate a particular 
symbol with religion, the use of a symbol even when it is 
associated with some deity, cannot, without something 
more, be regarded as a corrupt practice within the 
meaning of sub-section(3) of Section 123 of the Act. For 
instance, a particular object or a plant, a bird or an 
animal associated with a deity is used in such a way as to 
show that votes are being solicited in the name of that 
deity or as would indicate that the displeasure of that 
deity would be incurred if a voter does not reach 
favourably to that appeal, it may be possible to say that 
this amounts to making an appeal in the name of religion. 
But the symbol standing by itself cannot be regarded as an 
23 
appeal m the name of religion". 
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The Court concluded that election literature should 
neither be judged strictly nor taken literally. 
In the instant case it is to be noted that the 
pamphlet clearly implied that the candidate, if not the 
party, was devoted to religion. The religiosity of bhe 
candidate/party was certainly put forward as a positive 
feature which may appeal to religion among the voters. 
Nevertheless Justice Mudholkar (who delivered the judgment 
of the Court), chose to ignore the religious potential of 
the appeal by trying to convert Dhruva into a myth so as 
to conform to the distinction made by Subba Rao in 
(23-a) Shubhnath Deogam. 
Though the expression "religious symbol" can well 
include special flags of temples and articles of the 
deity of a temple, a candidate who was formerly the Ruler 
of State cannot be held guilty of the corrupt practice of 
using religious symbol in furtherance of his election 
merely because he was received by the villagers at 
meetings with abdagirs and temple flags and other articles 
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of the village deity. In Rustom Satin V Dr. 
25 
Sampoornand ^  the respondent, the Congress candidate 
published a pamphlet in which, after recounting the 
achievements of the Congress and expressing the hope that 
3 / / 
the electors would give their support to the Congress in 
the election, ended with the following sentence: 
May Bhagwan Vishwanath give 
all of us the strength and wisdom 
to do our duty. 
The Allahabad High Court, on the contention, that the 
sentence was hit by Section 123(3) held that it is 
well-known that Bhagwan Vishwanath is the presiding deity 
of Varanasi and that to the Hindus he represents the 
Supreme Being, i.e., God. Since the appeal is made to the 
entire public which consists of people of every religion 
and belief, the words "Bhagwan Vishwanath" must be 
understood in a sense which would make these words 
reconcilable with the conception of the Supreme Being 
according to the respective tenets and beliefs of the 
latter. The Court further observed that invoking the 
blessings of the Supreme Being to grant strength and 
wisdom to the electors to do their duty cannot be said to 
be an appeal on the ground of religion and religious 
symbol. 
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Recently the apex Court in Mullapudl V.K. Rao V Vedula 
Suryanarayana held thus: 
There is no doubt in our mind that the 
offendino poster is a religious symbol. The 
depiction of anyone, be it N.T. Rama Rao or 
any other person, in the attire of Lord 
Krishna blowing a 'shanku' and quoting the 
words from the Bhagvad Gita addressed by Lord 
Krishna to Arjuna that his incarnation would 
be born upon the earth in age after age to 
restore aharma is not only to a Hindu by 
religion but to every Indian symbolic of the 
Hindu religion. The use by a candidate of such 
a symbol coupled with the printing upon it of 
words derogatory of a rival politicl party 
must lead to the conclusion that the religious 
symbol was used with a view to prejudicially 
affect the election of„ the candidate of the 
rival political party. 
But the fact that, the Court observed, the offending 
poster was used at the election by the successful 
candidate or his agent or by any other person with the 
consent of the successful candidate or his election agent 
was not established. And hence the appeal was allowed. It 
may be noted that the High Court had come to the 
conclusion that it was clear from the evidence "that the 
respondent or his agent or other persons with his consent 
have used religious symbol for the furtherance of the 
prospects of the respondent or for prejudically affecting 
the election of the Congress candidate". 
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(e) Use of or Appeal to National Symbols 
The attributes of 'national symbol' were considered 
by the Bombay High Court in Shivram Sawant Bhonsale V 
Pratap Rao Deorao Bhonsale. In this case the question 
was whether the portrait of Shivaji Maharaj was a national 
symbol or not. The High Court held that the expression 
"naticnal symbol" had a limited special meaning and had to 
be understood as connoting something symbolical of all the 
citizens of the Republic who constituted the nation. The 
symbol must be a mark or a character taken as a 
conventional sign or an emblem of some object or idea of 
the nation. It must be something adopted by communis 
sententia as representing or identifying something by 
possession of analogous qualities or by association in 
27 fact or thought of the nation". Thus reversing the 
judgment of the Tribunal the High Court held that the 
respondent was not guilty of the corrupt practice of using 
a national symbol for furtherance of his prospects in the 
election by exhibiting a portrait of Shivaji Maharaj. 
Earlier the Tribunal had expressed the view that the 
term "nation" could be used for any aggregate of persons. 
In the opinion of the Tribunal 14 regional languages 
spoken by different groups of people can be termed as 
380 
different nations and that "Indians are a nation of 
nations". Under this background the conclusion of the 
Tribunal was that there could be a national symbol for a 
particular group of Indian society within the meaning of 
that expression as used in Section 123(3) of the Act and 
hence the portrait used by the respondent was a national 
symbol. 
The High Court rejected the contention that the 
expression "national symbol" as used in Section 123(3) is 
referrable to a number of nations or that there are a 
number of nations in a country and held that "We are only 
one nation and every citizen of the Republic goes to 
constitute that nation, which is one and indivisible. The 
proposition that groups of people speaking different 
languages can constitute various nations ... is wholly 
unsound and completely fallacious. Every citizen of India 
has one political status -— one nationality on which 
depends his allegiance to the sovereign which is the 
Republic of India and no person can have more that one 
nationality at one time ... there is for the citizens of 
the Republic one nationality, one allegiance and one 
flag".2^ 
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(a) Portrait of Mahatma Gandhi 
29 In Desai Basawaraj V Dasankep Hasansab it was 
contended that the respondent made use of a photo of 
Mahatma Gandhi and his pictures in connection with his 
election propaganda. It was alleged that a picture of the 
bust of Mahatma Gandhi with folded hands was put upon the 
same board on which the words 'vote for Dasankop' were 
written, making it appear that Mahatma Gandhi was himself 
appealing with folded hands to vote for the respondent, 
Dasankop. 
The Tribunal held that since the birthday of Mahatma 
Gandhi is observed as a national holiday or a public 
holiday under the Negotiable Instrument Act and the 
picture of Mahatma Gandhi is hung in all the government 
offices at government cost, the photo of Mahatma Gandhi is 
a national symbol. 
The same question, i.e., whether Mahatma Gandhi's 
photo is a national symbol or not came for consideration 
before the Allahabad High Court in Karan Singh V Jamuna 
30 Singh. Justice Bhargav.' who delivered the judgment of 
the Court, did not agree with the observation of the 
Tribunal in Desai Basawaraj. '.'"he learned judge held: 
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The use of the expression, "such as" instead 
of "including" or "for example" connotes an 
idea that only those national symbols should 
be taken into account which . are like and 
similar to the National Flag, or the 
national emblem. In order to be like or 
similar to the National Flag or the national 
emblem, or national symbol must possess the 
same characteristics which are possessed by 
the National Flag or a national emblem and, 
therefore, must become a national symbol by 
a process similar to that by which the 
National Flag became a national symbol. The 
National Flag acquired its characteristics 
of being a national symbol by a resolution 
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of the Constituent Assembly. 
Justice Bhargava further held that there was no provision 
of any law or any resolution by a competent authority 
declaring any emblem to be a national emblem. Thus, in the 
opinion of the learned judge, the portrait of Mahatma 
Gandhi could have been recognised as a national symbol if 
it had been declared so by the Constituent Assembly in the 
same manner in which the National Flag was declared to be 
a national symbol. "The National Flag is a national symbol 
because, wherever it exists, it at once gives an idea 
that, in some form or the other, the Indian Nation is also 
represented there. The same cannot be said with regard to 
a portrait of Mahatma Gandhi. People may keep his portrait 
because they revere him or have a great regard for him and 
treat him as the Father of the Nation. By keeping his 
portrait, however, it cannot be said that there is any 
3S3 
intention to signify that the Indian Nation as such is 
32 
represented where that portrait happens to be". 
(b) National Anthem 
The issue of National Anthem was considered by the 
33 Madras High Court in D. Venkatramiah V E. Narayana Gowda. 
Hegde J. who delivered the judgment of the Court observed: 
Illustrations of national symbols given in 
sub-section( 3) to Section 123 are the 
national flag or the national emblem. 
Undoubtedly these are merely Illustrative and 
not exhaustive. There may be other symbols 
Which may come within the expression 
"national symbols". According to chamber's 
twentieth century Dictionary, symbol or 
emblem is "that by which customs or 
conventions represent something". According 
to the Concise Oxford Dictionary symbol means 
thing regraded by general consent as 
naturally typifying or representing or 
recalling something by possession of 
analogous qualities or by association in fact 
or thought". "Mark or character taken as the 
conventional sign of some object or idea or 
process". Hence it must necessarily be a sign 
or a mark. It is difficult to visualize how 
34 the National Anthem could be symbol. 
Thus, in short, the High Court held that a symbol 
necessarily connotes a sign or mark; singing the National 
Anthem does not constitute the corrupt practice of using a 
national symbol. 
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(c) Use of Title 'Bharats Ratna' 
In Rustom Satin one of the questions was whether the 
titles like "Bharata Ratna" and "Padama Vibhushan" were 
national symbols or not. 
Following the test laid down by a division bench of 
the Allahabad High Court in Karan Singh, that for a symbol 
to become a national symbol, it has to be recognised as 
such by the competent legislative authority. The court held 
that the titles "Bharata Ratna" and "Padma Vibhushan" 
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could not be held to be national symbols. 
(d) Decoration with National Flag 
In Madan Mohan Upadhyay V Hari Datt Kandpal , the 
allegation was that in order to create a platform for the 
election propaganda, the respondent himself and through 
his election agent and other agents acting with his 
consent organised what was called a development conference. 
The Conference was decorated with National flags. The 
Platform was freely used by the respondent, his election 
agents with his consent for election propaganda and for 
the furtherance of his election campaign. 
The main question before the High Court was whether 
any National flags were used at that conference and 
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further whether the use of these Netional flags was in 
furtherance of the candidature of the respondent. The 
Court found the evidences of witnesses produced 
unsatisfactory and contradictory. The witnesses were 
unable to distinguish between National flags and the 
Congress party flags. The witnesses were not in a position 
to remeber that National flags bore the Ashok Chakra. 
The High Court held that the existence of national 
flags at a conference was not by itself evidence of the 
commission of a corrupt practice under section 123(3). 
There must further be evidence to show that the National 
flags were used for the furtherance of the prospects of 
the candidate's election. 
It is submitted that there is no use of including 
National flag under corrupt practice. No one is inclined 
to vote on the basis of National Flag being used. As it is 
proved in this case that the voters were not in a position 
to distinguish between the National Flag and the Congress 
Party Flag. 
CONCLUSION 
The provision was enacted to eliminate from the 
electoral process# appeals to those divisive factors, 
which arouse irrational passions that run counter to the 
3Sr, 
basic tenets of the Indian Constitution. Consistent vrith 
this constitutional philosophy, sub-section (3) of the Act 
treats an sppeal to the electorate to vote on the basis of 
religion, race, caste, etc. of the candidate, or, the use 
of religious symbols, a corrupt practice. 
In order to see whether a particular appeal falls 
within the ambit of clause (3), the apex Coutt in Kultar 
Singh laid down three principles. First, that the document 
must be read as a whole, and, its purport and effect 
determined in a fair, objective and reasonable manner. 
Secondly, the emotion and heat of an election campaign 
should not be lost sight of, in the cold atmosphere of the 
court room while interpreting the impugned document. 
Thirdly, the effect of these speeches, or, pamphlets on 
the mind of an ordinary voter should also not be ignored. 
Judicial decisions, however, are not consistent and force 
the conclusion that courts have generally ignored the 
spirit of the provision. In fact, courts have often 
concluded that since communal parties were allowed to 
function in politics in India, an appeal made to voters on 
communal basis by itself, should not therefore be viewed 
as a corrupt practice. Consequently, courts have 
virtually licensed the making of divisive appeals . in 
election campaigns, often stating that the impugned 
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statement lacked "the sharp edge of the appeal". 
In matters of religious symbols also, courts have 
generally made a distinction between religion and myth. As 
a result, religious susceptibilities of election 
campaigning were not thought to transgress Section 123(3). 
Even if the depiction of anyone, in the particular attire 
of a religious symbol, is held to affect the rival 
candidate prejudicially, the paradigm of strict proof has 
hurt the respondent. 
Candidates at an election should not be permitted to 
speak of rivals as unfit potential representatives, just 
because, of a particular religious profession or practice. 
Such aspersions ought to be discouraged in a democratic 
set-up that our Constitution visualises. However, courts 
have always been very subjective in their interpretation 
of the three principles enunciated in Kultar Singh by 
following them only partially. The final consequence of 
such selective implementation of the three Kultar Singh 
principles has been that the doors of sectarian appeal 
have been kept open in election campaigns. This is 
entirely against the spirit of the law and the 
Constitution. In a large and variegated country like ours, 
the judiciary must firmly oppose such divisive attempts to 
polarize our people on the basis only of religion, race, 
caste, community and language. 
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CHAPTER - IX 
PRCMOTION OF FEELIMGS OF ENMITY OR HATRED 
INTRODDCTION 
There has been a challenge to the secular character 
of the Indian Polity for a long period. One can to-day 
visualise such problems in the forms of rfegionalism, 
and conununalism. The virus of casteism and communalism 
spreads rapidly on the eve of elections when political 
parties appeal to and bank on the caste and 
religion-oriented behaviour of the voters. Section 123(3A) 
of the Act makes the creation of or an attempt to create 
feelings of enmity or hatred between the different classes 
of our citizens on the ground of religion, race, caste, 
community or language as a corrupt practice. 
THE LAW 
"The promotion of, or attempt to promote, feeling 
of enmity or hatred between different classes of the 
citizens of India on grounds of religion, race, caste, 
community, or language, by a candidate or his agent or any 
other person with the consent of a candidate or his 
election agent, for the furtherance of the prospects of 
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the election of that candidate or for prejudicially 
affecting the election of any candidate". 
The essential ingredients of the provision which 
constitute a corrupt practice under Section 123(3A) are : 
(I)the promotion or attempt to promote feelings of enmity 
or hatred between different classes of the citizens of 
India; (11) the promotion or attempt to promote enmity or 
hatred must be by a candidate or his agent or any other 
person with the consent of a candidate or his election 
agent; and (III) the object must be for the furtherance of 
the prospects of the election of that candidate or for 
prejudicially affecting the election of any candidate. 
RATIONALE OF THE PROVISION 
The spirit of the provision has nicely been summed 
up by the Kerala High Court as : Section 123 of the Act 
was enacted to prevent certain forces from interfering 
with the free exercise of electoral rights by an elector, 
sub-section 1 to 7 of Section 123 enumerate the different 
types of activities that are treated as corrupt practices 
for the purposes of the Act. An analysis of sub-section 
(1) to (7) of Section 123 shows that the corrupt practice 
included in sub-section(3A) has special significance and 
3S3 
certain particular features which are not possessed by the 
activities prohibited by the other sub-sections of Section 
123. The evil effect of the activities specified in the 
other sub-sections are comparatively short from the point 
of view of duration and less harmful to the society at 
large. But sub-section (3A) deals with activities which 
promote or attempt to promote what may generally be 
described as communal hatred. Feelings of enmity, or 
hatred between different classes of citizens of India 
based on religion, race, caste, community or language do 
not, when once created, usually disappear shortly after 
elections are over as in the case of other categories of 
corrupt practices. Communal hatred invariably inflicts 
wounds hard to heal and has the dangerous tendency to 
persist for long period, undermining the peace and 
security of the society as a whole. Since during an 
election campaign the most effective methods of propaganda 
are invariably used by almost all influential sections of 
the society, creation of communal disharmony will be 
easier and more effective. Experience has taught that in 
this country religious or communal hostility has often led 
to retaliation at the instance of the injured party, and 
in certain other cases the hatred so created lie dormant 
like a valcano which may unexpectedly erupt leading to 
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disastrous cosnsequences. Consequently, an allegation in ar. 
election petition of acts attracting Section 123(3A) of the Act 
has to be seriously considered by a court from a broader and 
realistic anyle. 
Giving the raison d etre of the related provisions as 
enumerated in sub-sections (2),(3) and {3A) of the Act, Bey,J., 
of the Supreme Court in a case observed: 
It seems to us that S.123, sub-sections (2),(3) and 
(3A) were enacted so as to eliminate, from the 
electoral process, appeals to those divisive factors 
which arouse irrational passions that run counter 
to the basic tenets of our Constitution, and, indeed, 
3 
of any civilized political and social order. 
The learned judge further held that due respect for the 
religious beliefs and practices, race, creed, culture, and 
language of other citizens is one of the basic postulates of 
our democratic system. The learned judge continued: 
Under the guise of protecting your own religion, 
culture, or creed you cannot embark on personal 
attacks on those of others or whip up low herd 
instinct and animosities or irrational fears 
4 
between groups to secure electoral victories. 
On an earlier occasion the apex Court had given the 
rationale of the provision in S.V. Chettiar V E.V. Ramas\/arai 
Naicker, as follows: 
"The section has been intented to respect the religious 
susceptibilities of persons of different religious 
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persuasions or creeds ... very 
circumspect in such matters and to pay 
due regard to feelings and religious 
emotions of different classes of persons 
with different beliefs irrespective of 
the consideration whether or not they 
share those beliefs, or whether they are 
rational or otherwise". 
JUDICIAL CHECK ON PERNICIOUS CAMPAIGNING 
To bring a corrupt practice within the purview of 
Section 123{3-A) mere attempt to promote will be 
sufficient and actual promotion of feeling of enmity or 
hatred is not necessary. The feeling of enmity or hatred 
will be between different classes of the citizens of 
India, based on grounds of religion, race, caste, 
community or language. In Pritpal Singh V Ranjit Rai , the 
Delhi High Court has held that promotion of enmity or 
hatred against the ruling government is not a corrupt 
practice, as the government cannot be comprehended within 
the expression "different classes of the citizens of 
India" The Court elaborated that promotion of feelings of 
enmity or hatred between different classes of citizens on 
grounds of religion, etc., is a corrupt practice. "But", 
the Court also held, "it is the right of every candidate 
to criticise however angrily, the opposite parties or the 
party in power against whom he is fighting the election 
and whom he wishes to disloge from power. This is the 
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brief moment of freedom of which the people make use 
7 during elections." The Court concluded that a democratic 
government could > not be said to be composed of any one 
class of citizen based on the ground of caste, religion, 
language or community. It is conterminous with the people 
as a whole. It is an authority set over them by themselves 
in a democratic set-up. 
In a leading judgment Ebrahim Sulaiman Salt V M.C. 
9 
Mohammad , the Supreme Court spelt out the scope of 
Section 123(3-A). The facts were that Ebrahim Sulaiman 
Sait, a Muslim League candidate for election to the Lok 
Sabha. from Kerala during his election campaign made a 
speech in English at Pullikat. A report of this speech 
translated into Mallayalam appeared in the local daily 
Chandrika. The said speech made certain allegations 
against the Muslim League (Opposition) group referring to 
them as anti-religious and accusing them of having helped 
the Jan Sangh which had killed many Muslims in Northern 
India and at Tellichery and had burnt the Sacred mosque. 
It was alleged in the speech that "these people have also 
been leading the poor Muslims towards the camp of communal 
reactionaries and therefore society can never forgive 
them." The main allegation levelled against Sulaiman Sait, 
the appellant, was that by making this speech he became 
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guilty of promoting feelings of enmity and hatred between 
different classes of citizens of India on grounds of 
religion and community as laid down under clause {3A) of 
Section 123 of the Act. 
While admitting that the reported version of the 
speech more or less tallied with the views expressed by 
the appellant, it was contended that a political party 
could not be described as a class in the sense in which 
the expression "class of the citizens" was used in Section 
123(3A) of the Act, and that whatever the appellant had 
said in his speech was directed against a political party 
so that the speech did not fall within the mischief 
contemplated in the sub-section. Gupta, j., who spoke for 
a division bench, however, was of the following opinion: 
A speech, though its immediate target is a 
political party, may yet be such as to 
promote feelings of enmity or hatred 
between different classes of citizens. It 
is the likely effect of the speech on the 
voters that has to be considered. 
On the contention made on behalf of the appellant 
that the allegations as regards the killing of Muslims and 
the burning of mosques were based on facts as found by the 
Commission of Inquiry that investigated the facts relating 
to disturbances which took place in Tellichery in 1971, 
the learned judge opined that "in our opinion truth is not 
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an answer to a charge of corrupt practice under Section 
123 (3-A). What is relevant is whether the speech promoted 
or sought to promote feelings of enmity or hatred as 
mentioned in that provision If it is found that this was 
so, then it is immaterial whether what was said was based 
on facts or not". The Court admitted that the tone of 
the speech as a whole was communal, and added that "but in 
this country communal parties are allowed to function in 
12 politics". It proceeded to quote the opinion of 
13 Gajendragadkar, C.J. an Kultar Singh in which he had 
said that there were several parties in this country which 
subscribed to different political and economic ideologies 
but the membership of them was either confined to, or 
predominantly held by, members of particular community or 
religions. So long as law did not prohibit the formulation 
of such parties and in fact recognised them for the 
purpose of election and Parliamentary life, it would be 
necessary to remember that an appeal made by such 
candidates of such parties for votes might, if successful, 
lead to their election and in an indirect way, might 
conceivably be influenced by considerations of religion, 
race, caste, community or language, the learned C.J. had 
further observed. 
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In Ebrahim Sulaiman Salt, however, after re-
evaluating the testimony of witnesses brought before the 
trial court to judge the effect of the speech on the minds 
of ordinary voters, the Supreme Court reversed the 
decision of the Kerala High Court and observed that the 
speech sought to criticise the wrong policy of the Muslim 
League (Opposition) in aligning with parties that were 
allegedly responsible for atrocities against the Muslims 
and not just to emphasise the atrocities. "Therefore, 
reading the speech as a whole and keeping in mind the 
well established principle that the allegations of 
corrupt practice must be proved beyond doubt it could not 
be said that the speech feel within the mischief of 
Section 123 (3-A) of the Act"."^ ^ 
At this stage it will be relevant to judge the 
attitude of the Supreme Court in an earlier case of 
15 Ziauddm Burhanuddm Bukhari V Brijmohan Ramdass Mehra. 
Some of the relevant facts of this case have already been 
discussed under sub-clause(3). For purposes of 
consideration under sub-section {3-A), one of the speeches 
found to contain objectionable matter was the one in which 
the appellant was shown to have stated that, although 
Muslim personal law may be considered a personal matter by 
Chagla, it was considered to be "the law of God" by 
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Muslims who would not tolerate any attempts to amend it as 
that would raise a religious question. In the course of 
this speech, the appellant is reported to have said that, 
if the Congress Government brought in "amendments in our 
religious law", battle would be fought in every street" as 
"the question of religion has arisen". The appellant had 
threatended the ruling Congress party with open rebellion 
if attempts were made to change Muslim personal law which 
he called "a question of religion". The appellant had also 
made statements implying that Chagla was a supporter of 
this policy of change in what Bukhari called "a matter of 
religion" for Muslims. The Bombay High Court held that 
these statements amounted to a violation of Section (3-A) 
of the Act on the ground that Bukhari' s language was 
calculated to promote hostility between Hindus and 
Muslims. The Supreme Court, in appeal, accepted this 
verdict of the High Court. 
Another speech containing objectionable matter 
proved to have been delivered by the appellant was the one 
which contained allegations against Chagla's faithfulness 
to Muslim religion on the ground that he had advocated 
inter-communal and inter-caste marriages and that he 
wanted a Hindu to be a member of the Haj Committee. The 
appellant had flung a question addressed to Chagla. It 
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was: "V^ ith what cheek you say that you are a 
representative of ours"? In addition, there were 
references to riots in which only Muslims were alleged to 
have been killed. There was also the statement that Muslim 
personal law was a matter of religion to Muslims, The 
appellant then declared that if this law was sought to be 
changed, Muslim League candidates "would become such a 
wall for them against which they will break their heads". 
Bukhari claimed that he could die for Islam. He then said: 
"God has blessed us that every drop of our blood would 
give birth to thousands of Bukharis". The supreme Court 
held that the High Court was right in construing the 
speech as highly inflammatory. It certainly amounted to 
the assertion that Muslim religion was in danger and could 
only be saved by man like Bukhari and not by Chagla. The 
Supreme Court accepted the findings of the High Court that 
it amounted to a violation of Section 123(3) and further 
observed that it was also struck by Section 123 (3-A) of 
the Act. 
Beg, j., (later C.J.) who wrote the judgment of the 
Court held that the whole outlook revealed by the speeches 
of Bukhari was that of a mediaeval crusader who had 
embarked, on a Jehad for extirpation of the heresy or 
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Kufr which, in Bukhari's imagination, was represented by 
Chagla and his party. The learned judge observed: 
We do not consider such speeches to have any 
place in a democratic set-up under our 
Constitution ... Our democracy can only 
survive if those who aspire to become 
people's representatives and leaders 
understand the spirit of secular democracy. 
For such a spirit to prevail, candidates at 
elections have to try to persuade electors 
by showing them the light of reason and not 
by inflamming their blind and disruptive 
passions. Heresy hunting propaganda on 
professedly religious grounds directed 
against a candidate at an election may be 
permitted in a theoratic state but not in a 
secular republic like ours ... It is 
forbidden in this country in order to 
preserve the spirit of equality, fraternity, 
and amity between rivals even during 
elections. Indeed, such prohibitions are 
necessary in the interests of elementary 
public peace and order. 
The Supreme Court accepted the findings of the High 
Court that the appellant was guilty of the corrupt 
practices defined by the provisions under clauses (2), (3) 
and (3-A) of Section 123 of the Act, by making the various 
speeches closely examined by itself also. On the scope of 
the provision. Beg, J., held that what is relevant in such 
a case is what is professed or put forward by a candidate 
as a ground for prefeering him over another and not the 
motive or reality behind the profession which may or may 
not be very secular or mundane. It is the professed or 
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ostensible ground that matters. If that ground is 
religion, which is put on the same footing as race, caste 
or language as an objectionable ground for seeking votes, 
it is not permissible. On the other hand, if support is 
sought on a ground distinguishable from those falling in 
the prohibited categories, it will not be struck by 
Section 123 of the Act whatever else it may or may not 
offend. It is then left to the electorate to decide 
17 
whether a permissible view is right or wrong. 
Sometimes in election speeches, the use of 
figurative language has been found. The question is 
whether a figurative language in election speeches is 
justifiable or it should also be subject to certain 
restraints. One such issue before the Kerala High 
18 Court was whether the statement by a Muslim League 
candidate that the group of leagues were assassins of the 
community and they were canvassing votes for R.S.S. and 
Jana Sangh who were thirsting for blood of the Muslims 
amounted to the corrupt practice falling under Section 
123(A) of the Act. The point at issue was also a cartoon 
which depicted Jana Sangh as a pig and suggested that 
opposition league members would have to swallow it if they 
vote for Marxist party. 
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Namboodiripad, j., who delivered the judgment of 
the Court observed that the question is not whether the 
speaker intended to use metaphoric language in choosing 
the particular expression found in his speech, "but it is 
the impression those words are likely to cause in the mind 
19 
of an ordinary reader". The learned judge accepted that 
figurative language is often resorted to for making the 
idea more appealing and more effective to the bearer or 
the reader as the case may be. "There are also the other 
general circumstances and the then subsisting disharmony 
between Muslims on the one part and R.S.S. and Jana Sangh 
on the other. The reference to R.S.S. and Jana Sangh 
people who are thirsting for the blood of the Muslims was 
not a mere figurative expression, but was one calculated 
to fan the hatred of the Muslims against those 
20 
organisations." Thus, in the opinion of the High Court, 
the relevant passages of the speech promoted or at any 
rate attempted to promote feelings of enmity and hatred 
between Muslims on the one part and the R.S.S. and Jana 
Sangh people on the other, who undoubtedly constituted a 
class within the meaning of Section 123 (3-A). 
21 On appeal to the Supreme Court, Fazal Ali, j., 
who wrote the judgment of the Court accepted the defence 
of the appellant that the phrase "Thirsting for Muslims 
4on 
blood" was used in a figurative sense and not in the sense 
of drinking blood. The learned judge observed that what 
the speaker meatjt was that as Jana Sangh and R.S.S. were 
against the Muslims they should muster all efforts to get 
them defeated and teach a lesson to the dissident Muslims 
.who had joined the Janasangh Party. According to the Court 
there did not appear to be any element of hatred or 
enmity in the extract of the speech of the appellant 
reported above. There was no exhortion by the speaker to 
the Muslims to attack the Janasangh or the R.S.S. or to do 
any kind of harm or violence. "The entire speech is made 
against a political background and for a political 
22 
purpose". 
It may be submitted that the Supreme Court has 
taken a very casual approach in interpreting the speech 
and seeing its impact on the audience. The apex court by 
saying that the speech was simply figurative in nature has 
not appreciated the background under which Section 12 3 
(3-A) was inserted; in this connection the Kerala High 
Court was right to say that by the impugned speech what 
the respondent did was to set the ball of communal hatred 
in motion. 
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RELATION BETWEEN ARTICLE 25 & SECTION 123(3) & (3-A) 
In a recent pronouncement in Subhash Desai V Sharad 
J. Rao the apex Court observed on the relationship 
between Article 25 of the Constitution of India and 
sub-sections (3) and (3-A) of Section 123 of the R.P. Act, 
1951. N.P. Singh, j., speaking for the Court on behalf of 
himself, Punchhi and Ahmadi, jj.» held that when the 
framers of the Constitution guaranteed every citizen right 
to freely profess, practice and propagate his religion, 
that right did not extend to creating hatred amongst two 
groups of persons, practising different religions. The 
learned judge further observed: 
Sub-section(3) and sub-section(3-A) of Section 
123, never purport to curb the right 
guaranteed by Art. 25 ... They only purport to 
curb the appeal on the ground of religion or 
propagating religion for creating feeling of 
enmity or hatred between different classes of 
citizens of India during the election campaign 
... Sub-section(3) and (3-A) ... in no way are 
in conflict with Article 25 of the 
Constitution - both can co-exist. Article 2 5 
enables every citizen of India to profess, 
practice and propagate his religion, whereas 
sub-sections . . . purport to ensure that an 
election is not influenced by considerations 
for religion, race, caste,, community or 
language. Sub-sections (3) and (3-A) ... 
merely prescribe the conditions, which must 
be observed if a candidate wants to enter in 
Parliament or Legislative Assembly. 
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The Court further reiterated that the right to 
stand for an election is a special right created by a 
statute and can be exercised on the conditions laid down 
by the said statute. Keeping in view that the election 
should not be contested on the ground of religion, etc., 
and result of an election is not affected by promoting 
feelings of enmity or hatred between different classes of 
citizens, on grounds of reli9io;?s, etc. ,the framers of the Act 
have declared sectarian campaigning as a corrupt practice. 
BURDEN OF PROOF 
Under the provisions of the Representation of the 
People Act, the onus lies entirely on the petitioner to 
prove the corrupt practices alleged against the elected 
candidate. The necessary facts and particulars and the 
statements of facts, etc., are to be pleaded by the 
election petitioner with exactitude and precision. So far 
as the elected candidate is concerned, he is merely to 
rebut the allegations made by the petitioner in accordance 
with the provisions of the Civil Proceudre Code, as far as 
23 practicable. In Sultan_SalauddinOwaisi V Osman Shaweed, 
an allegation of corrupt practice was made in the petition 
challenging the election of Sultan Salauddin Owaisi to the 
legislative Assembly of Andhra Pradesh. It was alleged 
that he made speeches provocative of hatred rousing 
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religious sentiments against different classes of 
citizens. Sultan Salauddin filed applications before the 
High Court for summoning witnesses as also for amending 
his counter. The applications were filed after the 
petitioner had closed the evidence and the High Court had 
directed Sultan Salauddin to file a list of witnesses. The 
applications were rejected on the ground that no 
foundation for the facts on the basis of which the 
witnesses were sought to be examined was laid in the 
counter. The High Court was of the view that in the 
absence of any specific plea of alibi set out in the 
counter, Sultan Salauddin could not be permitted to amend 
the counter or examine the witnesses. On appeal to the 
Supreme Court, it was observed that in refusing to amend 
the counter and to summon witnesses, the High Court 
appeared to have overlooked the fact that under the 
provisions of the Act, the onus lay entirely on the 
petitioner to prove the corrupt practice alleged against 
the elected candidate. The Court further stated: 
It is now well settled by a large catena of 
the authorities of this Court that a charge 
of corrupt practice must be proved to the 
hilt, the standard of proof of such 
allegation is the same as a charge of fraud 
in a criminal case. 
In the instant case the respondent had taken an express 
plea in his counter that he did not make any speech at the 
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places alleged by the election petitioner. He also stated 
that tape records or the casette alleged to coantain his 
speech were fabricated. 
Fazal Ali, j., speaking for the Court observed that 
one of the ways of proving this plea could be by showing 
that the appellant was not physically present at the places 
where the speeches were alleged to have been made as he 
was present at that time, at some other place. This was 
what the respondent sought to do through the proposed 
amendment and by summoning witnesses. 
25 In another leading case, C.H. Mohammad Koya, the 
allegation that Mohammad Koya was guilty of the corrupt 
practice of promoting ill-will and hatred between two 
classes of citizens, namely, the Jan Sangh and the Muslim 
/articles 
League, by publishing speeches,/and cartoons in a daily 
newspaper of which he was the chief editor was met by him 
by stating that his being the chief editor was purely 
ornamental and that he did not function as editor, as 
understood in Section 1(1) of the Press Law Repeal and 
2G Amendment Act, 1922. The Kerala High Court had found the 
allegations proved, declared his election void and 
disqualified him from taking part in elections for a 
period of six years under the provisions of the Act. On 
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appeal, the Supreme Court found, on a reappraisal of the 
evidence addduced, that Mohammad Koya was not engaged in 
the control of selection of the matter published in the 
newspaper, his name was published as chief editor only for 
ornamental purposes and the actual editorship was vested 
in another person whose name appeared in the newspaper'as 
its editor. In the light of these facts the Court held 
27 that the presumption under Section 7 of the Press Act 
couid not be applied to him, Fazal Ali, j., speaking for 
the Court observed: 
It is manifest that the petitioner has miserably 
failed to prove either that the appellant 
was the editor of the paper or that he was 
performing the functions, duties or 
shouldering the responsibilities of the 
editor. It is obvious that a presumption 
under Section 7 of the Press Act could be 
drawn only if the person concerned was an 
editor within the meaning of Section 1 of 
the Press Act. Where however a person does 
not fulfil the coanditions of Section 1 of 
the Press Act and does not perform the 
functions of an editor whatever may be his 
description of designation, the provisions 
of the Press Act would have no 
28 
application. 
The learned judge concluded that under such circumstances 
the High Court had no legal justification to draw a 
presumption against the appellant under Section 7 of the 
Press Act in holding that he was proved to be the editor, 
and, therefore, must be deemed to be aware of the articles 
published in the said paper. 
4 1 1 
The decision of the apex Court was mainly based on 
a re-evaluation of the evidence adduced before the trial 
Court. It was concluded that the petitioner had not been 
able to prove the corrupt practice alleged against the 
appellant. There was no legal or satisfactory evidence to 
prove that the speech made by the appellant promoted or 
attempted to promote feelings of enmity and hatred between 
two classes of citizens, namely, the Jana Sangh and R.S.S. 
on the one side and the Muslim league on the other. 
Similarly, there was no reliable evidence to show that 
the appellant had any knowledge or had given prior 
consent to the publication of the cartoon. 
Another point which requires mention here in 
connection with burden of proof is the term 'Consent'. One 
of the essential requirements to bring a case under 
Section 123 of the Act is that the act must have been done 
by the candidate or his agent or by any other person with 
the consent of the candidate or his election agent. In the 
29 
case of Nara Sxngh Charan Mohanty V Surendara Mohanty 
the Supreme Court pointed out that consent or agency 
could not be inferred but had to be proved affirmatively 
like any other fact. In this connection the Court 
observed: 
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Consent or agency cannot be inferred from remote 
causes. Consent cannot be inferred from mere 
close friendships or other relationship or 
political affiliation .. . however close the 
relationship unless there is evidence to prove 
that the p'erson publishing or writing the 
editorial v^ as authorised by the returned 
candidate or he had undertaken to be responsible 
for all the publications, no consent can be 
,30 inferred. 
The Court also distinguished between 'Consent' and 
'Knowledge' and held that the former is a much stronger 
31 
word than knowledge because it implies conscious assent. 
CONCLUSION 
Elections in India are apparently contested on 
economic and political programmes. However, actually 
elections are won on considerations of religion and caste. 
This leads to communal tension. To prevent arousing of 
animosities for political gain v/as the idea behind the 
enactment of Section 123(3A). It has been rightly said that 
communal hatred invariably inflicts v/ounds hard to heal and 
has the dangerous tendency to persist for long periods, 
undermining the peace and security of society as a whole. 
Hence use of corrupt practices in elections to secure short 
term gains at the cost of the democratic process must 
be frovmed at by every right thinking citizen. The 
democratic process v/ill naturally collapse if corrupt 
practices like appeals to voters on the basis of caste. 
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creed, community, etc., are allov;ed to go unchecked and 
unpunished. Justice Beg in Ziayuddin B. Bukhari expressed 
the same feeling when he deliberated that our democracy can 
only survive if those who aspire to become people's 
representatives understand the spirit of secular democracy. 
Everyone has to realise that "our tradition teaches 
tolerance; our philosophy preaches tolerance; our 
32 Constitution practices tolerance; let us not dilute it". 
The judiciary can, thus, play a significant role in 
combating communal and caste hatred by strictly 
interpreting the provision of Clause (3-A) of Section 123. 
However, a perusal of the cases discussed above shows that 
in some cases the apex Court has taken a lackadaisical 
approach towards Section 123{3-A). On such example, as 
^noted earlier, is 
^Ebrahim Sulaiman Salt, for, though the Court accepted that 
the tone of the speech as a whole was communal, yet it did 
not take any judicial notice under the pretext that in this 
country communal parties are allowed to function in 
politics. 
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CHAPTER-X 
GLORIFICATION OF SATI 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite Lord William Bentinck's legal ban on sati 
in 1829 and Lord Dalhousie's stringent measures for its 
abolition, the practice has not totally ceased in India. A 
section of the Hindus still glorify sati and look back 
nostalgically to the times when it was widely prevalent. 
A gruesome sati was committed in the recent past 
on 4th September 1987 in Deorala (Rajasthan) when an 
eighteen year old girl Roop Kanwar was burnt alive along 
with her husband's corpse. The incident, with the massive 
social acceptance it received, would probably not have 
had attracted much national attention, were it not for the 
sustained opposition from women-groups in Rajasthan. 
Hundreds of women had marched in protest in Jaipur 
demanding that the chunri Mahotsava should not be allowed 
to take place. They even obtained a High Court order 
directing the State Government to ensure that no public 
function or ceremony would be held at the place where 
sati had been committed. Yet nothing was done and more 
than five lakh people participated in the chunri mahotsava 
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and donated about 30 lakh rupees to a newly- formed sati 
committee which was planning to erect a monument there. 
And among the teeming millions who visited the spot and 
sought the sati mata's blessings were some well-known 
politicians. 
THE COMMISSION OF SATI (PREVENTION) ACT, 1987 
The Roop Kanwar incident sent shock waves country-
wide and feminist organisations demanded that Section 306 
of the Indian Panel Code, 1860 which punishes 
the abettor of sati was not sufficient and a 
more precise and deterrent law was needed. Ultimately the 
Act of 1987 came into existence. This legislation is a 
compact piece of twenty-two sections and is designed to 
meet the challenge of reviralist obscurantism in the form 
i' ^ 2 
of sati. The very preamble says that the "Act is to 
provide for the more effective prevention of the 
commission of sati and its glorification and for matters 
connected herewith or incidental thereto". The preamble is 
noticeable for three reasons: first, it clearly makes a 
declaration that sati is nowhere enjoined by any of the 
religions of India as an imperative duty. Secondly, it 
condemns sati on the basis of its incongruence with human 
3 dxgnity. Thirdly, it clearly recognises that the 
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practice of sati has been on the rise and emphasises that 
little has been done to eradicate this evil. 
The Act creates three new offences: (A) attempt to 
commit sati; (B) abetment of sati or the attempt to abet 
it; (C) glorification of sati. 
(A) Attempt to Commit sati 
An attempt to commit sati is already a penal 
offence under Section 309 of the Indian Penal Code. Now 
the inclusion of the offence in the Sati Act does not seem 
to be a very sound proposition. 
(B) Abetment of sati 
Section 4 of the Act lays dov/n that -
(I) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian 
Panel Code ... if any person commits sati, whoever 
abets the commission of such sati, either directly 
or indirectlym, shall be punishable with death or 
imprisonment for life and also be liable to fine. 
(II) If any person attempts to commit sati, whoever 
abets such attempt, either directly or indirectly, 
shall be punishable with imprisonment for life and 
shall also be liable to fine. 
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For the purposes of Section 4, the Explanation provides 
that any of the following acts or the like shall also be 
deemed to be ah abetment, namely -. 
(a) any inducement to a widow or woman to get her 
burnt or buried alive along with the body of her 
deceased husband or with any other relative or 
with any article, object or thing associated with 
the husband or such relative, irrespective of 
whether she is in a fit state of mind or is 
labouring under a state of intoxication or 
stupefaction or other cause impeding the 
exercise of her free will; 
(b) making a widow or woman believe that the 
commission of sati would result in some 
spiritual benefit to her or her deceased husband 
or relative or the general well being of the 
family; 
(c) encouraging a widow or woman to remain fixed in 
her resolve to commit sati and thus instigating 
her to commit sati; 
(d) participating in any procession in connection 
with the commission of sati or aiding the widow 
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or woman in her decision to commit sati by 
taking her along with the body of her deceased 
husband or relative to the cremation or buifial 
i 
ground; 
(e) being present at the place where sati is 
committed as an active participant to such 
commission or to any ceremony connected with it; 
(f) preventing or obstructing the widow or woman 
from saving herself from being burnt or buried 
alive; 
(g) obstructing, or interfering with, the police in 
the discharge of its duties of taking any steps 
to prevent the commission of sati. 
Now, an important feature of the offence is that liability 
is imposed not only for direct abetment but also for 
indirect abetment. However what would amount to an 
indirect abetment would really be a difficult question to 
decide. For, will a person who says that he must cherish 
the ancient traditions of Rajput tribes be guilty of 
4 
indirect abetment? 
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(C) Glorification of sati 
The Act defines a new offence called 'glorification 
of sati'. Section 2 Clause(b) holds that "glorification" 
includes, among other things, -
(I) the observance of any ceremony or the taking out 
of a procession in connection with the 
commission of sati; or 
(II) the supporting, justifying or propagating the 
practice of sati in any manner; or 
(III) the arranging of any function to eulogise the 
person who has committed sati; or 
(IV) the creation of a trust, or the collection of 
funds, or the construction of a temple or other 
structure or the carrying on of any form of 
worship or the performance of any ceremony 
thereat with a view to perpetuate the honour 
of, or to preserve the memory of, a person who 
has committed sati. 
Section 5 lays down punishment for glorification of sati. 
Thus whoever does any act for the glorification of sati 
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which 
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shall not be less than one year but which may extend to 
seven years and with fine which shall not be less than 
five thousand rupees but which may extend to thirty 
thousand rupees The mandatory provision for a minimum 
punishment of one year and a fine of five thousand rupees 
is in keeping with the standard practice in respect of 
5 
socio-economic offences. 
GLORIFICATION AS A CORRUPT ELECTORAL PRACTICE 
Along with the Sati (Prevention) Act, 1987 for the 
more effective prevention of the commission of sati and 
its glorification, the Parliament also took serious note 
of politicians' participation in the chunri mahotsava . It 
deprecated the tendency of illiterate and ignorant 
masses and made a significant amendment in the electoral 
law also. 
7 
Therefore, Section 123(3B) was added to the R.P. 
Act, 1951 which prohibits the "propagation of the practice 
or the commission of sati or its glorification by a 
candidate or his agent or any other person with the 
consent of the candidate or his election agent for the 
furtherance of the prospects of the election of that 
candidate or for prejudicially affecting the election of 
any candidate". 
The Explanation to Section 123(3B) makes it clear 
that for the purposes of the above clause "sati" and 
"glorificatiort" in relation to sati shall have the 
meanings respectively assigned to them in the Commission 
of Sati (Prevention^ Act, 1987. 
Similarly, sub-clause(2) of Section 8 of the R.P. 
Act, 1951 lays down that a person convicted of any 
provisions of the Commission of Sati (Prevention) Act, 
1987 and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than six 
months shall be disqualified from the date of such 
conviction and shall continue to be disqualified for a 
further period of six years from the time of his release. 
CONCLUSION 
Needless to say the sati (1987) Act has had a 
salutory effect and was a right step in the right 
direction. The fact that the glorification itself is made 
an offence hits at the root of the problem. Why should a 
crime against human life and dignity be at all 
glorified and whoever mistakenly did so, was liable to 
correction? Also, the abetment to commit sati has been 
/Should 
pronounced an offence, which^take care of enthusiasm, if 
any, to cajole a lady into committing the inhuman deed on 
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herself. Further, the R.P. Act has also been amended so 
that politicians itching for vote bank advantage may feel 
the designation of their acts as a 'corrupt practice', a 
dampner on their political activities. 
;^es--a 
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CHJVPTER - XI 
PUBLICATION OF FALSE STATEMENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
"A political campaign is always an interesting 
happening in the political life of nation ... In India a 
political campaign is an unusually fascinating spectacle, a 
kind of national festival or tamasha that extends froin the 
remotest village to the centres of pov/er in New Delhi . It 
involves larger number of people than any other national 
activity". All sorts of campaigning techniques are used 
by the political parties to highlight their policies and 
programmes through election manifestoes, pamphlets, 
speeches and catchy slogans. Generally such debates and 
discussions are followed by sharp criticism of the 
personalities and policies of their rival candidates and 
their parties. Sometimes such criticisms are based on 
false statements and they even touch the personal 
character and conduct of rival candidates. The question, 
therefore, is whether, such campaign will go unnoticed and 
untouched in the garb of freedom of speech and expression. 
It is under this background that clause (4) of 
Section 123 has been enacted to lay down the permissible 
limits within v/hich political campaigning may take place. 
The purpose of the present chapter is to see the judicial 
4 2 7 
interpj-etation of the provision in dilfc:e:,i fact-
situations. 
PROVISION UNDER THE ACT 
The statutory provision V7hich limits the scope of 
political campaigning is clause (4) of Section 123 
according to v/hich false statements touching the 
personality of a candidate comes under the rubric of 
corrupt practice. The provision reads as follov.'s : 
"The publication by a candidate or his agent, 
or by any other person with the consent of a 
candidate or his election agent, of any 
statement of fact which is false, and v.hich 
he either believes to be false or does not 
believe to be true, in relation to the 
personal character or conduct of any 
candidate, or in relation to the 
candidature, or withdrawal, of any 
candidate, being a statement reasonably 
calculated to prejudice the prospects of 
that candidate's election". 
Thus, inorder to make out the charge of corrupt practice 
under sub-section (4), the election petitioner has to show 
that (i) the impugned statement of facts V75s published by 
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a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the 
consent of the candidate or his agent, (ii) that the 
statement was false and which the maker either believes to 
be false or does not believe it to be true, (iii) that the 
statement relates to the personal character of a candidate 
and (iv) that the statement was reasonably calculated to 
prejudice the prospects of the other candidate's election. 
All the aforesaid ingredients are to be established before 
an election petitioner can succeed on the charge of 
2 
corrupt practice under Section 123 (4). 
SCOPE OF THE PROVISION 
The Supreme Court elaborately analysed the scope of 
3 the sub-section in Sheopal Singh V Ram Pratap. Subba Rao, 
J., speaking for the Court on behalf of himself and 
Hidayatullah, J., observed : 
The Sub-section is designed to achieve this 
dual purpose, namely, freedom of speech and 
prevention of malicious attack on personal 
character or conduct, etc., of rivals. The 
purity of an election is sought to be 
maintained without affecting the freedom of 
4 
expression. 
The learned judge continued : 
The Sub-section prohibits any statement of 
fact in relation to personal character or 
conduct of any candidate, which is not only 
false but also the candidate making it 
either believes it to be false or does not 
believe it to be true. It implies that a 
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statment of fact relating to the personal 
character or conduct, etc., of a candidate 
can be made, if it is true. Even if it is 
false, the candidate making it is 
protected, unless he makes it believing it 
to be false or not believing it to be true, 
that is to say statements which are not 
true made boria fide are also outside the 
ambit of the provision. To be within the 
mischief of sub-section (4) of Section 123 
of the Act such a statement shall satisfy 
another test, namely, it shall be a 
statement reasonably calculated to 
prejudice the prospects of the election of 
the candidate against whom it is made. 
Hov7ever, the Supreme Court also made it clear that the 
"boundary between personal character and conduct and 
public character and conduct is well drawn, though, 
sometimes, it is thin. Sometimes a statement may appear to 
touch both, the candidate's personal as well as public 
character. But a deeper scrutiny enables a court to 
ascertain whether there is a reflection on his personal 
character or on his public character". 
It was under this background that the Supreme Court 
in the instant case proceeded to examin the poster which 
was at issue under Section 123 (4). The contents of the 
poster are thus : 
"Bounties of the cement of the Rajasthan 
Canal Cinema of seven lakhs in Ganga-
nagar and magnificient kothis in the 
neighbour-hood of Jaipur's Rajmahal ... 
Give proof of bravery, modesty and 
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selflessness by giving vote to Sheopal Singh 
Makkasar who would bravely sacrifice 
himself for the glory and prestige of 
Hanumangarh..." 
Counsel for the appellant, Sheopal Singh, contented 
that the poster did not overstep the limits of reasonable 
criticism of the opposite candidate, Ramchandar Chowdhry, 
and that it said only generally that under the Congress 
rule many corrupt practices were going unheeded and that 
if the appellant was elected he would rectify the defects 
and restore the glory and prestige of Hanumangarh. 
The Supreme Court held that the vernacular word for 
"bounties" is "barkatain". The first paragraph of the 
poster meant that the cinema theatre of Rs.7 lakhs in 
Ganganagar was the barkat of the cement of the Rajasthan 
Canal. That meant by misappropriating the cement of the 
Rajasthan Canal the cinema theatre worth Rs.7 lakhs was 
built. Ex facie the poster did not say who misappropriated 
the cement and to whom the cinema belonged. But the words 
in the context of the well known facts could reasonably 
lead only to one inference, the Court opined. At the 
crucial time, Ramchandar Chov;dhry was the Minister in 
charge of the Rajasthan Canal Project. During the election 
at Ganganagar a cinema theatre knovm as Adarsh Theatre was 
431 
being built up. It was admitted by the appellant and his 
agent that the theatre referred to in the poster was the 
Adarsh Theatre and it belonged to Ramchander and his sons. 
In the context, therefore, the Supreme Court concluded 
that it was manifest that the poster meant to convey the 
idea that Ramchander misappropriated the cement of 
Rajasthan Canal, of which.he was incharge and built a big 
theatre in the name of his sons. That was to say the act 
of misappropriation was in clear terms attributed to 
Ramchander. 
The Court held: 
To make a statement that a minister has mis-
appropriated the cement in his charge and 
built a theatre from out of the proceeds is 
certainly a reflection on his personal 
character and conduct? 
Regarding the question whether the said statement 
V7as reasonably calculated to prejudice the prospects of 
Ramchander's election, the Court held that "the object 
vi?ith which the statement was made is the crucial test". 
Here it was established that Ganganagar cinema theatre 
belonged to Ramchander's sons. It was proved that 
Ramchander was the Minister in charge of the Rajasthan 
Canal. He was the only effective candidate against the 
appellant. The appellant's intention in making that 
statement was therefore obvious and that was to attack the 
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personal character of Ramchander in order to prejudice his 
prospects in the election. 
Subba Rao.J,concluded: 
An election is the expression of a popular 
will. It shall be so conducted that the 
popular will shall be reflected on the 
basis of the policy of the party which 
thecandidate represents. That object cannot 
be achieved unless freedom of speech is 
assured at the election and the merits and 
demerits of a candidate, personal as well 
as political, are prominently brought to 
the notice of the voters in the 
constituency. At the same time it shall not 
be allowed to generate a vilification 
Crtii.paign aimed at bringing down the personal 
character or conduct, etc., of the candidate 
without any basis whatsoever? 
The above discussion shows that in order to bring a 
statement under the mischief of Clause (4), an important 
ingredient is that the statement shall be made in 
relation to the personal character or conduct of another 
candidate v/hich is reasonably calculated to prejudice the 
prospects of the election of the candidate against whom it 
is made. 
MEANING OF PERSONAL CHARACTER OR CONDUCT 
The Supreme Court considered the meaning of the 
expression" personal character or conduct" in its two 
earlier pronouncements, namely, T.K. Ganqi Reddy V.M.C. 
Anjaneya Reddy and Inder Lai V Lai Singh. In the former 
433 
Subba Rao, J., speaking for the Court observed : 
The words "personal character or conducf'are 
so clear that they do not require further 
elucidation or definition. The character of 
a person may ordinarily be equated with his 
mental or moral nature. Conduct cannotes a 
person's actions or behaviourl^ 
In this case the appellant was elected to Mysore 
Legislative Assembly. The respondent called in question 
the election of the appellant by an election petition on 
various grounds. One of the grounds was that two leaflets 
(exhibits P-3 and P-4) were published and circulated 
either by or at the instance of the appellant with false 
allegations attacking the personal character and conduct 
of the respondent and, therefore, the election was void 
under Section 100 (i) (b) of the Act. The exhibits 
contained statements relating to instigation of murder and 
throwing of stones at public meetings by the respondent. 
The Court held that a statement which attributes 
acts of violence (e.g., instigation of murder, throv;ing of 
stones at public meetings) to a candidate even though such 
acts are done during his poolitical career is a statement 
relating to the personal character and conduct of the 
candidate, and if such statements are published a few days 
before the polling, such statement must be held to be 
reasonably calculated to prejudice the prospects of that 
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candidate's election, and the candidate publishing such 
statement would be guilty of a corrupt practice within the 
meaning of Section 123(4) of the Act. While dismissing the 
appeal, Subha Rao, J., observed: 
What is more damaging to a person's character and 
conduct than to state that he instigated a murder 
and that he was guilty of violent acts in his 
political career.We,therefore, have no hesitation 
in holding that the allegations in the two leaf lets, 
exhibitis P-3 and P-4, are in relation to the 
personal character and conduct of the 
respondent. 
14 In Inder Lai V Lai Singh, the Supreme Court through Gajendra-
gudkar, J., once again adverting to this aspect, observed: 
In discussing the distinction between the private 
character and the public character, sometimes 
reference is made to the "man beneath the 
politician" and it is said that if a statement of 
fact affects the man beneath the politician it 
touches private character and if it affects the 
politician, it does not touch his private 
character. 
After referring to the statements which affect the public and 
the private character of a person, the Court proceeded to 
state: 
But there may be cases on the borderline where 
the false statement may affect both the 
politician and the man beneath the 
politician and it is precisely in dealing with 
cases on the boderline that difficulties 
are experienced in determining whether the 
impugned false statement constitutes a 
corrupt practice or not. 
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The Court also observed that in dealing with such 
border-linecases under Section 123(4), a working line 
would have to be drawn to distinguish private character 
from public character and "it may also have to be borne 
in mind that in some cases, the false statement may affect 
17 both the private and the public character as well". 
In the instant case the election petition was filed 
by the appellant challenging the validity of the election 
of respondent No.l, Lai Singh. The point at issue was the 
pamphlet issued by the respondent on the eve of election. 
The relevant portion in the pamphlet to which objection 
was taken by the appellant reads thus:-
"Enemy of Democracy. Agent of the foreigners 
strangling the freedom of Bharat,... (6) 
Purchaser of the opponents of the Congress 
by means of Money". 
The Supreme Court did not accept the contention of the 
respondent that impugned pamphlet may be "extravagant, 
unreasonable and false, it is nevertheless criticism made 
against him in his public and political character and as 
such. Section 123(4) cannot be invoked". 
Gajendragadkar, J., observed that in order that the 
elections should be free, it is necessary that the 
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electrorate should be educated on political issues 
in a fearless manner and so, the Legislature, thought that full 
and ample scope should be left for free and fearless 
criticism by candidates against the public and political 
character of their opponents. However, according to the 
laearned Judge: 
But the position with regard to the private 
or personal character of the candidate is 
very different. Circulation of false 
statements about the private or personal 
character of the candidate during the period 
preceding elections is likely to work 
against the freedom of election itself in as 
much as the effect created by false 
statements cannot be met by denials in 
proper time and so the constituency has to 
. be protected against the circulation of such 
false statements which are likely to affect 
the voting of the electors. That is why it 
is for the protection of the Constituency 
against acts which would be fatal to the 
freedom of election that the statute 
provides for the inclusion of the 
circulation of false statements concerning 
the private character of a candidate amongst 
corrupt practices. Dissemination of false 
statements about the personal character of a 
candidate thus constitutes a corrupt 
practice. •'•° 
The Supreme Court reversed the finding of the Rajasthan 
High Court that the publication of the impugned pamphlet 
does not constitute a corrupt practice under Section 
123(4). The appeal was allowed and the election of 
respondent No.l was set aside. 
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In a later pronouncement in G.S. Baliram Jivatode V 
19 Vithalrao, ' the apex court through Hegde, J., 
re-emphasised the above discussed propositions by saying 
that the election law in this country as in England 
guarantees, freedom of criticism of political nature at 
the time of elections. It is in the interest of democracy 
that such criticism should be allowed. "A political 
party's reputation is not built on shifting sands. It has, 
at any rate, it should have, firmer foundation and should not 
20 be affected by passing winds" 
The learned judge further observed : 
But in the case of individuals a different 
approach is necessary. A campaign of slander 
is likely to create prejudice in the mind of 
the people against him... Democracy will be 
a farce if interested persons are allowed to 
freely indulge in character assassination 
during election... Every false alleqation 
does not come within the mischief of Section 
123(4). When any false allegation of fact 
pierces the politician, and touches the 
person of the candidate then Section 123(4) 
is contravened.(21) 
Thus it would be seen that the object of the 
provision is to protect the constituency against 
circulation of false statements about the private and 
personal character of the candidate during the period 
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preceding election in such manner as to leave the 
opportunity to the other side to meet it by denials in 
proper times. That indicates that the proximity of the 
date of publication to the date of election would be a 
relevant consideration in considering whether the 
publication is such as would reasonably be calculated to 
prejudice the prospects of that candidate. 
NATURAL AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCE TEST 
As already noted in Sheopal Singh-, the sub-section 
prohibits any statement of fact in relation to the 
personal character or conduct of any candidate, which is 
not only false but also the candidate making it either 
believes it to be false or does not believe it to be true. 
To come within the mischief sub-section (4) of Section 123 
of the Act such a statement has to satisfy another test, 
namely, it shall be a statement reasonably calculated to 
prejudice the prospects of the election of the candidate 
against whom it is made. 
The meaning of the expression, "being a statement 
reasonably calculated to prejudice the prospects of that 
candidate's election", was considered in detail by a 
Division Bench of the Maharashtra High Court in D.N. Pati] 
22 V D.N. Khanvilkar. It observed: 
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In our opinion... the Legislature having in 
its vdsdom used the expression "calculated" and not 
"designed" or "intended", it would be 
reasonable to hold that what is provided in 
sub-section (4) is that the publication of 
false statement of fact relating to the 
personal character and conduct must be such 
as would in the estimation of the court, 
having regard to the nature of the 
publication, evidence tendered in court and 
the surrounding circumstanceses as have its 
natural and probable consequence of 
pre judicing the prospects of the candidate 
relating to whose personal character or 
conduct the publication has been made.23 
Thus, as per decision of the High Court, in defining 
corrupt practice, the emphasis is not so much on the 
intention of publisher of a false statement of fact 
relating to the personal character or conduct of a 
candidate, but the emphasis is on the probable consequence 
of prejudicing the prospects of the candidate by such a 
publication/ in other words, whatever, be the intention of 
a publisher if the natural and probable consequences of 
the publication of a false statement relating to the 
personal character or conduct be of prejudicing the minds 
of the voters, the election cannot be said to be a free 
one. The High Court also h^ld that in order to determine 
the effect of - the impact of the publication left on the 
mind of the voters the testing time would be the time of 
casting their votes. Similarly, the Court also specified 
the relevant circumstances which would have a bearing on 
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the determination of the impact of publication. The Court 
would, in the first instance, ash the question what is the 
reaction on the candidate himself of the publication? Does 
he think that it is likely to prejudice his prospects or 
does he not think so? Has he published any contradiction? 
VJhat is the reaction of his election agent and the 
supporters of the candidate? what have they done in this 
matter? What is the proximity of the date of the 
publication to the date of election? What is the nature of 
24 the allegations contained m the publication? The Court 
V70uld, however, not blindly accept the candidate's or his 
election agent's evidence that it affected or prejudiced 
his prospects, or blindly accept the statement of the 
publisher that it did not prejudice the prospects of the 
candidate relating to whom the publication has been made. 
According to the Court, they would, in the circumstance, 
be admissions in their own favour. But the admission or 
the statement of the candidate relating to whom the 
publication has been made or his election agent which 
would go to show that he or his election agent did not 
consider the statement to be such as v>7as likely to effect 
his prospects at the election, would certainly be relevant 
factors, it being an admission against his interest or 
conduct which would be relevant because it is an admissior 
made against his ov;n interest, the court further opined. 
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All these circumstances will be material and relevant 
consideration in deciding the issue as to whether a 
particular publication would reasonably be calculated to 
25 prejudice the' prospects of that candidate. 
Thus a statement that the candidate had colluded 
with the mine owners and thereby sacrificed the interest 
of the labourers for his selfish ends and that he had 
opened at several places gambling and drinking dens and 
encouraged goondaism and that he had collected by 
unfairmeans property worth Rs.40,000/- were held by the 
M.P. High Court in Shanti Swaroop V Abdul Rehman to be a 
statement reasonably calculated to prejudice the prospects 
of that candidate's election. On the other hand, a 
statement imputing rough nature and abusive language to a 
candidate, even though it was a statement relating to the 
personal character of the candidate was not held to be 
violative of Section 123 (4) as it was not a statement 
affecting the prospects of such candidate in the 
27 
election. "Rough nature in a certain candidate may be 
taken by the voters as an asset to him in his political 
life and when it is said about a candidate that he is 
well known for using abusive language it cannot be said 
that the chances of such a candidate for election are in a 
28 
way pre j udi ced". 
442 
In defining corrupt practices, the emphasis is not 
so much on the intention of a publisher of a false 
statement of fact relating to the personal character or 
conduct of a candidate but on the probable consequence of 
prejudicing the prospects of the candidate by such 
29 publication. 
SOME MORE INSTANCES OF PERSONAL AND POLITICAL CHARACTER 
I) Allegation of Low Moral Character 
In a leading case on the point, namely, D.K.Barooah 
30 V G.C. Baruah the appellant was declared elected to the 
Assam Legislative Assembly in 1967. G.C. Baruah, one of 
the respondents, filed an elecion petition challenging the 
election of the appellant on various grounds, including a 
charge that false statements about the personal character 
and conduct of the respondent had been published with the 
consent of the appellant. A leaflet in Assamese had been 
published in which it was stated : 
(I) That Golok Chandra Baruah after "rolling from 
several colleges" failed to pass the I.A. examination...; 
(II) That in 1952 the Congress Party refused to 
nominate him, as in the 1942 Movement he helped the 
British and revolted; 
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(III) That during his tenure as the Chairman of the 
Municipality, several thousand rupees were taken away from 
the Treasury unlawfully on signatures resembling those of 
his signatures. The matter was pending for hearing; 
(IV) That when a huge amount of money withdrawn 
from the National Savings was misapprpriated the 
GovernmentExaminer of Accounts declared Golok Chandra 
alone as guilty; 
(V) That on account of corruption in the 
Municipality alone the then Head Cleark of his time had to 
commit suicide; 
(VI) That one night like a drunkard he went to the 
house of Dr. B.K. Guha, and not finding him behaved with 
his wife and daughter unmannerly. After that assualted 
Dr. Guhawith shoes in presence of many persons ... 
The appellant contended before the Supreme Court 
that the statements in the leaflet did not relate to the 
personal character and conduct of the respondent and those 
V7hich did were proved to be true so that Section 123 ( 4) 
was not attracted. The Court found that the respondent did 
move from one college to another. Bhargava, J., speaking 
for the Court on behalf of himself and Sikri,J., held: 
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In an aelection, it is always open to a can-
didate to show that his rival candidate 
islacking in knowledge, in education and is 
not capable of managing the affairs properly 
in any public body^l 
Itwas found that the respondent in fact moved from one 
college to another and therefore the learned judge 
observed : 
May be, that there is a slight exaggeration 
when the leaflet mentions that he rolled 
from several colleges; but such an 
exaggeration is quite natural on occasions 
when canvassing is going on for an 
election... He failed to pass because he did 
not appear at the examination"32 
Regarding the nomination, the finding of the High 
Court was that in 1942 the respondent was in government 
service working as a clerk and it was only later on after 
1943 that he actively participated in the business of his 
brothers of taking military contracts for the British. In 
this connection the Supreme Court held : 
The trend of the evidence, however, shows 
that his brothers had been carrying on the 
Military contract business even earlier than 
1943... it appears to be quite likely that, 
even before he actually resigned government 
service and joined the business of his 
brother, he may have been assisting them, so 
that the allegation that he helped the 
British in 1942 movement by taking Military 
Contracts Cannot be said to be a false 
statement; at best, there may be a slight 
error about the period during which he did 
that work. Again, the aspect that he was 
helping the British by taking military 
contracts relates to a reflection on his 
political conduct in siding with the ,g>ritish 
Government rather than joining the Congress 
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which was carrying on a movement against the 
British for achieving independence of this 
country. It was in this background that his 
activities were described by using the word 
"Deshdrohita" in the pamphlet.33 
This expression "Deshdrohita", too, in the opinion 
of the Supreme Court, was used to describe the nature of 
his activities which in fact related to the political 
situation at that time. 
As regards respondent's administration of the 
municipality, the Court held that the impression that 
would be expected to be created was that his 
administration as Chairman was so unsatisfactory that 
corruption and chaos prevailed in the affairs of the 
municipality; it was not stated that the respondent 
himself was corrupt. The imputation was only that he was 
not a good administrator and was not intended to convey to 
the voters any reflection on the personal character of 
the respondent. 
It was also found in the auditor's report that the 
respondent alone was responsible for the loss of money 
withdrawn from the National Savings which occurred during 
his tennure of office. The Supreme Court observed : 
It is true that this statement, to some 
extent, reflects on the personal character 
of respondent No. 1 inasmuch as it stated 
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that he was held responsible for the mis-
appropriated money; but, that being in 
true fact, its application has rightly 
been held by the High Court not to amount 
to corrupt practice. 
Similarly, the Supreme Court accepted the finding of 
the High Court that the respondent had visited Dr. Guha's 
house and had misbehaved with the latter and his family. 
The allegation regarding suicide was found by the Supreme 
Court to be substantially but not literally true, as the 
suicide was committed not "at that time" when the respondent 
was Chairman but after he had tendered his resignation. 
However, it was noted that the opportunity for the Head 
Clerk to misappropriate the money occured only because an 
order which had been passed earlier by the respondent while 
he was Chairman of the municipality. It was observed: 
In these circumstances, it has to be held that 
the allegation made in this clause is also 
substantially correct. The allegation was 
intended to convey that there was corruption 
in the Municipality at the time when 
respondent No.l was the Chairman and that it 
was so has been found to be true. There was no 
suggestion ... that respondent No.l himself 
was corrupt and that the suicide was the 
result of his personal corruption. Thus, this 
part of the leaflet also cannot constitute 
35 
corrupt practice ... 
Finally, as regards the two words "Deshdrohita" and 
Vishwasghatika" used in the pamphlet, the Court held that 
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these words had been used in the context of facts on the 
basis of which the writer of the leaflet thought that 
respondent No.l had been guilty of "Deshdrohita" and 
Vishwasqhatika". "It is therefore, really an expression of 
opinion about respondent No.l based on facts. These words 
do not themselves connote any statement of fact which can 
be said to be false, the Court observed . 
The Court also discussed and distinguished the 
cases referred to by the learned counsel for the 
respondent. The first case relied on was the decision of 
the Supreme Court in Kumara Nand V Brijmohan Lai 
37 Sharma. where in apoem the candidate was described as 
the "greatest of all thieves." The Court had held that 
this description was not a mere opinion and that, when the 
candidatewas called the greatest of all thieves, a 
statement of fact was being made as to his personal 
character and conduct. 
Distinguishing the two cases, Bhargava, J. held 
that there were tV70 features which distinguished that case 
from the present one. First, a statement that a person was 
a thief clearly imputed to him moral depravity while 
statments saying that he had committed "Deshdrohita or 
"Vishwasqhatika" only reflected on his conduct in the 
political field and did not bring in any element of moral 
depravity. Secondly, in that case, no facts were 
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qiven from v.'hich an inference might have been pc-.:c:.t to be 
drav7n that the candidate was the greatest of all thieves, 
while, in the present case, objectionable words had been 
used after giving the facts, on the basis of which it was 
held that the conduct of respondent No.l had been 
undesirable so as to be described as "Deshdrohita" and 
Vishwasghtika". 
Reference was also made to the decision of the 
•30 
Supreme Court in Mohan Singh V Bhanwarilal where it was 
held that the leaflet in question clearly implied that the 
candidate had misappropriated the fund collected by him, 
and this was held to be a statement of fact constituting a 
corrupt practice under Section 123 (4) of the Act. In that 
case, again, Bhargava, J., observed, the imputation v.'as of 
a nature that affected the personal character of the 
candidate indicating that he had been dishonest in 
misappropriating money, while, in the case before us, no 
such facts have been found. 
In the opinion of the Supreme Court, thus, it was 
quite clear that the words "Deshdrohita" and 
"Vishwasghatika" had been used in the leaflet only to 
bring into light the conduct of respondent No.l v.'hich was 
adverse to the policies of the Congress and, at one stage 
against the interests of the country. The Court,however, 
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was of opinion that, "Possibly, milder words could have 
been used to describe his conduct on those occasions, but 
even the uses of strong words is not very unnatural at the 
39 time of elections". 
Upholding the principles laid down in Kultar Singh 
in construing the documents like the present leaflet the 
Court concluded: 
nt] would be clear that the words that were 
used, though harsh, were not such as to lead 
the voters to think that respondent No.l had 
a low moral character.^^ 
^ * 
II. Describing Opponent as Obnoxious Person 
In a an appeal before the Supreme Court in Om 
41 Prakash V Lai Chand, against the judgment and order of 
the High Court of Punjab and Haryana dismissing the 
election petition of the appellant, counsel for the 
appellant contended that respondent Lai Chand was guilty 
of corrupt practices mentioned in sub-Section (4). The 
poster on which the appellant relied on was to the 
following effect: 
"Appeal to the voters ..." 
Just after one year election is being held... The 
deeds of Om Prakash are well known to the publlic. 
Under the auspices of his father Ch.Devi Lai he had 
been indulging in smuggling and today he is asking 
4r>o 
for votes in the name of his father. I hope the 
people will show the face of defeat to such an 
obnoxious person... " . 
The Supreme Court observed that the appeal left no room 
for doubt that there were allegations against the personal 
character and conduct of the appellant Om Prakash who was 
described as "having been indulging in smuggling", besides 
being described as an "obnoxious" person. The statment was 
held to be in relation to the personal character and 
conduct of the appellant and the same was calculated to 
prejudice the prospects of the appellant's election. For 
such reasons the Court held that respondent Lai Chand was 
guilty of corrupt practice under Section 123 (4) of the 
Act. 
III. Describing Opponent as Menace to the Society. 
The petitioner's allegations against the appellant 
in J.S.B. Jivatode V Vithalrao was that he was responsible 
for the publication of a poem and a leaflet containing 
statement of facts which were false and which he either 
believed to be false or did not believe to be true in 
relation to the personal character and conduct of the 
first respondent. 
The various statements contained in the pamphlets 
are summarised thus: 
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"(a) (The petitioner) has imposed the toll tax on 
poor citizenon their bullock-carts through his selfish and 
bogus companion Shankarrao Deshmukh/ President of Rajura 
Municipality, which has caused undue suffering to every 
poor citizen... 
(b) Vithalrao Dhote has only secured advantage for Abid 
Husain, contractor, by imposing the burden of paying for 
the border stones which were compulsorily ordered to be 
fixed. 
(c) In this taluk no cultivator has been able to 
get taccavi without payment of bribe and Vithalrao is 
unable to prevent it. 
(d) Vithalrao has solely protected the interest of the 
contractors and neglected the poor citizen and on that 
account Vithalrao has forfeited confidence of poor persons 
in Rajura taluk. 
(e) The poor population is simply harassed and I have 
found that the inclination of the people is against 
Vithalrao v/hen I went around in the village. 
(f) Poor persons are simply harassed on account of 
exploitation and ruin caused by Vithalrao solely for the 
benefit of his selfish bogus companions. 
(g) Person (meaning the petitioner) who is menace to the 
majority of thecommunity and poor persons must be sacked 
from the office is my first conviction". 
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The Supreme Court held that none of the 
aforementioned allegations could be held to relate to the 
personal character or conduct of the first respondent. 
They were undoubetedly "criticism, true , false or 
exaggerated, of the first respondent's role as a 
politician. Those statements did not make any reflection 
on the moral or mental qualities of the first 
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respondent". A Congressman was the President of the 
Rajura Municipality at the time tolls were reimposed. It 
might be that the first respondent had no hand in the 
matter of reimposition of the tolls and that the 
accusation that he got it reimposed was not true but that 
in no manner could be said to reflect on the personal 
conduct and character of othe first respondent. Similarly, 
the Court held, the accusation that the first respondent 
secured advantage for Abid Husain by imposing a burden on 
the land-owners by making them pay for the boundary stones 
could not be said to reflect on the private character of 
the first respondent whether the statement in question was 
true or false. The appellant had a right to hold the first 
respondent responsible for the actions of the Government 
as he was a member of the party in power. The allegation 
that no cultivator had been able to get taccavi loans 
without payment of bribe and that first respondent was 
unable to prevent it, was undoubtedly a legitimate 
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criticism. The allegation that he solely protected the 
interests of the contractor and ignored that of the poor 
citizens and on that account he had forfeited the 
confidence of the poor persons in his constituency was an 
expression of opinion, whether the same was true or not. 
The allegation that the poor population was simply 
harassed and that the signatory to thepamphlet found that 
the inclination of othe people against the first 
respondent when he went around in the village, was merely 
an opinion and not a statement of fact. Similarly, the 
allegation that the poor persons were being harassed on 
account of the exploitation and ruin caused by the first 
respondent solely for the benefit of his selfish and bogus 
companions was an expression of an opinion and it was a 
permissible criticism in a political debate. The assertion 
that the first respondent was a menace to the majority as 
also to the poor and therefore he must be sacked from the 
office was as stated in the pamphlet itself, was purported 
to be the conviction of the person who issued the 
statement. He was entitled to hold that opinion and 
propagate it. 
The Supreme Court reiterated that "it is not a 
corrupt practice to say sometime v;hich may be severe about 
another person, nor which may be unjustifiable 
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nor v.'hich may be derogatory unless it 
amounts to a false statement of fact in relation to his 
44 personal character and conduct" . It was unfortunate, the 
Supreme Court observed, that the High Court exclusively 
focussed its attention on the question whether or not the 
appellant caused to get Exhibits in question printed and 
published and completely ignored the true effect of the 
statements contained therein. It proceeded on the 
erroneous impression that every false or unjustified 
criticism of a candidate amounted to a contravention of 
Section 123(4) . 
The Court through Hegde J. concluded: 
It must be remembered that during election 
time passions are roused; election 
propaganda should not be tested by the 
standards to be adopted in a debate carried 
on by intellectuals. It may be that many of 
the charges levelled against a candidate as 
regards his political past or about his 
capacity to be a useful representative are 
not ture. It is for the electorate to judge 
those accusations. Solong as those 
accusations do not affect the personal 
character or conduct of " the candidate, the 
election law will not take note of them. 
That is why it is said that a politician 
must be thick - skinned and more so at the 
election time. 
In this case the appeal was allowed and the 
verdict of the Bombay High Court was set aside by the 
Supreme Court mainly on two grounds. Firstly, the High 
Court failed to examine the effect of the statement 
455 
contained in Exhibits 55 and 56 by the tests prescribed in 
Section 123(4). Further, there was no proof in this case 
that the statements contained in the tvjo exhibits were 
reasonably calculated to prejudice the election of the 
respondent. The trial court did not give any finding to 
that effect. 
IV. Charge of Misappropriation of Workers' Fund 
The contention of the appellant Mangilal before the 
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Supreme Court in Mangilal V Krishnaji Rao Pawar was that 
a few speakers at an election meeting where Krishnaji Rao, 
respondent No.l, was present, made certain observations 
relating to the personal character and conduct of the 
former, which the speakers and the returned candidate 
either believed to be false or did not believe it to be 
true. It was alleged that the statements were reasonably 
calculated to prejudice the appellant's prospects of 
election. 
The charges were mainly about the alleged 
misappropriation by the appellant ofworkers' subscription tc 
the Mazdoor Sangh. For example: 
"Appeal to remain careful of the mi^ppropriator of 
mill workers' subscription, corrupt candidate 
Mangilal Joshi". 
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Similar statements were published in a weekly 
called 'Ranchandi'. The finding of the trial court was 
that the appellant had failed to prove that the impugned 
statements were false or were either believed to be false 
or not believed to be true by the speakers and the 
returned candidate. This conclusion was arrived at in the 
background of the fact that the criminal complaint had 
been filed against the appellant by one Lai Singh, as far 
back as July, 1965 when he was the President of Dewas Mill 
Mazdoor Sangh and had held that office for the preceding 
9 years; several amounts relating to membership fee were 
stated to have been collected from the workers and the 
amount of several thousand rupeeswere neither 
depositedwith the Mazdoor Sangh Office nor entered in the 
related registers. Accepting the verdict of the Madhya 
Pradesh High Court, the Supreme Court through Dua, J., 
held that the "reasoningand approach of the High Court is 
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unexceptionable". The learned judge observed : 
It was principally on the basis of the 
pendency of this complaint that the High 
Court came to the conclusion that the 
appellanthad not discharged the onus of 
showing that the offending statements of 
facts were false and were believed by the 
returned candidate, the speakers at the 
meeting in question and the Editor of 
'Ranchandi'to be false or were not 
believed by them to be true. 
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It is to be noted here that the High Court had 
referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Sheopal 
49 Singh , which held that "even if the statement is false 
the candidate' making it is protected unless he makes it 
believing it to be false or not believing it to be true 
i.e. to say statements which are not true but made bona 
fide are also outside the ambit of the provisions of 
Section 123 (4) of the Act". Thereafter the High Court 
referred to the fact that the criminal complaint against 
the petitioner for having committed criminal 
misappropriation or criminal breach of trust was filed in 
1965 when the present bye-election was not even in 
contemplation. This very complaint was pending at the 
time of this bye-election in question. The filing of such 
complaint against the petitioner, the Supreme Court 
observed, was a notorious fact known to several persons of 
the area and subsequently the charge was framed against 
him on the same material. Hence the impugned statement was 
not founded on mere suspicion pure or simple nor was it 
the result of pure conjecture and guess. "It had positive 
basis and the basis subsequently proved to be prima facie 
correct, therefore, the impugned statement fell within the 
ambit of bona fide statement." 
45s 
V. Demand of Accounts of Fund 
Where amounts have been collected for any public 
purpose, asking the person collecting those amounts or 
those who were responsible for their collection, to give 
an account cannot amount to an imputation against their 
51 personal character. "Men in public life particularly 
those who collect monies for public or charitable purposes 
ought not to be sensitive when there is a demand to 
account for those amounts. Such a demand may hurt the 
vanity or the ego of the person from whom accounts are 
asked, but it is far from being an imputation against the 
52 personal character or conduct of the person concerned". 
Such a demand, in the opinion of the Court, would refer to 
the public conduct of the person who is liable to render 
accounts and does not amount to corrupt practice. In the 
instant case the Supreme Court, thus, accepted the verdict 
of the High Court that asking Dwivedi, the defeated 
candidate^ to render accounts in respect of the amounts 
collected for the cyclone and flood relief purposes was an 
expression of opinion and related to the public conduct 
and did not amount to any imputation against the personal 
character and conduct of the defeated candidate. 
VI. The Expression 'Brashtachari' 
One of the main allegations against the returned 
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candidate in Laxminarayan V Returning Officer was that 
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he used the expression bhrashtachari while speaking of one 
of the candidates at an election meeting. Counsel for the 
appellant argued that the said expression made out a 
corrupt practice under Section 123(4). Dwivedi, J., 
speaking for the Court, disagreed with the counsel and 
held: 
It is well to remember that it is one of 
those flourishes or hyperboles which are 
the common stock-in-trade of election 
speakers to exploit the emotions of the 
audience and to augument their popular 
support. Election speeches should be 
understood broadmindedly, not literally. 
Election speakers often do not mean what 
they say, and the audience generally does 
not take them by their words.^^ 
In the instant case the High Court had given a 
uniform meaning of 'corruption' to the word 'bhrashtachaii 
in the reported speech. The Supreme Court did not agree 
and held that it is well known that a person who takes 
liquor, etc. is even now regarded by the common folk in 
India as a 'bhrashtachari'. "So", the Court concluded, "it 
cannot be said that the aforesaid portion of Dhote's 
speech is susceptible of one and only one construction 
which will establish a corrupt practice. And Dhote cannot 
55 be put m peril on an ambiguity". 
The thin line between criticism of political 
activities and attack on personal character and conduct 
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appears to be blurred in some cases. One such case 
decided by the Supreme Court is Pratap Singh V Hardwari 
Lai. One of the posters mentioned that in the general 
elections of '1967, the respondent received in the form of 
garlands of currency notes, a large amount which he had 
promised to utilize for payment of fees to poor students 
and that the said amount had been misused. It was further 
stated that fees were being collected from the children of 
Haryana and instead of increasing the salaries of 
teachers, the respondent was enjoying himself in the Mount 
View Hotel at Chandigarh. The third statement was that the 
respondent started a weekly, 'Sentinel', and received 
subscription from people, but the publication stopped 
after a few months. Another poster contained an allegation 
that during an election the respondent who wore saffron 
gold clothes resigned his membership of the legislative 
Assembly, but nevertheless continued to be a Minister and 
the so-called resignation was merely a stunt to collect 
money. Another poster made certain general allegations 
about the respondent leaving the Congress and joining the 
Swatantra Party which was a party of rich Rajas and 
Maharajas and one could not be sure as to how long he 
would stick to that party. The Punjab and Haryana High 
Court had held that as these posters made insinuations that 
the respondent was not an honest and straight man, hence 
fied with the version of the High Court on 
n its opinion those statements related more 
cal status or reputations of the respondent 
Lan. In the words of Vaidialingam, J., who 
jment of the Court : 
these statements may err on the side 
jgeration, in our opinion they cannot 
ought under Section 123 (4) as 
ng to the personal character and 
t of the respondent. 
other hand, in the instant case, the Supreme 
some other allegations to fall within the 
Section 123 (4). For instance, a cartoon 
espondent in front of an almirah full of 
ss, faced by a large number of Swatantra 
lo were demanding from the respondent their 
ncial assistance. Rajaji, the founder of the 
rty, was shown as standing on one side in 
and bewilderment at the misconduct of the 
I appropriating to himself the funds provided 
by the Party. On one side of the cartoon was printed an 
appeal in the name of respondent to the Swatantra Party 
candidates. The appeal read as follows : 
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"... I am neither in any service nor am I 
practising as a lawyer. I have no source 
from which I can meet my monthly expenses 
of Rs.5,000/-.I roped in Swatantra Party 
with great difficulty ... In the next 4 
years I shall have to depend on this money. 
You are all young people. You can earn your 
livelihood anywhere elese ...". 
In the opinion of the Supreme Court the statements 
contained therein that there was a serious allegation that 
lacs of rupees of the Swatantra Party entrusted with the 
respondent, had been mis-appropriated by him and not given 
to other candidates. "We cannot but hold that the 
statements ... taken along with the cartoon, cast serious 
reflection upon the personal character and conduct of the 
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respondent". 
One hand bill with the caption "Do not vote for the 
corrupt" purported to have been issued by "indicators of 
correct path to the votes", alleged that the respondent 
was removed from Government service because he accepted 
bribes and that after becoming a member of the Public 
Service Commission he was removed from that position 
before the expiry of his term for the same reason and that 
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even after joining the Swatantra Party he had 
misappropriated the entire money of his comrades or 
colleagues. 
The Supreme Court accepted that the statement 
related to the personal character and conduct of the 
respondent. It was also found tht the statements were 
false and that the appellant could not have believed them 
to be true. "Those statements had been made by the 
appellant to prejudice the prospects of the respondent in 
the election". 
FALSE STATEMENT OF FACT AND NOT FALSE STATEMENT OF OPINION 
While discussing the scope of Section 123 (4), the 
courts have drawn a distinction between the two 
expressions, namely, false statement of fact and false 
statement of opinion. The former is covered by Section 123 
(4) while the latter is not. In order to come within the 
ambit of Section 123 (4), there must be a false statement 
of fact by a candidate or his agent which is made in 
relation to the personal character or conduct of any other 
candidate. Adverse criticism however severe, however 
undignified or illmannered, however regrettable it might 
be in the interest of purity and decency of public life, 
in relation to the political views, position, reputation 
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or action of a candidate, will not bring it within the 
mischief of the statute. The court in such matters cannot 
judge these statements in the light of their decency or 
desirability in so far as they are political statements 
not calculated to attack the personal character or conduct 
of any rival cndidate. Wht is objectionble is a false 
statement of fact, and not a false statement of opinion 
however unfounded or however unjustified•It is only when 
the person beneath the politician is thought to be 
assailed and his honour, integrity and vercity are 
challenged and such a statement is false that it can be 
said that a false statement of fact about his personal 
character and conduct is made; and once it is established 
that such a statement was made the question whether there 
was malice or not is immaterial. In ascertaining the \.rue 
nature of the statement made the court must take into 
consideration all the surrounding circumstances including 
the occasion when it was published or made, the person 
against whom it was made, the person publishing it or 
making it, the audience or readers to whom it was addressed 
as also the precautions or care taken by the publisher to 
verify the truth or otherwise of the statement 
challenged. Similarly, the Rajasthan High Court in 
Bhanwar Lai Vs Hari Prasad observed: To fall within the 
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mischief Section 123(4), a false statement need not 
necessarily be libellous under the ordinary law. It must, 
however, bear a definite relation to the personal 
character or conduct of the candidate as distinct from his 
public or political character. It must also be a false 
statement of fact as opposed to a false statement of 
opinion. In the instant case the appellant challenged the 
respondent's election on the ground tht he had committed 
various corrupt practices, including one under Section 
123(4) by the publication of a pamphlet in which the 
appellant was referred to as a 'dalal' (broker) of an 
impliedly dishonest Minister and was, in effect, alleged 
to have kept his mouth shut because of payment of money to 
him. It was contented that these amounted to statements of 
fact which were false and which the respondent believed to 
be false or did not believe to be true in relation to the 
personal charater or conduct of the appellant. The High 
Court held that the publication did not fall within the 
mischief of Section 123(4). 
Where a newspaper contained the statements, viz: 
(i) that the workers of the "Hut symbol" party (the Praja 
Socialist Party) have been so foolish as to threaten to 
shoot even Jawahar Lai Nehru, the great leader of India, 
(ii) that the Paraja Socialist Party is, by coming to an 
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understanding with the Muslim league, following the 
footsteps of Mir Jafar, Jaychand and Mohammad Ali Jinnah 
and making common cause with Pakistanis, and (iii) that to 
vote for such a party is to sell the country and nothing 
but treason. The Madhya Pradesh High Court in Sarla^Devi V 
Brindra Singh held that the first two statements did not 
relate to the personal character or conduct of the 
candidate or to his candidature, and the third was not a 
statement of fact but only an opinion and the statement 
did not fall within the ambit of Section 123(4). On the 
other hand, a false allegation that the petitioner had 
bribed government officials and got a false report from 
them is not a mere expression of opinion of a trivial or 
limited character but a serious • allegation about 
the personal character of the petitioner.^^ 
Recently the Supreme Court in G.Y. Kankarrao V 
Balasaheb Vikhe Patil observed that the statement of a 
proposal to take out a rally of 5,000 bicycles and then 
distribute the bicycles to the participants and the 
statement alleged to have been made of the likelihood of 
distribution of sarees, dhoties, liquor and cash in the 
constituency related to the future and were at best merely 
the expression of apprehension. It was not even suggested 
that such a rally or such distribution of the article was 
made by a candidate during the election campaign. That 
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means that it was at best an apprehension which did not 
materialise and, therefore, there was no reasonable 
likelihood of any impact thereof on the mind of the 
voters. This being so, the Court held, the expression of a 
mere apprehension which did not come true apart from not 
being a 'statement of fact", did not satisfy the other 
requirements of section 123(4). 
Similarly statements made in meetings which were 
only expression of opinion based on apprehension about the 
likely future conduct of a candidate (the election 
petitioner) or relating only to the candidate's political 
character do not fall within the ambit of Section 123(4) 
as none of them is a 'Statement of fact' relating to othe 
personal character and conduct of the candidate. 
STATEMENTS OF FACTS AND INFERENCES DRAWN FROM FACTS 
It the statements of facts mentioned in a 
publication are ture, a corrupt practice under Section 
123(4) is not committed, even though the publication 
contains certain inferences from those facts which may not 
be true or sound. It was stated int^^publication that 
Congressmen who were unsuccessful in getting the Congress 
ticket were seeking election against the Congress nominees 
and that "on account of selfish motives these people have 
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not only committed breach of faith against this 
institution but had also committed breach of faith with 
the public in general". It was admitted that the appellant 
had given a pledge to the Congress that she would not seek 
election even if she was not nominated by the Congress, 
but when she was not nominated she stood for election as 
an Independent candidate. The Allahabad High Court in 
fi7 
Savitri Devi V Prabhawati Misra held that as the main 
facts alleged were admitted and the other allegations were 
mere inferences from those facts and not statement of fact 
the publication did not come under Section 123(4). 
PUBLICTION OF STATEMENT 
1. Meaning of Publication 
Publication may be in writing, print or picture as 
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well as by word of mouth. Publication obviously refers 
to publication amongst the electors and some time may be 
published orally, for exmple, at meeting or announcement 
made otherwise such as by beat of drum, or in songs or by 
distributing leaflets and pamphlets. 
If the offending article appears in a paper, which 
is proved to have circulation and is read by the public, 
this would be sufficient publication in the eye of law to 
constitute corrupt practice, within the meaning of the 
4 6 H 
Act, provided it is also found that the said publication 
was at the instance or with the consent, of the candidate 
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or his election, agent. Even though the authorship of a 
pamphlet is not known if it contains false statements 
relating to the personal character of a candidate, and 
another candidate knowing that such statements are false, 
or not believing that they are true, reads it in a public 
meeting or circulates printed copies of it, the latter 
will be guilty of a corrupt practice under section 
123(4).''-•-
When the person against whom a false statement is 
said to have been made cannot be fixed up with certainty, 
it cannot be said that there was any publicati-s-n in 
relation to the personal character or conduct of any 
candidate. 
II. Publicat-ion with consent 
Under Section 100, the publication of a false 
statement as contenplated - in Section 123(4) will avoid the 
election only if it is by the returned candidate or his 
election agent or by any other person with the consent of 
the returned candidte or his election -^ gent If the 
publication was by person other than the candidate or his 
election agent, the consent of the candidate or his 
election agent must be established to substantiate the 
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cli.arge. Expoundina this provision, the Supreme Court in 
B.R. Rao V N.G. Ranqa observed: 
Mere commission of a corrupt practice is not 
sufficient; it is proof of consent of the 
commission of corrupt practice which 
requires the court to declare the election 
void. In the matter of publication of 
statements v;hich are false and are 
reasonably calculated to prejudice the 
prospects of the candidate's election, proof 
of consent not infrequently assumes great 
importance, for, even if it be proved that 
the publication has been made unless it is 
shown that it was with the consent of the 
candidate or ^ his election agent, the 
corrupt practicfe may not be held to be 
committed so as to invalidate the election. 
Cases of publication without authority or 
with a view to creating evidence by 
interested persons against the candidate who 
is likely to be successful are not unknown.73 
The consent, required under section 123(4) of the Act, may 
be express or implied. It can be implied or inferred from 
acts and conduct of the candidate or from other facts and 
circumstances. It is a question of fact in every case. 
Shah J. who wrote the judgment of the court gave two 
instances from which an inference of consent could be 
made: 
Prior knowledge of the contents and the kno-
wledge that it is likely to be published may 
raise inference of consent, if the candidate 
deliberately keeps quiet and does not stop 
the publication if it be within his power. 
VJhere the offending matter has already been 
published and thereafter it comes to the 
knowledge of the candidate at the election 
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and he does not take steps to repudiate it, the 
consent may not necessarily be inferred unless 
the candidate or his election agent permits or 
74 
aids in publication. 
In short, the consent of the candidate for the purposes 
of Section 123(4) when the offending statement of fact which is 
false is published by any other person may be proved by 
inference from the circumstances and not necessarily by positive 
evidence to that effect since positive evidence of consent may 
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not be available. 
III. Editor's Liability 
In order to fasten the liability for a newspaper editor's 
acts on a candidate, it is necessary to establish that the 
editor was acting as an agent of the candidate in connection 
with the election and that too with his consent. Mere action of 
the editor beneficial to the candidate is not enough to prove 
that he was acting as an agent in connection with the candidate's 
election, and even if it is proved that he was acting as an agent, 
for invalidating the election under section 100 it has further to 
76 be proved that he was doing so with the candidate' s consent. 
IV. Contribution to party fund 
Contribution by a candidate to the party fund in general 
relating to printing works, would not amount to consent on his 
part for publication of objectionable pamphlets by the party, 
unless the sum was ear-marked for the publication of such 
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objectionable pamphlets. A candidate set up by a party cannot be 
held responsible for all that the members of the party did in further-
ence of the interests of the party organisation as a whole, unless 
47 
the participation therein of the particular candidate or 
78 his agent expressly or by necessary implication is proved. 
V. Mens rea an essential ingredient 
79 The Supreme Court in Sheopal Singh observed that 
under section 123(4) of the Act mens rea is a necessary 
ingredient of the corrupt practice and the person who 
publishes a statement, whether he is the author of it or 
not does not commit a corrupt practice, unless he has the 
requisite knowledge. "The sub-section does not accept the 
doctrine of constructive knowledge. Justice Subba Rao 
who deliveredt the judgment of the court was replying to 
the argument that "publication with guilty knowledge under 
Section 123(4) of the Act is a composite act and it 
involes two elements, namely, (1) the statement of fact, 
and (2) its publication and therefore, all persons who 
take part in one or other of the said elements will be 
guilty of corrupt practice, even though some of them have 
and others do not have the guilty knowledge". If this 
statement be accepted, observed Subba Rao J., not only the 
person who makes a false statement of fact and gets it 
published through his servant, but his innocent servant 
who mechanically obeys the order of his master would be 
guilty of a corrupt practice. This contention was 
untenable, the learned judge observed. 
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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PROVISION 
The two provisions, namely. Sections 123(5) [(now 
r^ -and 124(5)[now 123(3)], 
123(4)] were challenged before the Supreme Court in Jamuna 
81 Prasad Mukhariya V. Lachhi Ram as ultra vires Article 19 
(1) (a) of the Constitution. It was contended that Article 
245 (1) prohibits the making of laws which violate the 
Constitution and that the impugned sections interfere with 
a citizen's fundamental right to freedom of speech. A 
five-Judge Bench negatived the contention. Bose J., 
speeking for the Court observed: 
These laws do not stop a man from speaking. 
They merely prescribe conditions which must 
be observed if he wants to enter Parliament. 
The right to stand as a candidate and 
contest an election is not a common law 
right. It is a special right created by the 
statute and can only be exercised in the 
conditions laid down by the statute. The 
Fundamental Right Chapter has no bearing on 
a right like this created by statute. The 
appellants have no fundamental right to be 
elected members of Parliament. If they want 
that, they must observe the rules. If they 
prefer to exercise their right of free 
speech outside these rules, the impugned 
sections do not stop them. We hold that 
these sections are intra vires,82 
Burden of Proof 
The general rule of burden of proof being on an 
election petitioner applies to the case of the corrupt 
practice under Section 123(4) as well. However, the 
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question of oburden of proof of this category of corrupt 
practice has some special features. They were elaborated 
by the apex Court in T.K. Gangi Reddy V M.C. Anjaneya 
83 
Reddy» Subba Rao, J., speaking for othe Court observed: 
Burden of proof has two distinct meanings, 
viz., (1) the burden of proof as a matter of 
law and pleading, and (11) the burden of 
proof as a matter of sdducina p\M'dpnrp 
Section 101 of the Evidence Act deals with the 
former and section 102 vi^ ith the letter .The first 
remains constant and the second shifts.°' 
The learned Judge further deliberated: 
In an election petition the burden of 
proving that certain statements alleged to 
have been published by the respondent were 
false and that the respondent believed them 
to be false ordid not believe them to be 
true is in the first sense, on the 
petitioner, but if the petitioner examines 
himself and states that he has not 
committed the alleged acts and proved 
circumstances indicating a motive on the 
part of the respondent to make false 
allegations against him, the court is 
entitled to accept his evidence, and if it 
does so, the onus would shift to the 
respondent to prove the circumstances if 
any to dislodge the assertions made by the 
petitioner; and if the respondent has 
failed to put before the court any facts to 
establish either that the petitioner did in 
fact commit the alleged acts of violence in 
the past or to give any other 
circumstances which made him bona fide 
believe that he was so guilty the court is 
entitled to say that the burden of proving 
the necessary facts had been discharged by 
the petitioner. ^ '^^ '^ ^ 
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From the aforesaid observation of Subba Rao, J., it is 
clear that the burden of proving that the impugned 
allegations of facts are false lies on the petitioner, and 
that burden, is discharged by the petitioner 
by examining himself and denying the alleged 
facts said to have been committed by him, and if the 
evidence of the petitioner is, in the circumstances, 
accepted by the Court, then the burden shifts on to the 
person publishing the statements to prove that the alleged 
facts are true, or to prove some other circumstances, 
which made him bona fide believe in these facts. 
Later in the case of Kumara Nand V Brijmohan Lai 
Sharma, it was again held by the Supreme Court that the 
onus to prove the charge of a corrupt practice under 
Section 123(4) was on the election petitioner, but the 
onus on him to prove that the maker of the statement 
believed it to be false or believed it not to be true, is 
very light and can be discharged by complaining candidate 
swearing to that effect; once that is done the burden 
shifts to the candidate making false statement of fact to 
show what was his belief. Wanchoo, J., speaking for the 
Court said: 
But though the onus is on the election 
petitioner to show all these things, the 
main things that the election petitioner has 
to prove are that such publication was made 
of a statement of fact and that that staterient is 
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false and is with respect to the personal 
character or conduct of the election 
petitioner. The burden of proving that the 
candidate publishing the statement believed 
it to be false or did not believe it to be 
true though on the complaining candidate is 
very light and would be discharged by the 
complaining candidate swearing to that 
effect. Thereafter it would be for the 
candidate publishing the statement to prove 
otherwise. The question whether the 
statement was reasonably calculated to 
prejudice the prospects of the election of 
the candidate against whom it was made would 
generally be a matter of inference.8^ 
The principle has recently been reiterated in the 
case of Subbash Desai V Sharad J. Rao, The facts were that 
the respondent •— election petitioner alleged that the 
appellant — elected candidate, who was printer and 
publisher of a daily newspaper, had published a news 
report to the effect that the appellant along with his 
workers, during Mahaprasad celebration of Sankalpasiddhi 
Ganesh Mandir created ugly scene with repeated shouting of 
'Allah Ho Akbar' along with a Muslim criminal. The 
respondent stated on oath not only in his election 
petiotion but also in his evidence that the news report 
was false and had been printed and published by the 
appellant to malign him in the eyes of the Hindu voters 
who were in majority in his constituency. The appellant 
admitted in the written statement that he had published 
the report in good faith as submitted to him by his news 
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reporter but in evidence he stated that he had seen that 
news item before publication in a hurry and could not read 
the same fully and had asked the reporter to verify 
whether it was true and then to print it. In the written 
statement he categorically denied that the report 
published in the newspaper was a false report. The 
question was whether the allegation of corrupt practice 
was established. The appellant admitted that he had 
published the report in the newspaper. 
The Supreme Court held that when a charge had been 
levelled that while publishing the statement of fact which 
was false, the appellant either believed it to be false or 
did not believe it to be true, he should have come out 
with the justification for publishing such a news item. In 
the instant case, no justification had been given by the 
appellant, except that the news item was shown to him by 
the reporter while he was in a hurry and he told him to 
print and publish the same after verifying the correctness thereof .This 
statement \ms at variance vri.th the statement made by him in his written state-
ment, admitting 
^that he had published that news item, submitted to him by 
his news reporter. He also denied that the said news 
report was false, meaning thereby that it was a correct 
report. But at the stage of evidence, neither the 
appellant had asserted nor any witness on his behalf had 
come forward to state before the court that any such 
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incident, as mentioned in the news item, had actually 
happened, the Court observed. In such a situation, the 
Court held, the irresistible conclusion was that the 
respondent had been able to establish that the publication 
by the appellant of the statement of the fact regarding 
his personal conduct at the Ganesh Mandir was not only 
false, but the appellant believed it to be false or did 
not believe it to be true. Because of that publication, 
the Court concluded, the appellant had not only committed 
a corrupt practice under Section 123(4) but also under 
sub-clause ( 3-A) of Section 123. "By publishing the news 
item, he shall be deemed to have promoted feeling of 
enmity and hatred between different classes of citizens on 
ground of religion for the furtherence of his prospects at 
the election and for prejudicially affecting the prospects 
88 
of the election of the respondent". Thus on the 
materials on record the charge of corrupt practice under 
sub-section (3-A) and sub-section (4) of Section 123, had 
been established against the appellant, vitiating his 
election to the Legislative Assembly. 
In the light of the above discussion, N.P. 
singh,J., who delivered the judgment of the Court spoke on 
the scope of sub-section(4) of Section 123 as follows: 
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The momentum, the mood and the emotional 
upsurge during the elections are well-known 
and even small things which in normal times 
may not assume much significance, have 
serious consequences during the election and 
affect the minds of the electors and in some 
cases "may be a decisive factor, to seal the 
fate of one candidate or the other. 
Sub-section(4) of Section 123 maintains the 
delicate balance between the freedom of 
speech of an individual, the interest of the 
public to get full information about the 
candidate concerned, but not to affect the 
prospect of the candidate concerned by 
publishing facts about his personal 
character or conduct which are false.89 
Conclusion 
A political campaign is an essential attribute of 
electoral process. Clause (4) of Section 123 lays down the 
ambit and scope of political campaigning. The provision is 
designed to achieve the dual purposes, namely, freedom of 
speech and prevention of malicious attack on personal 
character or conduct of rivals. In other words: the object 
of sub-section (4) of Section 123 is not only to protect 
any candidate at the election from character assassination 
and vilification, but to maintain the purity and fairness 
of the election. Sub-section (4) maintains the delicate 
balance between the freedom of speech of an individual, 
the interest of the public to get full information about 
the candidate concerned, but not to affect the prospect of 
the candidate concerned by publishing fact about his 
90 personal character or conduct which are false. 
4<S0 
Sub-section (4) of Section 123 defining a corrupt 
practice is not conditioned by any proviso to the effect 
that it would cease to be a corrupt practice if the 
statement was Inade to counteract the rival statement of an 
opponent and if the conditions of that sub-section are 
satisfied, it is irrelevant to enquire whether the 
91 
statement was a counterblast to another. 
The requirements of Section 123 (4) shall be 
satisfied when the publication is held: (i) a statment of 
fact, (ii) which was false; (iii) which the appellant 
either believed to be false or did not believe to be true, 
(iv) which relates to the personal character or conduct of 
the respondent; (v) the statement was reasonably 
calculated to prejudice the prospects of the election of 
the appellant. 
The judicial guidelines for interpreting the 
sub-section are: election speeches should be understood 
broad-mindedly, not literally. Election propaganda should 
not be tested by the standards to be adopted in a debate 
carried on by intellectuals. 
A distinction has been made between public 
character or conduct and private character or 'conduct. If 
a statement of fact affects the man beneath the politician 
it touches private character and if it affects the 
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politician, it does not touch his private character. It is 
only when any false allegation of fact pierces the 
politician and touches the person of the candidate then 
Section 123 (4) will be contravened. Courts have also 
admitted that there may be cases on the borderline where 
the false statement may affect both the politician and the 
man beneath the politician and it is precisely in dealing 
with cases on the borderline that difficulties are 
experienced in determining whether the impugned false 
statement constitutes a corrupt practice or not. 
The onus of proving the ingradients of sub-section 
(4) of Section 123 is on the election petitioner who 
alleged the commission of the corrupt practice under the 
said sub-section. But the onus on him to prove that the 
maker of the statement believed it to be false or believed 
it not to be true, is very light and can be discharged by 
complaining candidate swearing to that effect; once that 
is done, the burden shifts to the candidate making the 
92 false statement of fact to show what was his belief 
A review of judicial pronouncements shows that 
the courts have generally taken a very serious view in the 
interpretation of sub-section (4). And as such the courts 
have very much succeeded in not only in protecting a 
48 
candidate at the election from character assassination but 
also in maintaining the purity and fairness of election. 
The Judicial pronouncements have definitely made an impact 
on the leaders and most of them are to-day very cautious 
in attacking their rivals. 
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CHAPTER - XII 
HIRING OR PROCURING VEHICLES FOR VOTERS 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the corrupt practices largely resorted to in 
the elections is the illegal transportation of voters to 
or from polling stations. Voters are generally influenced 
to vote for a candidate \7ho uses rapid means of transport 
to carry them to polling booths. "It is not possible to 
assess accurately how the use of cars effects voting, but 
certainly lack of cars worries parties which do not 
possess them." The practice is not something nev; to 
India. In the Lebanon elections of 1957, for instance, the 
price of taxis v/as bid up to £30 a day, by competition 
between the parties; there was even an allegation in 
Singapore that a candidate employed women of doubtful 
virtue to ride in election cars to tempt men to the 
polls. 
Hiring or procuring of vehicles or vessels whether 
on payment or otherwise for carrying voters to or from the 
polling booth is prohibited by lav/. 
THE LAW 
The clause which defines the 'corrupt practice' of 
hiring or procuring as amended up to date is as follows : 
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Clause(5) of Section 123: Ihe hiring or procuring, v.lnether on payment 
or otherwise, of any vehicle or vessel by a candidate or 
his agent or by any other person with the consent of a 
candidate or his election agent or the use of such 
vehicle or vessel for the free conveyance of any elector 
(other than the candidate himself, the members of his 
family or his agent) to or from any polling station 
provided under Section 25" or a place fixed under 
sub-Section (1) of Section 29 for the poll: 
Provided that the hiring of a vehicle or vessel by 
an elector or by serveral electors at their joint costs for 
the purpose of conveying him or them to and from any such 
polling station or place fixed for the poll shall not be 
deemed to be a corrupt practice under this clause if the 
vehicle or vessel so hired is a vehicle or vessel not 
propelled by mechanical powers : 
Provided further that the use of any public 
transport vehicle or vessel or any tramcar or railway 
carriage by any elector of his own cost for the purpose of 
going to or coming from any such polling station or place 
fixed for the poll shall not be deemed to be a corrupt 
practice under this clause. 
Explanation - In this clause the expression 
•vehicle' means any vehicle used or capable of being used 
4S9 
for the purpose of road transport, whether propelled by 
mechanical power or otherwise and whether used for drawing 
other vehicles oi; otherwise. 
In other words, the chief features of the section 
are : 
1. The hiring or procuring or use of any vehicle or 
vessel; 
2. For the free conveyance of any elector to or 
from any polling station; 
3. By a candidate or his agent, or any other person 
with the consent of a candidate or his election 
agent; 
4. There will be nothing vnrong if the hiring or 
procuring is for the free conveyance of the 
'""Candidate himself or his agent or members of his 
family; 
5. There will be nothing wrong if the electors 
themselves jointly hire or procure a vehicle or 
vessel at their joint cost for the purposes of 
conveying themselves, provided that the vehicle 
or vessel should not be propelled by mechanical 
power; 
6. Public transport vehicles such as railways, 
tramcars and public buses can be used by electors 
at their own cost; 
7. 'Vehicle' includes all sorts of vehicles used for 
road transport, power-driven or otherwise. 
AMENDMENT OF THE PROVISION 
Clause (5) of Section 123 has been amended more than 
once. The first amendment in 1958 inserted in it the vjords 
"with the consent of the candidate or his election agent". 
4H0 
The subsequent amendment of 1966 substituted for the words 
"or the conveyance", the phrase "or the use of such vehicle 
or vessel for the free conveyance". 
OBJECT OF THE AMENDMENT 
The object of introducing the 1966 amendment was 
stated to be the following : 
... under clause (5) of Section 123, the 
hiring or procuring of any vehicle or vessel 
by a candidate, etc., for the conveyance of 
any voter is a corrupt practice. But the 
Election Commission has expressed the view 
that it is not so and the hiring or procuring 
of the vehicle, etc., as the free conveyance 
of voters by candidate or his agent as an 
inducement to them to vote on his behalf that 
requires to be condemned as a corrupt practice. 
Clause (5) of section has been amended 
3 suitably for this purpose. 
PRE - 1966 POSITION; JUDICIAL ATTITODE 
It may be noted that prior to the 1966 amendment, 
the courts had generally taken the vie\^  that only hiring or 
procuring of a vehicle for the purpose of carrying an 
elector to and from a polling station was sufficient to 
constitute a corrupt practice. Proof of actual coanveyance 
was not necessary. An instance of this attitude was Jagan 
4 
Prasad Rav/at V Krishna Dutt Paliv^ al where the Allahabad 
High Court observed that the "basic ingredient of the 
corrupt practice referred to in Section 123(5) ... consists 
of the procurement of any vehicle or vessel by a candidate 
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or his agent ... for the conveyance of any elector ... The 
actual user of those vehicles or vessels for carrying 
electors is not an ingredient of the corrupt practice under 
this sub-section, and evidence of such user is unnecessary 
except in so far as it may have some bearing on the 
5 
question of the purpose of the procurement ... ". Thus, the 
corrupt practice was committed not by conveying the voters 
but by the act of hiring or procuring. 
This viev/ found approval v;ith the Supreme Court 
which in Balwan Singh V Lakshmi Narain held that it was 
the fact of hiring or procuring a vehicle for the 
conveyance of voters that is declared a corrupt practice, 
not the contract of hiring or procuring. In the words of 
7 
Shah, J., who spoke for himself and three other Judges: 
Not the contract of hiring but the fact of 
hiring for conveying voters to and from the 
polling station is declared by section 
123(5) a corrupt practice ... In 
considering whether a corrupt practice 
described in section 123(5) is committed, 
conveying of electors cannot be dissociated 
from the hiring of a vehicle. The corrupt 
practice being the hiring or procuring of a 
vehicle for the conveyance of the electors, 
if full particulars of conveying by a 
vehicle of electors to or from any polling 
station are given, section 83 is duly 
complied with, even if the particulars of 
the contract of hiring, as distinguished 
fron the fact of hiring are not given. 
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Sarkar, J., fifth member of the division bench, hov;ever, 
delivered a separate judgment. In his opinion, "it is of 
the essence of this corrupt practice that the vehicle must 
have been hired, that is to say, a contract for the hiring 
of the vehicle musthave been made. I am unable to 
9 
imagine how a vehicle can be hired without a contract". 
The learned Judge further elaborated that simple conveyance 
of electors in a vehicle is not enough. The vehicle must be 
a hired vehicle. "Hence, there is no corrupt practice 
unless the hiring of the vehicle, that is the contract of 
hire in respect of it is established". 
SCOPE OF THE AMENDED PROVISION 
The scope of the 1966 amended provision of clause (5) 
of section 123 was analysed by the Supreme Court in 
Jashbhai Chunibhai V Anverbeq A-Mirza. Hidayatullah. 
C.J., speaking for himself and Mitter, J. first elaborated 
the Section thus: Section 123 (5) defines one of the 
corrupt practices and it consists of the hiring and 
procuring whether on payment ot otherwise of any vehicle. 
This hiring and procuring must be by a candidate or his 
agent or by any other person with the consent of the 
candidate or his election agent and the hiring according to 
the section must be for the free conveyance of any elector 
other than the candidate himself or members of his famili^  
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or his agent to and from any polling station. The learned 
Chief Justice then observed : 
It willI therefore, appear that the 
Ejection requires three things, (1) hiring 
or procuring of a vehicle; (2) by a 
candidate or his agent, etc/ and (3) for 
the free conveyance of an elector. It will 
be noticed that the Section also speaks of 
the use but it speaks of the use of such 
vehicle which connects the two parts, 
namely, hiring or procuring of vehicle and 
the use. The requirement of the law, 
therefore, is that in addition to proving 
the hiring or procuring and the carriage 
of electors to and from any polling 
station, it should also be proved that the 
electors used the vehicle free of cost to 
themselves. 
In the instant case the main contention was that a car was 
hired or procured by the returned candidate and on the day 
of poll, it was used for free conveyance of three ladies to 
the polling booth and thereby the corrupt practice under 
clause (5) of Section 123 was committed by the returned 
candidate. On examination of witnesses by the trial Court 
it \7as established that three ladies came by car and to 
this effect a complaint was lodged with the presiding 
officer. The Supreme Court held that all this did not 
satisfy the requirement of the provision. Section 123(5) 
contains a few ingredients; one such ingredient that the 
car must be -used for the free conveyance of the voters to 
the poll. As regards the finding of the Gujrat High Court 
that the ladies must have travelled free, the Supreme 
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Court opined that we can only say that it is a mere surmise 
because there is no evidence whatever on this part of the 
13 
case". Negating the contention that this was difficult 
of proof, the Court held that it was not an utter 
impossibility because the owner of the car, the driver or 
one of the ladies could have been questioned about it and 
something would have then come in evidence. "Since no such 
attempt v/as made there is nothing on which we can say 
whether the ladies were brought free or on payment and 
regard being had to the strictness of the law on the 
subject of corrupt practice we must hold in favour of the 
returned candidate that the requirements of the section 
14 have not been met". 
Clause (5) again came to be considered by the 
Supreme Court in Ch. Razik Ram V J.S. Chouhan . This time 
Sarkaria, J., speaking for the Court held that on analysis, 
clause (5) falls into two parts. The requirements of the 
first part are : (I) The hiring or procuring whether on 
payment or otherwise, of any vehicle or vessel for the free 
conveyance of voters, (II) Such hiring or procuring must be 
by a candidate or his election agent or by any other person 
with the consent of a candidate or of his election agent. 
The second part envisages the_ use of such vehicle or vessel 
for the free conveyance of any elector (other than the 
candidate himself, the members of his family, or his 
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election agent) to or from any polling station. "The two 
parts are connected by the conjunction "or" which is 
capable of two constructions. In one sense, it is a 
particle coordiftating the two parts of the Clause and 
creating an alternative between them. In the other sense -
which is akin to the sense of "and" - it can be construed 
as conjoining and combining the first part of the clause 
with the second. The latter construction appears to comport 
better with the aim and object of the amendment of 
1966". In this connection, the Supreme Court held, it is 
noteworthy that even before the amendment this Court in 
17 Shri Balwan Singh held that in construing whether a 
corrupt practice described in Section 123 (5) was 
committed, "conveying of electors cannot be dissociated 
from the hiring of a vehicle." The Court further observed^ 
"Even if the word "or" is understood as a co-ordinating 
conjunction introducing alternatives, then also a 
petitioner in order to succeed on the ground of a corrupt 
practice under the second part of the clause, must prove, 
in addition to the use of the vehicle or vessel for the 
free conveyance of any elector to or from any polling 
station, the hiring or procuring of that vehicle or vessel. 
This is so because the word "such" in the phrase introduced 
by the 1966 amendment, expressly imports these elements of 
18 the first into the second part of the clause". The 
49r, 
Supreme Court finally observed that in this connection "v.'e 
are fortified by the dictum of this Court in Jashbhai 
19 Chunibhai Patel V Anver Beg A.Mirza" , wherein 
Hidayatullah, C.J., analysed the requirements of the 
clause, thus : 
"It will be noticed that this section also 
speaks of the use of such vehicle v/hich 
connects the two parts, namely, hiring or 
procuring of vehicle and its "use. The 
requirements of the law therefore is that 
in addition to proving the hiring or 
procuring and the carriage of electors to 
and from any polling station, it should 
also be proved that the electors used the 
vehicle free of cost to themselves." 
20 Dharmesh Prasad Verma V Faizal Azam is another leading 
pronouncement of the Supreme Court on the point. The 
contention of the appellant was that the respondent 
committed the corrupt practice falling under Section 123 (5) 
by procuring and using a jeep of his friend for the free 
conveyance of the voters to the polling station on the date 
of the poll. A single judge of the Patna High Court who had 
tried the election petition stated in the light of the 
21 
relevant case law that proceedings arising out of an 
election petition are quasi - criminal in nature and that 
the evidence relating to corrupt practice should be 
scrutinized with scrupulous care and merciless severity, 
and then proceeded to consider the evidence adduced by the 
parties. It was found that the jeep carrying five ladies 
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was seized by the District Magistrate and the S.P. of the 
district from a road near a canal situated about IJ5 or 2 
miles away from the booth on the date of the poll and that 
the five ladies were voters who were being carried free of 
cost for casting votes on behalf of the respondent. 
However, the learned judge held that these facts were not 
sufficient by themselves to hold that the respondent 
himself procured the jeep in question. Besides, the learned 
judge also found that since the jeep with the voters was 
caught not at the polling station but at some distance away 
from it, it was only a case of an attempt at corrupt 
practice and not corrupt practice itself as per Section 123 
(5) of the Act. 
The Supreme Court, on appeal, once again analysed 
the provision. Varadarajan , J., speaking for himself, 
Murtaza F. Ali and Ranganath Misra, JJ., observed : 
In clause (5) of Section 123 the word "or" is 
used in several places and the word "and" is 
used in two places in the first proviso and 
the explanation. Prima facie. Parliament must 
be deemed to have used the word "or" and "and" 
for different purposes or objects. If the 
matter is res Integra it would be said that 
the main clause (5) consists of two separate 
parts, namely (I) the hiring or procuring 
vi/hether on payment or otherwise, of any 
vehicle or vessel by a candidate or his agent 
or by any other person, with the consent of a 
candidate or his election agent for the free 
conveyance of any elector to or from any 
polling station or (II) the use of any vehicle 
4 98 
or vessel by any candidate or his agent or by 
any other person with the consent of a 
candidate or his election agent for the 
purpose of free conveyance of any elector to 
or from e^ny polling station. It is true that 
in the latter part of clause (5) the word 
"such" is used before the words "vehicle or 
vessel for the free conveyance of any elect 
to or from any polling station". But t 
matter is no longer res Integra 
Drawing Support from the earlier judgments in Jashbhai 
23 24 
Chunibhai Pately Razik Ram , Dadasahib Dattatrya 
25 Pawar , the learned Judge observed that it has to be held 
that the requirement of the lav/ in regard to corrupt 
practice under Section 123 (5) of the Act is that in 
addition to proving the hiring or procuring of any vehicle 
or vessel for the carriage of voters to or from any polling 
station it should also be proved that the electors used the 
vehicle or vessel free of cost to themselves. The Supreme 
Court set aside the decision of the Patna High Court. The 
appellant, acccording to the Supreme Court, has thus proved 
satisfactorily all the three requirements of the clause. 
The respondent was held "guilty of corrupt practice falling 
under that Clause V7hich is ordinarily difficult to 
prove" . The Court at the same time also suggested that 
such corrupt practice which is very largely resorted to in 
the elections could be avoided by either locating polling 
booths within walking distance of the electors or by having 
mobile polling stations. 
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It is, thus, now well settled by judical precedents 
that in or^er to bring a corrupt practice within the scope 
of Section 123(5), the requirement of law is that in 
addition to proving the hiring or procuring and the 
carriage of electors to and from a polling station, it 
should also be proved that the electors used the vehicle 
free of cost to themselves. 
FREE CONVEYANCE AND PROOF 
Proof of free carriage of voters in addition to 
proving the hiring or procuring of voters to or from 
polling station is a must although it is ordinarily very 
difficult to prove. There are different situations and 
circumstances in which free carriage of voters is done and 
for which no direct evidence is available. The Supreme 
27 Court, for example, in Balwan Singh V Prakash Chand , 
observed that it is not always possible for an election 
petitioner to adduce direct evidence to prove that a 
particular vehicle was hired, or procured by the candidate 
or his agent or by any other person with the consent of 
the candidate or his election agent, but this can be 
inferred from the proved circumstances where such 
inference is justifiable. In the present case, it had been 
proved by clear and reliable evidence that a particular 
tractor was used for the conveyance of electors to and 
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from a polling station, and that was so used by the 
workers of the appellant. Then there was the further fact 
that the voters .were conveyed free of cost. It had also 
been proved that the tractor belonged to the appellant's 
wife and he could not succeed in his efforts to prove that 
it was used elsewhere or for some other purpose. "In these 
facts and circumstances, it would be quite permissible to 
draw the inference that the tractor had been procured by 
2 8 
the appellant for the free conveyance of the electors". 
Though the knowledge of a candidate that his agents and 
workers had conveyed voters may not lead to the inference 
that he had consented to such acts where all that is 
established is a stray act or a number of them committed 
on the same day, yet, where such acts were numerous and 
extended for a number of days, knowledge of such acts and 
the absence of anything to show that the candidate 
prohibited such acts may lead to a reasonable inference 
29 
that the acts were done V7ith the candidate's consent. On 
the other hand, where the petitioner did not make a 
written complaint to the Returning Officer about hiring of 
vehicles by the successful candidate for carrying voters 
nor did he mention this fact in the complaint made against 
the Presiding Officer of a polling station and in his 
cross-examination, he, though admitted that he did not 
501 
make a complaint about hiring of vehicles, did not come 
forward with the explanation that he was not aware of the 
fact of hiring, the petitioner could not be deemed to 
have not made the complaint because he was not aware of 
the fact of hiring of vehicles. The petitioner, in such 
circumstances, could not be said to have proved the 
corrupt practice in the absence of complaint in regard to 
30 the alleged corrupt practice. 
On the facts of the case the Supreme Court in 
31 Ra^endra Singh Yadav V Chandra Sen , held the evidence as 
untrustvvorthy. In this case an election petition was filed 
by two electors alleging among other things, the 
commission of a corrupt practice as laid down under 
Section 123(5) of the Act, against one Rajendra Singh 
Yadav v/ho had been declared elected from an assembly 
constituency in Madhya Pradesh. The main allegation was 
that Yadav himself and his V70rkers, agents and supporters 
with his consent, hired and procured vehicles, tractors 
with trolleys, trucks, jeeps and cars for free conveyance 
of voters from their houses to polling stations on the 
date of the poll. The High Court found the allegation 
proved, declared Yadav's election void and disqualified 
him for a period of six years. On appeal, the Supreme 
Court made a re-evaluation of the evidence and found that 
50 
the evidence was not only insufficient to hold the corrupt 
practice to have been proved, but should not have been 
allowed to be brought on record or was untrustworthy. In 
the opinion of the Court the entire evidence produced to 
prove certain allegation was an afterthought. The Court 
observed : 
We need hardly say that it is not at all 
difficult for a defeated candidate to produce 
a few witnesses in support of such allegations 
after the event, even though the truth may be 
32 far different from v/hat they state. 
The case of the appellant in relation to the 
transportation of voters to the polling station stood on a 
still stronger footing. Entries in Schedule III of the 
petition where the name of the village from where voters 
were transported were given as "from adjoining hamlets" and 
similarly the names of electors transported to the polling 
station as "men and women". The Supreme Court interpreted 
that the inference which must be drawn was that when 
Schedule III was framed, the petitioner-electors had no 
knowledge at all of any particular voters having been 
transported, or of the places from where they were picked 
up. In the opinion of the Court the oral evidence produced 
got a severe jolt from this circumstance and must be 
characterised as a vain attempt to support a case concocted 
later. Besides, the Court held, the item was so lacking in 
503 
particulars that it should not have been allowed to be 
proved at the evidence stage, nothing specifically having 
been disclosed such as would give notice to the appellant 
as to what case he had to meet. In the opinion of the 
Court the allegations remained unproved and it revised the 
finding of the Allahabad High Court on the point of the 
commission of the corrut practice described in clause (5) 
of the Act and set aside the impugned judgment. 
Thus, the present case was mainly set aside on the 
ground of vague and meaningless particulars furnished to 
establish the charge of corrupt practice. 
FREE LIFT TO VOTERS 
An interesting but important question before the 
Himachal Pradesh High Court in Sita Ram Sharma V Narain 
33 Singh Swami was whether giving of free lift to voters 
would amount to the commission of corrupt practice under 
Section 123(5). The High Court held that if the truck was 
proved to have been plying on the road for any purpose and 
it stopped to carry or give a lift to a person who was 
going to the polling booth at the instance of that person 
(elector) or at the instance of the truck driver, then 
this fact did not mean that the truck was hired or 
procured by the returned candidate for the free conveyance 
504 
of the electors. If a vehicle was on its way to deliver 
the forms to the polling agents at a particular polling 
station and in the way some voters were going to the 
polling stations and per chance they were familiar with 
the truck driver or any other occupant of the truck, then 
in that situation the aforesaid voters might be carried in 
the truck without any conveyance charges. The Court opined 
that it did not in any way mean that the voters were 
carried free of conveyance charges for the purpose of 
casting of their votes or that they were influenced for 
casting their votes in favour of the returned candidate, 
who had hired those trucks for delivering the forms to the 
polling agents at various polling booths. Consequently the 
returned candidate could not be said to have committed any 
corrupt practice. 
CONCLUSION 
The use of vehicles for transportation of voters to 
and from polling stations is a very common practice in 
India. Inspite of the fact that there is a statutory ban 
on such use, hardly any attention is paid to check this 
corrupt practice. 
The scope of Section 123(5) is nov/ well settled 
after various judicial pronouncements of the apex Court. 
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Jash bhai Chunibhai Patel, Razik Ram and Dadasahib 
Dattatrya Pawar have demonstrated well that in order to 
bring a practice within the fold of Section 123(5), the 
requirement of law is that in addition to proving the 
hiring or procuring and the carriage of electors to and 
from a polling station, it should also be proved that the 
electors used the vehicle free of cost to themselves. The 
Supreme Court in Balwant Singh also observed that it is 
not alv;ays possible for an election petitioner to adduce 
direct evidence to prove that a particular vehicle was 
hired or procured by a candidate or his agent or by any 
other person with the consent of the candidate or his 
election agent, but this can be inferred from the proved 
circumstances where such inference is justifiable. 
The above discussion has further made out that the 
use of vehicles for carrying prospective voters is so 
V7idespread that Clause (5) is gradually losing its 
prohibitive value. The fact that very few cases have been 
fought in the courts under Clause (5), makes it clear that 
the practice has somewhat acquired public acceptibility. 
The courts are not unaware of the phenomenon and have 
consequently taken a rather lenient view of the situation. 
The courts do not seem to be seriously inclined to 
interfere with an election result on the ground of misuse 
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of vehicles at the election time. Since almost all the 
political parties are involved, at least indirectly, in 
the misuse of vehicles, and the misuse is so enormous that 
the courts too have taken a liberal view of the 
prohibitions contained in clause (5). 
Where the entire system gets afflicted with a 
malady, the remedy lies in a gradual transformation of the 
system itself rather than in an isolated legal provision. 
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CHAPTER-XIII 
EXCESSIVE EXPENDITURE 
INTRODUCTION 
An important aspect of electrol reform that has not 
received proper attention is the need to rescue elections 
from the clutches of money power. President V.V. Giri once 
lamented , "It has been a most regrettable development in 
recent years that money power has come to play such a 
dominant role in the elections to legislatures. This, to my 
mind, is at the' root of corruption and corruptive 
influences in our public life" . Dr. Farooq Abdullah, a 
former Chief Minister of J & K, once remarked, "Election 
creates money pov/er and not mass power". The Santhanam 
Committee on Prevention of Corruption has pointed out that 
the belief in the prevalence of corruption at high 
political levels has been strengthened by the manner in 
v/hich funds are collected by political parties especially 
2 
at the time of elections. The Tarkunde Committee report on 
Electrol Reform submitted in 1975 observed, "A major 
malady in the operation of elections in India has been the 
reckless use of money" . A similar feeling has been 
voiced by the Supreme Court, "It is a notorious fact that 
huge sums of money are lavished by candidates on election. 
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thus closing the door for ordinary people to contest 
democratic elections. The point is that when suspiciously 
small sums are returned as election expenses, no machinery 
to investigate and take action is found with the result 
that return of election expenses becomes an idle ritual and 
not an effective check. If parties pour funds for 
campaigning the law is silent and helpless. This is 
certainly a matter for the Election law to consider. It 
must make provision deterrent enough so as to enable the 
3 
small to negotiate with elective opportunities". 
Similarly, on another occasion the highest Court observed: 
"Money power casts a sinister shadow on our elections and 
the political pay-off of undue expenditure in the various 
constituencies is too alluring for parties to resist 
4 
temptation". 
It has been experienced that excessive expenditure of 
elections has been a recurring allegation in election 
petitions. Despite the legal limit on expenditure it has 
reached unimaginable proportion, corroding the moral fabric 
of the society. That is why Krishna Iyer, J. observed, "If 
campaigns run berserk and expenses unlimited become the 
rule, general elections become national nightmares and the 
fabric of our freedom shakes". Thus it can be seen that 
the vicious role of money in our elections has been 
(5-a) 
attacked from every quarter. 
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THE LEGAL LIMITS ON EXPENDITURE 
Under Section 123(6) of the Act the incurring or 
authorising of expenditure in contravention of Section 77 
is a corrupt practice for the purpose of the Act. Section 
77 deals with accout of election expenses and maximum 
thereof. The first sub-section of Section 77 states that 
every candidates at an election shall, either by himself 
or by his election agent, keep a separate and correct 
account of all expenditure in connection with the election 
incurred or authorised by him or by his election agent 
betv/een the date of, publication of the notification calling 
the election and the date of declaration of the result 
thereof, both dates inclusive. The second sub-section 
states that the account shall contain such particulars, as 
may be prescribed. The third sub-section states that the 
total amount shall not exceed such amount as may be 
prescribed. The amounts prescribed are to be found in Rule 
90 of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961.^^"^' Under 
Section 10-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 
if a candidate fails to lodge with the District Election 
Officer, the account of election expenses within 30 days 
after the date of election of the returned candidate, he is 
liable to be disqualified for a period of three years from 
the date of the order which is required to be made by the 
Election Commission. Under Rule 87 of the Conduct of 
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Election Rules, 1961 the District Election Officer is 
required to publish a notice on his notice board within two 
days from the date of lodging of the account specifying the 
date on which the account has been lodged with him and the 
time and the place at which the account can be inspected. 
Any person can inspect such account and obtain an attested 
copy of such account on payment of the prescribed fee. The 
above provisions, taken together^ have sought to place two 
limitations upon a candidate: Firstly, candidate is 
required to spend money on his election within the maximum 
limit prescribed by the relevant law, and secondly^ a 
candidate is under obligation to maintain an account of the 
expenses incurred. 
THE RATIONALE OF LIMITING EXPENDITURE 
The object behind putting a ceiling on the 
expenditure which a candidate may incur in his election 
campaign has been clearly summed up by the Supreme 
Court. Bhagwati, J. Speaking for the Court, observed that 
the object of the provision limiting the expenditure is 
two-fold. In the first place, it should be open to any 
individual or any political party, howsoever small, to be 
able to contest an election on a footing of equality with 
any other individual or political party, howsoever rich and 
well financed it may be and no individual or political 
party should be able to secure an advantage over others by 
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7 
reason of its superior financial strength. The other 
objective of limiting expenditure is to eliminate, as far 
as possible, the influence of big money in the electrol 
8 process. The small man's chance is the essence of Indian 
democracy and that would be stultified if large 
contributions from rich and affluent individuals or groups 
9 '•'' 
are not divorced from the electrol process. It is for this 
reason that our legislators, in their wisdom, enacted a 
ceiling on the expenditure which may legitimately be 
. -"10 incurred in connection with an election. 
THE SCOPE OF SECTION 77 
Section 77 of the Act requires correct account to be 
maintained of "all expenditure in connection with the 
election incurred or authorised" by the candidate or his 
election agent and under sub-section (3) the amount of such 
expenditure is not to exceed the prescribed limit. The 
scope of this provision was explained by the Supreme Court 
in Vidya Sagar Joshi V Surinder Nath. Hidayatullah, 
C.J., speaking for the Court, observed: 
The critical words of section 77 are 
"expenditure" "in connection with election" 
and "incurred or authorised". "Expenditure" 
means the amount expended and "expended" 
means to pay away, lay out or spend. It 
really represents money out of pocket, a 
going out. Now the amount paid away or paid 
out need not be all money which a man 
spends on himself during this time. It is 
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money " in connection with " his election. 
These words mean not so much as "consequent 
upon" as "having to do v;ith". All money laid 
out and having to do v/ith the election is 
contemplated. But here again money which is 
liable to . be refunded is not to be taken 
note of. The v;ord "incurred" shows a 
finality. It has the sense of rendering one-, 
self liable for the amount. Therefore the 
Section regards everything for which the 
candidate has rendered himself liable and of 
which he is out of pocket in connection with 
his election that, J.s to say having to do 
with his election. 
In this case the facts were that by notifications 
dated January 13, 1967 the electors of Santokhgarh 
Assembly constituency of Himachal Pradesh constituency were 
invited to elect a member to the Assembly. The last date 
for filing of nomination papers was January 20, 1967. Three 
candidates contested the election. The appellant was an 
independent candidate opposed by the respondent who v/as a 
Congress nominee. The present appellant was returned with a 
margin of 742 votes. The returned candidate filed his 
return of election expenses showing an expenditure of 
Rs. 1862.05. The limit of expenditure in this constituency 
v/as Rs.2000/-. One of the contentions of the election 
petitioner was that he had filed a false return of his 
election expenses, that he had spent an amount exceeding 
Rs.2000/-in the aggregate and therefore contravened the 
provision of Section 77(3) of the Act and therefore 
committed corrupt practice under Section 123(6) of the Act. 
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The petitioner therefore asked that the election be 
declared void. The main item on which the expenses were 
said to be false was a deposit of Rs.500/- as security and 
Rs.200/- as application fee which the returned candidate had 
made with the Congress Party on or before January 2, 1967. 
The fee was not returnable, but as this payment was made 
before the notification calling upon the voters to elect a 
member to the Assembly nothing turned upon it. The returned 
candidate was denied the Congress ticket on or about 
January 10, 1967. This was also before the said 
notification. According to the rules of the Congress Party 
the security deposit was refundable to a candidate if he or 
she was not selected. It was however provided in the same 
rules that if the candidate contested the election against 
the official Congress candidate the security deposit would 
be forfeited. The returned candidate chose to stand as an 
independent candidate against the official Congress nominee 
and incurred the penalty of forfeiture. This was after the 
date for the filing of the nomination paper, January 20, 
1967. He had time till January 23, 1967 to withdraw from 
the contest. If he had done so the deposit would have 
presumably been returned to him. The case of the petitioner 
was that if this deposit were added to the election 
expenses, the limit of Rs.2000/- was exceeded and therefore 
this amounted to a corrupt practice under Section 123(6) 
read with Section 77(3) of the Act. 
The Court held that the deposit with the party was 
an expenditure in connection with the election. If he had 
got the ticket and the money was refunded to him, that 
would not have counted as an expenditure since the expenses 
would not have incurred. As he became a contesting 
candidate the forfeiture of the deposit became a fact 
between the two dates prescribed under 77 (1) and thus was 
an election expenses. But since inclusion of this amount in 
the expenses would have exceeded the limit of the election 
expenses there was contravention of Section 77(3) and the 
candidate v/as guilty of corrupt practice under 
o J.- TOO (c\ J -u-v. o X.- nnir>\ (12-a) "When the 
Section 123 (6) read with Section 77(3). 
candidate knowing that the money would be lost went on to 
stand as an independent candidate, he was vjilling to let 
13 the money go and take a chance independently". 
(a) The Earlier Judicial Approach on S. 77 
On several occasions the courts came to be called 
upon to determine the trtie scope of S. 77. The moot 
qustion was whether any expenses incurred ' by others than 
the candidate or his agent were excluded from the purview 
of the provision. The courts sought to give a literal 
meaning to the words employed by S.77. The courts came out 
with the view that election expenses incurred without the 
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authority of the candidate or election agent v/ere not liable 
to be included in election expenses under Section 77. Ram 
. . . . 14 . Dial V Briiraj Singh, is a good instance of such approach. 
The Supreme Court through Shah, J. observed: 
Unless it is established that the expenditure 
v/as incurred in connection with the election 
by the candidate or by his election agent or 
was authorised by him it is not liable to be 
included under Section 77 of the Representation 
of the People Act .We agree with the High Court 
that under Section 77(l)only the expenditure 
incurred or authorised by the candidate himself 
or by his election agent is required to be 
included in the account or return of election 
expenses and thus expenses incurred by any other 
agent or person v/ithout anything more need not 
be included in the account or return, as such 
incurring of expenditure would be purely 
Voluntary. 
Another case on similar line is Magraj Patodia V R.K. 
Birla in which the allegation made against R.K.Birla, the 
candidate returned from one of the Parliamentary constituencies 
in Rajasthan was that he had incurred or authorised expenditure 
in contravention of Section 77 of the Act, in connection with his 
election. The maximum amount of expenditure permitted for the 
constituency from which R.K. Birla contested the election was Rs.25,000. The 
return of the respondent sheared that his total expenditure in connection with 
the election was Rs.1638/96* 
*P. If it was shown that the total expenditure incurred 
either by the respondent or his election agent or by others 
v/ith their consent or under authority exceeded Rs. 25000/- then 
the election of respondent must be held to be void. 
Evidence was led to show that about the time of the 
election,several telephones installed in the residence of some 
of the members of the Birla family and some of their 
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executives were extensively used and the telephone charges 
ran into few thousands of rupees; that a large number of 
Jeeps and Cars v/ere used in connection with the election; 
that thousands ' of persons worked for respondent; that 
considerable expenses were incurred for arranging meetings. 
In the opinion of the supreme Court, since the 
petitioner failed to prove that those amounts were spent 
with the consent or under the authority of the respondent 
or his election agent, those expenditures could not be 
taken into consideration. In other words, according to the 
Supreme Court, whatever was spent was done freely and 
voluntarily. A voluntary expenditure would not come within 
the mischief of Section 123 (6). It is true, the Court 
observed, that many times corrupt practices at election may 
not be able to be established by direct evidence and the 
commission of those corrupt practices may have to be 
inferred from the proved facts and circumstances but the 
circumstances proved must reasonably establish that the 
alleged corrupt practice was committed by the returned 
17 
candidate or his election agent. Preponderance of 
18 
probabilities is not sufficient. But showing his 
"uneasiness", Hegde, J. speaking for the Court, observed : 
Section 123(6) is by and large ineffective 
in controlling election expenses. There are 
ways to bypass that provision. From v^ hat we 
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have seen in the various election cases 
that came before us v;e are of the opinion 
that the law controlling election expenses 
19 has been reduced to a mockery. 
In this 'helpless' situation the learned Judge held 
that he could only repeat the observation of the Supreme 
20 Court in an earlier case, Raananiaya Singh V Baijnath/ 
that "the appeal in this connection must be to the 
21 Parliament." In Raananiay Singh the Supreme Court had to 
consider a case where a proprietor of an estate lent the 
services of his Manager, Assistant Manager, twenty Ziladars 
and their peons for canvassing on behalf of his son. It was 
proved that the father was an old man and the returned 
candidate was helping his father in the management of his 
estate. The question was v/hether because of- the 
canvassing by those personsthe returned candidate had 
committed the corrupt practice of engaging the services of 
more than the prescribed number of persons and further 
whether the salary and v/ages paid to them should have been 
included in computing the expenses incurred by the returned 
candidate. The Supreme Court found that there was no 
evidence to show that the services of those persons were 
either procured by the returned candidate or his election 
agent nor was it proved that their services were obtained 
v/ith the consent or under the authority of the returned 
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candidate or his election anent. The Court observed that 
there v/as no doubt that in the eye of the law those extra 
persons were in the employment of the father of the 
appellant and paid by the father and they were neither 
employed nor paid by the appellant. "It obviously v;as a 
case v/here a father assisted the son in the matter of the 
election. These persons v/ere the employees of the father 
and paid by him for v/orking in the estate. At the request 
of the father they assisted the son in connection with the 
election v/hich strictly speaking they were not obliged to 
22 do". It was, however, contended that such a construction 
would be against the spirit of the election laws in that 
candidates who have rich friends or relations will have an 
unfair advantage over a poor rival. To this. Das, J., who 
v/rote the judgement on behalf of a five-judge bench 
replied: 
The spirit of the law may well be an 
elusive and unsafe guide and the supposed 
spirit can certainly not be given effect to 
in opposition to the plain language of the 
sections of the Act and the rules made 
thereunder. If all that can be said of 
these statutory provisions is that 
construed according to the ordinary, 
grammatical and natural meaning of their 
language they v/ork injustice by placing the 
poorer candidates at a disadvantage the 
appeal must be to Parliament and not this 23 Court 
Thus all the three above mentioned judgements show 
that in order to bring a case under Section 123 (6) it is 
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necessary that unauthorised expenditure must have been done 
either with the candidates consent or with the consent of 
his election agent. In case 'consent' is not proved, the 
candidate is not liable for what has been spent by others 
for making his election a success. The act of others will 
simply come under the category of volunteers. In other 
words, the Supreme Court has been consistent in holding 
that any expenditure incurred by persons other than the 
candidate for election purposes will not be taken into 
account (unless it is incurred by such third persons as the 
candidate's agent) in determining whether a corrupt 
practice was committed by the candidate. The effect of the 
decisions of the Court is also that the expenses incurred 
by a political party to advance the prospects of the 
candidates put up by it, do not fall within Section 77 of 
the Act. 
(b) The Shift in Attitude 
The Supreme Court judgement of Kanwar Lai Gupta V 
24 Amarnath Chav/la brought shock v;aves to the political 
bosses as the Court there in clear terms held that expenses 
incurred by political parties and friends are also to be 
included under the head of election expenses. This was an 
obvious departure from the line the Court had so 
consistently followed. In the words of Bhagwati, J., who 
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spoke for the Court on behalf of himself and 
Sarkaria, J. : 
Nov7, if a candidate V7ere to be subject to 
the limation of the ceiling, but the 
political party sponsoring him or his 
friends and supporters v/ere to be free to 
spend as much as they liked in connection 
v;ith his election, the object of _ imposing 
the ceiling v7ould be completely frustrated 
and the beneficient provision enacted in 
the interest of purity and genuineness of 
the democratic process would be wholly 
emasculated ... The legislators could 
never have intended that what the 
individual candidate cannot do, the 
political party sponsoring him or his 
friends and supporters should be free to 
do. That is v;hy the legislators wisely 
interdicted not only the incurring but also 
the authorising of excessive expenditure by 
,., ^  (24-a) 
a candidate. 
The Court further observed that v/hen the political 
party sponsoring a candidate incurs expenditure in 
connection with his election, as distinguished from 
expenditure on general party propaganda, and the candidate 
knowingly takes advantage of it or participates in the 
programme or activity orfails to disavow the expenditure or 
consents to it or acquiesces in it, it would be reasonable 
to infer, save in special circumstances, that he impliedly 
authorised the political party to incur such expenditure 
and he cannot escape the rigour of the ceiling by saying 
that he has not incurred the expenditure, but his political 
party has done so. "A party candidate does not stand apart 
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from his political party and if the political party does 
not want the candidate to incur the disqualification it 
must exercise control over the expenditure v/hich may be 
incurred by it directly to promote the poll prospects of 
the candidate. The same position must also hold good in 
case of expenditure incurred by friends and supporters 
directly in connection v/ith the election of the 
25 
candidate". 
On the facts, the Court held that the first 
respondent's election expenditure exceeded the statutory 
limit and his election was accordingly invalid. Thus, in 
the opinion of the Court, this is the only reasonable 
interpretation of the provision which would carry out its 
object and intendment and suppress the mischief and advance 
the remedy by purifying our election process and ridding it 
of the pernicious and baneful influence of big money. This 
is in fact, the Court continued, v;hat the lav; in England 
has achieved. There, every person, on pain of criminal 
penalty, is required to obtain authority from the candidate 
before incurring any political expenditure on the 
candidate's behalf. The candidate is given complete 
discretion in authorising expenditure upto the limit permitted. 
If the expenditure made v/ith the knowledge and approval of 
the candidate exceeds the limit or if the candidate makes a 
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false report of the expenditure after the election, he is 
subject not only to criminal penalties, but also to having 
his election voided. 
Bhagwati, J., also pointed out that it would not be 
correct to say that putting ceiling on the expenditure of a 
candidate by unauthorised persons/volunteers or friends 
would considerably inhibit the electoral campaign of 
political parties. In the words of the learned judge : 
In the first place, a political party is 
free to incur any expenditure it likes on 
its general party propaganda though, of 
course, in this area also some limitative 
ceilifng is eminently desirable coupled with 
filing of return of expenses and an 
independent machinery to investigate and 
take action. It is only where expenditure is 
incurred which can be identified with the 
election of a given candidate that it would 
be liable to be added to the expenditure of 
that candidate as being impliedly authorised 
by him. 
In short. Section 77 provides for a limit on the 
expenses in connection with the election incurred or 
authorised or authorised by a candidate or his election 
agent. The Supreme Court in this case has held that this 
limit on the expenditure cannot be evaded by the candidate 
by not spending any money of his own but leaving it to the 
political party sponsoring him or his friends and 
supporters to spend an amount far inexcess of the limit and 
if the latter were to be left free to spend such amount. 
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The object of imposing ceiling on the expenditure to be 
legitimately incurred in connection vith the election would 
be completely frustrated. The rationalistic approach of the 
apex Court behind the judgment is that the ^ small man's 
chance is the essence of Indian democracy and that would be 
stultified if large contributions from rich and affluent 
individuals or groups are not divorced from the electoral 
•„(26-a) process. 
AMENDMENT OF THE LAW 
It may be noted that follov/ing this decision the law 
was amended within a fortnight. The Representation of the 
People (Amendment) Ordinance 1974 promulgated by the 
President on 19th October, 1974 set at naught the above 
decision of the Supreme Court. It added an Explanation to 
Section 77(1) of the Act according to which notwithstanding 
any judgment, order or decision of any Court to the 
contrary^ any expenditure incurred or authorised in 
connection v;ith the election of a candidate by a political 
party or by anyother association or body of persons or by 
any individual (other than the candidate or his election 
agent) shall not be deemed to be and shall not even be 
deemed to have been expenditure incurred or authorised by 
the candidate or by his election agent. It was, however, 
provided by a proviso to the Explanation that the Ordinance 
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v.'ould not affect any decision of the Supreme Court given 
before its commencement or any decision of a High Court 
against which np appeal had been preferred and that the 
time allowed for filing such appeal had expired before its 
commencement. 
Another notable change in clause (1) of Section 77 
came to be relating to the period of keeping a separate and 
correct account. Previously a candidate was required to 
keep . the account of expenditure incurred or authorised 
by him or by his election agent "between the date of 
publication of the notification calling the election and 
the date of declaration of the result thereofboth dates 
inclusive". Now by the amending Act 40 of 1975, the period 
is "betwwen the date on which he has been nominated and the 
date of declaration of the result thereof, both dates 
inclusive". 
POST - AMENDMENT JUDGMENTS 
In the same year of 1975 the Supreme Court decided 
27 Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi V Ra:i Narayan. One of the 
main allegations was that the appellant's election expenses 
exceeded the prescribed limit if the expenses incurred by 
the Congress Party was taken into account. Beg, J., held 
that there was no case or evidence that the Congress Party 
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was the agent, express or implied, of the returned 
candidate or acting as the channelthrough whichany money 
•whatsoever was spent by her. The learned Judge observed : 
Voluntary expenditure by friends, relations 
or sympathisers and expenditure incurred by a 
candidate's party, without any request or 
authorisation by the candidate, has never 
been deemed to be expenditure by the 
28 
candidate himself. 
Beg J. further observed that the law requires proof 
of circumstances from which at least implied authorisation 
29 
can be inferred. It is not enough that some advantage 
accrued or expenditure was incurred v/ithin the knowledge of 
the candidate. The test of authorisation would naturally 
be the creation of a liability to reimburse whoever spends 
the money and not necessarily the provision of money 
before-hand by the candidate on whose behalf it is 
31 
spent. To the same effect was the opinion of Ray, C.J. : 
"Authorisation means acceptance of the responsibility. 
Authorisation must precede the expenditure. Authorisation 
means reimbursment by the candidate or election agent of 
the person who has been authorised by the election agent of 
the candidate to spend or incur. In order to constitute 
authorisation the effect must be that the authority must 
32 
carry with it the right of re-imbursement". 
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Thus, justice Bhagvrati' s approach in Kan\;ar Lai 
Gupta did not find favour V7ith the majority judgment in 
Indira Nehru Gandhi because the expenses incurred by a 
political party could not always be taken as either 
incurred or authorised by the candidate himself. In this 
connection A.N. Ray, J., observed^ "A candidate is not 
required to disavov; or denounce the expenditure incurred or 
authorised by the political party because the expenditure 
is neither incurred nor authorised by the candidate. One 
can disavow v;hat would be ascribed to be incurred or 
authorised by one." Similarly Beg, J., said^ "If some 
expenses are shov/n or admitted to have been incurred by the 
candidate's party or third persons over the election of the 
successful candidate, is it possible to separate it from a 
total expenditure on more than one constituency by some 
process of estimation and apportionment ?" Moreover, 
according to the learned Judge, this question could only 
arise if it is first proved that v/hatever expenditure was 
incurred by candidate's party or by some other person, who 
may be a friend, a relation or a sympathiser, was incurred 
in circumstances from which it could be inferred that the 
successful candidate V70uld reimburse the party or person 
u • ^ -^  (32-c) 
vmo incurred it. 
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Then came Nongthomban Ibomeha Singh V Leisangthem 
33 . Chandramani Singh m which the main allegation was that 
the respondent's election expenses exceeded the prescribed 
limit of Rs.2,500. He had filed his nomination on 23 
January, 1974. On 5 December, 1973 he had given Rs.500 to a 
political party to secure an election ticket. This amount 
of Rs.500 was not mentioned in the return of election 
expenses filed by him. According to the return the expenses 
amounted to Rs.2160. Adding the sum of Rs.500 to the amount 
of Rs.2160 would take the expenses beyond the prescribed 
limit of Rs.2500. This would have invalidated his election 
but for the amendment of the Act in 1975 which was given 
retrospective effect. According to the amendment made in 
Section 77 of the Act, every candidate of an election will 
either by himself or by his election agent keep a separate 
and correct account of all the expenditure in connection 
v/ith the election, incurred or authorised by him or by his 
election agent between the date on which he has been 
nominated and the result thereof, both dates inclusive. The 
Supreme Court held that the said amount of Rs.500 
consequently need not have been shown in the return of 
expenses filed by the respondent, nor could the same amount 
be taken into the consideration in calculating the total 
expenses of the respondent v;ith a view to judge as to 
v/hether his expenses exceeded the prescribed limit. The 
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amending Act of 1975, because of the retrospective effect 
attributed to it, vjas in operation at the time of election 
v;hich returned the respondent to the Assembly. 
In Dhartipakar V Rajiv Gandhi, ~^' K.N. Singh, 
J., on behalf of himself and Venkataramiah, J., Commenting 
on the allegation that 'a number of vehicles were plying 
v/ith Congress (I) flags and food was served in connection 
v;ith the election meetings, distribution of badges and leaf-
lets , reiterated the principle that any voluntary expenses 
incurred by a political party, well—wishers, sympathisers 
or association of persons does not fall within the mischief 
of Section 123(6) of the Act, instead only that expenditure 
which is incurred by the candidate himself or authorised by 
him is material for the purpose of Section 77. 
CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF THE AMENDING ACT 
The validity of Explanation I to Section 77(1) of 
the Act which gives a carte blanche to political parties to 
spend unlimited monies for the election of the candidates 
sponsored by them was challenged before the Supreme Court 
In Dr. P. Nalla Thampy Terah V Union of India. ' The 
matter v/as examined by a five-judge Constitution Bench. 
Chandrachud C.J. who headed the Bench outlined the 
principle which the Court as a matter of judicial policy 
must be inclined to follov; in such cases : 
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The main strength of the judgment ... lies 
in this : The Constitution Bench first 
separates the policy considerations of the 
legislature from the ones which are 
perceived . or preferred by us privately or 
individually and then insists that the issue 
of constitutional validity of the impugned 
provision should be tested on the count of 
r. ^ ^^ (33-c) 
the former and not the latter . 
He then emphasised: 
... it is not for us to lay dov/n policies in 
matters pertaining to elections. If the 
provisions of the lav; violate the 
Constitution, they have to be struck down. We 
cannot, however, negate a lav; on the ground 
that we do not approve of the policy which 
underlies it ... we may have our own 
preferences and perceptions but, they cannot 
-.•..• -, (33-d) be used for invalidating laws. 
And further noted that the legislative policy behind 
Explanation I is "that persons other than the candidate or 
his election agent may, on their ov/n, release their purse 
strings and never tie them again". 
One of the grounds on v;hich the Explanation was 
challenged v/as that it violated Article 14 of the 
Constitution because it sanctions serious discrimination 
between one political party or individual and another on 
the basis of money pov/er. It makes the v/ealth or affluence 
of the political party supporting the candidate the 
decisive factor in the outcome of elections. It introduces 
wealth and affluence as a measure of a candidate's 
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qualification or prospects of success, \;hich is to 
'introduce a capricious or irrelevant factor'. To 
this the Court answered that Explanation I classifies all 
political parties or association in one group and confers 
upon them the same or similar advantages". " A 
classification of this nature, the Court held, bears 
reasonable relationship v/ith the object of the statute that 
expenses incurred by those who fall within the particular 
group should not be regarded as expenditure incurred or 
authorised by the candidate or his election agent.It is 
then no ansv/er to say that all political parties are not 
equally situated in the wealth v/hich they command. It is 
not the election law which creates such inequalities. 
"Inequalities exist apart from that law and are, 
unfortunately, implicit in the unequal positions in which 
the citizens find themselves". ~ VJhat the law does, the 
Court observed, is to allow, in an equal measure, all 
political parties, associations or bodies of persons or 
individuals (other than the candidate or his election 
agent) to incur expenses in connection v/ith the election of 
a candidate, which need not be included in the return of 
election expenses which the candidate is required to file. 
"Election laws are not designed to produce economic 
equality amongst citizens. They can, at best, provide an 
equal opportunity to all sections of society to project 
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their respective points of view on the occasion of 
elections. "^ "^ "^^  The method, the Court admitted, somewhat 
unfortunate, by which law has achieved that purpose, is by 
freeing all others except the candidate and his election 
agent from the restriction on spending, so long as the 
expenditure is incurred or authorised by those others. 
Regarding the argument that different political 
parties have been treated equally though they are situated 
unequally, or that individuals have been discriminated 
against either interse or in relation to political parties 
is correct, the Court observed^ "the only method which 
would measure upto the required constitutional standard is 
the one in which the State would have to allocate funds 
from its own exchequer in order to enable the various 
candidates to contest elections. That would be the fairest 
form of fairness. But, that is a far cry." ~^ 
Another ground of challenge in the instant case was 
/I 
that the Explanation'nullified the effect of Section 77(1) 
"as it not only permits but encourages and legitimises the 
influence of big money in the elctoral process and thus 
militates against the fairness and purity of the electoral 
process." The impugned provision, it was further 
pointed out, far from suppressing the mischief of baneful 
influence of big money directly promoted it and thereby 
sullied the purity of the electoral process. 
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Discarding the argument that the Explanation/denudes 
the Section of its meaning and makes it purposeless, the 
Supreme Court held that Section 77(1) on the one hand and 
the Explanation I on the other, deal v/ith two different 
situations. The former deals with the expenditure 'incurred 
or authorised by' a candidate or his election agent in 
connction with the election. It is obligatory to keep a 
separate and correct account of such expenditure. The 
Explanation deals v/ith the expenditure incurred or 
authorised by a political party or any other association or 
body of persons or by an individual other than the 
candidate or his election agent. It is not obligatory for 
the candidate or his election agent to keep a separate and 
correct account of such expenditure. That is, in the 
opinion of the Court, because of two reasons. Firstly, such 
expenditure is not incurred or authorised by the candidate 
or his election agent and therefore, in the very nature of 
things, they cannot keep an account of that expenditure. 
Secondly, the argument that expenditure of the kind 
described in the Explanation! must be deemed to be incurred 
or authorised by the candidate or his election agent, is 
met by the provision in the Explanation that it shall not 
be so deemed. The Court, thus^ concluded that "the latter 
(namely. Explanation!) cannot render the former (namely. 
Section 77(1) meaningless ." ^  "^ "^•'-^  
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THE SCOPE OF EXPLANATION I 
In the Court's estimation thus if an expenditure 
which purports to have been incurred, for example, by a 
political party, has in fact been incurred by the candidate 
or his election agent the Explanation would not be 
attracted. If it is in fact incurred by a political party 
or any other association or body of persons, or by an 
individual (other than the candidate or his election agent) 
that the Explanation v/ould come into play. The candidate 
cannot place his own funds in the power or possession of a 
political party or a trade union or some other person and 
plead for the protection of the Explanation. The reason is 
that in such a case, the incurring of the expenditure by 
those others, is a mere facade. In truth and substance,the 
expenditure is incurred by the candidate himself because, 
the money is his. "What matters for the purpose of 
Explanation is not v.'hose hand it is that spends the money. 
The essence of the matter is whose money it is. It is only 
if the money expended by a political party, for example, 
is not laid at its disposal by the candidate or his 
election agent that the Explanation would apply." ~^' In 
other words, it must be shown, in order that the 
Explanation may apply, that the source of the expenditure 
incurred was not the candidate or his election agent. The 
Court also clarified that the reason why the expression 
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"shall not be deemed to be" is used in the Fxplanation is 
that the Parliament \7anted to get over the effect of the 
judgment of he Supreme Court in Kanv/ar Lai Gupta. 
Similarly, the reason v/hy the expression "shall not ever 
be deemed to have been" is used in the Explanation is that 
the intention of the Parliament v/as to get over the effect 
of that judgment retrospectively, except to the extent 
mentioned in clause (a) and (b) of the Proviso to the 
Explanation. 
CONCLUSION 
There can be no doubt that money power in many 
situations dominates and determines the fate of election in 
India. The vast majority of our representatives represents 
a select class rather than the masses. Our experience of 
holding elctions has shown that elections are hardly free 
and fair. The law has miserably failed to check the mal-
practices of excessive electoral expenditure. 
Section 77, taken in its totality, suffers from two 
distinct disabilities. Firstly, it leaves out from its 
purview all political parties and associations. Secondly, 
its requirement as to the rendering of account is so 
superfluos that it can hardly ever be effectively enforced. 
It is a matter of common knowledge that political parties 
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are largely funded by vested interests deeply interested in 
the outcome of the election results. It is also a matter of 
common knowledge «that political parties, with huge sums of 
money at disposal, know well how money can play its part 
in furthering the interests of their candidates and what 
method they should employ in order that money can be made 
operative. Those fighting as independents have also come to 
learn the tricks of the trade. That the provision of 
Section 77 implies, if anything, a meek mandate is a fact 
too well known. Since the commencement of the R.P. Act, a 
number of political parties and combinations have been at 
the helm of affairs. Neither of them has wanted to tie 
its own hands, and so none of them has ever been serious to 
bring about changes in the law to reduce, if not eradicate, 
the malaise that has permeated through the entire 
institutions of electioneering. 
The Courts know it, and know it too well, that the 
remedy, if at all there can be one, lies largely with the 
Parliament, and not with the the Courts. The law, as it 
exists now, is so weak that the courts are hardly a forum 
for redressel of the consequence which money-pov/er often 
brings to the individual. The cases fought in the apex 
Court, and discussed earlier, show a relaxed attitude on 
the part of the Judges. They do not seem to be truely 
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inclined to invalidate an election on the touchstone of 
Section 77. Kanv;ar Lai Gupta's v?as a case where the Court 
seemed to be keen to effect a reversal in the traditional 
judicial trend. But that effort soon found itself negatived 
by a Parliamentary amendment. The Courts therefore started 
treading the same path in the post-amendment litigation 
-> . . . period. The Courts disinclination to interfere is generally 
comparable with the Parliament's disinclination to bring 
about any appreciable reform in the existing law. Opinions/ 
like those of Bhagwati are exceptions, and are notable for 
the intensity with v/hich a particular Judge might feel 
obsessed with the system that somehow has come about. 
A> time may come, it may be hoped, when the various 
political combinations in the Parliament realise that if 
democracy in this country has to be established on fairer 
foundations, the potentiality of the money-role in 
elections has to be cut down, to the possible extent it 
34 
can be through and by the instrumentality of law. 
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Rs.1.50 lakh to Rs.4.5 lakh for Parliamentery 
elections. The revision was last done in 1984. See 
The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 22-10-1994. 
6 Kanwar Lai Gupta V Amarnath Chawla, AIR 1975 
S.C. 308. 
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dravm attention to a serious and glaring flav; in the 
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taken by Parliament to amend the law. The Court 
has called upon Parliament to enact a law that 
identifies and locates persons investincj in a 
candidate's election in order to promote the 
purity of polls. The Court is correct in its 
conclusion on the present law that this means 
the freedom of any "Smuggler, criminal or any 
other anti-social element" to make an 
investment in a candidate's election without 
announcing or accounting for it. 
It has been rightly observed by L.M. Singhvi 
that there is no public accountability in our 
political system. "Everyone is politically 
accountable, except political parties. The political 
parties are the least politically accountable 
institutions in our country. Is that a healthy state 
of affairs"?: J. of Constitutional & Parliamentary 
Studies 106 (January - June, 1984). 
Former CEC R.K. Trivedi expressed concern over 
the "money power influence" in elections and said, 
"We shall go back to the old law" under which any 
expenditure incurred by a political party for the 
benefit of its candidate formed part of the ceiling 
on expenditure: The Times of India, New Delhi, 
December 12, 1984. 
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CHAPTER-XIV 
OBTAINING ASSISTANCE OF GOVERNMENT SERVANTS 
INTRODUCTION 
Parliament intended to keep government servants 
aloof from politics and also to protect them from being 
used for election purposes by those with influence or in 
positions of authority and power and to prevent the 
governmental machinery from being exploited for furthering 
a candidate's interests. The Act accordingly declares that 
any kind of obtaining of assistance would be a corrupt 
practice, and as such prohibited. The objective behind the 
lav; is laudable and is an important part of the scheme of 
Section 123. The prohibition as incorporated in clause(7) 
of Section 123 is given below. 
SECTION 123 (7) 
The obtaining or procuring or abetting or 
attempting to obtain or procure by a candidate or his 
agent or, by any other person (with the consent of a 
candidate or ohis election agent), any assistance of the 
prospects of that candidate's election, from any person in 
the service of the Government and belonging to any of the 
following classes, namely: 
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(a) gazetted officers; 
(b) stipendiary judges and magistrates; 
(c) members of the armed forces of the Union; 
(d) members of the police forces; 
(e) excise officers; 
(f) revenue officers other than village revenue 
officers known as lambardars, malguzars, patels, 
deshmukhs or by any other name, whose duty is to 
collect land revenue and who are remunerated by a 
share of, or commission on, the amount of land 
revenue collected by them but v7ho do not discharge 
any police functions; and 
(g) such other class of persons in the service of the 
government may be prescribed: 
Provided that where any person, in the service of 
the Government and belonging to any of the classes 
aforesaid, in the discharge or purported discharge of 
his official duty, makes any arrangements or provides 
any facilities or does any other act or thing, for, 
to, or in relation to, any candidate or his agent or 
any other person acting with the consent of the 
candidate or his election agent (whether by reason of 
the office held by the candidate or for any other 
reason), such arrangements, facilities or act or 
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thing shall not be deemed to be assistance for the 
furtherance of the prospects of that candidate's election. 
EXPLANATION. 
(1) X X X 
(2) For the purposes of clause (7), a person shall be 
deemed to assist in the furtherance of the 
prospects of a candidate's election if he acts as 
an election agent of that candidate. 
(3) For the purposes of clause (7), notwithstanding 
anything contained in any other law, the 
publication in the Official Gazette of the 
appointment, resignation, termination of service, 
dismissal or removal from service of a person in 
the service of the Central Government (including a 
person serving in connection with administration of 
a Union territory or of a State Government shall be 
conclusive proof « — 
(i) of such appointment, resignation, termination 
of service, dismissal or removal from service, 
as the case may be, and 
(ii) where the date of taking effect of such 
appointment, resignation, termination of 
service, dismissal or removal from service, as 
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the case may be, is stated in such 
publication, also of the fact that such person 
was appointed with effect from the said date, 
or in the case of resignation, termination of 
service, dismissal or removal from service 
such person ceased to be in such srvice with 
effect from the said date. 
A perusal of clause(7) thus shows that what 
constitutes corrupt practice under this clause is the 
obtaining or procuring or abetting or attempting to obtain 
or procure by a candidate or his agent or by any person 
with the consent of candidate or his election agent any 
assistance (other than giving of vote) for the 
furtherance of the prospects of the candidate's election 
from any person in the service of the governmet and 
belonging to any of the classes specified therein. 
WHO IS A 'CANDIDATE'? 
The prohibition under Section 123(7) would apply 
only when 'assistance' for the furtherance of the 
prospects of one's election was taken from a person in the 
service of the government by a candidate or his agent. In 
other words, the corrupt practice as defined in section 
123(7) cannot be committed by a person before he became a 
candidate. The question that would necessarily follow 
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would be: who is a candidate? And a 'candidate' is defined 
of the Act 
is Section 79(b)/as "a person who has been or claims to 
have been duly nominated as a candidate at any 
election" . 
2 
Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi V Raj Narain is a well 
known judgment in which the scope of the word 'candidate' 
was directly raised. In the instant case one of the 
allegations made against the returned candidate was that 
she had obtained, for the furtherance of the propects of 
her election, the assistance of Yashpal Kapoor during the 
period January 7 to 25, 1971, when he was a government 
servant. 
Mrs. Gandhi had filed her nomination on 1.2.1971. 
Yashpal Kapoor had tendered his resignation from 
government service on 13-1-1971 which was accepted by the 
President of India on 25.1.1971 with effect from 
14.1.1971. The appointment of Yashpal Kapoor as the 
election agent of Mrs. Gandhi was made on 1.2.1971, the 
date on which Mrs. Gandhi filed her nomination. Yashpal 
Kapoor did not work in the Prime Minister's Secretariat 
after 13.1.1971 and he drew no salary as government 
servant after that date. 
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The Supreme Court held that no corrupt practice 
could be said to have been committed by the respondent 
(Mrs. Indira Gandhi) vicariously due to anything done by 
Yashpal Kapoor because he acted voluntarily; he was not a 
government servant after 14.1.1971 and the respondent was 
not a candidate before 1.2.1971 i.e. the date of filing of 
her nomination. She became a candidate only on 1.2.1971" 
Interpreting the definitioon of 'candidate' in the 
sub-section as amended by the Act of 1975, Khanna, J., 
observed: 
I find that the only reasonable inference is 
that the person referred to as a candidate 
in that clause should be a person who has 
been or claims to have been duly nominated 
as a candidate at an election and not one 
who is yet to be nominated-^. 
The corrupt practice defined in Section 123(7) could not 
be committed by any person before there was a 'candidate' 
4 
for an election. It is clear that the procuring or 
obtaining of assistance had to take place either by a 
candidate or by his agent or by somebody "with the consent. 
of the candidate or his election agent." Until the 
candidate had appointed an election agent, the action of 
any other person could not constitute him automatically an 
agent so that he may by doing something voluntarily, 
succeed in making the candidate vicariously liable for his 
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own actions whether he was or was not a gazetted officer 
5 
at the time when he committed the act complained of . 
Recently,, the Supreme Court in Mohan Rawale V 
5-a Damodar Tatyaba reiterated the viev; that a person 
becomes a candidate for the election in question only 
after filing the nomination paper. "Therefore, the 
allegations relating to the period anterior to the 
commencement of the candidature cannot be relied upon to 
establish corrupt practice proprio viqore 
IN THE SERVICE OF THE GOVERNMENT 
Before a case can come under Section 123(7), it 
must also be shown that the person whose assistance has 
been obtained or procured is "in the service of the 
governmeiit" and that he belongs to any of the categories 
specified in sub-clauses (a) to (g ) of Section 123(7). 
Explaining the said expression the Supreme Court in 
7 Kishore Chandra Deo Bhan:i V Raqhunath Misra made a 
distinction between" serving under the Government" and "in 
the service of the Government." In the instant case the 
appellant and the respondent No.l were candidates for 
election to the Orissa Legislative Assembly. The 
appellant was declared elected. Respondent No.l filed an 
election petition questioning, on various grounds, the 
election of the appellant. The Election Tribunal dismissed 
5b 0 
the petition holding that no grounds had been established 
to invalidate the election. Respondent No.l appealed to 
the High Court .against the order of the Tribunal. The 
matter to be decided before the High Court was whether the 
obtaining and procuring by respondent No.l of assistance 
for the furtherance of the prospects of his election from 
Sarpanches of certain Gram Panchayats, would amount to the 
violation of Section 123(7). The Orissa High court was of 
the opinion that a Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat, though 
not a government servant appointed by the government, was 
none the less a person in the service of the government as 
he performed many of the governmental duties and was also 
removable by the government and such a person came within 
the provisions of Section 123 (7) (f) of the Act. A 
Sarpanch exercised under the Orissa Grama Panchayats Act 
mostly governmental functions like collection of taxes, 
maintenance of public accounts etc. The High Court thought 
that if such a person was not brought under Section 123(7) 
(f) there v/ould be " a lot of undue influence exercised on 
the voters by these persons who in the village exercised a 
lot of influence considering the nature of their powers 
and the ideas of the village people". The High Court 
accordingly allowed the appeal and set aside the 
appellant's election. 
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The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the 
judgment of the High Court. The Court held that tv;o things 
will have to be established before the provisions of Section 
123(7)(f) can apply to a Sarpanch of Grama Panchayat 
constituted under the Orissa Act: (1) That such a person is 
in the service of the government and (2) That such a person 
is in the service of the government,and that he comes within 
the class specified in class (f). It would not be enough to 
establish only one of these conditions. It is necessary, 
therefore, to decide, in the first instance, whether a 
Sarpanch is a person in the service of the Government of the 
state of Orissa. 
Imam, J., who delivered the judgment of the Court 
observed that there is a distinction between "serving under 
the Government" and "in the service of the Government", 
because while one may serve under a Government, one may not 
necessarily be in the service of the Government; under the 
latter expression one not only serves under the Government 
but is in the service of the Government and it imports the 
o 
relationship of master and servant. 
9 
There are tv;o essentials to this relationship: (l)the 
servant must be under the duty of rendering personal service 
to the master or to others in his behlaf, and (2) the 
master must have the right to control the servant's 
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work either personally or by another servant or agent. 
"It is this right of control or interference, of being 
entitled to tell the servant when to work (within the 
hours of service) or when not to work, and what work to do 
and how to do it (within the terms of such service), which 
is the dominant characteristic in this relation and marks 
off the servant from and independent contractor, or from 
one employed merely to give to his employer the fruits of 
his labour. In the latter case, the contractor or 
performer is not under his employer's control in doing the 
work or effecting the service; he has to shape and manage 
his work so as to give the result he has contracted to 
effect. Consequently, a jobbing gardener is no more the 
servant of the person employing him than the doctor 
employed by alocal authority to act as visiting physician 
to its hospital". None of the provisions of the Orissa Act 
suggested that as between the State Government and the 
Grama Panchayat and its sarpanch any such relationship 
existed. There was no doubt that the State Government^the 
District Magistrate and Sub-divisional Magistrate had been 
given certain powers of control and supervision over the 
Grama Panchayat but those power of control and supervision 
were in relation to the administrative functions of the 
Grama Panchayat and the Sarpanch. It can hardly be said 
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that the Grama Panchayat in so functioning was in the 
service of the Government, the apex Court observed. Its 
administrative functions were akin to the functions 
generally performed by Municipalities and District Boards. 
"It would be a conception hitherto unknown to suppose that 
any Municipality or District Board was in the service of 
the Government merely because it exercised administrative 
functions and to some extent was under the control of the 
.. 10 Government . 
From the above discussion the Court concluded that 
in the present case the two essential elements that a 
Sarpanch must be a person in the service of the Government 
and that he belonged to the class mentioned in clause (f) 
of sub-section (7) of Section 123 had not been 
established. Even if one of them had been established and 
not the other the provisions of Section 123 (7) would not 
apply to such a person. In the opinion of the apex Court, 
the High Court erred in supposing that because a Sarpanch 
of a Panchayat exercised governmental duties he must be 
regarded as a person in the service of the government. The 
High Court did not give any clear finding that a Sarpanch, 
even if a person in the service of the Goverraent, was 
either a revenue officer or a village accountant. Hence, 
the Supreme Court held, the provisions of Section 123 (7) 
did not apply to him. 
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Thus "serving under a governiTient" is different from 
being "in the service of the government", for a person 
temporarily doing some work may, while doing that work be 
"serving under the government" but that would not make him 
a person "in the service of the government". The use of 
the expression "in the service of" iitplies a sort of continuity. 
OBTAINING OR PROCURING OF ASSISTNCE 
'Corrupt practice' under cluse (7) consists in 
obtaining or procuring the assistance of government 
servants. The Courts have sought to give a restricted 
meaning to the v7ords 'obtain' and 'procure'. In Motilal V 
Mangla Prasad , the Allahabad High Court held that in 
order to prove that assistance from a person in the 
service of the government was "procured" in a given 
situation, it must be shown that the condidate had 
consciously done some positive act in order to bring about 
the result of receiving assistance from that person. The 
word obtain" in Section 123 (7) cannotes "purpose" or 
"effort" behind the action of the candidate. The word has 
not been used in the sub-section in the sense of a mere 
passive receipt of assistance without the candidate being 
even conscious of the fact that the assistance has been 
rendered. Consequently, in order to bring the case under 
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sub-section (7) it must be shown that the candidate did 
some effort or performed some purposeful act in order to 
get the assistance. The receipt of assistance must be the 
result of some conscious action of the candidate and not 
mere passive happening of getting the assistance. In the 
opinion of the Court, "it further appears to be 
unreasonable to impute to the legislature an intention 
that the election of a candidate should be declared to be 
void, even though the cndidate had no knowledge even of 
the fact that some person in the service of the Government 
had taken into his head to assist a particular candidate. 
This would be inconsistant with the entire scheme of the 
13 
Act, as it stands after its amendment.... of 1956". 
In another judgment Hafiz Mohd. Ibrahim V Election 
14 Tribunal, a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court 
(Mootham C.J. and Mukher ji. ,J.) had pointed out that a 
government servant has a "private personality" too. In 
this case the allegtion was that the Minister of State, 
who was the agent of a candidate, wrote out an appeal in 
his own hand and signed it and sent it to his personal 
assistant, who was a government servant, to be 
communicated to the press and the latter typed, attested, 
and issued the matter to the press. It was contended that 
the Minister had committed the corrupt practice of 
obtaining the assistance of a government servant. 
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Chief Justice Mootham delivering his judgment held 
that it was not every act which was done by a government 
servant at the instance of a candidate or his agent which 
came within the ambit of this clause even though it might 
result in the furtherance of the candidate's election, 
"for, were that so, the candidate would be unable to 
utilize the services of the post office to deliver copies 
of his election address or of the railwy service to travel 
to a place where he wants to make an election speech". 
1 6 The learned judge further illustrated: A candidate is on 
his way to the railway station for the purpose of 
travelling to a nearby town where he is due to make an 
important election speech. His car breaks down and he 
stops the first car which comes along and obtains a lift. 
It happens that the driver of the car is,and is known by the 
candidate to be, a government servant. Has the candidate 
been guilty of a corrupt practice?, the learned Judge 
17 
asked. He ansered: If the assistance which he has 
obtained is merely that of being taken to the station and 
nothing more I think the answer must be in the negative, 
for the candidate's request was in no way motivated by the 
fact that the driver was a government servant. l£ howerver 
the breakdown of the candidate's car was a subterfuge and 
his subsequent arrival at the station in the other vehicle 
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was a part of a plan to convey the impression to the 
public that his candidature had official support, then 
clearly, in my view, a corrupt practice has been 
committed. The learned Judge further asked as to whether 
the petioner v/hen he sent the manuscript of his appeal to 
his personal assistant with instructions (as alleged in 
the charge) to type, authenticate and issue it to the 
press did so because his personal assistant was a 
government servant; or put in other words, did he do so 
because he wanted to make capital out of the fact that the 
appeal was being sent to the press by a government 
servant? "Unless that question can be answered in the 
affirmative, I am of opinion that the facts alleged do not 
amount to the corrupt practice defined... in Section 
123"^^. 
Mukherji,J., wrote a separate but concurring 
judgment. In his opinion, the words of the sub-section 
indicate that the obtaining and procurring of the 
assistance of the government servant has to be with the 
object or with the intention of furthering the prospects 
of a candidate's election and further that this assistance 
which is taken of the government servant must be taken 
because the individual happens to be a government servant 
which fact or circumstance was likely, in the opinion of 
5Hn 
the person v.^ho obtained the assistance, to influence the 
prospects of the election. 
The learned judge emphasized that mere taking of 
assistance of a government servant v/as not enough to 
attract the provision of the sub-section unless the 
assistance was taken because he was a government servant 
with the intention of furthering the election prospects in 
some manner. Justice Mukherji concluded: 
Every government servant has a personality 
apart from his official personality and the 
intention is not to keep this "private 
personality", so to speak, from acting in 
elections or rendering assistance to 
candidates in their private capacity without 
involving in that assistance their official 
personality in any mannerl9 
Similar observations are found in a Division Bench 
decision of the Punjab High Court in Ram Phal V Braham 
20 Prakash. In this case it was pleaded that one Gopi Nath 
Aman, who was a government servant (i.e. Chairman of the 
Public Relation Committee) canvassed and pursuaded voters 
to cast their votes in favour of Braham Prakash and that 
for this reason Braham Prakash should be held to have 
obtained or procured the service of the said government 
servant for the furtherance of his election prospects. 
Inder Dev Dua, J., speaking for the Court, observed 
that merely because a government servant has pursuaded 
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voters to cast their votes in favour of a particular 
candidate does not by itself bring his conduct within the 
mischief of Section 123(7) because it is the conduct of 
the candidate or his agent in obtaining or procuring or 
abetting or attempting to obtain or procure the assistance 
of a person in the service of the government for the 
furtherance of the prospects of that candidates election 
21 
V7hich is the gravamen of this corrupt practice. In the 
opinion of the learned Judge Section 123 (7) does not, as 
its language show, purport to place any disability on the 
right of a citizen of this Republic who may happen to be 
in the service of the government, to persuade his friends 
of his own volition, to vote for one of the candidates 
seeking election to the Parliament. "This is a valuable 
right which, in my opinion, every citizen possesses and 
is not as such hit by Section 123(7) which merely 
invalidates an attempt on the part of a candidate to 
obtain or procure the services of a Government 
22 
servant". 
The Court found that the allegation in the 
petition, even if taken to be correct, did not lead to the 
irresistible inference that Braham Parakash obtained or 
procured Araan's services. The onus of proving corrupt 
practice is alv/ays on those who assert their commission 
562 
and the commission of such practices has to be established 
by unimpeachable evidence. The appeal was thus dismissed 
as mere convassing by a government servant would by itself 
not attract the provisions of Section 123(7). 
On the same line the Allahabad High Court in Haji 
23 Abdul VJahid V B.V. Keshar observed that obtaining the 
assistance of a government officer to get a list of the 
polling stations from the District Election Officer v;ill 
not by itself constitute corrupt practice under Section 
123(7). It was held that simply because the list was taken 
from the office was not sufficient to convey to anybody 
present in the office the feeling that the candidate had 
official support. In the opinion of the Court the act of 
obtaining the list from an office was of such trivial 
nature that it could hardly be said that the employment of 
the government servant for the purpose of obtaining the 
list would further improve the chance of the candidate. 
The Patna High Court in Chandrashekhar Singh V 
24 Sarioo Prasad held that a candidate was not guilty of 
corrupt practice under Section 123(7) merely because his 
son, who was a sub-Inspector of Police on leave, drove a 
jeep, in which important members of the government who 
V7ere also leaders of the party to which the candidate 
belonged, were travelling during the election period. It 
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was held that mere driving of the jeep \;as an act of 
carrying the leaders who were important members of either 
State Government or Central Government and the 
Sub-Inspector of Police, even if he was on leave could be 
expected, if required, to show this much of courtesy to 
the important leaders who were members of the government 
too. In the opinion of the Court, thus, mere driving of 
the jeep of the tv.'O leaders under the circumstances by a 
sub-Inspector of Police on leave could not be said to be 
asistance in the furtherance of the prospects of the 
respondent's election from a person in the service of the 
government. The driving was merely on act of courtesy 
shown to the important leaders. 
In an earlier pronouncement the Supreme Court in 
25 Ra-) Krushna Bose V Bmod Kanungo held that the fact that 
a candidate was proposed or seconded by a government servant 
did not constitute a corrupt practice under the said 
sub-section."But", the Court further clarified, "though it 
is permissible for a candidate to go thus far, he cannot 
go further and if the procurement of government servants 
to propose and second a nomination is part of a plan to 
procure their assistance for the furtherance of the 
candidate's prospects in other ways than by vote, 
then Section 123 ... is attracted, for^ in that case, the 
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plan and its fulfilment must be viev;ed as a connected 
acts of 
whole and the/proposing or seconding v.-hich are innocent 
Of: 
in themselves cannot be separated from the rest". 
Das, J., speaking for the Court on behalf of 
himself and four others, also laid dovrn the policy behind 
the provision. He observed : 
The policy of the law is to keep Government 
servants aloof from politics and also to protect 
them from being imposed on by those with influence 
or in positions of authority and power, and to 
prevent the machinery of Government from being used 
in furtherance of a candidate's return. But at the 
same time it is not the policy of the law to 
disenfrenchise them or to dendue them altogether of 
27 their rights as ordinary citizens of the land. 
Raj Krushna Bose is a locus classicus on the point 
and the courts have consistently adhered to the ratio as 
propounded therein by S.R. Das J. 
' 28 
In K.M. Mani V P.J. Antony, once again the 
electoral freedom of a government servant was discussed. 
The allegation against the returned candidate, K.M. Mani, 
was that he obtained and procured the services of a public 
servant, Joseph Thomas, City Police Commissioner, 
Trivendrum, and hence a corrupt practice under Section 
123(7) of the Act was thereby committed. The 
Commissioner was alleged to have exhorted the priests and 
leaders of the community assembled at the Bishop's house 
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to vrork for the success of K.M. Mani "as it was in the 
interest of the Church and the community" to do so. The 
Kerala High Court had held that K.M. Mani "obtained and 
procured the services" of Joseph Thomas, a police 
officer, "in furtherance of the prospects of his 
election", and a corrupt practice was committed under 
sub-section 7 of Section 123 of the Act. The Supreme 
Court, on a reappraisal of the evidence, did not find any 
evidence to prove that Joseph Thomas attended the meeting 
and spoke there at the instance of the returned candidate, 
or that he spoke anything at all at the meeting for the 
furtherance of Mani's election prospects. However, the 
apex Court was of the opinion that the mere presence of 
the police officer at the meeting or expression of his 
personal views could not possibly be considered a corrupt 
practice ascribable to the returned candidate. 
Shinghal, J., who wrote the judgment on behalf of 
himself and Murtaza Fazal All, J., observed : 
Even a police officer whose assistance has 
been prohibited under sub-section 7 of 
Section 123 of the Act, is nonetheless a 
citizen and an elector and is entitled to 
have his own belief that a particvley 
candidate would win, and to express that 
belief, without lending an impression that 
it was meant to assist him in the election 
in any manner. It v;ould have been open to 
objection if Joseph Thomas had stated at 
the meeting that it v;as necessary for the 
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benefit of the Christian community that 
persons like Mani should v/in and become a 
Minister to save them from rigour of the 
Land Reforms Act, but the Bishop has 
returned •& categorical answer that Joseph 
29 
Thomas did not say any such thing. 
About the remaining part of the statement of the 
witness relating to Joseph Thomas's statement that if it 
was necessary he v/ould give up his uniform and job, the 
Supreme Court evaluated it as : 
That was a statement regarding his future course of 
action, and it shows that Joseph Thomas realised 
that without giving up his job it v;as not possible 
for him to assist the appellant in the election. 
When therefore Joseph Thomas was conscious of that 
limitation it cannot be believed that he would 
throw discretion to the v/inds and then and there 
launch an exhortation for the appellant's success 
at the polls. The fact that no such impression was 
created from what Joseph Thomas said at the 
meeting, will be clear from the Bishop's answer 
that he did not know what for the witness mentioned 
his v/illingness to give up his job when necessary. 
We have no reason to disbelieve the statement of 
the Bishop, and we are unable to take the view that 
it can be used for the purpose of proving the 
5G7 
alleged corrupt practice of obtaining or 
procuring the assistance of the police 
officer fo^ furtherance of the 
appellant's prospects in the 
T ^. 30 election. 
The Court concluded that the election petitioner 
must therefore exclude every hypothesis except that of 
guilt on the part of the returned candidate or his 
election agent, and the trial court erred in basing its 
31 finding on a mere probability. 
The instant case once again clarifies in clear terms 
that a government servant (police officer), like any other 
citizen, has every right to give his views about the 
success of a candidate provided it was without lending an 
impression that it was meant to assist him in the election 
in any manner. 
In order, therefore, to bring a case within the 
ambit of Section 123(7) the assistance must be for the 
furtherance of the prospects of the candidate's election. 
What is, thus, penalised by Section 123(7) is the 
intention of the candidate or his agent to use the 
government servant's influence in furthering the prospects 
of an election. It is not, therefore, every act which is 
done by a government servant at the instance of a 
5B8 
candidate or his agent which comes v/ithin the mischief of 
this sub-clause, even though it may incidentally result in 
furthering the election of a candidate in some form. 
The onus of proving corrupt practices is alv/ays on 
those who assert their commission and the commission of 
such practices has to be established by unimpeachable 
evidence. Undoubtedly, the evidence in support thereof 
need not be direct and it may be merely circumstantial and 
inferential but such circumstantial evidence and inferences 
deducible there from must be strong enough to lead to the 
only reasonable conclusion of the commission of corrufpt 
practices as alleged. No conjectures or surmises however 
attractive or even plausible can replace proof and if two 
equally reasonable conclusions or inferences are open, one 
guilty and the other innocent, the latter is generally 
speaking, allowed to prevail. 
CONCLUSION 
A review of the cases fought on the ground of 
Section 123(7) would show that the courts have sought to 
give a narrow construction to the prohibition contained in 
that provision. The Central and State Governments 
employ a very large number of persons, and quite a good 
number of them have to be involved in the management of 
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the election process. The courts do not seem to be keen 
to disturb an election result on mere allegations of 
procurement of services of a government servant. The 
Judicial insistence is on the fulfilment of two 
conditions. Firstly, there must be a clear and cogent 
evidence to substantiate the allegation that assistance 
from a government servant v;as in fact secured by a 
candidate. Secondly, it must further be proved on evidence 
that the assistance was procured with the object of 
materially affecting the results of an election. The 
latter condition places a heavier burden on the plaintiff 
which it may not always be an easy job to discharge. This 
explains the reason v;hy no plaintiff has ever succeeded, 
as it is clear from the cases reviewed above, to get an 
election result judicially reversed on the basis of the 
prohibition contained by Section 123 (7). The efficacy 
thus of the prohibition in many cases must remain 
doubtful, though its value as an important part of the 
scheme devised by Section 123 can hardly be denied. 
570 
NOTES AND REFERENCES 
1. Substituted by Act 40 of 1975^ S. 7, for Cl(b) 
(restrospectively) 
The position was however different before the 
Election Law Amendment in 1975 and the definition 
of 'candidate' prior to the amendment as provided 
in Section 79(b) was : "a person who has been or 
claims to have been duly nominated as a candidate 
at any election and any such person shall be deemed 
to have been a candidate as from the time when, 
with the election in prospect, he began to hold 
himself out as a prospective candidate". 
It may be noted that the Supreme Coaurt held 
that R.P. (Amendment) Act, 1974, and, and the 
Election Lav7s (Amendment) Act, 1975 are valid. "It 
is within the poweri^ of Parliament to frame laws 
with regard to elections" and the constitutional 
validity of a State depends entirely on the 
existence of the legislative power and the express 
provision in Article 13 of the Constitution. (Per 
Ray C.J. in Smt. Indira Gandhi V Raj Narain, AIR 
1975 S.C. 2299 at 2332). 
I 
2. Supra Note 1 
3. Id_. at 2357 
4. Id. at 2304 (per Beg, J) 
5. Id at 2398 (per Beg, J) 
5-a (1994) 2 S.C.C 392 
5-b Id at 393. In this case the cut-off date 23.4.1991 
was fixed with reference to the date when 
nomination papers were filed by the appellant 
concerned, because since that date the appellant 
v;ill be deemed to have legally acquired the status 
of a candidate. Accordingly, the Court held : "we 
hold that all the averments in paragraphs 1 to 20 
of the memorandum of election petition in so far 
as they refer to a period prior to April 23, 1991 
cannot amount to allegations of corrupt practice". 
6. There is a material difference betv/een the 
phraseology of Section 123 (8) before it was 
amended and Section 123 (7) as now contained in 
571 
the Act. The language of the provisions of Section 
123 (8) covered a vi7ide field and referred to every 
person "serving under the Government" of India or a 
State unless such person was declared to be one to 
whom the provisions would not apply. After the 
amendment, the provisions of Section 123(7) are 
narrower in scope and apply to any person "in the 
service of the Government" belonging to the classes 
specified in clauses (a) to (g) and none else. 
7. 19 E.L.R.I. 
8. TJA at 11 
9. Ibid (The Court quoted Batt on the Law of Master 
and Servant). 
10. Id at 12 
11. Tej Pal Singh V Jagbir Singh, 15 ELR 349. In the 
R.P. Act, 1951, before its amendment in the year 
1956, the requirement was that a person should be 
serving under the Government of a State. The 
Allahabad High Court held that Vice-Sarpanches and 
ranches of Niyaya Panchayats constituted under the 
U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947, are not persons "in 
the service of the Government" within the meaning 
of Section 123 (7) of the Act. The word 
"stipendiary" in Section 123 (7) applies to 
"magistrates" as well as "Judges", and since 
Vice-Sarpanches and Panches are not stipendiary 
magistrates though they have some magisterial 
powers, they do not come under Section 123(7)(b). 
12. 15 ELR 425 
13. ^ at 433-34 
The Assam High Court followed this 
interpretation in Biresh Mishra V Ram Nath Sharma, 
17 ELR 243. In this case it was proved that the 
Chief Minister and the respondent who was a 
Congress candidate, travelled together to address a 
Congress Election meeting in a railway trolley 
provided by the Assistant Traffic Superintendent, 
who was a government officer. But, the Court held, 
that it by itself did not establish that the 
respondent procured assistance of a government 
servants as the Assistant Traffic Superintendent 
(ATS) had not been produced and thus there was no 
evidence to shov; that the respondent made aaryef f ort 
to obtain the assistance of the Assistant Traffic 
Superintendent by getting the trolley from him. The 
572 
Court concluded that since the evidence did not 
show that the respondent had obtained or procured 
the assistance of the Assistant Traffic 
Superintendent, or that the Chief Minister had 
obtained the assistance of the Assistant Traffic 
Superintendent with the consent of the respondent 
and for the furtherance of the prospects of his 
election the respondent had not committed a corrupt 
practice under Section 123(7). 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
13 E.L.R. 262 
^ at 271 
Ibid 
Id at 271-72 
Id at 272 
Id at 273-74 
23 E.L.R. 92 : AIR 
Id at 105 
Ibid. The Supreme 
1962 Punj. 1291. 
Court in Smt. Indira Gandhi 
accepted the meaning of the v/ords obtain and 
procure as given by the Allahabad & the Punjab High 
Courts in Hafiz Mohd. Ibrahim and Ram Prasad, 
respectively. 
23. 21 E.L.R. 409 
24. 22 E.L.R. 206 
25. 9 E.L.R. 294: (1954) S.C.R. 913 
26. M_ at 298 
27. Ibid 
28. K.M. Mani V P.J. Antony, AIR 1979 S.C. 234 
29. Id at 241 
30. Ibid 
31. Id at 245. 
573 
C H A P T E R - X V 
B O O T H C A P T U R I N G 
INTRODUCTION 
India is the largest in the comity of world 
democracies where over 500 million people have the right to 
choose their government through the ballot box. One of the 
basic postulates of democracy is a free and fair election. 
During the past few elections 'rigging' and 'booth capturing' 
have become a menace. So widespread is their use, in some 
States atleast, that they are now almost a part of the 
electoral process. Of the two, booth capturing is 
comparatively a recent phenomenon. Behind the trait is the 
power of money. Seats of power have, in course of election 
history, become so tempting that the opportunity to take law 
into one's own hand is seized at its quickest on the pretext 
that eds justify means. Of course all this is a part of the 
gradually deteriorating law and order situation and the 
flourishing culture of criminality . 
THE LAW ON BOOTH CAPTURING 
Booth capturing originally did not figure under the 
categories of corrupt practices enumerated under Section 123 
of the Act., It was only in 1989 that Parliament included 
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"booth capturing by a candidate or his agent or other person" 
2 
as one of the eight categories of corrupt practices . 
The Explanation to Section 58-A lays down that booth 
capturing shall have the same meaning as in Section 135-A. 
Section 135-A which was brought on statute with effect from 
March 15, 1989 under Amendment Act 1 of 1989, prescribes 
booth capturing to be an of fence and the person committing it 
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall 
not be less than six months and which may be extended to a 
maximum of two years and fine. Where such offence was 
committed by a person in the service of the Government he 
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall 
not be less than one year but which may extend to three 
years and fine. Booth capturing has been explained in its 
explanation thus : 
"For the purpose of this section 'booth 
capturing' includes, among other things, all 
or any of the following activities, namely : 
(a) Seizure of a polling station or a place fixed for the 
poll by any person or persons making polling 
authorities surrender the ballot papers or voting 
machines and doing of any other act which affects the 
orderly conduct of elections; 
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(b) taking possession of a polling station or a place 
fixed for the poll by any person or persons and 
allowing only his or their own supporters to exercise 
their right' to vote and prevent others from voting; 
(c) threatening any elector and preventing him from going 
to the polling station or a place fixed for the poll 
to cast his vote; 
(d) seizure of a place for counting of votes by any person 
or persons, making the counting authorities surrender 
the ballot papers or voting machines and the doing of 
anything which affects the orderly counting of votes; 
(e) doing by any person in the service of Government, of 
all or any of the aforesaid activities or aiding or 
conniving at, any such activity in the furtherance of 
the prospects of the election of a candidate". 
In the statement of Objects and Reasons for which the 
amendments were introduced in Section 123 of the Act, 
"booth capturing" was made an electoral offence under 
Section 135-A; it was stated that booth capturing and 
rigging of elections had been on the increase in the recent 
past and to check the evil, booth capturing had been made an 
offence and also a corrupt practice. 
57f, 
THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE 
In its first judicial pronouncement by the apex Court 
3 
on booth capturing m Basanagouda V S.B. Amarkhed , it was 
observed that "in the recent past there have been various 
complaints regarding booth capturing. The tendency to over -
awe the weaker section of the society and to physically take 
over the polling booths meant for them is on the increase. 
Booth capturing wholly negates the election process and 
subverts the democratic set-up which is the basic feature of 
4 
our Constitution " "During the post - independence era ten 
parliamentary elections have entrenched democratic policy in 
this country which cannot be permitted to be eroded by 
showing laxity in the matter of booth capturing which has 
5 
now been made an offence under Section 135-A of the Act ", 
it was further observed. 
On the point of enumeration of categories of booth 
capturing AS" aH)ended to the Explanation in Section 135-A, the 
Supreme held that it was an inclusive explanation and 
seizure of polling station, taking possession thereof and 
making polling authorities to surreftder the ballot papers 
or voting machines and doing of any other act which affected 
the orderly conducting of elections, etc. had been 
enumerated. "They are only explanatory and inclusive but not 
exhaustive. The Parliament used words of width with 
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generality to lug in or encompass diverse acts or 
omissions ; innovated with ingenuity to escape from clutches 
of law^". 
On the facts of the case the Supreme Court held that 
in the instant case the High Court erred in taking the view 
that even though no factual foundation had been laid in the 
election petition, but since there were allegations of 
booth capturing and rigging in various paragraphs of the 
petition it was necessary to summon and examine the 
documents asked for by the respondent. The examinations of 
marked ballot papers and other used ballot papers can in no 
way substantiate the allegations of booth capturing. Neither 
the names of persons nor anyother details were given in the 
election petition. Only bare allegations were made that 
votes of dead persons and those who had left the 
constituency had been cast. "Therefore"/ the Supreme Court 
held, "the High Court grossly erred in permitting the 
summoning of items ... ". Following its earlier decisions 
the Court reiterated that in the election petition, 
proceedings being of quasi - criminal nature the allegations 
must be pleaded clearly and with full particulars especially 
the grounds of corrupt practices cannot be permitted to be 
tried on the basis of deficient pleadings or by filing 
applications for production of record to fish out grounds as 
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material v:hich is not part of the pleadings . In any case 
secrecy of the ballot boxes cannot be tinkered unless an 
iron-cast case is made out in the election petition ". 
The second case is a decision of the 
Punjab and Haryana High Court in S. Baldev Sinqh Mann V 
9 
Gurcharan Sinqh . In the instant case the election 
petitioner had stated in the election petition that he had 
challenged the election of the returned candidate on the 
ground of corrupt practice mentioned in Section 123(8) of 
the Act. The evidence as had been brought on record was to 
the effect that some people had polled votes in place of the 
real electors or some people had forcibly cast their votes. 
The High Court observed that if an elector had cast his vote 
at two polling booths or genuine electors had not polled 
their votes, the offence of corrupt practice of booth 
capturing would not be established. The activities v/hich 
denote 'booth capturing' are not exhaustive."Nevertheless" 
these activities have to be of the kind which are mentionned 
in clauses (a) to (e) under the Explanation to Section 
135-A of the Act ". The Court found that the evidence 
brought on record did not establish any of the activities 
mentioned in clauses (a) to (e) under the Explanation to 
Section 135-A of the Act. 
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In Mukhtiar Singh V Bal Mukand, the allegation of 
booth capturing was made, but the Court found the allegation 
untenable. Petitioner, a defeated candidate, filed the 
present election 'petition for setting aside the election of 
respondent No.l. Allegations of capturing of booth No.73, 
had been made in the petition. It was alleged that 
respondent No.l tried to capture the booth but his attempt 
did not materialise and with the help of his supporters and 
agents indulged in large scale bogus polling in spite of 
the objections, protest raised by the agents of the 
petitioner that the Presiding Officer did not check 
impersonation; that at least 300 bogus votes were cast by 
impersonation but the names and details of these persons had 
not been given in the petition. 
A Single Bench of High Court through Ashok Bhan, J., 
held that he did not find any substance in the allegations 
made that respondent No.l tried to capture booth No. 7 3 in 
which he did not succeed. The learned judge did not find any 
substance in the other allegation that on booth No.73 bogus 
votes were polled by impersonation at the instance of 
respondent No.l or his supporters. PW 1 and PW 9 had not 
stated in their statements that they saw respondent No.l 
present on booth No. 73 on the day of polling. In the 
absence of any such evidence to this effect, it cannot be 
held that there was any attempt to capture booth No.73 or 
5.S0 
that any bogus votes were polled by way of impresonation, 
observed Ashok Bhan, J. 
A perusal of the above decisions shows that in all 
the three cases the plea of booth capturing was not accepted 
for want of proper evidence. The allegation of booth 
capturing, if proved, is a corrupt practice under Section 
100(1) (b) and materially affects the result of the election 
under clause (1) (d) and also is a disqualification. 
Therefore, the allegation must be apecifically pleaded 
giving material particulars. The nature and various acts of 
capturing booths have been enumerated in the Explanation to 
Section 135-A. They are only illustrative but not 
exhaustive. Diverse ways would be innovated to capture 
booths and rigging. Nevertheless these activities have to be 
of the kind which are mentioned in clause (a) to (e) under 
the Explanation to Section 135-A of the Act. 
THE VIOLATION OF THE LAW 
Political violence in India is a recent phenomenon. 
One important factor for this is the politicians' anxiety to 
somehow either stay in power or overthrow the centre of 
power by fair or foul means. This has ultimately led to the 
criminalisation of politics. 
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The selection of candidates has a considerable 
bearing on the quality of future leaders and hence the 
choice of candidates is of vital importance. In the early 
four or five general elections, nobody raised an eyebrow on 
the quality or integrity of candidates chosen by different 
parties. Pandit Nehru while selecting Congress candidates 
always emphasized on persons "who are men and women of 
proved integrity". So was the case with other political 
leaders. But the last three general elections specially the 
10th one has completely changed the outlook of almost all 
top political parties, perhaps believing that "elections are 
the alchemy of politics—they turn base metals into gold". 
In the 10th Lok Sabha elections all the major parties gladly 
distributed tickets to criminals and known patrons of 
criminals. Dacoits, mafia dons and an assorted bunch that 
lives by the gun and the dagger held the sway in a large 
number of constituencies with the blessings of those who 
12 
swear by democracy . Some former bandits like Malkhan 
/-Madho Singh 
Singh,'and Tehsildar Singh, the once dreaded dacoits of the 
Chambal Valley, had been wooed by the Bhartiya Janata Party 
(BJP) to campaign for the party candidates in the Lok Sabha 
elections. Tehsildar Singh was fielded against Maulayam 
Singh Yadav in Jaswant Nagar Assembly constituency of Uttar 
Pradesh. Tehsildar Singh is the sonof late King of dacoits, 
13 Man Singh . Five hundred seventy five dacoits 
campaigned in Jaswant Nagar to wrest support for 
5S2 
Tehsildar Singh. On the otherhand Anna, a former don of the 
Daliganj locality of Lucknow had been rewarded with the 
Lucknow West Assembly seat by Yadav's Samajwadi Janata 
Party. Anna, who has 40 police cases against him, five of 
them relating to murder is the best known of the alleged 
criminals in the fray in U.P. Further, Maulayam Singh Yadav 
made his muscle managers' task easier by issuing 300 gun 
licences to them, while ordering the Etawah district 
14 
magistrate to ban the entry of others with fire-arms . An 
estimated hundred old history-sheeters were reportedly in 
the fray for the 85 Lok Sabha and 425 Assembly seats in 
Uttar Pradesh alone. Thus almost all political parties this 
time politicised criminality by putting them up as their 
candidates. It has thus rightly been said that Indian 
politics is fast becoming the last refuge of criminals. 
Particularly so in much of the Hindi heartland where bullets 
and bombs have come to cast an ominous shadow over the 
ballot box. Money and mere muscle are passe . That the 
Indian democracy itself might be uder siege was alarmed by 
N. Palkiwala : "unless the rapid criminalisation of politics 
is put an end to, there is the very real threat of military 
take over" . Similarly, H.R. Khanna, a former Judge of the 
Supreme Court, lamented; "It is a most disturbing state of 
affairs and we must pause and ponder over the fact as to 
what vi70uld be the fate of our polity if we allow bandits and 
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murderers, mafia-dons and criminal elements to occupy seats 
of political power and what would be its fall out on the 
state of our law and order and the machinery for its 
17 * 
maintenance" 
ELECTION COMMISSION ON BOOTH CAPTORING 
Another menace to which mention may be made is the 
removal of ballot boxes from polling stations at the time of 
1 o 
the poll. Sometimes it is called "booth capturing . This 
menace, it may be pointed out also comes mainly from the 
19 State of Bihar with some stray cases in some other States 
About booth capturing in Bihar it may be pointed out that it 
has been in vogue in Bihar for quite sometime, at least 
20 
since the Second General Elections of 1957 
The Report on the 4th General Elections of 1967 makes 
specific mention of adjournment of poll and re-poll in Bihar 
on account of serious disturbances or apprehended breach of 
peace. In the General Election of 1971, there were eight 
cases of removal of ballot boxes in Bihar by organised gangs 
of goondas and other anti-social element, two cases of 
removal of ballot boxes in J & K and one such case in 
Haryana. In these eleven cases, the ballot boxes were 
snatched away from the polling stations in spite of the best 
arrangemets for safeguarding the ballot boxes and the 
polling stations by posting a number of policemen often 
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armed with fire arms. But in spite of such arrangements, 
ritous mobs armed with deadly weapons like revolvers, 
pipeguns, etc., attacked the polling stations, overwhelmed 
the security forces, threatened the presiding and polling 
officers and forcibly removed the ballot boxes in Bihar, 
Haryana & J & K. A ballot box was removed from a polling 
station in Anantnag parliamentary constituency by a woman 
21 
voter under her burqa 
In all the above cases fresh poll was directed by the 
Election Commission under Section 58 of the Act. In addition 
to these 11 cases, there were 55 more cases in some states, 
thus bringing the total number of cases in which the poll 
had to be adjourned under Section 57 or fresh poll had to be 
directed under Section 58 of the Act, to 66. Of these 66 
cases, the largest number, namely, 52 occured in Bihar, 3 in 
Haryana, 6 in J & K, one in Nagaland, one in Orissa, and 3 
22 in U.P. . Thus it is clear that in the matter of this 
vicious practice of removal of ballot boxes or snatching 
away of bundles of ballot papers and marking them by members 
of unruly and ritous mobs and then dropping them into the 
23 ballot boxes, etc. the State of Bihar comes first 
THE CASE OF BIHAR 
The above mentioned report of the Election 
Commoission has shown that in the matter of all unlawful 
5S5 
electrol practice the State of Bihar comes first. The 
natioal press has also reported that in no other State has 
24 the election process been vitiated so much as in Bihar 
Although repollihg as a result of rigging or violence is not 
a nev; phenomenon in the State, but in the recent past the 
graph has gone up. The number of such booths V7hich stood at 
26 in 1952 rose to 283 in 1989 and over 1,000/- in the 1990 
Assembly polls. As many as 28 constituencies covering 23 
districts witnessed repolling in 1984. The number of such 
constituencies rose to 34 covering 30 districts in the 1989 
25 Lok Sabha poll 
It may be recalled that Doordarshan had telecast a 
film some time back on December 3, 1989 about some 
parliamentary constituencies of Bihar, giving a graphic 
description of booth capturing. What was shov/n was shocking. 
Following is the text of the iterview shown on the T.V. : 
Question : Do people die here at election time ? 
Answer : Yes, in earlier elections also many died. We drive 
away people with bribes, bombs, pistols, then we 
cast their votes. 
An open confession by a group of people in a Bihar village 
engaged in booth capturing brought on the T.V. screen by 
Nalini Singh. When she asks a 'Mukhiya', hov; he would go 
about it, he answers camly: "V?e will give the voters money. 
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If that does not work, we will slap them and chase them 
away. If even that does not work, we will tear up the ballot 
papers. Sawn off guns, bullets, we have everything we need". 
And once a booth is captured, it is very simple to stamp 
ballots in favour of the candidate who has doled out . the 
currency notes. As a regular says, "in an hour, we cast 800 
votes on a booth. Then we move over to the next booth. By 11 
a.m. we are done". 
"What if a voter comes after 11 a.m."? 
"He is told the pollig is over. But they do not come. 
When the earlier lot had been driven away, the rest are 
scared". The officers in the booths come out as a meek lot, 
unable to resist the mercenaries or take the help of 
police". "We know orders to shoot booth capturers are only 
threats. No one will lift a finger", boasts a bearded 
young man. 
The camera zooms in for a close up of a menancing 
middle aged man with a pronounced punch: "It is all worked 
out from the beginning with the polling party. They know in 
advance that at a certain time we will arrive at their 
booths". 
"What if the presiding officer does not cooperate"?, 
asks Nalini. "He will", comes the reply with confidence. 
Then there was an iterview with a Zamindar on a mobike. 
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arrogantly ruling out the participation of farm labour 'and 
womenfolk in voting". "It has been like this for generations 
in our village", he boasts, dismissing with contempt talk 
of "lok tantra".' A terrorised, shrivelled old man echoes the 
general feeling of the poor that they would not dare to go 
near a booth. "Some one else casts my vote", he says. 
In one of the chilling sequences, the camera closes 
ih^on a group of people armed with lathis and other weapons 
descending on a queu of voters. The villagers were not 
identified nor were the candidates named. The objective was 
to "show the trampling of a democratic right". The film no 
doubt exposed candidly the display of mucle power. 
In the just concluded 10th Lok Sabha Elections the 
situation was described thus: "you need a ticket from my 
party. Can you arrange at least 100 rifles and Rs.5 lakhs? 
If yes, you are welcome, otherwise please do not waste my 
27 time" . That was a former Chief Minister of Bihar abruptly 
ending a screening session of a ticket aspirant for the 
10th Lok Sabha Elections. Sounds outlandish all right, but 
this is the done thing in this backward State where muscle 
28 
and money reign supreme, come election time" . In a village 
in Bihar, where an upper—caste combine forcibly,' kept 
Harijans away from the polling booth, the slogan was, 
'Jeetenge to bantenge, harenge to Katenge' (we will share if 
we win, we will massacre if v/e lose) '. 
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Fear of violence this tine v>'as so much forseen that 
various Government employees' organisations urged the Bihar 
Government to exempt their members from poll duties. 
"VJould you, given the chance, agree to supervise the 
polls"? Put this question to any of the employees and a 
sharp and frank "no thank you" came the answer in a pre-poll 
29 
survey . The survey showed that, given the chance not a 
single employee would like to be in the seat supervising the 
polls. P.N. Das, accountant in the office of the Auditors 
General, Bihar, said, "nobody is willing to go for poll duty 
in a happy frame of mind. The elections do not portray the 
will of the people and criminals have taken over the entire 
process. With violence and danger lurking at each corner, 
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who would like to sacrifice his life" . The employees 
frankly admitted that fair polling remains no more than 20 
percent while the rest is bogus voting. The employees' 
organisation in Jamshedpur demanded that the Government 
announce that at least Rs.l lakh would be provided to the 
kin, if any polling officer became a victim of violence 
during the elections. It was pointed out that at least four 
polling officials were shot dead by criminals, two in the 
one station in Jehanabad, during the last (1990). Assembly 
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elections and compensation had not been paid to their kin . 
The Election Commission set up 65,000/- booths in the 
State in 54 constituencies of which 25,000/- were believed 
5S9 
to be sensitive. About three lakh government employees 
functioned as presiding, petrolling and polling officers, an 
equal number of home guards, policemen including 125 
companies of para-military forces were kept on duty in the 
10th Lok Sabha Election. 
The Election Commission in its 5th Report asks : A 
question naturally arises who encourages this sordid 
practice in Bihar ? At the same breath the Commission itself 
answers : 
Those who are conversant with the social, economic 
and political conditions of Bihar, know that 
economically in spite of its vast natural resources, 
Bihar is a backward State; Socially it is perhaps the 
most cast-ridden state in the whole India and this 
bane of excessive casteism vitiates in no mean degree 
the political atmosphere in the State. Politicians 
and their workers and supporters belonging mainly to 
three dominant castes, to v.'hatever party or parties 
they may belong, take a leading part in arranging or 
instigating 'booth capturing' by organised goondas or 
hoodlums in large numbers necessitating the holding 
of repoll under Section 57 and fresh poll under 
32 Section 58 in the concerned polling stations 
N( 5!)n 
The Commission also points out the remady : Unless 
the politicians and political parties not only desist from 
indulging in or encouraging this nasty practice of elections 
but also openly denounce it with united voice in unequivocal 
terms, no arrangement however, efficient it may be, can 
. 33 
eradicate this evil 
NO LONGER BIHAR'S PRESERVE 
A well-known case from Uttar Pradesh is that of H.N. 
Bahuguna who had won the Garhwal Lok Sabha constituency as a 
Congress-I candidate in the 1980 general elections, resigned 
from the party after a tiff with Mrs. Gandhi and contested a 
bye-election on June 14, 1981 in the constituency in order to 
assert his personal influence. The Congress-I was equally 
determined to defeat him. The Chief Election Commissioner 
first postponed counting and then on June 20, ordered repoll 
upholding the objection of Mr.Bahuguna to the deployment of 
policemen fron other States in the constituency without the 
Commissioner's knov.'ledge. This was the first time in an 
Indian eLectioh . that a repoll had been ordered in a entire 
Parliamentary constituency on the ground of the induction 
of outside police forces by a ruling party without the 
concurrence of the Election Commission. The repoll was held 
and Mr. Bahuguna won the election . 
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The 9th Lok Sabha and Assembly elections in sonie 
States have proved that rigging and booth capturing are no 
longer Bihar's exclusive preserve. At that time the shadow 
of the musclemeh could be seen all over the entire country 
from Bihar to Gujrat and West Bengal to Andhra Pradesh. In 
,Gujrat, its Health Minister was stabbed to death; in Uttar 
Pradesh, Sanjay Singh was shot in his abdomen. In Amethi, 
late Prime Minister Rajiv Gadhi's own constituecy the 
Election Commission had to order repoll in as many as 97 
35 polling booths . This was done when President R. 
Venkataraman wrote to the Chief Election Commissioner on 23 
November to take appropriate action on the complaints of 
poll violence and booth capturing. Opposition leaders had 
complained to the President about violence engineered by 
Congress (I) men and booth capturing by policemen in Uttar 
Pradesh. 
The 1989 elections were perhaps the bitterest and the 
bloodiest ever fought in Andhra Pradesh. Twenty six persons 
lost their lives and repolling was ordered in 504 polling 
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stations, a record of sorts in any State . For the first 
time in Andhra Pradesh a Presiding Officer fell a victim to 
the violence. The officer reportedly took action against a 
bogus voter sent by Telugu Desam Workers. The irate partymen 
assaulated the officer who succumed to injuries. When a 
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polling agent objcted to another bocus voter in a nearby 
37 booth, his hand was chopped off 
In Meham (Haryana), the constituency of the then Chief 
Minister Om Prakash Chotala, poll violence took place on a 
large scale. The Election Commission held that there was 
booth capturing and rigging in Meham with the active support 
of the State police. Atal Bihari Vajpayee described the 
Meham incident as blot on Indian democracy. Later a 
Commission of inquiry was constituted to probe poll violence 
leading to many deaths. 
"Resist rigging in elections to the Lok Sabha and the 
Assembly at all costs". This was emphasised by the PCC-I 
president, Mr. S.S. Ray, at the meetings of the PCC-I, the 
Congress-I Legislature Party and the Congress-I Election 
Committee he addressed in Calcutta. 
"We will not allow elections to be reduced to a farce. 
)) 
We will resist it even if we have to land in jails for that, 
38 Mr. Ray said . The Chief Minister of West Bengal Mr.Jyoti 
Basu published the Slist instalement of the serialised 
reminiscences entitled "with the people" in the party's 
Bengali organ, "Ganashakti". The entire piece was devoted to 
a graphic description of the massive "rigging of the March 
1972 elections to the Assembly which saw the Congress seize 
^S3 
power in the State after 1966. " The opening paracrapi. of 
the article says, " Marchil, 1972, was one of the blackest 
days in the history of parliamentary democracy of West 
Bengal and India. An unprecedented example of robbing the 
people of their right to vote was set by the police, 
administration the Congress and the right Communist part 
(meaning the CPI). "Nine of our workers and supporters were 
killed in attacks by Congress goondas on the election day 
... This semi-fascist terror against democracy, against the 
people's minimum rights was masterminded by Mr. S.S. Ray 
CONCLDSION 
This discussion demonstrates that because of the way 
the elections have come to be contested, the law, in its 
present form, has hardly any role to play. Its efficacy will 
largely depend on how deterrent it is made to be, and how 
Indian public opinion views the malady. The opinion of the 
Election Commission is very pertinent here. It has observed: 
Unless public conscience is stirred to its depth 
against these evil practices and the standard of 
public and electoral morality is raised, no police 
arrangement and no legal provisions however adequate 
can root out these practices from out elections. It, 
therefore, lies upon the leaders of all political 
parties and the members of Parliament irrespective of 
their party affiliation to create, a healthy public 
opinion among the masses of the people 
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A survey of press clippins from May - June 1991 
suggests the following solutions for eradication of election 
violence : 
(i) Increase public awareness; 
(ii) Broaden the powers of the Election Commission; 
(iii) Get non-partisan observes from abroad; 
(iv) Beef up the security - cops, BSF and homeguards; 
(v) Vote against violence - an appeal to the electorate; 
(vi) Install a computer programme called Election; 
(vii) Drastic penal actions against offenders; 
(viii) Screening of the biased security. 
The suggestions, however, according to the author 
"in no way show any remarkably vigrous democratic 
imagination". See Ratnak Tripathy, "College of Violence", 
Seminar 39 (September, 1991^, 
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CHAPTER - XVI 
ELECTORAL ADJUDICATION 
INTRODUCTION 
Free and fair elections are the fountain-spring of 
a healthy democratic set up. Hence electoral 
administration must be free from pressure and interference 
of the executive and legislature. The declaration of 
result is sometimes questioned by the defeated candidates 
on one pretext or the other. Generally allegations of 
corrupt practice in elections happen to be afterthoughts 
mischievously conceived after the elections when one finds 
that the results declared are not to one's satisfaction. 
In the course of a judgment justice Krishna Iyer observed: 
The end of the poll process is often the 
beginning of the forensic process at the 
instanceof the defeated candidates with its 
protracted trial and appeals upon appeals, 
thus making election doubly expensive and 
terribly traumatic... 
To ihspife public confidence in the verdict of ballot box, 
the founding fathers of the Indian Constitution provided 
for a fair and speedy adjudication of election petitions. 
Part VI of the R.P. Act, 1951 provides for settlement of 
election disputes. 
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PRESENTATION OF ELECTION PETITIONS 
Section 80 lays dov^ n that no election shall be 
called in question except by an election petition 
presented in accordance with the provisions of this Part. 
This provision has its genesis in the constitution of 
India. Article 329(b) is the provision v;hich runs : No 
election to either House of Parliament or to the House or 
either House of the Legislature of a State shall be called 
in question except by an election petition presented to 
such authority and in such manner as may be provided for 
by or under any law made by the appropriate legislature. 
It should be observed that there is some difference 
between constitutional provisions and the provisions in 
Section 80 of the R.P. Act, 1951. The Constitution 
authorities an appropriate legislature to make any law 
prescribing the authority and the manner for the 
presentation of an election petition. Evidently, 
Parliament has got the right to prescribe the authority 
and the manner for Parliamentary election and a State 
Legislature has got similar powers for elections unto 
2 
itself. This is made especially clear by the provisions 
of Articles 327 and 328 which are as follov.'s : 
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Article 327; Power of Parliament to make provision 
v;ith respect to elections to legislatures; Subject to the 
provisions of this constitution. Parliament may from time 
to time by law make provision vrith respect to all 
matters relating to, or in connection with, elections to 
either House of Parliament or to the House or either 
House of the Legislature of a State including the 
preparation of electoral rolls, the delimitation of 
constituencies and all other matters necessary for 
securing the due constitution of such House or Houses. 
Article 328 : Power of Legislature of a State to 
make provision with respect to election to such 
legislature : Subject to the provisions of this 
Constitution and in so far as provision in that behalf is 
not made by Parliament, the Legislature of a State may 
from time to time by law make provision with respect to 
all matters relating to or in connection v;ith^  the 
elections to the House or either House of Legislature of 
the state including the preparation of electoral rolls 
and all other matters necessary for securing the due 
constitution of such House or Houses. But the powers of 
the State Legislature in this respect are postponed to 
those of the Parliament also by Article 328 ... in so far 
as provision in that behalf is not made by Parliament. As 
Section 80 of the R.P. Act has made a provision which 
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applies to the elections to the State Legislatures also, 
3 
the latter's powers in this respect are not exercisable. 
Pursuant to the provision under Article 329, the 
R.P. Act, 1951, has made provisions relating to election 
petitions. 
HIGH COURT TO TRY ELECTION PETITIONS 
An election may be called in question by 
presenting an election petition to the High Court within 
the local limits of whose jurisdiction the election to 
4 
which the petition relates has been held. An election 
petition calling in question an election may be presented 
5 
by any candidate at such election, or any elector who was 
entitled to vote at such election. The petition must be 
presented within forty —five days from, but not earlier 
than, the date of election of the returned candidate. 
Every election petition shall be accompanied by as many 
copies thereof as there are respondents mentioned in the 
petition and every such copy shall be attested by the 
petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy of 
the petition.^^"^^ 
If the requirements are not followed, it would 
result in the dismissal of the election petition without 
any trial as provided by Section 86. 
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Interpreting Section 81(1) of the Act, it has been 
held by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Ramanlal Premy V 
Shiv Pratap Singh that the presentation of the election 
petition ought to be made by the candidate himself though 
the words "himself" or "personally" have not been 
incorporated in the section. The words "candidate at such 
election" particularises the person; where the petition 
was presented by the candidate's counsel and the candidate 
waited outside or was somewhere away, the presentation of 
the petition could not be construed as having been made in 
his immediate presence. As this was tantamount to 
non-compliance of the provisions in Section 81((1), the 
petition deserved to be dismissed. The Court opined in 
this connection that the provisions of the Civil Procedure 
Code could be invoked only in the absence of procedural 
provisions in the Act or the rules framed under its 
authority. As the manner of presentation of an election 
petition has been provided for in the Act itself its scope 
cannot be extended or enlarged by importing into its 
provisions something from the Civil Procedure Code or from 
the general law. 
5-c In Chandrakant Shukla V Maharaja Martand Singh 
the question of an election petition being barred by 
limitation was discussed. As already noted Section 81(1) 
so; 
of the Act provides that a petition calling in question 
any election may be presented to the High Court within 
forty-five days from the date of election of the returned 
candidate. Section 67-A lays dov/n that the date on v.'hich a 
candidate is declared by the returning officer to be 
elected to a House of Parliament or the Legislature of a 
State shall be the date of election of that candidate. 
In the instant case, the election to the 
parliamentary constituency from Madhya Pradesh was held on 
March 1, 1971. The counting was over on March 10 and the 
same day the election results were announced. The 
respondent was declared elected. The results were 
published in the official gazette on March 15, 1971. The 
election petition was filed on April 29, 1971. Reading 
Section 81(1) and Section 67-A together, it is clear that 
the election petition should have been filed within 
forty-five days from March 10, 1971. 
It was contended that there was sufficient cause 
to condone the delay in filing the petition. The averment 
made by the petition was that the advocate he had 
consulted had advised him that he could file the petition 
within forty-five days from the date of publication of 
the results in the gazette. The advocate was not examined 
as a witness. The High Court therefore had come to the 
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conclusion that the petitioner's story of his consulting 
the advocate was an afterthought and refused to condone 
the delay. Referring to the finding of the High Court that 
there was no sufficient cause for condonation, the Supreme 
Court through Hegde, j., observed : 
This is essentially a finding of fact and 
this Court ordinarily does not interfere 
with the decision of the High Court on 
question of fact. Further, the relief 
asked for is essentially a discretionary 
relief and when a trial court exercises 
its discretion an appellate court is 
reluctant to interfere with that 
discretion unless there are very good 
grounds for doing so. 
The scope of sub-clause (3) of Section 81 has also 
been a subject of judicial scrutiny in a large number of 
cases. One such pronouncement of the apex Court is Satya 
5-e Narain V Dhuna Ram. In the instant case the Punjab and 
Haryana High Court had dismissed Satya Narain's election 
petition on the preliminary ground that the appellant had 
failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of Section 
81(3) of the Act inasmuch as the requisite number of 
spare copies of the petition for the respondents were not 
filled alongv/ith the petition in the High Court. It was 
further held by the High Court that the said defect could 
not be cured subsequently even within the period of 
limitation prescribed for filing the election. The High 
60G 
Court further held that the spare copies vere actually 
filed beyond the period of limitation. 
As the • requisite number of copies v/ere actually 
filed soon after the period of limitation, it was 
contended on behalf of the appellant that there would be 
substantial compliance if the prescribed number of copies 
instead of being enclosed with the petition were filed 
before the petition was laid before the judge for orders 
or even within the time the judge might grant for the 
purpose. 
The Supreme Court (Goswami, j., on behalf of 
himself and Jaganmohan Reddy, j.) opined that the 
Representation of the People Act, being a self-contained 
special law, the court had to seek answers to questions 
raised within the four corners of the Act and the powers 
of the Court were circumscribed by its provisions. An 
election petition could not be equated with a plaint in a 
civil suit. The purpose of enclosing the copies of the 
election petition for all the respondents, the Court 
observed, was to "enable quick despatch of the notice with 
the contents of the allegations for service on the 
respondent or respondents so that there is no delay in the 
trial at this very initial stage when the election 
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petition is presented. If there is any halt or arrest in 
progress of the case, the object of the Act will be 
5-f 
completely frustrated". The Supreme Court, therefore, 
held that the provision relating to the number of copies 
which should accompany the petition was a peremptory 
provision and that total non-compliance with the same 
would entail dismissal of the election petition under 
Section 86 of the Act. The Court also held that in the 
absence of any provision under the Act or the rules made 
thereunder, the High Court Rules could not confer upon the 
Registrar or the Deputy Registrar any power to permit 
correction or removal of defects in an election petition 
presented in the High Court beyond the period of 
limitation provided for under the Act. 
The observation of Dwivedi, j., in the instant 
case who delivered a separate judgment requires serious 
thinking. The learned judge agreed that the requisite 
copies of the election petition were not filed within the 
period of limitation. He was constrained also to agree 
that for this procedural fault the election petition was 
liable to be dismissed in view of the decision of the 
Court in Jaqat Kishore Prasad Narain Singh V Rajindra 
5-a Kumar Poddar. ^ "It makes me sad to read this requiem for 
this election petition", justice Dwivedi felt. In this 
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connection he referred to the opinion of Lord Bucknaster: 
"All rules of courts are nothing but provisions intended 
to secure proper administration of justice. It is 
therefore essential that they should be made to serve and 
be subordinate to that purpose". The opinion of 
Justice Ameer All that "Rules of procedure are not made 
for the purpose of hindering justice", v;as also 
referred to. Justice Dwivedi, hence, commented : "OUr 
decision restores the primacy of procedure over justice. 
It makes Section 86(1) a tyrannical master. The rigidity 
5-i 
of the rule of precedent ties me to its chains". -• He, 
however, added that his only hope was that Parliament 
would make a just choice between the social interest in 
the supply of copies by the election petitioner alongv/ith 
his election petition and the social interest in the 
purity of election by excluding Section 81(3) from the 
5-k purview of Section 86 (1) of the Act. 
It is clear that in construing the provision the 
Court has kept in the forefront the expeditious trial of 
the election dispute for the purity of election. And the 
very object of expeditious trial will be defeated if the 
presentation of the election petition should be treated 
casually permitting all kinds of devices to delay the 
ultimate trial. The purpose of the provision under 
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Section 81(3) i? tc enable quick despatch of the notice 
for service on the respondent or respondents so that there 
is no delay in the trial at this very initial stage when 
the election petition is presented. The legislature shov;s 
no mercy in case there is non-compliance of Section 81(3). 
It has rightly been concluded that "Section 81(3) read 
vith Section 81(1) is draconian in their severity". 
PARTIES TO A PETITION 
A petitioner must join as respondents to his 
petition : 
(a) VJhere the petitioner, in addition to claiming 
declaration that the election of all or any of the 
returned candidates is void, claims a further 
declaration that he himself or any other candidate 
has been duly elected, all the contesting 
candidates other than the petitioner, and v/here no 
further declaration is claimed, the returned 
candidate; and 
(b) any other candidate against whom allegations of any 
corrupt practice are made in the petition. 
The applicability of Section 82(b) was discussed by the 
Supreme Court in Udhar Singh V M.R. Scindia. The Court 
held that Section 82(b) in clear, peremptory terms. 
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obligates an election petitioner tc join as respondent to 
his petition, a candidate against v.'hom allegations of any 
corrupt practice are made in the petition. Disobedience of 
this mandate, in the opinion of the Supreme Court, 
inexorably attracts Section 86 which commands the High 
Court, in equally imperative language, to "dismiss an 
election petition vzhich does not comply with the 
provisions of Section 82". It was further observed that 
the respondent cannot by consent, express or tacit, v/aive 
these provisions or condone a non-compliance with the 
imperative of Section 82(b). "Even inaction, laches or 
delay on the part of the respondent in pointing out the 
lethal defect of non-joinder cannot relieve the Court of 
the statutory obligation cast on it by Section 86. As 
soon as the non-compliance v;ith Section 82(b) comes or is 
brought to the notice of the Court, no matter in what 
manner and at v/hat stage, during the pendency of the 
petition, it is bound to dismiss the petition in unstinted 
obedience to the command of Section 86". 
In the light of the above enunciation, the Court 
observed, the respondent was not precluded from raising 
the objection as to non-joinder, merely because he had 
done so after the close of the petitioner's evidence, and 
not at the earliest opportunity. He could do it by his 
v;ritten statement, he could also follov; some other mode. 
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Referring to Rule 2 & Order 8 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, it was observed that if the plea or ground of 
defence raised issues of fact not arising out of the 
plaint, such plea or ground v;as likely to take the 
plaintiff by surprise and was, therefore, required to be 
pleaded. The Court further observed : 
If the plea or ground of defence raises an 
issue arising out of what is alleged or 
admitted in the plaint, or is otherwise 
apparent from the plaint itself no question 
of prejudice or surprise to the plaintiff 
arises. Nothing in the Rule compels the 
defendant to plead such a ground, nor debars 
him from setting it up at a later stage of 
the case particularly when it does not 
depend on evidence but raises a pure 
question of law turning on a construction of 
the plaint. Thus, a plea of limitation that 
can be substantiated without any evidence 
and is apparent on the face of the plaint 
itself, may be allowed to be taken at any 
6~c 
stage of the suit. 
Sarkaria, j., speaking for the Court on behalf of himself 
and Bhagv/ati, j., also explained the rationale of this 
provisions : 
Behind this provision is a fundamental 
principle of natural justice, viz., that 
nobody should be condemned unheard. A 
charge of corrupt practice against a 
candidate, if established entails serious 
penal consequences. It has the effect of 
debarring him from being a candidate at an 
election for a considerably long 
• J 6-d period. 
612 
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal by upholding the 
judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court on the ground of 
petitioner's failure to implead one of the candidates 
against whom allegations of corrupt practice were made in 
the petition. 
CONTENTS OF PETITION^ 
An election petition : 
(a) shall contain a concise statement of the material 
facts on which the petitioner relies; 
(b) shall set forth full particulars of any corrupt 
practice that the petitioner alleges, including as full a 
statement as possible of the names of the parties alleged 
to have committed such corrupt practice and the date and 
place of the commission of each such practice; and 
(c) shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in 
the manner laid dovm in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 
for the verification of pleadings. 
Where the petitioner alleges any corrupt practice, 
the petition shall also be accompanied by an affidavit in 
the prescribed form in support of the allegation of such 
corrupt practice and the particulars thereof. Any schedule 
or annexture to the petition shall also be signed by the 
petitioner and verified in the same manner as the 
petition. 
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The petitioner shall deposit in the High Court, a 
sum of Rs.2000 as a security for costs of the petition. 
During the course of the trial on an election petition, 
the High Court may, at any time, call upon the petitioner 
to give such further security for costs as it may 
direct. 
Hidayatullah, C.J., laid down in Samant N. 
8—a 
Balakrishna V George Fernandez a few propositions 
relating to the contents of election petitions. According 
to him, Section 83 is mandatory and requires the election 
petition to contain first a concise statement of material 
facts and then requires the fullest possible particulars. 
T^e word 'material' shoves that the facts necessary to 
formulate a complete cause of action must be stated; (II) 
Omission of a single material fact leads to an incomplete 
cause of action and the statement of claim becomes bad; 
(III) the function of particulars is to present as full a 
picture of the cause of action with such further 
information in detail as to make the opposite party 
understand the case he will have to meet; (IV) material 
facts and particulars are distinct matters, material facts 
giving statements of facts, and particulars setting out 
the names of persons v;ith date, time and place; (V) 
material facts will shov; the ground of corrupt practice 
G14 
and the complete cause of action and the particular? v:ill 
give the necessary information to present a full picture 
of the cause of action; (VI) in stating the material facts 
it is not enough merely to quote the v^ ords of the section 
because then the efficacy of the words 'material facts' 
will be lost; (VII) the fact which constitutes the 
corrupt practice must be stated and the fact must be 
correlated to one of the heads of corrupt practice; 
(VIII) an election petition without the material facts 
relating to a corrupt practice is no election petition at 
all; (IX) a petition which merely cites the sections 
cannot be said to disclose a cause of action where the 
allegation is the making of a false statement. That 
statement must appear and the particulars must be full as 
to che person making the statement and the necessary 
information. The entire and complete cause of action must 
be in the petition in the shape of material facts, the 
particulars being the further information to complete the 
. ^ 8-b picture. 
RELIEF THAT MAY BE CLAIMED 
A petitioner may claim a declaration that the 
election of the returned candidate is void and may, in 
addition, claim a further declaration that he himself or 
nay other candidate has been duly elected. 
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GROUNDS FOR DECLARING ELECTION TO BE VOID 
An election petition may be presented on one or 
more of the following grounds: 
(a) That on the date of his election a returned 
candidate was not qualified, or was disqualified to be 
chosen to fill the seat under the Constitution or the law; 
(b) that any corrupt practice has been committed 
by a returned candidate or his election agent or by any 
other person with the consent of a returned candidate or 
his election agent; 
(c) that any nomination has been improperly rejected; 
(d) that the result of the election, in so far as it 
concerns a returned candidate, has been materially 
affected -
(I) by improper acceptance of any nomination, or 
(II) by any corrupt practice committed in the 
interests of the returned candidate by an agent other than 
his election agent, or 
(III) by the improper reception, refusal or 
rejection of any vote or the reception of any vote which 
is void, or 
(IV) by an non-compliance with the provisions of 
the Constitution or of the R.P. Act, 1951, or of any rules 
or orders made under that Act; 
G i r 
If in the opinion of the High Court a returned 
candidate has been guilty by an agent, other than his 
election agent of any corrupt practice, the High Court may 
not decide the election of the returned candidate to be 
void if it is satisfied --
(a) that no such corrupt practice was committed at 
the election by the candidate or his election agent, and 
every such corrupt practice v/as committed contrary to the 
orders, and without the consent, of the candidate or his 
election agent; 
(b) that the candidate and his election agent took 
all reasonable means for preventing the commission of 
corrupt practice at the election; and 
(c) that in all other respects the election v/as 
free from any corrupt practice on the part of the 
candidate or any of his agents. 
GROUNDS FOR WHICH A CANDIDATE OTHER THAN THE RETURNED 
CANDIDATE MAY BE DECLARED TO HAVE BEEN ELECTED"*^ ''^  
If any person v/ho has lodged a petition has, in 
addition to calling in question the election of the 
returned candidate claimed a declaration that he himself 
or any other candidate has been duly elected and the High 
Court is of opinion — 
6]-; 
(a) that in fact the petitioner or such other 
candidate received a majority of the valid votes; or 
(b) that but for the votes obtained by the returned 
candidate by corrupt practices the petitioner or such 
other candidate would have obtained a majority of the 
valid votes, the High Court shall after declaring the 
election of the returned candidate to be void declare the 
petitioner or such other candidate, as the case may be, to 
have been duly elected. 
Thus, if any of the grounds under Section 100 is 
proved, the High Court will declare the election of the 
returned candidate void. If any of the grounds under 
Section 101 is proved, the High Court will after declaring 
the election of the returned candidate void, t-^lso declare 
the petitioner or such other candidate to have been duly 
elected. 
BAR TO INTERFERENCE BY CODRTS 
Article 329 of the Constitution prescribes bar to 
interference by courts in electoral matters. Part (a) of 
the Article lays down that the validity of any lav/ 
relating to the delimitation of costitutecies or the 
allotment of seats to such constituencies shall not be 
1 2 
called in question in any Court. Section 30 of the R.P. 
CIS 
Act, 1950 and Section 170 of the R.F. J^ ct, 1951, also 
debar the jurisdiction of civil court to adjudicate any 
question of a person relating to his registration as an 
elector or the legality of any action taken by the 
Electoral Registration Officer. 
14 Article 329(b) of the Constitution bars judicial 
intervention with the electoral process. The Supreme Court 
in the case of Ponnuswami on the scope of Article 329(b) 
has declared that the courts are barred from dealing with 
any matter that may arise while the elections were in 
progress. The courts would not interfere with the process 
of election, i.e., from the time the notification is 
issued till the election petition is disposed of. Any 
irregularity committed during the course of election could 
be . challenged through an election petition after the 
election was over. The Supreme Court in A.K.M. Hassan 
Uzzaman V Union of India emphasized that no High Court 
in the exercise of its pov^ ?ers under Article 226 should 
pass any order, interim or otherwise, which has the 
tendency or effect of postponing an election which is 
reasonably imminent and in relation to which its v/rit 
jurisdiction is invoked. The more imminent an election, 
the greater ought to be the reluctance of the High Court 
to take any step which will postpone the electoral 
process. 
6in 
A High Court cannot entertain a writ petition on 
behalf of a candidate whose nomination paper has been 
rejected by the'Returning Officer as this is a part of the 
election process and is covered by Article 329(b). The 
proper remedy for him is to file an election petition 
18 
after the completion of the election. But preparation of 
electoral rolls is anterior to, and not a part of, the 
election process, and the same may be challenged through a 
writ petition if provisions of the Constitution or the 
19 
relevant Act, are not complied with. On the other hand, 
once the final electoral rolls are published and elections 
are held on the basis of such electoral rolls, it is not 
open to anyone to challenge the election from any 
constituency or constituencies on the ground that the 
electoral rolls were defective. That is not a ground 
available for challenging an election under Section 100 of 
the R.P. Act, 1951. The finality of the electoral rolls 
cannot be assailed in a proceeding challenging the 
validity of an election held on the basis of such 
20 
electoral rolls. 
TRIAL OF ELECTION PETITIONS 
Chapter III (Sections 86 to 106) lays down the 
procedure for the trial of election petitions by the High 
Courts. Sub-section (1) of Section 86 says that the High 
BLMl 
Court shall dismiss an election petition v/hich does not 
comply v;ith the provisions of Section 81 or Section 82 or 
Section 117. The order of dismissal shall be final as it 
is dismissal under Section 98 after the conclusion of the 
trial. Sub-section (2) provides that the Chief Justice 
shall, as soon as may be after an election petition has 
been presented to the High Court, refer the election 
petition for hearing to the judge whom he has assigned for 
the trial of election petition. Subs-section (3) lays down 
that where more election petitions than one are presented 
to the High Court in respect of the same election, all of 
them shall be referred for trial to the same judge who 
may, in his discretion, try them separately or in one or 
more groups. Sub-section (4) provides for a candidate who 
has not been made a respondent to apply for being joined 
as such. He has to give an application to the High Court 
v/ithin fourteen days from the date of commencement of the 
trial. Explanation to the Sub-section lays down the trial 
of a petition shall be deemed to commence on the date 
fixed for the respondents to appear before the High Court 
and ansv;er the claim made in the petition. Sub-section (5) 
provides for amendment of the election petition by the 
petitioner. This right is available only when charges of 
corrupt practice are there. The High Court will allov; the 
petition to be amended or amplified in such manner as may 
621 
in its opinion be necessary for ensuring a fair and 
effective trial of the petition. Hov/ever, no amendment of 
the petition will be allov/ed v/hich will have the effect of 
introducing particulars of a corrupt practice not 
previously alleged in the petition. For allowing this 
amendment the High Court may subject the petitioner to pay 
costs. 
On the scope of Sub-section (5), the Supreme Court 
in Harish Chandra Bajpai V Triloki Singh has held that 
the Election Tribunal has power to allow an amendment in 
respect of particulars of illegal and corrupt practice, or 
to permit new instances to be included, provided the 
grounds or charges are specifically stated in the 
petition, but its pov/er to permit amendment of a petition 
under Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure 
v;ill not be exercised so as to allow nev; grounds or 
charges to be raised or the character of the petition to 
be so altered as to make it in substance a new petition, 
if a fresh petition on those allegations would on the date 
of the proposed amendment be barred. 
Hidayatullah, C.J., followed the above judgment of 
the Supreme Court in S.N. Balakrishna V George 
0 n —V* 
Fernandez ~ and observed that if the material facts of 
the corrupt practice are stated, more or better 
622 
particulars of the charge may be giveii later, but where 
the material facts themselves are missing it is impossible 
to think that the charge has been made or can be later 
amplified. The power of amendment is given in respect of 
particulars but there is a prohibition against an 
amendment "which will have the effect of introducing 
particulars of a corrupt practice not previously alleged 
U.U. j.-^- II 2 0 - c m the petition . 
The learned Chief Justice further clarified that 
there is, hov/ever, a difference of approach between the 
several corrupt practices: If for example the charge is 
bribery of voters and the particulars give a fev/ 
instances, other instances can be added;- if the charge is 
use of vehicles for free carriage of voters, the 
particulars of the cars employed may be amplified. But if 
the charge is that an agent did something, it cannot be 
amplified by giving particulars of acts on the part of the 
candidate or vice versa. In the scheme of election law 
they are separate corrupt practices which cannot be said 
to grov/ out of the material facts related to another 
person. Publication of false statements by an agent is one 
cause of action, publication of false statements by the 
candidate is quite a different cause of action. Such a 
cause of action must be alleged in the material facts 
623 
before particulars may be given. One cannot unccr the 
cover of particulars of one corrupt practice give 
particulars of a nev; corrupt practice. They constitute 
different causes of action. Since a single corrupt 
practice committed by the candidate, by his election agent 
or by another person with the consent of the candidate or 
his election agent is fatal to the election, the case must 
be specifically pleaded and strictly proved, if it hasnot 
been pleaded as part of the material facts, particulars of 
such corrupt practice cannot be supplied later on. The bar 
of the latter part of the fifth Sub-section to Section 86 
20-d then operates. 
20-e Goka Ramalmqam V Boddu Abraham is an 
interesting case. The question of amending a plea of 
conversion of the answering respondent to one of 
conversion of his parents to Christianity v/as raised 
before the Supreme Court in which the election of the 
respondent who had stood for a Scheduled Caste reserved 
seat was challenged on the ground that he was a convert to 
Christianity. Under the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) 
Order, 1950, it is provided that no person who professes a 
religion different from the Hindu or the Sikh religion 
shall be deemed to be a member of a Scheduled Caste. In 
the trial Court evidence was adduced to prove that the 
respondent was a convert to Christianity. But it appeared 
621 
fror^ . the evidence produced that his parents vjere 
converted to Christianity. If he v^ as born of Christian 
parents he did not need conversion. 
The Supreme Court did not allow the application for 
amendment. Hidayatullah, C.J., v7ho delivered the judgment 
of the Court,observed : 
... because it changes the nature of the case 
requiring fresh evidence to be taken and is 
filed also beyond the period of limitation 
prescribed for filing.-_. election petitions. 
That it does not ch'ance the entire nature of 
the case is obvious, because instead of the 
plea that the answering respondent was 
converted to Christianity, it is now sought 
to be substituted a plea that the parents 
were converted to Christianity. We should 
have understood such an application being 
made in the Court of trial when the Register 
was produced, because that might have been a 
matter not v/ithin the knowledge of the 
election petitioner till the register was 
produced. But after the Register had been 
produced and it lay in the Court for nearly 
an year and had been inspected by the 
answering respondent, it does not lie in his 
mouth to say that he had no notice of the 
^ ^ 20-f 
true facts... 
The learned Chief Justice dismissed the appeal and 
concluded : 
We may say that it is an odd situation, 
because probably a Christian occupies a 
Reserved Seat, but this is the result of the 
vagaries of litigation which has to be 
carried on according to rules. The rules do 
not permit us to give relief where the party 
himself is at fault in making a v;rong plea 
and in not making the right plea in 
20-g time. ^ 
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Sub-section (6) provides that the trial of the 
petition be continued from day to day until its 
conclusion. The trial should not ne discontinued unless 
the High Court finds it necessary, in which situation it 
is required to record its reasons. Sub-sectic3n (7) is a 
direction to the court to try the petition expeditiously 
and make endeavour to finish it v/ithin six months from the 
date on which the election petition is presented. This 
Sub-section embodies the long cherished flesire of 
parliament to provide for an expeditious hearing and 
electioji petitions without undue delay.* So far such 
petitions have taken years for disposal sometimes the 
v7hole period of the life of the House and thus made the 
trial of the petition of no use at all. The elected 
candidate has had a tenure of the entire period available 
under the law before his election could be set aside by 
the tribunal. It is to guard against this that the 
21 
amendment of the Act were made m 1966. 
It has been pointed out that Sub-section (1) and 
(2) of Section 86 discussed ,above present some 
22 difficulty. The learned author points out that at the 
time of the amendment of 1966 they did not receive proper 
attention. Under the old Jaw, election petitions were to 
be made to the Election Commission. The Commission would 
scrutinise the petitions and had the power to dismiss 
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those petitions v;hich did not comply v.'ith provifioi.s of 
Sections 81, or 82 or 117. It is only those petitions 
v;hich were found valid after this preliminary scrutiny 
v;hich could be referred to the tribunal to be appointed 
23 by the Commission. Nov; that the election petition is not 
to be made to the Election Commission at all but to be 
made direct to the High Court there is no possibility of 
a preliminary scrutiny before reference to the election 
court. Before referring them to the Election Judge in the 
High Court this cannot be done by the Registrar, neither 
can the Chief Justice hold this scrutiny before referring 
24 it to the Election Bench. Therefore, retention of 
Sub-sections(1) and (2) in the same order as they were in 
the original enactment causes some misunderstanding. 
Sub-section (2) should have come before Sub-section (1) 
and accordingly they should exchange their numbers. Then 
Sub-section (3) has a right of precedence over Sub-section 
(1). As it provides for the referring of all the petitions 
in connection with a particular election to the same 
judge, it properly comes after sub-section (2). It is only 
when the petitions have been referred to the election 
court that question of scrutiny may come up. So, 
Sub-section (1) should really become Sub-section (3). 
b2; 
PROCEDURE BEFORE THE HIGH COURT 
Every election petition is tried by the High Court 
in accordance with the procedure laid down under the Code 
of Civil Procedure, 1908. However, this is subject to the 
provisions of the Representation of the People Act and the 
Rules made there under. The provisions of the Indian 
Evidence Act, 1872, is subject to the provisions of the 
R.P. Act, 1951. The High Court has been given pov/er to 
refuse to examine any witness or witnesses if it is of the 
opinion that such evidence is not material for the 
decision of the petition or that it has been done on 
frivolous grounds or with a view to delay the 
26 
proceedings. In connection with evidence Section 93 
provides that no document shall be in admissible in 
evidence on the ground that it is not duly stamped or 
registered. And Section 94 provides for maintaining the 
secrecy of voting, i.e., no witness or other person shall 
be required to state for whom he voted at an election. 
Reasonable expenses incurred by a witness may be allowed 
27 by the High Court. A witness shall not be excused from 
answering any question as to any matter relevant to a 
matter in issue in the trial of an election petition upon 
the ground that the answer to such question may criminate 
or may tend to criminate him, or that it may expose or may 
br> 
tend to expose him to any penalty or forfeiture. Ho\"evcr, 
a \,'itness who answers truly all question shall be entitled 
to receive a certificate of indemnity from the High 
Coaurt. Such an answer given by a v;itness shall not, 
except in the case of any criminal proceeding for perjury 
in respect of the evidence, be admissible in either civil 
or criminal proceeding. After a certificate has been 
granted, it may be pleaded by him in any court and shall 
be a full and complete defence to or upon any charge under 
Chapter IX A of the Indian Penal Code or Part VII of the 
R.P. Act (i.e. Corrupt practices and Electoral Offences) 
arising out of the matter to which such certificate 
relates. Hov/ever, it shall not be deemed to relieve him 
from any disqualification in connection with an election 
imposed by the R.P. Act, 1951 or any other law. 
In other words, the indemnity applies to any 
proceeding against the witness for any corrupt or illegal 
practices at or in relation to the election or for any 
illegal payment, employment or hiring so committed, or for 
the partner oif cJrerk of an official, an agent in the 
conduct of or management of the election or for printing, 
publishing, posting or distributing election publications 
v/ithout the printer's and publisher's name and address 
h2i 
thereon or of making or entering into any agreement or 
undertaking for the corrupt withdrav;al of an election 
petition. The trying court may stay the proceedings on 
production of the certificate and pay costs to such 
28 persons. 
RECRIMINATION WHEN SEAT CLAIMED 
The literal meaning of the term 'recrimination' is 
counterattack or mutual accusation. Section 97 of the Act 
provides for recrimination when the election petition not 
only seeks to avoid the election of the returned candidate 
but also to have an unsuccessful candidate returned in his 
place. Section 97 lays down :(1) When in an election 
petition a declaration that any candidate other than the 
returned candidate has been duly elected is claimed, the 
returned candidate or any other party may give evidence to 
prove that the election of such candidate wculd have been 
void if he had been the returned candidate and a petition 
had been presented calling in question his election. The 
proviso to the Section adds that the returned candidate or 
such other party shall not be entitled to give such 
evidence unless he has, within fourteen days from the date 
of commencement of the trial, given notice to the High 
Court of his intention to do so and has also given the 
security and the further security referred to in Section 
K3f) 
117 and 118 respectively. Sub-section (2) of the Section 
mentions that a notice of recrimination shall be 
accompanied by the statement and particulars required by 
Section 83 in the case of election petition which shall be 
signed and verified in like manner. 
An election petitioner may ask for the relief under 
Section 100 that the election of the returned candidate be 
declared void. In addition to this, he may also ask for 
the additional relief under Section 101 that he or any 
other candidate (other than the returned candidate) should 
be declared as duly elected. It is only if such a 
composite claim is made that Section 97 is applied. Under 
Section (1) the returned candidate can, if he so desires, 
recriminate against the person in whose favour a 
declaration is sought under Section 101. 
On the scope of Section 97, the Supreme Court 
(Gajendragadkar, Sarkar, VJanchoo, Das Gupta and 
29 Rajogopala Ayyangarm J J.) in Jabar Singh V Genda Lai 
observed that there are cases in v;hich the election 
petition makes a double claim; it claims that the election 
of a returned candidate is void and also asks for a 
declaration that the petitioner himself or some other 
person has been duly elected. "It is in regard to such a 
composite case that Section 100 as well as Section 100(1) 
Ii31 
would apply, ano it is in respect of the additional claim 
for a declaration that some other candidate has been duly 
elected that Section 97 comes into play. Section 97(1) 
thus allov/s the returned candidate to recriminate and 
raise pleas in support of his case. The result of 
Section 97 (1) therefore is that in dealing with a 
composite election petition the Tribunal enquires into not 
only the case made out by the petitioner, but also the 
counter - claim made by the returned candidate. In this 
connection the returned candidate is required to comply 
v/ith the provisions of Section 97 (1) and Section 97 (2) 
of the Act". On the failure to file a recrimination 
petition, the Court held, "If the returned candidate does 
not recriminate as required by Section 97, then he cannot 
make any attack against the alternative claim made by the 
petitioner. In other words the returned candidate vi^ ill not 
be allov/ed to lead any evidence because he is precluded 
from raising any pleas against the validity of the claim 
31 
of the alternative candidate". 
32 In Anirudh Prasad V Ra^eshwari Saroj Das the 
Supreme Court held that the recriminatory plea is : 
[I]n truth and substance, not so much a plea in 
defence of one's own election, though that be its 
ultimate purpose and effect, as a plea of attack by 
v/hich the successful candidate assumes the role of 
633 
a counter - petitioner and contends that the 
election of the candidate in \;hose favour the 
declaration is claimed would have been void if he 
had been the returned candidate and a petition had 
33 been presented calling his election in question. 
Thus a recriminatory plea is a plea of attack by 
which the successful candidate assumes the role of a 
counter-petitioner. In such an event, the contest in the 
election petition is not only between the petitioner and 
the returned candidate but also between the returned 
candidate and any other party to the petition and the 
candidate who has been sponsored by the petitioner for 
such an election. The underlying idea behind the provision 
is to maintain the purity of election in vfhich the 
constituency as a v;hole is vitally interested. The lav; 
treats this counter claim as a second election petition 
and subjects the counter claimant to payment of security 
and further security under Section 117 and Section 118 
respectively. Since it is a new case, i.e., a nev; election 
petition against a successful candidate all the 
formalities of an election petition have to be complied 
34 
with m filing it. The provisions of Section 97 are 
clearly mandatory and have to be strictly complied 
35 
v;ith. In the instant case the respondent neither gave 
633 
notice within fourteen days from the date fixed for his 
appearance, nor furnished security. It v.'as held that he 
was disentitled to lead evidence in support of his 
recriminatory pleas. 
Though trial of a recrimination petition is to be 
held only after the election of the returned candidate is 
declared void, it cannot be said the recriminating 
petitioner can file details of the grounds on which he 
seeks the election of the unsuccessful candidate (if he 
were to be declared to be elected) to be declared to be 
void only at that time. The grounds have to be mentioned 
in recrimination petition itself. If the grounds are so 
taken then only they have to be tried after the election 
Of: 
of the returned candidate is declared void. 
DECISION OF THE HIGH COURT 
Sections 98 and 99 prescribe the orders which the 
High Court can make at the conclusion of the trial of an 
election petition. Section 98 provides that the High 
Court shall make an order - (a) dismissing the election 
petition^ or (b) declaring the election of all or any of 
the returned candidates to be void; (c) declaring the 
election of all or any of the returned candidates to be 
void and the petitioner or any other candidate to have 
been duly elected. 
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Section 99 deals with (a) naming all persons guilty 
of corrupt practice and the nature of that practice as 
found in the trial, (b) fixing the total amount of costs 
payable and specifying the persons by and to whom costs 
shall be paid. The proviso, however, lays down that a 
person who is not a party to the petition is found guilty 
of a corrupt practice he should be given a notice to 
appear before the court and to show cause why he should 
not be so named. And if he appears, he shall also be given 
an opportunity of cross-examining any witness who had 
already been examined by the High Court and had given 
evidence against him. He may also adduce evidence in his 
defence and be personally heard. It will appear that 
notice to a stranger to the petition can only be given 
after the petition has been heard for sometime and v/hen it 
can be inferred that the person is likely to.be guilty of 
the corrupt practice. No notice can be issued before such 
37 
a point m the trial. It is mandatory for the High Court 
to name such guilty persons. The duty of the court is to 
find out whether any corrupt or illegal practice has or 
has not been proved to have been committed and the nature 
of that corrupt practice. The High Court shall intimate 
the substance of its decision to the Election Commissioner 
and to the Speaker or Chairman of the House of Legislature 
635 
concerned. Thereafter as soon as possible, the Court v;ill 
send to the Coinmission an authenticated copy of the 
39 decision. Section 106 casts upon the Election Commission 
the duty of sending copies of the decisions of the High 
Court to the appropriate authority as also to the Speaker 
or Chairman of the House concerned. The Commission shall 
then cause the order to be published in the gazette. 
EFFECT OF ORDERS OF THE HIGH COURT 
Sub-section (1) of Section 107 lays down that the 
order shall take effect as soon as it is pronounced by the 
High Court, but if the losing side intends to file an 
appeal to the Supreme Court and makes an application for 
stay of operation of the order under Section 116 (B), the 
High Court can grant the application and the stay, as also 
the Supreme Court can grant such stay after the appeal has 
been filed to it. In such a case the order of the High 
Court will not take effect till such stay order is 
vacated. Sub-section (2) of Section 107 makes special 
provision for validating the acts of the elected member 
upto the date v^ hen his election is declared void. Neither 
will the proceedings of the legislature be vitiated 
thereby nor will the member incur any liability or penalty 
because of such participation. This indemnity clause shows 
that no interim injunction will be issued by the High 
83r, 
Court c'rainst an elected candidate prohibitino him fror 
participating in the affairs of the legislature to v.'hich 
he has been elected. 
WITHDRAWAL OF ELECTION PETITIONS 
An election petition once filed cannot be abandoned 
or \7ithdrawn by the petitioner at his sweet V7ill. It may 
be v:ithdravm only by leave of the High Court. After 
receiving an application for leave to v;ithdra\7, the 
Court shall fix a date for hearing thereof and shall give 
notice of the petition to other parties. The notice shall 
41 
also be published in the Official Gazette. If there are 
more than one election petition in the same matter no 
petition can be v/ithdravm without the consent of others. 
No application for withdrawal shall be granted if the High 
Court is of the opinion that the application for 
withdra\;al has been induced by any bargain or 
42 
consideration which ought not to be allowed. If the 
application is granted, then, first, the petitioner shall 
be ordered to pay the respondent's costs upto the time of 
the withdrawal or as the High Court may think fit; 
secondly, it may direct publication of the notice or 
withdrawal in the Official Gazette and in such other 
manner as it may specify. Finally, a provision is made for 
the substitution of the petitioner by another person v;ho 
B37 
might have himself been a petitioner, v/ithin fcur-Leen days 
of such application. The substituted petitioner shall have 
to fulfil the conditions as to security and comply v;ith 
43 
such other terms as the High Court may deem fit. The 
High Court will thereafter report the fact of granting an 
application for withdrav;al to the Election Commission and 
44 the latter shall publish it in the Official Gazette. 
ABATEMENT OF ELECTION PETITIONS 
An election petition shall abate only on the death 
of a sole petitioner or of the survivor of several 
petitioners. V7hen an election petition abates, the High 
Court shall publish this fact as it may deem fit. Any 
person v7ho might himself have been a petitioner desires he 
may be substitued as a petitioner within fourteen days of 
the publication of the notice of abatement. The 
substituted petitioner shall be required to furnish the 
statutory security and comply with the terms and 
. . . 45 
conditions imposed by the High Court. If before the 
conclusion of the trial of an election petition, the sole 
respondent dies or gives notice that he does not intend 
to oppose the petition or any of the respondents dies or 
gives such notice and there is no other respondent who is 
opposing the petition, the High Court shall publish this 
fact in the Official Gazette and thereupon any other 
83S 
elector/petitioner may apply for substitution vithin 
fourteen days of such publication, to oppose the 
petition. He V7ill be entitled to continue the 
proceedings upon such terms as the High Court may think 
fit. Highlighting the said special features of election 
case in matter of withdrawal and abatement the Supreme 
Court observed : 
The election petition does not necessarily 
abate or fail by reason of the death of the 
petitioner or any of the respondents or by 
their ceasing to take any interest in the 
petition, once the petition has been 
referred to the Tribunal. On the other 
hand, any person who could be a petitioner 
can continue the petition inspite of the 
death of either the petitioner or the 
respondents to the petition and on the 
original parties failing to prosecute it. 
These provisions have been made to ensure 
that the election process on which the 
democratic system of Government is based is 
not abused or misused by any candidate and 
that enquiry is not shut out by collusion 
betv;een persons made parties to the 
47 petition or by their deaths. 
APPEALS 
Before the amendment of the R.P. Act, 1951 in 1966, 
election petitions were triable by Election Tribunals set 
up for this purpose. Originally a tribunal consisting of 
three persons had been provided. Later by an amendment 
of the law a single member tribunal v7as provided for and a 
serving District Judge or a retired High Court judge was 
839 
appointed to constitute an election tribunal. After the 
amendment the jurisdictin to try an election has been 
47-a given to the High Court. 
(i) Appeals to Supreme Court 
Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law 
for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the 
Supreme Court on any question (Whether of law or fact) 
from every order made by the High Court under Section 98 
or Section 99. The limitation period fixed is thirty days 
from the date of the order of the High Court, but the 
Supreme Court can extend this time on sufficient cause 
48 being shovm by the appellant. 
(ii) Procedure in Appeal 
Section 116-C lays down the procedure in appeal 
before the Supreme Court. Sub-section (1) provides that 
every appeal shall be heard and determined by the Supreme 
Court as nearly as may be in accordance with the procedure 
applicable to the hearing and determination of an appeal 
from any final order passed by a High Court in the 
exercise of its original civil jurisdiction and of the 
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the 
Rules of the Court (including the provisions as to 
furnishing security and the execution of any order of the 
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Court) shall so far as may be, apply in relation to such 
appeal. Sub-section (2) provides that as soon as an appeal 
is decided, the Supreme Court shall intimate the substance 
of the decision to the Election Commission and the Speaker 
or the Chairman as the case may be, of the House of 
Parliament or of the Legislature concerned. The Supreme 
Court shall also send to the Election Commission an 
authenticated copy of the decision. The Commission will 
then forward copies thereof to the authorities to which 
copies of the High Court order would have been sent under 
Section 106. The order will then be published in the same 
manner as the order of the High Court to be published 
under Section 106. 
TTl LOCUS STANDI FOR APPEAL 
VJho can appeal against order dismissing election 
petition? On this point the Supreme Court in Thammanna V 
49 Veera Reddy observed that before a person is entitled to 
maintain an appeal under Section 116-C, all the 
conditions mentioned below, must be satisfied : 
(1) that the subject-matter of the appeal is a 
conclusive determination by the High Court of the 
rightswith regard to all or any of the matters in 
controversy, between the parties in the election petition; 
641 
(2) that the person seeking to appeal has been a party in 
the election petition; and 
(3) that> he is a "person aggrieved", that is, a 
party who has been adversely affected by the 
determination. 
The facts of the case were that Thammanna, a 
defeated candidate filed an appeal from a dismissed 
election petition in which he had not taken any active 
part, even though he v/as one of the respondents. Veera 
Reddy, the first respondent, raised a preliminary 
objection contending that the appeallant (Thammanna) was 
not competent to maintain the appeal, because he did not 
fulfil the character of a "person aggrieved" by the 
judgment of the High Court. The first respondent sought to 
prove his contention by pointing to the fact that the 
appealant did not participate in the proceedings before 
the High Court and that he did not join issue with the 
first respondent. The Supreme Court sustained the 
objection. The Court held that in the present case, the 
three conditions mentioned above, particularly Nos. (1) 
and (3), had not been complied with. Before the High Court 
the appellant did not, at any stage, join the contest. He 
did not file any written statement or affidavit. He did 
not engage any counsel. He did not cross-examine the 
B4 o 
witness produced by the election petitioner and the 
contesting respondent. He did not address any argument. In 
short, he did .nothing tangible to participate in the 
50 proceedings before the High Court. 
Explaining the expression "person aggrieved", the 
apex court held that the meaning might vary according to 
context of the statute and the facts of the case, 
nevertheless, normally, "a'person aggrieved' must be a man 
v;ho has suffered a -'.legal grievance, a man against whom a 
decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived 
him of something or wrcxigfully refused him something, or vnrongfully affected 
his title to j-, 
/something" "In the face of the stark facts of the case", 
the Court opined, it was not possible to say that the 
appellant was aggrieved or prejudicially affected by the 
decision of the High Court, dismissing the election 
petition. 
It was also argued that in an election petition, 
the petitioner is not the dominus litis, but acts as a 
representative of the whole body of elections in the 
constituency, that is why an election petitioner cannot at 
his sv/eet will abandon the election petition or withdrav^ ? 
from it without complying with the precudure prescribed, 
and if he does so, in view of Sections 109 and 110 of the 
Act, the Court can allow another voter or respondent to 
b43 
continue the petition. The Court shov/ed its inability to 
accept this "v;ide argument" and pointed that it was clear 
from the language, setting and scheme of the provisions in 
Section 109 to 116, that they did not either in terms, or, 
in principle, apply to appeals or the procedure to the 
allowed at the appellate stage before the Supreme Court. 
"The principle that an Election Petition is a 
representative action on behalf of the whole body of 
elections in the constituency, has a very limited 
application to the extent it has been incorporated in 
Section 109 to 116 of the Act, and its application cannot 
52 be extended to appeals under the Act." In the course of 
the judgment it V7as observed : 
If an appellant, who is an aggrieved person 
under Section 116-C of the Act, has got a 
right to withdraw or abandon his appeal 
unconditionally a fortiori, he has every 
right not to file an appeal against the 
dismissal of his Election Petition, much 
less has any other respondent who never 
joined the contest in the Election 
Petition, a right to file an appeal, if 
53 the aggrieved party does not do so. 
The Supreme Court, thus, upheld the preliminary objection 
that the appellant took no interest, whatever, in the 
controversy in the election petition which was confined 
only to the election petitioner and respondent I. The 
appellant could not, by any reckoning be said to be a 
'person aggrieved' by the decision of the High Court, 
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dismissing the election petition. It v,-£s on that ground 
that the appeal was dismissed. 
(iv) Stay of Operation of the Order 
Both the Supreme Court and the High Court enjoy the 
pov;er to issue order for the stay of operation of an 
order. The High Court has been given such power under 
Section 116-B (1) to stay the operation of its order under 
Section 98 or Section 99. The Supreme Court enjoys the 
power under Section 116-B (2) to stay the operation of an 
order of the High Court under Section 98 or Section 99 
where an appeal has been filed from the said order. The 
effect of such stay either case will be that the order 
shall be deemed never to have taken effect.As soon as the 
appeal is admitted, the High Court, or, as the case may 
be, the Supreme Court, shall intimate the fact to the 
Election Commission and the Speaker or the Chairman of the 
Legislature concerned. 
COSTS AND SECURITY FOR COSTS 
(I) Deposit of Security 
At the time of presenting an election petition, the 
petitioner shall have to deposit in the High Court in 
accordance with the rules of the High Court a sum of two 
thousand rupees as security for the costs of the petition. 
During the course of the trial of an election petition, 
B45 
the High Court may, at any time, call upon the petitioner 
to give such further security for costs as it may 
54 direct. Section 118 provides for the deposit of security 
by the respondents as the High Court may direct. Thus 
Sections 117 and 118 provide for deposits of securities 
for costs both by the petitioner and the respondent. This 
provision is intended to produce a salutory effect of 
55 discouraging frivolous petitions. But it is not the 
petitioner alone who can present a frivolous petition, a 
frivolous defence may also be put up by other persons by 
seeking to be joined as- respondents under Section 86(4). 
Candidates or persons who have already been made 
respondent by the petitioner are of course exempted from 
providing any security. The reason is that necessary 
parties must have been joined by the petitioner himself. 
If any other person wants to be joined of his own free 
will chances are that he may in the end be found to be 
unnecessary but as his inclusion will occasion some costs 
it is reasonable that he should be put to some security 
for this. That is why persons applying for being added as 
respondents are also put to such security as the «igh 
Court may decide. 
A question relating to the deposit of security was 
57 
raised in Chanan Lai Sahu V Nanda Kishore Bhatt before 
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the M.P. High Court. The petitioner prayed that the amount 
of security prescribed by Section 117(1) of the R.P. Act, 
1951, be reduced from Rs.2000 to Rs.250 or in the 
alternative he be permitted not to make any deposit 
whatever. The High Court rejected the petitioner's 
application and pointed out that an election petition is 
neither an action at lav/ nor a suit in equity, but a 
purely statutory proceeding unknown to the Common law and 
the Court possessed no common lav/ powers independent of 
the statute. It was observed : 
The right to stand for election and the right 
to move for setting aside the election are 
not common law rights. These rights are 
conferred by statute and strict statutory 
compliance is necessary for enforcing 
58 them. 
The High Court, therefore, held that it was not 
competent to reduce the amount of security deposit or to 
dispense with it. 
Another judicial pronouncement on the point is 
59 Yashwant V Jaisingrao. In this case it was ruled that 
the sum of Rs.2000, the deposit to be made under Section 
117 of the Act, could be made by joint petitioners where 
there were more than one and each petitioner need not 
deposit a sum of Rs.2000. The security should be 
deposited at the time the petition is presented and not 
later. 
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(II) Costs 
Under clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 99 
of the R.P. Act, 1951 the High Court is required, at the 
time of making an order under Section 98, to also make an 
order fixing the total amount of costs payable and 
specifying the persons by and to whom costs should be 
paid. Section 119 provides that costs shall be in the 
discretition of the High Court but that where a petition 
is dismissed under clause (a) of Section 98, the returned 
candidate shall be entitled to the costs incurred by him 
in contesting the petition and accordingly the High Court 
shall make an order for costs in favour of the returned 
candidate. It means that it will not be open to the High 
Court to disallow costs to a successful returned candidate 
on any such ground as production of false evidence by the 
returned candidate and the like, on which ground, 
sometimes, costs are disallowed to a successful 
defendant in a suit. In Ram Phal V Bramha Prakash 
it was observed that the question of awarding costs is, 
generally speaking, a matter left to the discretion of the 
Court and unless such discretion has been exercised 
arbitrarily or contrary to the well recognised principles, 
it is not open to the court of appeal to interfere with 
it. 
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One of the contentions raised before the Supreme 
Court in Lakshminarayan V Returning Officer, was 
concerning the costs awarded by the High Court to the 
second respondent. It was pointed out by the appellant's 
counsel that counsel, who appeared for respondents Nos.2 
and 11, did not file a certificate in the High Court in 
proof of payment of any fees to him. As no other evidence 
was adduced to prove payment of fees and as the 
respondent's counsel did not contradict the statement of 
the appellant's counsel, the court proceeded on the 
assumption that .ithere v/as no evidence on the record to 
shov/ that any fees were paid to counsel for these two 
respondents. Citing Section 119 which states that costs 
shall be in the discretion of the High Court provided that 
where a petition is dismissed under clause (a) of Section 
98, the returned candidate shall be entitled to the costs 
incurred by him in contesting the petition, and 
interpreting the word "incurred" in the section to mean 
"actually spent", the Supreme Court held that as there was 
no proof of any payment of fee to counsel by the returned 
candidate he was not entitled to the amount of Rs.4 00 a 
day, the fee prescribed by the Bombay High Court for 
counsel; he was, however, held entitled to any other costs 
shovm to have been incurred by him. 
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Another case in regard to the question of costs is 
B.B. Karemore V Govind. The first respondent in the 
instant case wap entitled to the costs he had actually 
incurred. But there \ms no proof of payment of any fee to 
counsel by him. Hence it was held that he would not be 
entitled to the amount of Rs.400 a day awarded by the High 
Court, but only to any other costs shown to have been 
incurred by him. The counsel for the first respondent 
submitted that his client should be given an opportunity 
to produce receipts of payment to fees, because at the 
time the case was decided costs were being av/arded as 
prescribed by the rules of the High Court. The Supreme 
Court rejected the prayer. Jaganmohan Reddy, j., who v;rote 
the judgment of the Court observed that "these rules did 
not preclude his client from filing any fee certificate, 
if he had paid any amount and obtained it. We cannot, 
therefore, allow him to do so nov;". 
(Ill) Payment of Costs 
Section 121 provides for payment of costs out of 
security deposits and return of such deposits. Clause I of 
the Section provides that if the costs awarded are not 
paid by the party ordered to pay them, this may be paid 
out of the security deposits on an application made in 
writing in that behalf within a period of one year from 
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the date of such order to the High Court by the person in 
v.'hose favour the costs have been awarded. Clause (2) 
lays down that if there is any balance left after payment 
it will be returned to the said person or his legal 
representative as the case may be. 
Section 122 provides for execution of orders for 
costs. Any order as to costs may be produced by an 
application before the principal civil court of original 
jurisdiction v/ithin whose local limits the judgment debtor 
resides. In presidency townsi the executing court will be 
the court of small causes. No application for execution 
lies within one year of the order. This period is allowed 
for realisation of all the costs from the security 
deposits of the other side. When such realisation has been 
made execution for any balance remaining unpaid can be had 
even within this one year. 
The Act does not make any express provision about 
orders in execution proceedings being appealable or not, 
but the fact that an order of High Court as to costs is to 
be executed in the same manner and by the same procedure 
as if it were a decree for the payment of money made by 
the principal civil court of original jurisdiction or the 
court of small causes v/ithin a presidency town imports 
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that the ordinary incidents of the procedure of that court 
are to attach. The general right of appeal from the 
decisions of the civil court in execution proceedings of 
a money decree would, therefore, apply to orders made by 
that court in the course of execution of an order of the 
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High Court as to costs. 
EXPEDITIOUS DISPOSAL OF PETITIONS 
Sub-section (7) of Section 86 of the R.P. Act, 1951 
provides that every election petition shall be tried as 
expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall, be made to 
conclude the trial within six months from the date on 
v/hich the election petition is presented to the High Court 
for trial. Hov;ever, it has been found that the period .of 
pendency of a large number of election petitions has 
always been much longer than the stipulated period of six 
months. The Election Commission has always been anxious 
that the election petitions are disposed of as 
expeditiously as possible so that an elected 
representative does not remain under cloud for an 
indefinite period and at the same time a person who 
secured his election by corrupt, illegal or irregular 
means does not sit in the august House for long. The 
Commission, therefore, addressed the Registrars of the 
Supreme Court and the concerned High Courts on 20.06.1983 
K 5 3 
requesting them to bring to the notice of the Chief 
Justice the position of the pendency of the election 
petitions for such orders as they might consider necessary 
for the speedy disposal of the pending petitions. Later 
the Commission suggested that ad hoc judges could be 
appointed on the basis of a stipulated norm. Ad hoc 
judges could be used for regular v7ork and some of the 
regular judges could be earmarked for dealing with the 
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election petition. 
Another suggestion is that the number of election 
petitions entrusted to a judge should not be more than 3 
to 5, provided this is possible having regard to the 
number of election petitions to be disposed of and the 
number of judges in the High Court. Election petitions in 
vjhich corrupt practices have been alleged take longer time 
for disposal as compared to others. The other kind of 
election petitions in order of the time usually taken in 
their disposal are those in which general scrutiny and 
recount are claimed. The number of election petitions to 
be entrusted to a judge should therefore be decided after 
considering the nature of the disputes raised in the 
election petitions. For this, of course, no statutory 
provision can be made.The number can be settled with the 
Chief Justices of the High Courts through a letter of 
request from the Home Ministry or the Election Commission 
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or by oral talhs. Preferably and as far as possible 
election petitions may be entrusted to judges who have had 
experience of original work, either in the High Court or 
elsev/here, that is to say, of taking oral evidence for 
decidinc disputes before them, as such experience will be 
conducive to greater control and therefore quicker 
70 progress at the recording of evidence. The entrustment 
of election petitions to judges in the High Court should 
be made as soon as the last date for filing election 
petitions upon a general election has passed and the 
number of election petitions filed and their nature are 
knovm. 
Yet another suggestion is concerning corrupt 
practices. Under the existing electoral law the Commission 
has hardly any power for dealing with cases of corrupt 
practices. They can be challenged only through election 
petitions filed by a contesting candidate or by a voter in 
the constituency. It may be recalled in this connection 
that according to the electoral rules under the Government 
of India Act of 1935, there was a provision which 
authorised an officer empowered by the Governor-General-in 
Council to present an election petition against any returned 
candidate on the ground that the election was not a free 
one because in a number of cases undue influence had been 
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exercised or bribery committed. It may be appropriate, in 
viev\' of the growing number of election petitions on 
corrupt practices, to amend our electoral law vesting a 
similar pov/er in Election Commission to authorise certain 
named officers under the Commission to file election 
petitions. The very existence of such a provision in the 
lav; may serve as a healthy deterrent against a candidate 
being guilty of corrupt practices of indulging in the 
exercise of undue influence lest his election should be 
challenged on a petition by an authorised election 
officer. It may also serve as a check on possible attempt 
by a scrupulous person to get an election petition 
72 
v/ithdrawn through monetary or other inducement. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court having the jurisdiction to try an 
election petition is the High Court. Section 81(1) of the 
Act provides that an election petition calling in question 
any election may be presented on one or more of the 
grounds specified in Sub-section (1) of Section 100 and 
Section 101 to the High Court. The term "election petition" 
used in Section 81(3) is not defined in the Act. However, 
it is well settled that other papers also, in addition to 
the petition, which form integral part of the petition, 
are to be included in the term "election petition". 
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It is apparent from clause (a) and (b) of Section 
83(1) that a election petition shall contain a concise 
statement of the material facts and also set forth full 
particulars of any corrupt practice. These two 
requirements are mandatory in nature. So, whenever there 
is an allegation of corrupt practice, the election 
petition shall contain a concise statement as to the 
material fact on which the petitioner relies and also 
must set forth full particulars of the corrupt practice 
alleged by the petitioner. If the material facts of the 
corrupt practice are stated, more or better particulars of 
the charge may be given later. The pov;er of amendment is 
given in respect of particulars but there is a prohibition 
against an amendment which will have the effect of 
introducing particulars of a corrupt practice not 
previously alleged in the petition. 
An election petition once filed cannot be abandoned 
or withdrawn by the petitioner of his sweet will. It may 
be withdrawn only by leave of the High Court. The 
abatement of election petition shall take place only on 
the death of a sole petitioner or of the survivor of 
several petitioners. Any person who might himself have 
been a petitioner desires he may be substituted as a 
petitioner within fourteen days of the publication of the 
65r, 
notice of abatement by the High Court. The substituted 
petitioner shall comply V7ith terms and conditions imposed 
by the High Court. 
An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court on any 
question (whether of law or fact) from every order made by 
the High Court under Section 98 or 99. Although the 
limitation period fixed is thirty days from the date of 
the order of the High Court, but the Supreme Court can 
extend this time. Before a person is entitled to maintain 
an appeal under Section 116-C, all the three conditions 
must be satisfied, First, that the subject - matter of 
the appeal is a conclusive determination by the High Court 
of the rights with regard to all or any of the matters in 
controversy, between the parties in the election petition^ 
Secondly, that the person seeking to appeal has been a 
party in the election petitionf Thirdly, that he is a 
'person aggrieved', that is, a party who has been 
adversely affected by the determination. 
A perusal of judicial interpretation of Part VI of 
the Act shows that the courts have always kept in mind 
that the right to stand for election and the right to move 
for setting aside the election are not common law rights. 
These rights are conferred by statute and strict statutory 
compliance is necessary for enforcing them. 
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It has been seen that more often than not, appellants 
appear to take up issues v/hich have been settled by 
judicial decisions. Perhaps what induces the litigiant to 
proceed to appeal is the desire to exhaust all possible 
remedies. He may also feel that since two or more heads are 
fairer than one, he may have a better chance at the 
appellate stage. One v/onders v/hether it will not make any 
difference in the attitude of the litigant, and incidently 
some improvement in the administration of justice, if a 
collegiate bench of at least three judges hear and 
adjudicate election disputes at the trial stage. This will 
undoubtedly help towards justice being manifestly seen to 
be done. 
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CHAPTER - XVII 
THE NEED FOR ELECTORAL REFORMS 
INTRODUCTION 
The question of electoral reforms has been engaging 
the attention of political parties. Election Commission and 
leaders of public opinion for many years. 
For the first time, it was in 1969, that the demand 
was made in the Parliament for electoral reforms in 
accordance with the experience about the working of the 
election laws and the suggestions made by the Election 
Commission of India. There was a suggestion in the 
Parliament to create an institutionalised set-up, akin to 
Britain's Speaker's Conference, in order to undertake 
periodic reviews into the working of election laws and to 
1-a 
made recommendations for electoral reforms. The then 
lav; Minister P. Govinda Menon, responded favourably to the 
suggestion. But the Speaker was reluctant to associate 
himself with the exercise. So, though an institutionalised 
arrangement did not emerge, a Joint Parliamentary 
Committee on Amendments to Election Law was set up to 
examine the question of electoral reforms from all 
2 
angles. This Committee, formed in 1970, did not last 
CD4 
long. With the dissolution of the Lok Sabha in December, 
1970, this Committee's life also came to an end. However, 
when in 1971 a new Lok Sabha was constituted in July 1971 
a 21-member Committee headed by Jagannath Rao was formed. 
After one year, this Committee submitted to Parliament a 
report in two volumes, making a number of valuable 
3 
suggestions. One of the important suggestions was : "The 
Committee feels that a process should be initiated, 
whereby the burden of legitimate election expenses at 
present borne by the candidate or the political party 
4 
would be progressively shifted to the State". A Bill 
incorporating some of the recommendations of the Committee 
was introduced in the Lok Sabha in December 1973. The 
Bill, however, could not be passed due to the dissolution 
of the House. 
Another significant development in this direction 
took place in 1974 when Jayaprakash Narayana launched a 
movement which later on came to be known as "A Movement 
for Total Revolution". One of the thrust areas of this 
movement ws electoral reform. On behalf of Citizens for 
Democracy, Jayaprakash Narayan set up the Tarkunde 
Committee for electoral reform which, too, after holding 
discussions with representatives of numerous organisations, 
produced a comprehensive set of recommendations. Apart 
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fror: this, the Election Coriirdssion s well as various 
Committees also have come out with suggestions for 
electoral reforms. 
ELECTORAL REFORMS PROPOSED BY C. RAJAGOPALCHARI 
The important suggestions put forward by the late 
7 
veteran politician are as follows: 
1. The entire election expenditure should be met by 
the Government itself, that is, the elections 
should be nationalised and there should be 'mobile 
booths' along with a system like the census 
operations replacing the present pattern of 
elections. There should be six months' interregnum 
for a party government, and a non-party 
administration should work during the election 
period, under the president and the Governors with 
their respective jurisdictions who should run the 
administration with the assistance of the permanent 
officials. 
2. There should be functional and proportional system. 
An elected Economic Council based on functional 
representation of industry, trade, commerce and 
labour should be substituted in place of the Rajya 
Sabha and the State Legislative Councils. 
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3. Instead of depending on company donations, all the 
political parties should fight the elections on 
their own strength by entirely depending on the 
income from their membership fees. This money for 
the elections can be raised through annual 
membership fee, which shall help in eliminating the 
corrupting influence of tainted-money in elections. 
The dependence on membership fee, for expenditure 
on electioneering would automatically help 
eliminate bogus membership the bane of many 
political parties in the country. This will 
automatically give the way for cleaner intra-party 
democracy. 
4. There must be a fixed limit to the company 
donations to our political parties, and it should 
be approved by the general meeting of the company, 
giving wide publicity to the party or parties to 
which the donations have been made. These donations 
must all go to the parties, and must be duly 
audited. Any breach of the above rule be made a 
penal offence and persons violating this rule must 
be severely dealt with. 
5. The Government should take the task of bringing 
voters to the booths instead of by the political 
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parties and individual candidates. The Government 
should run an official non-party scheme of mobile 
units that should go round in each constituency and 
collect ballot papers at each house as they collect 
census information once in ten years. This should 
be declared a 'national function'. 
6. There should be a ban on the collection of funds by 
the Ministers and their associates in the party for 
political and election expenditure, as the 
Ministers and their minions have a power, authority 
and opportunity to influence the conduct of the 
elections. It is not only funds but power and 
authority which make the elections unfair. 
7. In a poor country like India, it is an unpardonable 
wastage to follow the pattern of western 
electioneering. If to exercise franchise is a 
public duty and democracy is to be based on direct 
universal suffrage in this country, the procedure 
of the ballot-box should be reversed. The 
ballot-box should be taken to the voters at State 
expense instead of asking the voters to go to the 
booths. The procedure of census operations should 
mutatis mutandis be adopted at election. Mobile 
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polling booths, therefore, should serve instead of 
asking the voters to move to the polling stations. 
This reform will keep corruption and group-
intimidation out. 
8. The State through its permanent officials should 
give each voter his voting-card, and not by the 
candidate who is eager to get his vote. It should 
enable him to know his number in the electoral 
rolls so that he may exercise his right without his 
having to be informed and pestered by the 
candidates and other agents. This 'permanent 
official staff should be gradually trained to be 
sticktly non-party in all their administrative acts 
including the election work. Administrative duties 
should be done with strict judicial impartiality. 
This is inevitable to disabuse the prevailing 
notion that their partial loyalty helps the ruling 
party to win the elections. 
9. In order to secure proper votes and reduce 
corruption to the minimum, the distribution of 
identitly-cards ought to be done by officials well 
before the polling week, and all propaganda by the 
candidates or other parties should cease a week or 
so before the polling date. Personal visits by 
\j (.'} 
canvassers should be made illegal during that brief 
period, and the collection of votes in 
polling-booths should be manned by suitable Official 
and staff. 
10. The mobile - booth must be supplemented by a 
neutralisation of the Government or by a neutral 
rule for a certain period before the election, by 
Presidents Rule replacing the party in-power 
during the interregnum for six months. Under the 
law, it must be mde compulsory that during that 
time of the election, all the Ministers who are 
invariably engaged in their party-campaigns, should 
hand over official affirs to the permanent 
officials. Nevertheless, it must be demonstrated to 
the public as well as to the officials that the 
State is essentially neutral, inspite of party-rule 
under the parliamentary system. 
11. Some devices should be evolved so as to keep a 
check on the Prime Minister's power of dissolving 
the House of People because, "the expenses of 
elections placed a powerful instrument in the hands 
of the Prime Minister to keep his or her hold on 
those who sit on the ministerial chairs by a threat 
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of the dissolution of the Lok Sabha, throwing the 
members into the costly mess of fresh elections, if 
they are not obedient and suppress their own 
convictions, however, strong they may be". 
12. All the expenses and trouble involved in collecting 
the votes of the electorate should be borne by the 
Government itself. This would enlarge the scope for 
cittracting 'good and worthy candidates who are not 
in a position to defray the expenses involved in an 
electoral contest'. 
Besides the above mentioned measures suggested by 
Rajaji, M.C. Chagla in his introduction to the said book, 
made tvjo other suggestions. First, a time limit of six 
months should be laid down within which all the pending 
bye-elections must be held, and if the time is to be 
extended by the Election Commission, it should make a 
report giving the reasons and it should be placed before 
the parliament. In other words, the holding of 
bye-elections should not be left entirely to the 
discretion of the Election Commission. Secondly, it is 
entirely wrong that after his retirement, the Election 
Commissioner is appointed by the Government to another 
government office. Hence, his office should be made 
permanent like that of the office of the Auditor-General. 
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It should be provided for in the Constitution that once a 
person is appointed as Election Commissioner, he should be 
debarred from holding any office of profit in the 
Government. 
THE TARKUNDE COMMITTEE ON ELECTORAL REFORMS 
The Committee set up in 1974 by the President of 
the Citizens for Democracy, Mr. Jayaprakash Narayan, 
submitted its report on February 9, 1975. A summary of the 
9 important recommendations is as follows : 
1. The Election Commission should consist of more than 
one person. A Commission consisting of a body of three 
members can arrive at a consensus on major controversial 
problems of organising elections which is decidedly a 
superior method of ensuring impartiality to the individual 
decision of a single Chief Election Commissioner. This 
will be in consonance v;ith Article 324 of the 
constitution. 
The members should be appointed by the President on 
the advice of a Committee consisting of the Prime 
Minister, the leader of Opposition (or a Member of 
Parliament selected by the Opposition) in the Lok Sabha 
and the Chief Justice of India. 
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2. A statutory limit of six month? be imposed beyond 
V7hich a bye-election should not be proposed. 
3. In connection with election expenses the Committee 
made the follov;ing two recommendations: 
(a) All recognised political parties should be 
required by law to keep full and accurate accounts, 
including their sources of income and details of 
expenditure. The accounts should be audited by 
Chartered Accountants nominated by the Election 
Commission and should be open to public inspection on 
moderate charges. Keeping of false accounts should make 
the office bearers of the Party punishable of a 
cognizable offence. 
(b) In every constituency, all the amounts spent for 
the furtherance, directly or indirectly, of the 
prospects of a candidate in an election shall be 
disbursed through his election agent. These should 
include amounts spent by the candidate's political party 
or any organisation or persons supporting him. All 
contracts whereby election expenses are incurred shall, 
in every case, be entered into by the candidate 
himsel for by his election agent, and by nobody else. 
673 
4. Deposits required from candidates should be 
increased from Rs.500/- to Rs.2000/- in the case of 
Parliamentary election, and from Rs.250/- to 1000/- in 
elections to an Assembly or a Council. Propotionate 
increase should be made in the case of Scheduled Caste and 
Scheduled Tribe candidates. 
5. Any donation to a political party or for a 
political purpose upto Rs.lOOO/- per year per assessee 
should be eligible for exemption under the Income Tax Act. 
6. Government should not be allowed to initiate and 
announce new policies, promise or start new projects, 
grant allowances or increase salaries, etc. from the date 
the election has been notified. During the said period, no 
advertisements of Government achievements should be 
published at Government cost and no new roads should be 
exhibited at Government expense for the propaganda of the 
Government or the ruling party. Similarly no police 
officer above the level of head constable should be 
transferred from his post. 
7. In the background of the decision of the Supreme 
Court in Ghasi Ram V Dal Singh, an evil practice should be 
made a corrupt practice. 
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8. Any person who attains the voting age should have 
the right to apply for being registered as a voter as soon 
as the attains that age. This should be in addition to the 
suggestion of the Joint Committee on Amendment to Election 
Lav; that there should be four qualifying dates in relation 
to the preparation or revision of the electoral roll, 
namely, the first days of January, April, July and October. 
ELECTORAL REFORMS AND THE HEGDE GOVERNMENT 
The Hegde Government in Karnataka in 1983 came out 
V7ith suggestions for electoral reforms. Some of the 
suggestions are as followsr^-^ 
1. To fulfil the clear intention of the Founding 
Fathers of the Constitution in regards to Article 324, a 
multiple-member Election Commission of India must be 
provided by an enactment of lav7, providing for the terms 
and conditions of the Chief Election Commissioner and 
other Election Commissioners. 
2. There should be an establishment of an independent 
Election Department and creation of an election fund. To 
assist the Election Commission, some Regional 
Commissioners should be appointed. 
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3. The Flection Coninission should be invested with the 
statutory pov/ers to issue mandatory directions direct to 
all authorities in India-Central, State and local whether 
suo moto or on the complaint of an aggrieved individual or 
on the report of its observers who should, likewise, enjoy 
statutory authority. 
4. By statute, a model Code of Conduct containing 
comprehensive provisions against the abuse of Government 
machinery and official media should be formulated. And by 
a statutory law, all common forms of corrupt practices 
including those which have been pointed out by the C.F.D. 
Report, must be brought or included within the ambit of 
penal offences. 
5. Fixing a maximum time limit of six months within 
v^ hich a bye-election should be held, be provided for in 
the R.P. Act, 1951. 
6. All the political parties recognised by the 
Election Commission, should be required by law to have an 
inner democratic structure based on periodic elections as 
a part of their constitutions. They should be made to 
submit audited accounts regularly and simultaneously 
publish the same, and the State should contribute to 
election expenses. There must be a lav; regulating the 
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prohibition of certain items of expenditure during the 
elections, company donations and other kinds of funds 
given to the parties. 
7. The electronic voting machines should be 
introduced. 
8. The E.G. should establish a cell at the time of 
elections to monitor the official media - All India Radio 
and the Doordarshan. It should be made obligatory on the 
Ministry of Information & Broadcasting to furnish a copy 
of the Master Copy of the news bulletins to the C.E.C. for 
his reference. 
9. The C.E.C. should not be eligible for any further 
appointment. 
10. Immediately after the issuance of notification of 
the elections to the Lok Sabha and to the State Assembly 
the Centre or State Government, as the case may be, should 
resign and function only as a care-taker Government until 
the new Government is formed. 
11. A Committee of the representatives of the national 
parties should be formed without delay to formulate a 
scheme for electoral reforms, embodying the points on 
v;hich a consensus already exists. Also, after framing the 
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scheme, the Committee should consider change in the 
election laws including the introduction of state-funding 
of elections. 
12. By a statutory law, all the political parties 
should be required to get their accounts compulsorily 
audited and get them simultaneously published. 
13. All the amendments made in 1974 and 1975 in the 
R.P. Act, 1951, to nullify the Supreme Court's judgments 
delivered in Kanwarlal Gupta V Amarnath Chawla and the 
judgment of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Mrs. 
Gandhi's Election must be repealed. 
N.T. RAMA RAO'S ACTION - PLAN FOR ELECTORAL REFORM 
The then Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh, N.T. 
Rama Rao, submitted an action ~ plan for a fair and free 
election. The Chief features of this model schemes of 
State Funding of Elections to the Local bodies of Andhra 
12 
Pradesh are as follows: 
1. The State will bear all the poll expenses of the 
candidates set up by the political parties and those 
contesting as independents, and these candidates would 
further be entitled to reimbursement of the prescribed 
ceiling on election expenses provided they secure at least 
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one-rixth of th- tots] valid vote^ ? polled at the election 
in the aggregate for candidates set up by it is a district 
in the last preceding elections to the Assembly or to the 
local bodies as the case may be. 
2. Eligible political parties, however, would be 
entitled to receive 60% of the amount fixed as ceiling for 
election expenses by way of an advance. The remaining 40% 
will be paid after the election, on submission of claims 
by the political parties in the prescribed manner. 
3. VJhere an 'eligible' political party to which an 
advvance has been made,has failed to secure at the 
election the minimum number of votes prescribed, it will 
be required to refund the advance made to it v;ithin the 
prescribed period, failing which the amount due shall be 
recovered from the party in the same manner as an arrear 
of the land revenue. Such defaulting party will also be 
disqualified from receiving any advance reimbursement at 
any future elections to a local body. 
4. Each political party will be required to file 
within the prescribed period a detailed statement of 
accounts showing the amount received for each election 
.source 
from any including the official aid and the manner in 
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v/hich the election expenditure was incurrec by it/its 
candidates. These account books will be duly got audited 
by the State Election Authority through such agency as 
may be prescribed. The Audit Certificate shall be published 
and shall be laid on the Table of the Legislative Assembly 
by the Election Authority, i.e. (Returning Officer). 
5. There will be a ban on the erection of pandals/ 
sheds and other structures, temporary or permanent, in 
public places in connection with the election campaign of 
any candidate. There will be a complete ban on wall-
writings also. These public meetings in connection with 
the elections will be held only at notified places. 
6. Except the Election Authority no candidate or the 
party shall supply or cause to be supplied the Model 
ballot papers and identity slips to any voter, and such 
unauthorised action will be an electoral offence under 
the law. 
7. Any person found impersonating or indulging in 
booth capturing, rigging or any such malpractices will be 
treated as offenders, and v/ill be prosecuted under the 
Election Law. 
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8. All publicity materials including posters, banners, 
boardings, hand-bills, door-slips, buntings, etc. shall be 
approved by the. Election Authority and shall be displayed 
by it at notified places, and the ceiling limit for each 
item of such material shall also be prescribed by this 
authority. 
9. Vote-buying, money-distribution in elections, being 
in a state of drunkenness, while exercising vote, etc. 
will be treated as cognizable Offences. Candidates 
violating the Election law will be prosecuted against and 
disqualified from contesting future election to these 
local bodies. 
ELECTION COMMISSION ON ELECTORAL REFORMS 
Electoral reforms, as envisaged by the Election 
Commission^ have a long and chequered history. Initially, 
the Commission used to make its recommendations for 
amendments to Election Law and procedure and electoral 
reforms through its Reports on General Elections brought 
out after the completion of each General Election. Mostof 
these earlier suggestionsfor reforms mainly related to the 
changes to the electoral procedure found necessary on the 
basis of experience of the relevant General Election. No 
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major or vital changes were proposed to the basic 
13 
provisions of Election Law till 1970. 
For the first time in 1977, a review of all 
recommendations made by the Commission earlier was 
undertaken and consolidated recommendations of the 
Commissions on electoral reforms, including both the 
unimplemented recommendations and fresh recommendations 
were sent to the Government of India on October 22, 1977. 
In 1982, the earlier recommendations were again reviewed 
thoroughly by- the Commission on the basis of new 
developments and challenges thrown up at the General 
Elections held during the period 1980-82. The main 
recommendations which were reiterated with or without 
14 
modifications are : (I) Ban of defection; (II) Fresh 
delimitation of constituencies; (III) Creation of election 
fund; (IV) A new proposal to ensure same privileges and 
safeguards in the matter of Secretarial and staff of the 
Election Commission as are available to other 
Constitutional Bodies like Parliament, Supreme Court, 
Comptroller and Auditor-General of India and UPSC and make 
the expenditure of the Election Commission a charge on the 
Consolidated Fund of India; (V) The powers to be vested in 
the Election Commission to direct the State Governments to 
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file a complaint in respect of any breach of official 
duty, by an officer in connection with the preparation or 
revision of electoral rolls and conduct of elections and 
initiation of criminal action which should be binding on 
the Government; (VI) A lav? should be made (1) to define 
political parties, (2) to empower Election Commission to 
make regulations to deal with the matters like compulsory 
registration of political parties, compulsory maintenance 
of accounts and compulsory audit of accounts by an agency 
to be named by the Commission, submission of the 
periodical report to the Commission; (VII) Donation to the 
political parties to be regulated; (VIII) Security 
depositsshould be doubled; (IX) Commission should be 
empoweredto order fresh poll in case of destruction 
of ballot papers, ballot boxes, prevalence of coercion, 
intimidation and impersonation at the polling stations; 
(X) Law should be amended to empower the Commissionto 
order repoll in the entire constituency or an Assembly 
segment of a Parliamentary constituency; (XI) High Court 
should be empowered to declare an election void if it is 
satisfied that there has been prevalence of bribery, undue 
influence, coercion and intimidation of voters on a large 
scale and Government machinery has been abused or misused 
for the furtherance of the prospects of a candidate; (XII) 
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Restoration of the legal provisions as existed before 1974 
in connection with the incurring of election expenses by 
political parties, etc. for the furtherance of the 
prospects of a candidate. 
Some of the important items which were not pressed 
by the Election Commission in this review were (a) Mixed 
system of election; (b) Lowering of voting age to 18 
years; (c) Entrusting the Commission itself with the 
disposal of election petitions; (d) Direct subsidy to 
candidates; (e) Cash subvention to political parties. 
In September, 1982 the Commission recommended 
holding simultaneous elections to the House of the People 
and the Legislative Assemblies of States, v/ith a viev; to 
saving the colossal avoidable administrative and other 
expenditure incurred on account of holding of separate 
General elections. 
On the basis of the experience gained at the 
General election to the various Legislative Assemblies in 
1982-83, the Commission again proposed certain further 
electoral reforms in September, 1983. Some of the 
important recommendations are: (1) President's rule 
should be imposed in States simultaneously with the 
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announcement of Assembly elections for avoiding the 
alleged misuse of official machinery by the ruling 
parties; (2) The Constitutional provisions contained in 
Article 324(4) should be availed of to appoint Regional 
Commissioners; (3) Observers appointed by the Election 
Commission, be provided with statutory powers as in the 
case of Deputy Election Commissioner and Secretaries to 
the Commission; (4) The Election Commission be empowered 
to sanction penal action against the breach of official 
duty and to entrust the enquiry and prosecution in such 
cases to an independent organisation; (5) The Commission 
should have power to cancel poll in the entire constituency 
in certain contingencies; (6) The service voters should be 
allowed to vote by proxy at the polling station in which 
they have been ordinarily resident/ but for their service; 
{7)Use of electronic voting machines; (8) Amendment to 
certain provisions to J & K law to bring it in line V7ith 
17 that applicable to the rest of the country. That is, the 
Election Commission be empowered to order repoll if it is 
necessitated in specifide polling stations to ensure free 
and fair elections. 
Important Suggestions made in 1985 
On the basis of the experience gained during the 
Lok Sabha elections held in December 1984 followed by the 
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elections to a number of State Assemblies soon thereafter, 
the Commission highlighted two major problems. They 
related to (1)^ booth capturing and (2) the entry of 
frivolous candidates in the electoral fray. With a view to 
checking the menace of booth capturing, the Commission 
made the following recommendations: 
(I) Persons with proven criminal records and shady past 
/-and history sheets, 
and persons whose detention under National Security 
Act, Essential Services Maintenance Act, Conservation 
of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Act and 
FERA, etc., has been approved by the Judicial Advisory 
Boards shousld be disqualified from contesting 
elections. The Commission also recommended that the law 
may be amended so that a person convicted by a Court 
for any offence involving, moral turpitude shall be 
disqualified from the date of such conviction, even if 
he is sentenced for less than two years. 
(II) If it is established that booths have been 
captured even in a few polling stations, the Commission 
should have the power to declare election in the entire 
constituency as void and order fresh poll in the 
entire constituency. 
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(III) CandicEtes found responsible for booth capturing 
should be disqualified from contesting for the next six 
years. The Commission should have power to disqualify 
such persons without reference to any court so that 
expeditious action can be taken and the guilty 
candidates disqualified even before the elections are 
completed. 
(IV) Booth capturing should be made a cognizable offence 
and drastic penalty must be meted out to the candidates 
and their agents who indulge in or abet in the 
commission of offence. 
(V) In case any complaint as regards booth capturing is 
received, such allegationss should be immediately 
enquired into by the Commission through such an agency 
which it considers appropriate and if the complaint is 
found established, the polling in the entire 
constituency should be declared void and fresh poll 
ordered. The candidates and their agents guilty of the 
offence should be punished severely. Pending inquiry, 
the counting and the declaration of the result should be 
withheld. 
(VI) If it is found that the Returning Officer, 
Presiding Officer or such other officers connected with 
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the conduct of poll have abetted the crime, the 
Commission should have powers to initiate prosecution 
against such delinquent officers. 
About measures to check frivolous candidates, the 
Commission suggested the following steps: 
(1) The amount of security deposit under section 34 of 
the R.P. Act should be increased. In case of 
parliamentary constituency, the amount of security 
deposit should be Rs.5000/- and in the case of an 
election from an Assembly of Council constituency, this 
sum should be Rs.2500/-. 
(II) There should be provision for the nomination to be 
subscribed by at least one proposer from each of the 
component assembly constituencies in the case of a 
Parliamentary election subject to a maximum of ten 
proposers. In the case of an Assembly election, the 
nomination should be subscribed by one proposer each 
from different electoral parts, subject to a maximum of 
ten proposers. 
(Ill) It is observed that one reason for the increase of 
the number of non-serious candidates is that they want 
to avail themselves of the facilities given to the 
contesting candidates in the matter of priority 
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allotment of telephone connection. immunity from 
requisitioning of vehicles, subsidised supply of paper 
for printing posters etc. Accordingly, Commission 
suggested for the v/ithdrawal of these concessions in 
respect of independent candidates. 
(IV) The minimum number of votes required for refund 
of security deposit from l/6th to l/4th be increased 
for disqualifying a candidate in the event of his 
failure to secure a prescirbed minimum percentage of 
valid votes. A candidate should secure at least 20% of 
valid votes to escape disqualifications. 
The third new suggestion was to put restriction on 
contesting election from many constituencies. The 
Commission recommended for the amendment of the R.P. Act, 
1951 so that no person can contest an election from more 
than two constituencies. In the case of simultaneous 
elections to Lok Sabha and State Assembly, this limit will 
be enforced not separately but jointly. 
Some more Suggestions 
In its Third Annual Report for the year 1985, the 
Election Commission made some more recommendations which 
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are as follov^ ;s: 
f)Sn 
(T) Punitive measure? to check disturbances at election 
meetings shoulci be taken and persons found guilty should 
be tried summarily and if they are convicted by competent 
Courts, should be disqualified from contesting elections. 
(II) To prevent fraudulent filing of nomination papers, 
the Commission recommended that : (a) in each case of an 
election to a Parliamentary constituency and a State 
Assembly, the nomination paper should be signed by at 
least one proposer from each segment of the constituency, 
but not exceeding 10 in all; (b) it should be obligatory 
on the part of the candidate to furnish his photograph or 
that of his proper in case such proposer is presenting the 
nomination form in the absence of the candidate; (c) the 
photograph furnished \.'ith the nomination paper should be 
duly attested; (d) and the candidate or one of his 
proposers who presented the nomination paper should be 
present at the time of the scrutiny of nomination papers 
and the Returning Officer should satisfy himself about the 
identity of the candidate. 
To give effect to the above recommendation, the 
Commission suggested amendments to Sections 33 and 36 of 
the R.P. Act, 1951 and Forms 2A 2B of the Conduct of 
Election Rules, 1961. 
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(III) The Commission felt that restrictions on the 
political activities of enployees of Public Sector 
Undertakings, statutory Bodies and Corporations like Life 
Insurance Corporation, Nationalised Banks must be imposed 
in the interest of free and fair elections. This 
suggestion was given after the decision of the Allahabad 
High Court in Shyam Lai Sharma V Life Insurance 
20 Corporation of India. The court held that the 
prohibition on Government servants were not applicable to 
the L.I.C. employees as there vi;as no provision in the main 
Act prohibiting its employees from participating in 
politics. The Supreme Court upheld the verdict of the 
Allahabad High Court. 
(IV) A new provision should be enacted regarding taking 
seat in the House by a Member after his election by making 
2 
oath or affirmation under the Constitution. 
(V) The Law Commission in its 42nd Report recommended 
that (a) the punishment under Section 171-H of the IPC for 
illegal payments in connection with an election should be 
made more stringent and that (b) Section 171-1 providing 
for punishment for failure to keep election accounts may 
be modified as the same provisionis contained in Section 
78 of the R.P. Act, 1951. The Commission agreed with Law 
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Commission's recommendation for more deterrent 
punishment under 171. 
(VI) Rule 71 of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 
should be amended by inserting a new clause 4A defining 
"next available preference" as under: 
"(4A) 'Next available preference' means a second or 
sunsequent preference recorded in consecutive 
numerical order for a continuing candidate, the 
preference next in order on the ballot paper for 
any candidate already elected or excluded from the 
poll being ignored, and the expressions 'next 
preference and 'further preference' shall be construed 
22 
accordingly. 
(VII) There should be fresh delimitation of 
Constituencies so as to take care of administrative and 
other changes that have taken placeever since the last 
delimitation. It was also suggested that seats reserved 
for Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes should be rotated. 
In this connection the Commission pressed for appropriate 
amendment to Articles 82 and 170, etc., of the 
Constitution and to revive the Bill which lapsed. 
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(VIII) Assessment of political parties on filing the 
income tax returns including compulsory auditing of their 
accounts should be provided for in the electoral law. 
23 Recent Changes Planned in Poll Law 
The law Ministry is examining an Election 
Commission proposal for restoration of pre - 1975 position 
.regarding automatic disqualification of a person found 
guilty of corrupt practice. The Commission has recommended 
that a person convicted for such an offence should 
automatically incur disqualification for a period of six 
years. 
It has further suggested that conviction for any 
electoral offence should also automatically result in 
disqualification for six years both for voting and 
contesting election to Parliament and State Legislatures-
In its recent proposals to the Government/ the Commission 
has recommended that any prosecution launched in respect 
of any electoral offence under the Indian Penal Code or 
the Representation of People Act 1951, should not be 
allov7ed to be withdrawn/ except with the prior concurrence 
of the Commission. 
The Election Commission also suggested that making 
of any false declaration or statement before the Election 
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Commission, Chief electoral officer, district election 
officer, returning officer or any authority appointed 
under the Representation of the People Act, in connection 
•with any electoral matter, should be made an electoral 
offence punishable with imprisonment up to two years or 
fine or both. 
New electoral offences stipulated in the 
Representation of the People (Amendment) Bill, 1990^ 
pending before Parliament include going armed to or near a 
polling station, non-grant of paid holiday to employees 
on the day of poll and sale of liquor on polling day. The 
Election Commission, while agreeing with these amendments, 
is however of the view that sale of liquor and intoxicants 
should be prohibited not only on the day of poll but also 
(a) on a day prior to and day after the day of poll and 
(b) the day prior to the date of Commencement of counting 
day of counting and a day after. Official sources said the 
Commission has also proposed that writing of slogans or 
pasting of posters on the walls of Government buildings 
and private premises should be made an electoral offence 
punishable with imprisonment upto six months or fine or 
both. 
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The (Amendment) Bill, 1990, proposes to substitute 
the word "threatening" with "coercing or intimidating or 
threatening directly or indirectly". 
Similarly, preventing others from voting amounts to 
booth capturing. The Bill proposes to substitute the words 
"prevent others from voting" with "preventothers from free 
exercise of their right to vote". The Bill also proposes 
to enhance the penalty for offence of booth capturing for 
a Government servant from the existing penalty of not less 
than one year but upto three years and with fine, to not 
less than three years but upto five years. It proposes to 
make booth capturing a cognizable offence. The Commission 
has informed the Government that it was in agreement with 
the proposed changes in respect of booth capturing. 
The Commission has also supported Government's move 
to enhance the penalty for illegal hiring or procuring of 
conveyance at elections (which is a corrupt practice) from 
the existing fine of upto Rs. 1,000 to imprisonment upto 
three months and fine. This offence is also proposed to be 
made cognizable. 
The Commission has however recommendedthat in 
addition to it, there should be a complete ban on plying 
of vehicles, on the day of poll except public transport 
vehicles, vehicles, for maintaining essential supplies and 
• • • ' 
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services and private vehicles authorised bythe Commission. 
It has suggested seizure of the vehicles being 
unauthorisedly used in contravention of the ban. 
The Election Commission has "disqualified" as many 
as 14,900 persons for the purposes of contesting elections 
to the Lok Sabha or a State Assembly because of their 
failure to file in time the return of poll expenses. A 
large number of more than 40,800 cases of default had 
piled up in past, and some of them were as old as of the 
24 1989 Lok Sabha and Assembly electionss. But while doing 
so, the Election Commission in a Press note issued found 
that the "penalty" for failure to file the poll expenses 
with the returning officer was wholly inadequate and the 
existing law on the subject was "totally ineffective". It 
sought that the law should eitherbe suitably amended to 
minimise the role of money power in elections, or should 
be "scrapped". 
The Commission regretted that the Central 
Government had not yet responded to the suggestions made 
by it for electoral reforms exactly one year ago (in 
February 1992).It had suggested that if a candidate failed 
to file the poll expenses — — . « - and it should be a "true 
account"of expenditure incurred —within the prescribed 
69r, 
time lirait, he or she should be liable to a maximum of 12 
months of imprisonment and a fine. The minimum punishment 
25 
would be a six'months jail term. 
Another significant area for electoral reform is 
Former 
the use of religion in politics./Union Human Resource 
Development Minister Arjun Singh advocated changes in the 
electoral lav?s and the Constitution to disable political 
parties pursuing a communal agendafrom entering the 
1-^' 1 26 political arena. 
According to the latest information the Government 
has set in motion its plans to bring forward legislation 
aimed at eliminating the use of religion for electoral 
purposes. The Prime Minister is understood to have taken a 
personal initiative in these moves which are aimed at 
27 
checkmating the B.J. P. by law at the polls. In this 
connection it is proposed to introduce a code of conduct 
for political parties whichwill list dos and don'ts not 
just during-election campaigns, but for all times. The use 
of any kind of religious appeal/ including symbols, names 
of Gods and Goddesses and related slogans will attract 
penal provisionsof the nev/ rules that are currently being 
drafted. 
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CONCLUSION 
Thus the Election Commission of India, various 
other Committees,, and Commissions have been advocating 
electoral reforms and urging upon the Government to bring 
out a comprehensive legislation for a free and fair 
election, while only cosmetic changes have been made in 
the laws, even the pace of implementation has been tardy. 
This has beena major factor in making the electoral 
mandate not truly reflective of the people's will. 
Electoral reforms are necessary, but the Government, 
political parties, candidates and voters have also a 
responsibility to ensure that there is no obstacle in the 
way of the people's will prevailing in the country. 
Without free and fair elections, the Indian democracy will 
have a stunted grov;th. 
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CHAPTER-XVIII 
CONCLUSION 
The study of judicial decisions on corrupt 
practices as enumerated in Section 123 of the 
Representation of the People Act 1951 has led this thesis 
to conclude that the courts seem to have put a narrow 
construction on it. Thus/ in the interpretation of the 
first clause/ the courts have in most of the cases 
rejected a plea based on bribery as a ground of corrupt 
practice, because of lack of positive evidence, insisting 
on the motive behind the alleged act of bribery. 
They have, however, faltered because the determination of 
motive was always a matter of subjective satisfaction. 
This explains why similar situations have been differently 
decided. The law wants a voter to vote without fear either 
of physical injury, social deprivation or divine 
displeasure. It is only the abuse of influence that 
Section 123(2) seeks to prohibit. And yet, judicial 
interpretation has once again been restrictive and has 
called for evidence difficult to obtain. Consequently, the 
cases in which the courts have reversed election results 
are extremely rare. This is probably the reason why 
instances of judicial evaluation of Section 123(2) are 
only few in number. Section 123(3) rules against divisive 
factors in electioneering and prohibits arousing 
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irrational passions. The apex court even laid down three 
principles to judge if the provisions of clause (3) have 
been violatecj/ drawing attention to the heat of a 
campaign, the cold atmosphere of a court, and the ultimate 
effect on the mind of the voter. However, these directives 
in Kultar Singh have only been selectively implemented 
in subsequent decisions which have been rather subjective, keying the 
doors of divisive campaigning open. Creating animosities 
for political gain was also prohibited by adding clause 
(3A) to Section 123. However, judicial interpretation was 
occasionally found lackadaisical in approach. 
Glorification of Sati was added as a corrupt practice in 
1988. This has a limited scope as the practice is 
primarily confined to Rajasthan, and in any case, no 
election has yet been impugned on this account. Clause 
(4) of Section (123) is designed to achieve the dual 
,of 
purpose/protecting the freedom of speech, and, prevention 
of malicious attack on personal character or conduct of 
rivals. A distinction has been made between public 
character or conduct and private character or conduct. If 
a statement affects the man beneath the politician it 
touches private character and if it affects the politician 
only it does not violate Section 123(4). Courts have also 
admitted that there may be instances on the borderline 
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where the false statement may involve both the politician 
and the man beneath the politician, and, it is precisely 
in dealing with these borderline situations that 
difficulties are experienced in determining whether the 
impugned false statement constitutes a corrupt practice 
or not. A review of judicial pronouncements shows that by 
and large courts take a very serious view of Clause(4). 
Consequently they have succeeded not only in protecting a 
candidate at the election from character assassination but 
also in maintaining the purity and fairness of an election 
on this account. In spite of the fact that there is a 
statutory ban on the use of vehicles for carrying voters 
to and from polling stations, hardly any attention is 
given to check this corrupt practice. The fact that very 
few cases have been reported under Section 123(5) makes it 
clear that the practice has somewhat acquired public 
acceptability. The misuse is so enormous that courts too 
have taken a liberal view of this prohibition. The law to 
check excessive electoral expenditure suffers from two 
defects. Firstly, it catches only candidates but absolves 
politicial parties. Secondly, its requirement as to the 
rendering of accounts is somewhat self-defeating. The law 
as it stands now is so weak, that courts are hardly a 
forum for redressal of the consequences which money-power 
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often brings to the individual or a political party. 
Again, a review of the cases disputed on the ground of 
Section 123(7) shows that courts have sought to give a 
narrow construction to the prohibition contained in that 
provision. The courts do not seem to be keen to disturb an 
election result on mere allegations of procurement of 
service of a government servant. The judicial insistence 
is on the fulfilment of two conditions. Firstly, there 
must be clear and cogent evidence to substantiate the 
allegation that assistance from a government servant was 
in fact secured by a candidate. Secondly, it must further 
be proved that the assistance was procured with the object 
of materially affecting the results of an election. The 
latter condition places a heavier burden on the plaintiff 
which it may not always be easy to carry. Booth-capturing 
was included as a corrupt practice in 1989. The law, in 
its present form, has hardly any role to play, in the way 
the elections have come to be contested. Its efficacy will 
largely depend on how deterrent it is made to be, and how 
public opinion views the malady. 
It can thus be seen that courts very reluctantly 
reverse election results. This is basically because of two 
reasons. The first is that an election in India is a very 
costly venture. Secondly, the allegations in petitions are 
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often very frivolous and lack the required standard of 
proof. The degree of proof needed to establish a corrupt 
practice is the same as in a criminal case. Therefore, 
allegations should be sufficiently clear and precise, and 
statutory requirements must be strictly observed. But 
then, the scenario that emerges is not very happy. The 
malpractices which parties and candidates resort to in 
elections are too many and too serious, and not all of 
them can be curbed through laws alone. Pursuit of power 
and easy financial gain make politicians drop all sense of 
scruple, and law is more often than not taken for a ride. 
Public opinion is manipulated, or else rendered 
inoperative. Governments have the interest of the party in 
power to protect, and therefore a poll reform is left a 
dream. Criminalisation of politics has become the order of 
the day. Identifying a few practices as corrupt becomes a 
meaningless exercise, if circumvention is galore, and 
corruption infects the body-politic as a heinous disease. 
Law and its courts are the greater sufferers, because, as 
institutions they are given short shift. The Constitution 
of India has yet to become a way of life, its bulk, and 
lip-service to it, notwithstanding. VJhat has eroded is a 
sense of values. Money is collected from questionable 
sources, and there is lavish spending in election 
7n r 
campaigns. Money and muscle power have no accountability. 
India is as yet a nascent democracy, eyeing the courts, 
the government, the political parties, public opinion and 
the Parliament for survival. Neither by itself can be 
panacea for this young democracy's teething troubles, and 
shift of responsibility from one to the other can be the 
most hurting factor. However, courts indeed have to be 
watchful that the State as well as the law does not 
abdicate its authority, and public opinion is sufficiently 
geared against all kinds of corrupt electoral practices. 
Or else, define as many such practices as the Legislature 
may, the effort will be defeated to the lethal hurt both 
of India's Constitution and its democracy. 
TABLE OF CASES 
1. Abdul Hussain Mir V Shamsul Huda, AIR 1975 SC 1612 
2. A.C. Jose V Sivan Pillai, AIR 1984 SC 921 
3. Akshoya Narayan Praharaj V Maheshwar Bag/ 16 E.L.R. 337 
4. A.K. Nair V The Election Commissioner of India, AIR 
1972 Ker, 5 
5. A.K.M. Hassan-Uzzama V Union of India,(1982)2 SCC 218 
6. Amiad Ali V B.C. Barua, 13 E.L.R. 285 
7. Amjad Ali V Nazmul Hague, 21 E.L.R. 345 
8. Ambika Saran Singh V Mahant Mahadev Nand Giri, 41 
E.L.R. 183: (1969) 3 SCC 492 
9. Amirchand V Surendra Lai Jha, 10 E.L.R. 57 
10. Anirudh Prasad V Rajeshwari Saroj Das, AIR 1976 SC 
2184 
11. Arun Kumar Bose V Mohd. Furkan Ansari, AIR 1983 SC 
1311 
12. Ashfague Ali Khan V Darshan Singh, 20 E.L.R. 136 
13. Azmat Khan V Khillan Singh, AIR 1984 SC 304 
14. Bashir Ahmad Magrey y Ghulam Qadir Mir, AIR 1977 
SC 231 
15. Bar Council of Maharashtra V M.V. Dabholkar, AIR 
1975 SC 2092 
16. Basanagouda V S.B. Amarkhed, (1992) 2 SCC 612 
17. Badri Narain Singh V Kamdeo^Prasad Singh, 21 E.L.R. 64 
18. Balwan Singh V Lakshmi Narain, 22 E.L.R. 273 
19. Babu Rao Patel V Dr. Zakir Husain, AIR 1968 SC 904 
20. Basawraj 'K. Nagur V B.R. Shidlingappa, 12 E.L.R. 168 
21. Bankabehari Das V Chittranjan Nair, AIR 1963 Orissa 83 
22. Balwant Rai Tayal V Bishan Saroop 17 E.L.R. 101 
23. B.B. Karemore V Govind AIR 1974 SC 405 
24. Beliram Bhalaik V J.B. Khachi, AIR 1975 SC 283 
25. Bhimsen V Gopali/ 22 E.L.R. 288 
26. Bhaq Mai V Ch. Prabhu Ram, AIR 1985 SC 150 
27. Bhupendra Narain Mandal V E.K. Narain Lai Das, AIR 
1965 Pat. 332 
28. Bhanwar Lai V Hari Prasad, 25 E.L.R. 265 
29. Bhanu Kumar Shastry V Mohanlal Sukhadia, AIR 1971 SC 2025 
30. Bijoe Emmaneuel V State of Kerala, AIR 1987 SC 748 
31. Bishwanath Rai V Sachhidanand Singh, AIR 1971 SC 1949 
32. Biresh Mishra V Ram Nath Sarma, 17 E.L.R. 243 
33. Borough of Kingston upon Hull. 60 M and H 372 
34. Braj Bhushan V Raja Anand Brahma Shah 22 E.L.R. 225 
35. Brij Sundar Sharma V Election Tribunal, Jaipur, 12 
E.L.R. 216 
36. B.R. Rao V N.G. Ranga, AIR 1971 SC 267 
37. Chandrakant Shukla V Maharaj Martand Singh, AIR 1973 
SC 584 
38. Chandrashekhar Singh V Sarjoo Prasad, 22 E.L.R. 206 
39. Chanda Singh V Shiv Ram Verma, AIR 1975 SC 403 
XXX 
40. Charanl Lai Sahu V Nand Kishor Bhatt, AIR 1974 M.P.40 
41. Ch. Razik Ram V J.S. Chouhan, AIR 1975 SC 667-
42. C.H. Mohd. Koya V T.K.S.M.A. Mutlukoya, 1978 KLT 699: 
(1979) 2 sec 8 
43. Daulat Ram V Maharaja Anand Chand> 6 E.L.R. 87. 
44. Dadasahib Dattatraya Pawar V Pandurag Raoji Jagtap, 
AIR 1978 SC 351. 
45. Desai Basawraj V Darsankop Hasansab/ 4 ELR 380 
46. Deo Kant Braooah V Kusha Ram NaltO/ AIR 1959 Assam 68 
47. Dharmesh Prasad Verma V Faizal Azam^ AIR 1984 SC 1516 
48. Dhartipakar V Rajiv Gandhi, AIR 1987 SC 1577 
49. D.K. Barooah V G.C. Baruah, AIR 1970 SC 1231 
50. D.N. Patil V D.N. Khanvilkar, 25 ELR 143 
51. Domodar Tatyaba V Vamanrao Mahadik, AIR 1991 Bom.373 
52. P.P. Mishra V Kamal Narayan Sharma (1970)2 SCJ 639 
53. Dr. Y.S. Parmar V Hira Singh Pal, 16 ELR 45 
54. Dr. P. Nalla Thampy Terah V Union of India, AIR 1985 
SC 1133 
55. Dr. Wilfred D' Souza V Francis Menino Jesuss Ferrao, 
AIR 1977 SC 286 
56. Dvittatyraya Eknath Lanka V Returning Officer Amravati 
Division Teachers Constituency 1985 Bomb. 
57.D. Venkatramiah V E. Narayan Gowda 20 ELR 101 
58. D. Venkat Reddy V R. Sultan. AIR 1976 SC 1599 
IV 
59. East Nottingham. 60 Mandh 262 
60. Ebrahim Sulaiman Salt V M.C. Mohammad, AIR 1980 SC 354 
61. Election Commission of India V The State of Haryana, 
AIR 1984 SC 1406 
62. Ganqadhar Maithun V Narendra Singh Bhandari, 18 ELR 124 
63. Ghasi Ram V Dal Singh (1968) 3 SCR 102 
64. Ghayur Ali Khan V Keshav Gupta, 16 ELR 154 
65. Goha Ramalingam V Bodhu Abraham (1957) SCR 370 
66. G.S. Baliram Jivatoda V Vithalrao AIR 1970 SC 1841 
67. Gurdev Singh V Baldev Singh, AIR 1979 SC 731 
68. Guru Govinda Basu V Shankari Prasad Ghosal 25 ELR 77 
69. Gurnam Singh V Pratap Singh, 7 ELR 338 
70. G.Y. Kankarrao V Balasaheb Vikhe Patel (1994) I SCC 682 
71. Hari Singh V Popat Lai, AIR 1976 SC 271 
72. Harish Chandra Bajpai V Triloki Singh, 1957 SCR 370 
73. Hafiz Mohd. Ibrahim V Election Tribunal, 13 ELR 262 
74. Haji Abdul Wahid V B.V. Keshar, 21 ELR 409 
75. Hardwari Lai V Kanwal Singh AIR 1972 SC 515 
76. H.C. Mohanty V Surendra Mohanty AIR 1974 SC 47 
77. Heera Singh V Veerka, AIR 1958 Raj. 181 
78. Hukam Singh V Suraj Bhan, AIR 1973 Delhi 234 
78-a H.V. Kamath V C.H. Nitraj Singh, AIR 1970 SC 211 
79. Inderjit Barua V Election Commission of India, AIR SC 27 
80. Inder Lai V Lai Singh, AIR 1962 SC 1156 
81. Iqbal Singh V Gurdas Singh, AIR 1976 SC 27 
82. Janardan Dattuappa Bondeo V Govind Prasad^ AIR 1979 SC 
1617 
83. Jayalakshmi Devamma V Janardhan Reddy, 17 ELR 302 
84. Jagan Prashad Rawat V Krishna Putt Paliwal, 20 ELR 443 
85. Jagdev Singh Sidhanti V Pratap Singh Daulta, AIR 1965 
SC 183 
86. Jashbhai Chunibhai V Anverbeg A. Mirza, AIR 1969 SC 586 
87. Jagat Kishore Prasad Narain Singh V Rajendra Kumar 
Poddar, AIR 1971 SC 342 
88. Jabar Singh V Genda Lai, (1964) 6 SCR 54 
89. Jamuna Prasad Mukherariya V Lachhi Ram, 10 ELR 120 
90. Gagannath V Jaswant Singh, 9 ELR 231 
91. J.M. Desai V Roshan Kumar, AIR 1976 SC 578 
92. Jujhar Singh V Bhairon Lai and others, 7 ELR 457 
93. Jyostna Chandra V Mehrab Ali, 3 ELR 488 
94. Kanti Prasad Jayshankar Yagnik V Purshottam Das 
Ranchodas Patel, AIR 1969 SC 851 
95. Karan Singh V Jamuna Singh, 15 ELR 370 
96. Kataria Takandas Hemraj V Pinto Frederick Michael, 18 
ELR 403 
97. Kalyan Singh V Genda Lai, AIR 1975 SC 1631 
98. Kanwar Lai Gupta V Amar Nath Chawla, AIR 1975 SC 308 
99. Kabul Singh V Kundan Singh, AIR 1970 SC 340 
100. Khader Sherrif V Munnuswami Gounder, 11 ELR 208 
101. Khilumal Topandas V Arjundas Tulsidas, 22 ELR 404 
102. Kishore Chandra Deo Bhanj V Ragunath Misra, 19 ELR 1 
103. K.M. Mani V P.J. Antony, AIR 1979 SC 234 
104. K.P.K-Rao V M. Seshagiri Rao, AIR 1981 SC 658 
105. Kultar Singh V Mukhtiar singh, AIR 1965 SC 141 
106. Kumar Nand V Brij Mohan Lai Sharma, AIR 1967 SC 808 
107. Laxitti Narayan V Returning Officer, AIR 1974 SC 66 
108. Linge Gowda V Shivanan Jappa 6 ELR 288 
109. Mahinder Singh Gill V The Chief Election Commissioner, 
AIR 1978 SC 851. 
110. Ma Shive Mya V Maung Ho Hnaung, AIR 1922 P.C. 249 
111. Manik Rao V Bapu Rao, AIR 1973 Mys. 271 
112. Magraj Patodia V R.K. Birla, AIR 1971 SC 1295 
113. Mangilal V Krishanji Rao Pawar, AIR 1971 SC 1943 
114. Madan Pal V Rajdeo Upadhya, 6 ELR 28 
115. Magan Lai Bagdi V Hari Vishnu Kamath, 15 ELR 205 
116. Mast Ram V Harnam Singh Sethi, 7 ELR 301 
117. Madan Mohan Upadhya V Hari Datt Kandpal, 15 ELR 331 
118. Mast Ram V S. Igbal Singh, 12 ELR 34 
119. Meghraj Kothari V Delimitation Commission, AIR 1962 SC 
694 
120. Mithilesh Kumar Sinha V Returning Officer, (1992) 3 SCJ 
630 
Vll 
121. M. Narayana Rao V Venkat Reddy, AIR 1977 SC 208 
122. M.N. Samarth V Marotrao, (1979) 4 SCC 93 
123. Mohd. Yunus Saleem V Shiv Kumar Shashtri, AIR 1974 SC 
1218 
124. Mohan Rawale V Damodar Tatyaba, (1994) 2 SCC 392 
125. Motilal V Manqla Prasad, 15 ELR 425 
126. Mohan Singh V Bhanwarlal, AIR 1964 SC 1366 
127. Mukhtar Singh V Bal Mukund, AIR 1994 P. & H. 192 
128. Mullapudi V.K. Rao V Vedula Surynarayana, 1993 Supp(3) 
SCC 504 
129. Murlidhar Reddy V Paga Pulla Reddy, AIR 1964 AP 530 
130. Nara Singh Charan Mohanty V Surendre Mohan(1974)2 SCR 39 
131. Nathulal Mantri V Vindrawan Prasad Tiwari, 9 ELR 375 
132. Nani Gopal Swaitii V Abdul Hamid Choudhary, 19 ELR 175 
133. N.L.Verma V Muni Lai, 15 ELR 495 
134. Nongthombam Ibomcha Singh V Leisangthem Chandramani 
Singh, AIR 1977 SC 682 
135. N.P. Ponnuswami V Returning Officer, 1 ELR 133 
136. N. Sankara Reddi V Yashoda Reddy, 13 ELR 34 
137. Om Prabha Jain V Avinash Chandra, AIR 1968 SC 1083 
138. Om Prakash V Lai Chand, AIR 1970 SC 1889 
139. Onkar Singh V Ghasiram Majhi, 39 ELR 477 
140. Penryn, (1869) 10" Mand L.H. 127 
141. Pierce V Delmeter, (1847) 3 AMY 
142. Plymouth (1880) 30 M and N 109 
Vlll 
143. P. Malai Chami V M. Andi Ambalam, AIR 1973 SC 2077 
144. Pratap Singh V Hardwari Lai, AIR 1970 SC 1500 
145. Pritpal Singh V Ranjit Rai, AIR 1984 Delhi 198 
146. Pyari Mohan Das V Durga Shankar Das, 14 ELR 338 
147. Ramanlal Premi V Shiv Pratap Singh, AIR 1978 NOC 1982 MP 
148. Ram Deyal V Brii Rai Singh, AIR 1970 SC 110:(1970) 1 
SCR 530 
149. Ram Phal V Brairtha Prakash, AIR 1962 Punj. 1291 
150. Raja Inderjit Pratap Bahadar Sahai V Amar Singh, AIR 
1923 PC 128 
151. Raj Krushna Bose V Binod Kanungo and others, 9 ELR 294 
152. Rajendra Singh Yadav V Chandra Sen, AIR 1979 SC 882 
153. Raananjaya Singh V Baijnath, 10 ELR 129 
154. Rahim Khan V Khurshid Ahmed, AIR 1975 SC 290 
155. Radha Krishna Shukla V Tara Chand Maheshwar, 12 ELR 378 
156. Radha Kant Mishra V Nityananda Mahapatra, 19 ELR 203 
157. Ram Dial V Sant Lai, 19 ELR 430 
158. Ramanbhai Ashabna Patel V Dabhi Ajit Kumar Fulsunji, 
AIR 1965 SC 669 
159. Raja Vijay Kumar Tripathi V Ramsaran Yadav, 18 ELR 289 
160. Ram Vinod Singh V Sheo Bachan Singh, 22 ELR 53 
161. Ratti Lai V State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 388 
162. Raghunath Misra V Kishore C. Deo Bhanj, 17 ELR 321 
163. R.B. Burendra Narayan Sinha V Amulyadhone Roy, 1940 
Indian Election Cases 188 
IX 
164. Roop Lai V Dhan Singh, AIR 1968 Punj. 1 
165. Rohiteshwar Saikia V Tonu Konwar, AIR 1990 Guhati 41 
166. Rustom Satin V Dr. Sampoornanad, 20 ELR 221 
167. Saw Ganesan V M.A. Muthiah Chettiar, 19 ELR 16 
168. Satya Narain V Dhuja Ram, AIR 1974 SC 1185 
169. Samant N. Balakrishna V George Fernandez, AIR 1969 SC 
1201 
170. Sarla Devi Pathak V Brindra Singh, 20 ELR 275 
171. Savitri Devi V Prabhawati Misra, 15 ELR 358 
172. S. Baldeo Singh V Teja Singh, AIR 1975 SC 693 
173. S. Baldev Singh Mann V Gureharan Singh, AIR 1994 P. & 
H.66 
174. Shiv Kirpal Singh V V.V. Giri, AIR 1970 SC 2097: (1971) 
2 SCR 197. 
175. Shubnath Deogam V Ram Narain Prasad Yadav, 22 ELR 1 
176. Shankara Goada V Veerabhadrappa, AIR 1963 Mys. 81 
177. Shivram Sawant Bhonsle V Pratap Rao Deorao Bhonsle, 
17 ELR 37 
178. Shyma Lai Sharma V Life Insurance Corporation of India, 
ALL LJ 214 
179. Sheopat Singh V Harish Chandra, 16 ELR 435 
180. Shah Jyantilal Ambalal V Kasturilal Nagindas Doshi, 
42 ELR 307 
181. Sheopal Singh V Ram Pratap, AIR 1965 SC 677 
182. Shanti Swaroop V Abdul Rehman, AIR 1965 M.P. 55 
183. Shiv Putt V Bansi Das Dhangar, 9 ELR 324 
184. Shankare Gowda V Mariyappa, 9 ELR 101 
185. Sita Ram Sharma V Narain Singh Swami, AIR 1984 NOC H.P. 
127 
186. S.J.Jhala V Chief Election Officer, AIR 1969 Guj. 292 
187. Sitit. Indira Nehru Gandhi V Raj Narayan, AIR 1975 SC 2299 
188. S. Mehar Singh V Umrao Singh, AIR 1981 Punj. 244 
189. Sohan Singh Jodh Singh Kohli V Chandrakanta Goyal, AIR 
1991 Bom. 343. 
190. Soowalal V P.K. Chaudhary 21 ELR 137 
191. S.S. Dhanoa V Union of India, AIR 1991 SC 1745 
/1994 
192. Subhash Desai V Sharad J. Rao AIR^SC 2277: (1994) Supp. 
2 sec 446 
193. Sultan Salahuddin Owaisi V Mohd. Usman Shaweed, AIR 
1980 SC 1347 
1975 
194. Suresh Prasad Yadav V Jai Prakash Mishra, Aip/sc 376 
195. Sudhir LaXman Hendre V S.A. Dange, 17 ELR 373 
196. S.V. Chettiar V E.V. Ramaswami Naicher (1959) SCR 1211 
197. Swaminatha Merkondar V Ramalingam, 2 ELR 390 
198. Te-jpal Singh V Jagbir Singh, 15 ELR 349 
199. Thammauna V K. Veera Reddy, AIR 1981 SC 116 
200. T.K. Gangi Reddy V M.C. Anjaneya Reddy, 22 ELR 261 
XI 
201. T.K.S.M.A. Muthukoya V C.H. Mohd. Koya, 1978 KLT 38 
202. Triloki Singh V Shivrajawati Nehru (1958) 16 ELR 234 
203. Udhar Singh V M.R. Scindia AIR 1976 SC 744 
204. Umed V Raj Sing, AIR 1975 SC 43 
205. Vatal Nagraj V R. Dayanand Sagar AIR 1975 SC 349 
206. Vidya Sagar Joshi V Surinder Nath AIR 1969 SC 288 
207. V.R. Sree Rama Rao V Telgudesam AIR 1983 AP 96 
208. Wigam case 40' M and H I 
209. Z.B. Bukhari V B.R. Mehra, AIR 1975 SC 1788 
BOOKS 
Xll 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Andre Beteille, 
Anwarul Yaqin, 
B. Shiva Rao, 
Bhawani Shankar 
Chowdhary, 
Chawla, 
C.P. Bhambri, 
Caste, Class and Pov/er, Oxford Univ-
ersity Press, New Delhi, 1969 
Constitutional Protection of Minority 
Educational Institutions in India, 
Deep & Deep, New Delhi, 1986 
The Framing of India's Constitution, 
N.M. Tripathi, Bombay, Vol. 11,1968 
The Law of Elections in the Ind.ian 
Republic, Eastern Law House, Calcutta 
1967 
Elections; Law and Practice, Bahri 
Brothers, New Delhi, 1995 
Election 1991: An Analysis, B.R. 
Publishing, Delhi, 1991 
G. Austin, The Indian Constitution; Cornerstone 
of a Nation, Oxford, 1966 
G.L. Srivastava, 
G.S. Sharma (ed.). 
Law of Indian Elections and Election 
Petitions, Vol. II, Eastern Book Co., 
Delhi 1967 
Secularism; Its Implications for Law 
and Life in India, The Indian Law 
Institute, New Delhi, 1966 
Xlll 
Gaytri Devi, A Princess Remembers, 1982 
Harry M. Jonson, 
Jaqdish Svarup, 
Sociologyt A Systematic Introduction, 
1966 
Constitution of India, Dandewal Pub. 
Allahabad, Vol.2, 1986 
M.HidayatullahCed.) Constitutional Law of India, Vol.11, 
Arnold-Heinemann, New Delhi, 1986 
Mohammad GhousCi 
M.Krishnan Nair# 
Marc Galanter, 
M.N. Srinivas, 
M.P. Jain, 
Secularism, Society and Law in India, 
Vikas, Delhi, 1973 
Election Law, 1981 
Competing Equalities; Law and the 
Backward Classes in India, Oxford 
University Press, Delhi, 1984 
Social Change in Modern India, 1972 
Outlines of Indian Legal History, 
N.M. Tripathi, Bombay, 1990 
Michael H. Lamobos, Sociology; Themes and Perspective, 
1987 
M.M. Dube, 
Myron Weiner, 
Elections; Law and Procedures, Vedpal 
Law House, Indore, 1985 
India at the Polls - The Parliamentary 
Elections of 1977, 1978 
N.G. Nadkarnif Mannual of the Law of Elections in 
British India, 1937 
N.S. Gehlot, 
XXV 
Election and Electoral Administration 
in India/ Deep & Deep, New Delhi/ 
1992 
N.V. Paranjape/ Indian Legal and Constitutional 
History/ Central Law Agency, 
Allahabad, '1992 
Norman D. Palmer, Elections and Political Development, 
Vikas, New Delhi, 1976 
P.N. Krishna Mani, Elections Candidates and Voters/ 
Sterling/ New Delhi/ 1971 
P.C. Banerjee/ 
Paton. 
The Lav? of Elections/ Purna Publishing, 
West Bengal/ 1975 
A Text-book of Jurisprudence/ Oxford 
University Press 
R. Bhos Karan (ed.). Sociology of Politics/ 1967 
R.P. Bhalla, 
Rajni Kothari, 
Rogers/ 
Elections in India, S. Chand, New 
Delhi, 1973 
Politics in India, Orient Longman, 
New Delhi, 
Elections, Vol. 11/ 19th ed. 
Subhash C. Kashyap, The Ten Lok Sabhas/ Shipra/ Delhi, 
1992 
T.B. Botoomore, Sociology, Blackie and Son, 1975 
V.R. Krishna Iyer, A Constitutional Miscellany, Eastern 
Book Company, New Delhi, 1986 
XV 
K.H. Morris-Jones, Parliament in India, 1957 
W.J.M. Mackenzie, Free Election, 1958 
ARTICLES 
A.R. VJig, 
B. Shiva Rao, 
"Poll-eve Promises to Woo Voters", 
The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 
October 22, 1989 
"Election Practices and Machinery; 
Need for Reform", Journal of Consti-
tutional and Parliamentary Studies, 
Vol. IV, No.4, October-December, 1970 
Bashiruddin Ahmad "Caste and Electoral Politics", in R. 
Bhaskaran (ed.). Sociology of 
Politics 
Dev Dutt, 
G.L. Srivastava, 
Ghanshyam Singh, 
H.R. Khanna, 
H.R. Khanna, 
"What Price Election", The Week, 
December, 1989 
"Election Petitions Expediting 
Disposals", Journal of Constitutional 
and Parliamentary Studies, Vol. IV, 
No.4 October-December, 1970 
"Caste, Class and State", Seminar 
March, 1990 
"Politics of Violence", The Hindustan 
Times, New Delhi, June 27, 1991 
"Supreme Court Judgement on Article 
356", AIR 1994 Journal 145 
X V i 
Tameel Farooqui, 
Jagmohan, 
"Caste and Indian Muslims", Journal 
of Objective Studies, July-October, 
1989 
"Election Commission: Appointment of 
Members", The Hindustan Times, New 
Delhi, August 3, 1995 
K. Gopala Krishnan, "The Lucky Constituencies", The.Week, 
Jan 6-12, 1986 
K.M.H. Rayappa, 
K. Ganesan, 
L.K. Advani, 
"Reconversion and its Effect with 
special Reference to Election cases", 
Indian Bar Review, April-June, 1987 
"Crime and Politics", The Hindustan 
Times, New Delhi, August 17, 1995 
"Electoral Reform Imperative and 
urgent", Journal of Constitutional 
and Parliamentary Studies, Vol. XVI, 
1984 
M. Hanguly and 
B. Ganguly 
M.H. Beg, 
M. Katju, 
"The Election Scene 1989", Seminar 
April, 1990 
"Judicial Role and National 
Integration", (1984) 4 SCC(J) 1 
"Law Religion and Politics", AIR 1994 
(Journal) 133 
Meenu Roy, "Chief Election Commissioner's 
Controversial Role in Election-1991", 
Journal of Constitutional and Parlia-
mentary Studies, Jan-Dec, 1991 
XVll 
Murtaza Khan, "Caste, Money and Elections", Indian 
Journal of Politics, Vol.XV, 1981 
N.S. Gehlot, 
P.K. Tripathi, 
"The Appointment of Chief Election 
Commission in India: A Critical 
Study", Journal of Constitutional and 
Parliamentary Studies, Jan-Dec, 1991 
"Secularism: Constitutional 
Provisions and Judicial Review", in 
G.S. Sharma (ed.)/ Secularism: Its 
Implications for Law and Life in 
India, I.L.I. 1966 
R.P. Pathasarathy "What price nodal agency, The 
Hindustan Times, New Delhi, August 
21, 1995 
R.P. Bhalla, 
Ratnak Tripathy, 
S.K. Pande, 
"Elections Commission of India", 
Journal of Constitutional and Parlia-
mentary Studies, Jan-June, 1984 
"College of Violence", Seminar, 
September, 1991 
"Cost of our Democracy", The Hindustan 
Times, New Delhi, Nov. 23, 1989 
S. Sethi "Packaging Politics", Seminar, April, 
1990 
Surendra Ajanta, 
S.S. Dhanoa, 
"Cancer of Casteism in Hindu Epics", 
Women Era, December, 1989 
"Seshan - A Liability", The Hindustan 
Times, New Delhi, August 10, 1995 
T.R. Chellappa, 
XVIXI 
"Cleansing a Commission", The Indian 
Express, New Delhi, September 10, 
1995 
V.M. Tarkunde, "Tarkunde Report on Electoral 
Reform", Journal of Constitutional 
and Parliamentary Studies, Jan-June, 
1984 
V. S. Rekhi, "Religion, Politics and Law in 
Contemporary India: Judicial Doctrine 
in Critical Perspective", 
(Unpublished) 
NEWSPAPERSf REPORTS, etc. 
1. Election Commission's Guide to Parliamentary Elections 
in India (1979-80) 
2. Election Commission Report on the First General 
Elections in India Vol. I (1951-52) 
3. Election Commission Report on the Fifth General 
Elections in India, 1971-72 
4. Election Commission of India, First Annual Report, 
1983 
5. Election Commission of India, 2nd Annual Report, 1984 
6. Election Commission of India, 3rd Annual Report, 1985 
7. Annual Survey of Indian Law, Indian Law Institute, New 
Delhi 
XIX 
8. Constituent Assembly Debates,Vol. 3 
9. Constituents Assembly Debates,Vol.8 
10. Encyclopaedia Britania (Vol.VIII) 
11. Halsburys Law of England, Third Edition,Vol.14 
12. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi 
13. The Statesman, New Delhi 
14. The Times of India, New Delhi 
